6. MORTGAGES.-A MORTGAGEE'S DELAY IN ENFORC-
ING HIS CLAIM OR HIS OMISSION TO PROCEED AGAINST
THE VENDEE OF THE MORTGAGOR, who has assumed the pay.
ment of the debt, cannot prejudice his right to foreclose his mort-
gage and to obtain judgment against the mortgagor for the de-
ficiency. (Hull v. Hayward, 890.)

7. MORTGAGOR'S LIABILITY ON JOINT AND SEVERAL
NOTES.-If cotenants execute notes and a mortgage to secure them,
It may be assumed, in support of the judgment against one of their
number for a deficiency remaining after a foreclosure sale, that
such notes were joint and several, and that he was properly held
liable for such deficiency. (Hull v. Hayward, 890.)

8. AN ASSIGNEE OF A MORTGAGE takes it subject to all
the defenses which were valid between the original parties. This rule
relates only to defenses arising out of the matters inherent in the
contract by which the deed in question is evidenced and existing
before it is signed. New equities arising or defenses accruing
thereafter are not within its application. (Merchants' Bank v.
Weill, 605.)

SUBSE-

9. ASSIGNMENT OF MORTGAGE – DEFENSES
QUENTLY ACCRUING.-If, when an assignment of a mortgage is
made, there is no defense thereto, the subsequent exercise by the
mortgagor of an option conferred by an unrecorded and collateral
agreement to rescind the sale of the property, and then be relieved
of the obligation growing out of it, cannot create a defense in his
favor assertable against the assignee. (Merchants' Bank v. Weill,
605.)

10. JUDGMENT FORECLOSING A MORTGAGE-EFFECT OF
UPON PARTIES HOLDING TITLE UNDER A CONVEYANCE
ANTEDATING THE MORTGAGE.-Titles adverse to that of the
mortgagor, or superior to that covered by the mortgage, are not
proper subjects for determination in a suit for its foreclosure. If
one holding a conveyance of prior date to that of a mortgage is
made a party defendant under a general allegation that he has
some interest in the premises subsequent and subordinate to that
created by the mortgage, and judgment is taken against him by de-
fault or upon an answer denying such averment, and is followed by
a sale thereunder of the premises, the title of such prior grantee is
not affected by such judgment and sale. (Beronio v. Ventura etc.
Co., 118.)

11. MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE OF UNDER A POWER.-
There is no necessity of a mortgagee's making any entry into the
possession of mortgaged premises as a prerequisite for foreclosure.
(Karcher v. Gans, 893.)

12. SHERIFF.-THE OMISSION OF A SHERIFF TO IN-
DORSE THE AMOUNT OF A BID ON A NOTE AND MORT-
GAGE cannot prejudice a purchaser at a foreclosure sale. He has
no control over the sheriff, and if the mortgagor suffers damage, his
remedy is by an action against the sheriff. (Karcher v. Gans, 893.)

13. REDEMPTION AGENT'S AUTHORITY TO EXTEND
TIME FOR.-The authority of an agent to foreclose a mortgage
does not authorize him to extend the period allowed for redemption
from a sale thereunder. (Karcher v. Gans, 893.)

14. MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE - EXTINGUISHMENT OF
DEBT.-While a foreclosure does not extinguish a mortgagor's
equity of redemption until after the expiration of the statutory
period for redemption, yet it does pass a defeasible title which
may become absolute, and the sale to the mortgagee for the full

amount of the mortgage debt operates as an extinguishment thereof. (Reynolds v. London etc. Ins. Co., 17.)

See Chattel Mortgage; Fraudulent Conveyance, 5; Guaranty, 24; Homestead, 4-6; Injunction, 5; Insurance, 1-3; Intervention.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—WANT OF POWER-NOTICE.-A person who deals with a municipal corporation is chargeable with knowledge of its want of power to act in the matter. (Ecroyd v. Coggeshall, 741.)

2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ORDINANCE REGULATING ERECTION OF BILLBOARDS.-A municipal ordinance prohibiting the erection of billboards exceeding six feet in height, within the city limits, except with the permission of the common council, is authorized by a charter conferring power upon the city "to license and regulate billposters, and to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which any license shall be granted." (Rochester v. West, 659.)

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REGULATION OF HEIGHT OF BILLBOARDS.-A statute conferring upon the common council of a city authority to regulate the height of boards erected for the purpose of billposting, so far, at least, as such regulation is necessary to the safety or welfare of the inhabitants of the city, or persons passing along its streets, is valid and constitutional. (Rochester v. West, 659.)

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.- VALIDITY OF STATUTES AND ORDINANCES is not to be determined from their effect in a particular case, but upon their general purpose and their efficiency to effect that end, and when a statute is obviously intended to provide for the safety of the community, and an ordinance passed under it is reasonable and in compliance with its purpose, both the statute and the ordinance are valid and constitutional, and must be sustained. (Rochester v. West, 659.)

5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ORDINANCES LIMITING HEIGHT OF BILLBOARDS.-A city ordinance prohibiting the erection of billboards more than six feet high within the city limits, without the consent of the common council, is not unreasonable, or an undue restraint of a lawful trade or business, nor a restraint upon the lawful and beneficial use of private property. (Rochester v. West, 659.)

6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ORDINANCE REGULATING STREET-CAR TRANSFERS - CONSTITUTIONALITY.—A municipal corporation has power to pass any reasonable regulation affecting street-car lines to remedy an interference with the comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the traveling public. Hence an ordinance making it a misdemeanor for any person except the conductor or agent of the street-car line to give, sell, or issue any transfer check or ticket issued for passage on any streetcar or line, the main purpose of which is to promote the convenience and welfare of the traveling public and not an attempt by penal legislation to enforce a private contract, is legitimate, and does not violate the constitutional guaranties protecting personal liberty or the right of private property. (Ex parte Lorenzen, 47.)

7.

MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE-REGULATING STREET-CAR TRANSFERS-RESTRICTING USE OF PRIVATE PROPERTY.— A municipal ordinance which makes penal the disposal in any manner by a passenger of a street-car transfer check, but which leaves

him all the rights which he enjoyed under his contract, and at most merely makes penal what before was illegal and against good morals, is a legitimate restriction on the use of private property. (Ex parte Lorenzen, 47.)

8. MUNICIPAL ORDINANCE-GENERAL TERMS-REASONABLE CONSTRUCTION-STREET-CAR TRANSFERS.-A municipal ordinance forbidding a passenger from disposing in any manner of a street-car transfer is not unreasonable and oppressive by reason of the generality of its terms, since the letter of a penal statute is not controlling, but will be given a liberal and equitable construction, making it apply according to its spirit to an act in its nature illegal or fraudulent, and no lawful or innocent use of the transfer will subject a passenger to the penalties of the ordinance. (Ex parte Lorenzen, 47.)

9. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-EXPENSES OF OFFICER -LIABILITY FOR.-Expenses incurred by a member of a city council under authority of such council in visiting other cities, for the purpose of informing himself upon subjects connected with inunicipal matters, are not necessary expenses incurred in the performance of official duties, and the city is not liable therefor, although the claim has been audited and ordered paid by the city council. (James v. Seattle, 957.)

10.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-RIGHT TO REFUSE TO PAY CLAIM.-If a city council is without power to authorize the payment of a claim against the city, the comptroller thereof may properly refuse to countersign the warrant directing its payment. (James v. Seattle, 957.)

11. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POLICE OFFICERS-UNLAWFUL DISCHARGE OF-RIGHT TO COMPENSATION.—If an appointive municipal officer, such as a policeman, is unlawfully dismissed and prevented from rendering any service, but makes no complaint to the mayor or to the city council, and no attempt to secure a reinstatement, but apparently acquiesces in the dismissal, he thereby abandons and relinquishes his office, or "resigns by implication," and cannot, therefore, recover of the municipality the compensation incident to the office during the period in which he performs no service. (Byrnes v. St. Paul, 384.)

12. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-INJURY FROM OVERTAXED SEWERS-LIABILITY.—If a city turns into a sewer a much larger amount of surface water and sewage than was contemplated at the time of its construction, it is answerable in damages to an abutter who is injured thereby. Hence, it is liable if, after a sewer is constructed and an abutter has rightfully connected his premises therewith, it changes the grade of streets and turns into the sewer a large amount of surface water and sewage, formerly flowing in another direction, thereby overtaxing the sewer and causing a retroflux of sewage through such connection and upon the premises of such owner to the latter's injury. (King v. Granger, 779.)

13. RELEASE-INJURY FROM CONNECTION WITH SEWERS-CONSTRUCTION.—A release, required by statute, as a condition of an abutting property owner's making connection with a city sewer, must be construed in view of the facts and conditions existing at the time of its execution, as well as those reasonably to be anticipated. It does not bar him from all claims for damages which may subsequently arise by reason of such construction. Hence, if the city, after the construction of a sewer, changes the grade of streets and turns into the sewer a large amount of sur

face water and sewage formerly flowing in another direction, thus
overtaxing the sewer to such owner's injury, the city is answerable
in damages notwithstanding such a release. (King v. Granger, 779.)

14. RELEASE REQUIRED BY STATUTE-EQUIVALENT-
SEWER CONNECTIONS.—An agreement, by the owner of abut-
ting property, who has been permitted to make connection with
a city sewer, "that no claim for damages which may be occasioned
to such estate, or any property thereon, in any manner, by the
construction, use, or existence of such drain or connection, shall be
made against the city," while not technically a release, must be
held equivalent to the release required by statute as a condition
of making such connection. (King v. Granger, 779.)

15. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SEWERS CHANGE OF
PLAN.-When a city desires to drain a much larger territory by
the use of a sewer than was originally contemplated, and larger
than the sewer is capable of draining, it must increase its capacity,
for it cannot materially change its plan as to the territory to be
drained without also changing its plan as to the size of the sewer.
(King v. Granger, 779.)

16. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SEWERS-DUTY AS TO-
NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY.-When a plan for a sewer has been
adopted by a city, and the sewer constructed in accordance there-
with, judicial discretion ends and ministerial duty begins. The
city then becomes answerable in damages for injuries to others
resulting from the negligent discharge of such duty, or the negli-
gent omission to discharge it. (King v. Granger, 779.)

17. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-AUTHORITY TO ISSUE
BONDS TO PAY PRE-EXISTING INDEBTEDNESS, or to raise
moneys with which to pay it, is conferred by a statute giving a
municipality power to borrow money on the credit of the corpora-
tion for corporate purposes. (National Life Ins. Co. v. Mead, 876.)

18. MUNICIPAL BONDS-ESTOPPEL AGAINST CORPORA-
TION.-Evidence that a municipality employed persons to dispose
of its bonds, and furnished them with certificates or statements of
fact concerning its financial condition, should not be received for
the purpose of estopping the municipality from showing that the
bonds are in excess of the indebtedness it might incur under the
constitution and statutes of the state. (National Life Ins. Co. v.
Mead, S76.)

19. MUNICIPAL BONDS-KNOWLEDGE WITH WHICH PUR-
CHASER IS CHARGEABLE.-A purchaser of negotiable municipal
bonds is held to know the constitutional and statutory restrictions,
and the authority to issue them, and the valuation of the taxable
property of the municipality as ascertained by its assessment. (Na-
tional Life Ins. Co. v. Mead, 876.)

20. MUNICIPAL BONDS-LIABILITY OF MUNICIPALITY.-
IN CONSIDERING THE AMOUNT OF THE LIABILITY WHICH
A CITY MAY INCUR, the debts of a school district cannot be in-
cluded, though its territorial limits coincide with those of the city.
(National Life Ins. Co. v. Mead, 876.)

21. MUNICIPAL BONDS.-AN ESTOPPEL TO PROVE THAT
THE MUNICIPAL BONDS ARE IN EXCESS OF THE AMOUNT
OF INDEBTEDNESS which the municipality was allowed to
incur cannot arise from any recital in the bonds or any repre-
sentation or certificate made by any of the municipal officers,
if it was required to keep, and did keep, regular books of account
showing all the municipal indebtedness, and the amount of its

taxable property also appears from public records open to the inspection of all persons. (National Life Ins. Co. v. Mead, 876.)

22. MUNICIPAL BONDS TO DISCHARGE PRE-EXISTING OBLIGATIONS, WHETHER AN INCREASE OF INDEBTEDNESS.-The issuing of bonds, whether to be exchanged for preexisting indebtedness, or to be sold and their proceeds applied to its satisfaction, does not constitute an increase of indebtedness within the meaning of statutory and constitutional restrictions upon the amount of indebtedness which may be created by or against a municipal corporation. (National Life Ins. Co. v. Mead, 876.)

See Attachment, 6, 7; Constitutional Law, 9, 17; Dedication.

MUTILATED NOTE.

See Negotiable Instrument, &

NATURALIZATION.
See Citizenship.

NEGLIGENCE.

1. NEGLIGENCE-EXPLOSIVE CAPS KEPT BY CITY IN VACANT LOT-BREAKING OF CAUSAL CONNECTION-NONLIABILITY.-If a city keeps explosive caps in a tool-chest on a vacant lot, for highway work, it is not negligent in leaving the chest open and unguarded, so that the caps may be removed by mischievous persons, but conceding that it is, and a number of the caps have been removed by someone, the act of a boy in exploding one of the caps picked up some ten or twelve feet distant from the chest, whereby another boy, the plaintiff, was injured, is the proximate cause of the injury, intervening between the negligence of the city and the injury to the plaintiff and breaking the causal connection between them, so that the city is not answerable for such injury. (Afflick v. Bates, 801.)

2. NEGLIGENCE-CONTRIBUTORY.-THE DOCTRINE OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE does not prevail in Illinois. Where a party seeks to recover damages for a loss which has been caused by negligence, he must be able to show that his own negligence or misconduct has not concurred with that of the other party in producing the injury, and the burden is upon him to show not only negligence on the part of the defendant, but also that he was not guilty of negligence. (West Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Liderman, 226.) 3. NEGLIGENCE-RISKING LIFE TO SAVE ANOTHEREXCEPTION.-A person has a right to risk his own life or limb in an effort to save the life of another person, and cannot be charged with contributory negligence in so doing, unless his act is rash or reckless; but such rule does not apply if the person attempted to be rescued was placed in the position of danger through the fault of the person injured. (West Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Liderman, 226.)

4. NEGLIGENCE-RISKING LIFE TO SAVE ANOTHERQUESTION FOR JURY.-Whether one who risks his life to save another acted with reasonable prudence or with recklessness is a question for the jury under all the facts and circumstances of the case, where reasonable minds might draw different conclusions therefrom. (West Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Liderman, 226.)

Am. St. Rep., Vol. LXXIX-65