the answer showed a sufficient dependence to satisfy the statute remained for the jury to answer under the instructions of the court. Even more plainly admissible were interrogatories whether the son contributed to her support, and if so how much. The plaintiff also testified that she "had to turn around and go three miles to earn [her] support," that she had a boy that was hard set to earn from eight pence to one shilling a day, and another boy an invalid. How far these statements should outweigh the others was for the jury: See Houlihan v. Connecticut River R. R. Co., 164 Mass. 555, 557, 42 N. E. 108; Daly v. New Jersey Steel etc. Co., 155 Mass. 1, 5, 29 N. E. 507; American Legion of Honor v. Perry, 140 Mass. 580, 590, 5 N. E. 634. Partial dependence for the necessaries of life would be enough, as it is made in terms by the English statute: 60 & 61 Victoria, c. 37, sec. 7, cl. 2; McCarthy v. Supreme Lodge New England Order of Protection, 153 Mass. 314, 318, 25 Am. St. Rep. 637, 26 N. E. 866; Simmons v. White Brothers, [1899] 1 Q. B. 1005; Atlanta etc. Air-Line Ry. Co. v. Gravitt, 93 Ga. 369, 372, 44 Am. St. Rep. 145, 20 S. E. 550. In Hodnett v. Boston etc. R. R. Co., 156 Mass. 86, 30 N. E. 224, there was nothing to show that the plaintiff did not support herself by her own earnings.

We come, then, to the more difficult question, whether the plaintiff can claim the benefit of the act. However this may be decided, it is not to be decided upon any theoretic impossibility of Massachusetts law conferring a right outside her boundary lines. In Mannville Co. v. Worcester, 138 Mass. 89, 52 Am. Rep. 261, where a Rhode Island corporation sought to recover for a diversion of waters 268 from its mill in Rhode Island by an act done higher up the stream in Massachusetts, it was held, following earlier decisions, that there was no such impossibility, although the point was strongly urged. It is true that legislative power is territorial, and that no duties can be imposed by statute upon persons who are within the limits of another state. But rights can be offered to such persons, and if, as is usually the case, the power that governs them makes no objection, there is nothing to hinder their accepting what is offered. The same principle is recognized without discussion in Lumb v. Jenkins, 100 Mass. 527, where a nonresident alien was held entitled to take land by descent. So, after discussion, as to a nonresident's right to sue: Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217. So the supreme court of the United States holds that a right to recover for wrongfully causing death under

a state law similar to Lord Campbell's act may be asserted by an administrator appointed in another state: Dennick v. Central R. R. Co., 103 U. S. 11. See 8 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2d ed., 879, "Death by wrongful act." It is true that the arguments which prevailed in this case did not prevail in Richardson v. New York Cent. R. R., 98 Mass. 85, and perhaps would not have prevailed in England: Adam v. British etc. S. S. Co., 79 L. T., N. S., 31. But so far as the principle for which we cite the case is concerned, it is in accord with our own decisions, assuming that, like Lord Campbell's act, the statute was regarded as conferring a new right of action on the foreign executor or administrator, and not as giving a right of action to the deceased which went to the executor by survival only: Blake v. Midland Ry., 21 L. J. Q. B. 233, 237; Seward v. Vera. Cruz, 10 App. Cas. 59, 67. The cause of action survived in Higgins v. Central New England etc. R. R. Co., 155 Mass. 176, 31 Am. St. Rep. 544, 29 N. E. 534. This distinction seems to be lost sight of by many of the cases given in the Encyclopedia as following Dennick v. Central R. R. Co., 103 U. S. 11, so that their reasoning is not very satisfactory. But see Bruce v. Cincinnati R. R. Co., 83 Ky. 174, 182 et seq.

The question then becomes one of construction, and of construction upon a point upon which it is probable that the legislature never thought when they passed the act. In view of the decisions to which we have referred, we lay on one side as tooabsolute some expressions which are to be found in the English 269 cases, and some of which are cited in Adam v. British etc. S. S. Co., 79 L. T., N. S., 31. Our different relation to our neighbors politically and territorially is a sufficient ground for a more liberal rule, at least as to inhabitants of the United States.

One or two cases may be found where a general grant of a right of action for wrongfully causing death has been held to confer no rights upon nonresident aliens: Deni v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 181 Pa. St. 525, 59 Am. St. Rep. 676, 37 Atl. 558; Brannigan v. Union Gold Min. Co., 93 Fed. 164. But compare Knight v. West Jersey R. R. Co., 108 Pa. St. 250, 56 Am. Rep. 200. On the other hand, in several states the right of the nonresident to sue is treated as too clear to need extended argument: Philpott v. Missouri Pac. R. R. Co., 85 Mo. 164, 167; Chesapeake etc. R. R. Co. v. Higgins, 85 Tenn. 620, 622, 4 S. W. 47; Augusta Ry. Co. v. Glover, 92 Ga. 132, 142, 143, 18 S. E. 406; Luke v. Calhoun County, 52 Ala. 115, 118, 120.

Under the statute the action for death without conscious suffering takes the place of an action that would have been brought by the employé himself if the harm had been less, and by his representative if it had been equally great, but the death had been attended with pain: Stats. 1887, c. 270, sec. 1, cl. 3. In the latter case, there would be no exception to the right of recovery if the next of kin were nonresident aliens. It would be strange to read an exception into general words when the wrong is so nearly identical, and when the different provisions are part of one scheme. In all cases the statute has the interest of the employés in mind. It is on their account that an action is given to the widow or next of kin. Whether the action is to be brought by them or by the administrator, the sum to be recovered is to be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the employer or negligent person. In other words, it is primarily a penalty for the protection of the life of a workman in this state. We cannot think that workmen were intended to be less protected if their mothers happen to live abroad, or less protected against sudden than against lingering death. In view of the very large amount of foreign labor employed in this state, we cannot believe that so large an exception was silently left to be read in. Whether if the statute were of a different kind we could make a distinction between a mother living just across the 270 boundary line between Massachusetts and Rhode Island and one living in Ireland, need not be considered now.

We are of opinion that the superior court was right in letting the case go to the jury. A similar decision has been rendered upon this statute by the United States circuit court for this district: Vetaloro v. Perkins, 101 Fed. 393.

Exceptions overruled.

DEATH, ACTION FOR.-PARTIAL DEPENDENCE on her son will sustain a cause of action by a mother for his wrongful death: See the monographic note to Brown v. Electric Ry. Co., 70 Am. St. Rep. 679.

DEATH, ACTION FOR.-NONRESIDENT ALIENS are not included under a statute giving a right of action for death caused by negligence: Deni v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 181 Pa. St. 525, 59 Am. St. Rep. 676, 37 Atl. 558. But see the notes to Attrill v. Huntington, 14 Am. St. Rep. 353, 354; Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Co., 59 Am. St. Rep. 869-885.

WHICHER V. BOSTON AND ALBANY RAILROAD CO. [176 Mass. 275, 57 N. E. 601.]

NEITHER RAILWAYS NOR PALACE SLEEPING-CAR COMPANIES OWE TO A PASSENGER, IN REGARD TO BAGGAGE, the duties imposed by law on carriers or innkeepers, where the passenger keeps the baggage in his custody and control. Their only obligation is that of exercising reasonable care, and their liability is restricted to the negligence or misconduct of their servants or agents.

RAILWAYS-PALACE-CAR COMPANIES.-NEGLIGENCE IS NOT INFERABLE on the part of a palace sleeping-car company, its agents or employés, from the mere loss, in the daytime, of the baggage of a passenger left by him or by the porter in his section.

RAILWAYS - PALACE SLEEPING-CAR COMPANIES NEGLIGENCE OF PASSENGER.-A passenger who, after his traveling-bag is. in the daytime, placed in his section by the porter of a palace sleeping-car company, leaves such bag without attention for five hours, during which time it is stolen, does not exercise reasonable care, and cannot recover of the company.

RAILWAYS.-IN THE RUNNING OF A PALACE SLEEPING-CAR COACH IN THE DAYTIME there is no necessity for the care required when passengers are sleeping. All that is required is reasonable care, and this is not negatived by the loss of a passenger's traveling-bag placed in his section by him or the porter and left there without attention for five hours.

Action against the Boston and Albany Railroad Company and the Wagner Palace Car Company for a traveling-bag. The trial court directed a verdict in favor of the railroad company, but submitted the case to the jury as to the other defendant, and the verdict returned was for the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleged exceptions to the giving of the direction to the jury in favor of the railroad company, and the palace car company to the refusal of the court to direct a verdict in its favor.

A. H. Russell, for the Wagner Palace Car Company.

E. F. McClennen, for the plaintiff.

276 LATHROP, J. There is no material dispute about the facts in this case. The plaintiff was a passenger on a sleepingcar of the Wagner Palace Car Company, which was hauled with other cars from Albany to Boston by the Boston and Albany Railroad Company, leaving Albany at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, and arriving in Boston at 9 in the evening. The Wagner Palace Car Company had no control of the car in so far as its movement over the roadbed was concerned, but retained the internal management thereof, and hired the porter and conductor for

said car. Although there was some discrepancy in the evidence on the point whether the plaintiff carried his traveling-bag to his section, or whether the porter carried it for him, we assume in favor of the plaintiff that the porter carried it for him. The bag was placed in the section nearest the front door of the car. The plaintiff remained by it for ten minutes, and then went into the smoking compartment of the car, which was at the rear end. He remained there half an hour, and then returned to his section, took something out of his bag, and returned to the smoking compartment and remained there until the train was 277 approaching Boston. He then went to his section and his bag was gone. Search was made for it, but it could not be found. The train made three stops between Albany and Boston, namely, at Pittsfield, Springfield, and Worcester. The porter testified that he received one passenger at Pittsfield, but none at the other two stations; that two passengers left the car at Springfield, neither of whom had a hand-bag; that no passengers left at the other stations; and that, while the train was in motion, passengers walked back and forth from the other coaches. He further testified that there were three sleepingcars on the train, and it appeared that there were also ordinary

cars.

The principles of law which govern these cases we consider to be well settled. In the first place, neither a railroad company, a steamboat company, a sleeping-car company, nor a palace-car company owes to a passenger in regard to baggage the duty imposed by law on carriers or innkeepers, where the passenger keeps the baggage in his own custody and control. The only obligation imposed upon them is that of exercising reasonable care, and they are liable only when the loss is due to the negligence or misconduct of the servants or agents of the carrier: Railroads: Tower v. Utica etc. R. R. Co., 7 Hill, 47, 42 Am. Dec. 36; Henderson v. Louisville etc. R. R. Co., 123 U. S. 61, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 60; Illinois Cent. R. R. Co. v. Handy, 63 Miss. 609, 56 Am. Rep. 846. Steamboats and steamships: Clark v. Burns, 118 Mass. 275, 19 Am. Rep. 456; Steamboat Crystal Palace v. Vanderpool, 16 B. Mon. 302; Abbott v. Bradstreet, 55 Me. 530; American S. S. Co. v. Bryan, 83 Pa. St. 446; Gleason v. Goodrich Transp. Co., 32 Wis. 85, 14 Am. Rep. 716; The R. E. Lee, 2 Abb. (U. S.) 49, Fed. Cas. No. 11,690. In New York, however, a steamboat is regarded as a floating inn; but we believe this view is peculiar to that state: Adams v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 151 N. Y. 163, 56 Am. St. Rep. 616, 45 N. E.