claim. It is not 335 important whether the claim was in point of law valid and enforceable. To end the litigation, not only the receiver's suit, but the one brought by the attorneys, in which Nunnenmacher was made garnishee, upon the theory that he was indebted to Frederiksen, Nunnenmacher settled with the attorneys, and paid them upon that claim the sum of $36,000. He thereby confessed an indebtedness to Frederiksen in that sum. It belonged to Frederiksen, and the defendant and attorneys engaged with him appropriated it to their own use. They were engaged to act for the receiver, and were under every moral and legal duty to preserve and protect the interest of the trust estate. The money was paid to them in settlement of a cause of action which they knew was claimed by the receiver, and they cannot be heard to say that Nunnenmacher was not legally liable thereon. 2. The court below also held, in line with respondents' contention, that no title or interest in or to the Nunnenmacher cause of action passed to the receiver by the order of the court appointing him, or by the deed of the master in chancery. This contention is not based on any defect or omission in the order or deed, but upon the claim that the supreme court of Wisconsin so held, and it is insisted that the courts of this state should follow that decision. In this position we cannot concur. By the order of the Illinois court, plaintiff was appointed receiver of all of Frederiksen's property, real, personal, and mixed, including choses in action of every kind, and the deed of the master in chancery conveyed the same to him. The decision of the Wisconsin supreme court is quite broad, and, on its face at least, seems to justify respondents' contention. It is there stated, in effect, that a receiver appointed in a creditor's suit by a court of another state acquires no title or interest to property located in Wisconsin. Whether this is sound law we need not consider. We do not believe that that court intended its decision to go to that extent. It certainly could not have intended so to decide with respect to the property here involved, because it was not located in that state at the time the receiver was appointed or since. The property consisted of certain causes of action for alleged usurious interest taken by Nunnenmacher from Frederiksen, and amounted to a debt or 336 chose in action, and had a situs at the residence of the creditor. Frederiksen resided in the state of Illinois at the time of the appointment of the receiver, and, in contemplation of law, this cause of action, or these causes of action, were with his person in said state, and undoubtedly passed to the receiver: Swedish-American Nat. Bank v. Bleecker, 72 Minn. 383, 71 Am. St. Rep. 492, 75 N. W. 740; Putnam v. Pitney, 45 Minn. 242, 47 N. W. 790; State v. Gaylord, 73 Wis. 316, 41 N. W. 521; National Bank v. Furtick, 2 Marv. (Del.) 35, 42 Atl. 479, 69 Am. St. Rep. 99, and cases cited in note on page 117. We do not, therefore, believe that the Wisconsin court intended to hold that the receiver acquired no title to the causes of action against Nunnenmacher, but only that he could not maintain an action to recover thereon in that state. That the court intended to go no further than this is evident by the syllabus. It is clear to us, and we hold, that the Nunnenmacher causes of action passed to the receiver, belonged to the trust estate, and that Hewetson and the attorneys had no right to purchase or to otherwise acquire the same for their own profit and and benefit. 3. Respondents' contention that the plaintiff's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations is wholly untenable. The case of Hardwick v. Ickler, 71 Minn. 25,73 N. W. 519, most effectually puts at rest the question whether the statute must be pleaded to be available as a defense. It is there held that the statute is waived if not pleaded; and this, notwithstanding the bar of the statute may appear on the face of the complaint. The claim that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by laches is also untenable. 4. Counsel also urge that the receiver knew that his attorneys had purchased the Rice notes, and were endeavoring to enforce the same against Nunnenmacher, and that he made no objection thereto, but silently acquiesced therein, and it is claimed that he thereby waived all right to object to the transaction or to bring the parties to account. While it is true that the receiver had some knowledge as to the purchase of the Rice notes by Hewetson and his attorneys, and that they were endeavoring to enforce the claim against Nunnenmacher, this by no means amounts to a waiver of his rights or to a ratification of the acts of his agents. He was himself an agent, a trustee of an express trust, and he could not permit or 337 authorize his agent to do with the trust estate that which he himself could not do. He could not speculate in the trust property to his own advantage and benefit, nor could he authorize his agents to do so. It would be a perversion of the law to hold that an agent could, by his silence, authorize, ratify, or sanction an act he could not expressly authorize, sanction, or approve. We have examined all the other points made by respondents, and find none of them fatal to appellant's right of recovery. The facts found by the trial court warrant at least a portion of the relief demanded in the complaint, and the judgment should have been for plaintiff. It is beyond question that Hewetson and the attorneys engaged with him violated the trust reposed in them and they should be compelled to account. Hewetson acquired, with $3,000 of his share of the profits of the deal, the lands in question, and the receiver should be adjudged to have a specific lien thereon to the extent of such $3,000, and interest since the date of the Nunnenmacher settlement at the rate allowed by law. The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to the court below to amend its conclusions of law so as to direct the entry of judgment in plaintiff's favor, adjudging and decreeing said sum of $3,000 and interest to be and constitute a specific lien upon the lands in question, and authorizing the enforcement thereof by execution, as in other cases. Judgment reversed. A TRUSTEE MAY NOT BECOME INTERESTED personally in the trust property: Chicago Hansom Cab Co. v. Yerkes, 141 Ill. 320, 33 Am. St. Rep. 315, 30 N. E. 667; Galbraith v. Tracy, 153 Ill. 54, 46 Am. St. Rep. 867, 38 N. E. 937; Petrie v. Badenoch, 102 Mich. 45, 47 Am. St. Rep. 503, 60 N. W. 449. A RECEIVER IS A TRUSTEE for all the parties: See the monographic note to American etc. Bank v. McGettigan, 71 Am. St. Rep. 353. SUITS BY FOREIGN RECEIVERS are treated in the notes to Straughan v. Hallwood, 8 Am. St. Rep. 49-54; Alley v. Caspari, 6 Am. St. Rep. 185-189. Receivers appointed upon the removal of an assignee for the benefit of creditors may maintain an action in relation to personal property of the assigned estate situate in another state: Whitman v. Mast, 11 Wash. 318, 48 Am. St. Rep. 874, 39 Pac. 649. But see Holbrook v. Ford, 153 Ill. 633, 46 Am. St. Rep. 917, 39 N. E. 1091. THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS MUST BE PLEADED in order to be available: Valz v. First Nat. Bank, 96 Ky. 543, 49 Am. St. Rep. 306, 29 S. W. 329. STEINBACH v. BRANT. [79 Minn. 383, 82 N. W. 651.] ASSIGNMENT OF WAGES TO BECOME due, indefinite as to amount, unlimited as to time, without acceptance by the employer, and without notice to an attaching creditor, is void as to the latter. F. B. Robinson and W. S. Hammond, for the appellant. 383 LEWIS, J. In proceedings in garnishment instituted by plaintiff in justice court, the garnishee was served with the summons on January 6, 1899, and appeared on the return day, January 14, 1899, and disclosed that it was indebted to defendant, Brant, in the sum of ninety-one dollars and forty-one cents, and stated that the Sioux Trust Company claimed the money under a written assignment, and demanded that the claimant be made a party. This was done and claimant appeared, and answered that it was the owner of the money, under a written assignment. A hearing was had upon the pleadings, and judgment was rendered for the claimant for the sum of ninety-one dollars and forty-one cents damages, and against the plaintiff for costs. Plaintiff appealed to the district court upon questions of law alone. In the district court the judg ment 384 was reversed, and judgment was ordered for the plaintiff and against the garnishee for the sum of ninety-one do lars and forty-one cents. From an order denying its motion for a new trial, claimant appeals. The return from the justice court shows that defendant, Brant, was in the employ of the garnishee from October 6, 1898, continuously up to the time of the service of the garnishee summons, January 6, 1899; that on the day of such service the garnishee was indebted to defendant in the sum of eighty-two dollars and seventy-seven cents, which he had earned as wages in December, 1898, and eight dollars and sixty-four cents which he had earned in January, 1899. It also appeared that Brant had drawn his pay direct from the company every month from the date of the assignment. The return shows that claimant proved Brant's signature to the assignment, but no evidence was offered either as to the consideration of the assignment, or as to the nature of the contract of employment of defendant by the garnishee, or as to whether anything was actually due claimant at the time of the service of the garnishment. The claimant bases its claim to the money wholly upon the written assignment, which is as follows (Exhibit "A"): "For value received, I hereby sell, assign, and transfer to the Sioux Trust Company my claim against the C., St. P., M. & 0. Railway Company for wages now earned and to be earned, due and to become due. And I do hereby represent, guaranty, and do solemnly swear that I am now employed by the said railroad company as conductor, and that there are no other assignments, liens, or garnishments against me or my wages, and that there is now due me from said railroad company the sum of $120.00; and I fully understand that I am making this affidavit for the purpose of effecting the above sale of my claim against said railway company. "Residence, St. James, Minn. J. W. BRANT. "Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th day of October, 1898. "Filed Feb. 23, '99. Notary Public. W. E. ALLEN, "Justice of the Peace." This instrument contains the words "for value received," and those words import a consideration, and it was not necessary to prove it: Frank v. Irgens, 27 Minn. 43, 6 N. W. 380; Elmquist v. 885 Markoe, 39 Minn. 494, 40 N. W. 825. As to the amount of the claim then earned, this instrument operated as an assignment, and as to the wages "to be earned" and "to become due," conceding that it operated as an equitable assignment of the future earnings so far as the parties to the instrument were concerned, still, as to creditors of the assignor, there is some uncertainty, under the authorities. It is a general rule that, if the wages assigned are definitely defined and certain as to time, character, and amount, they may be assigned, when predicated upon a present contract for continuous employment. And, if the assignment is merely in the form of an order upon the employer it must be accepted by the employer before it becomes binding upon either creditors or employers. It has also been held that, where the wages to be earned are definite and certain, they may be assigned, although not predicated upon a contract for continuous employment, but are wages earned in an existing |