ditions make imperative; and when one party uses the constraining conditions to extort some thing phenomenal either in price or rent from the other. Assimilation of Laws. Ontario is not, it appears, much of an enthusiast for assimilating the Commercial Laws of the Empire as far as it is possible and expedient. In a magazine published in London, largely with this objective, Ontario is put forward as one of the Provinces which have displayed some hesitancy or reluctance in adopting such Acts as the following: (1) The Sale of Goods Act. (2) The Factors Act. (3) The Partnership Act. These are all, as near as may be, codifications of existent law; and if they have been found generally effective and have been, most of them, adopted and reenacted in the other parts of the Empire, what advantage does Ontario derive from ignoring the advance movement and adhering to the combrous and perplexing method of ascertaining the law from old text books and decisions of the Courts? The suggestion is made: (1) That the Sale of Goods Act 1893 be adopted by Ontario. (2) That the Factors Act 1889 be adopted by Manitoba and Prince Edward Island. (3) That the Partnership Act 1890 be adopted by New Brunswick, Ontario, and Prince Edward Island. All as they are enacted in England with necessary modifications. The Lawyer's Gown. Barristers appear to have had no official costume until the end of the 17th century. Before then the costume worn by students at the Inns of Court and by "Utter Barristers" consisted of a stuff gown, and sometimes, in term time, a round cap, which was worn in Hall or in church. When the judges adopted wigs the barristers did so too, but while the judge's wig has only one vertical curl just above the tail of the wig, the barrister's has three rows of horizontal curls going all the way around. The silk gown, full-bottomed wig and black Court dress now worn by King's Counsel are generally held to date from the funeral of Queen Mary, before the mourning dress worn by the wish of King William for a considerable period after the Queen's death, and adopted as a convenient costume ever since. The jest of Chief Baron Pollock that "the Bar of England went into mourning at the death of Queen Anne and never came out again" goes some way in support of this theory, though it seems to involve a conflict with other authorities in the matter of the precise Queen who was concerned. RECENT NOTABLE CASES. Trade Union Restraint of Trade. 3 2 Davies v. Thomas1 seems at first sight to give a tilt to the cases of Quinn v. Leatham, Giblan v. National Amalgamated Union, and Glamorgan Coal v. South Wales Miners. But the distinction is drawn that in the last three cases the element of coercion, or procuring a legal thing to be done by illegal means, was present, whereas in Davies v. Thomas it was, according to the finding of the Judge on the fact, totally absent. His finding on the fact does not by any means appear as clear as his statement of the Law. It may be the evidence was defective. But the facts are: the plaintiff was employed by a man named Williams on the terms that after the engagement ceased he would not for 2 years carry on or be employed in the business of his employer within a radius of 12 miles. The Agreement ceased regularly and plaintiff entered the same business within the radius with a man named Hopkins on practically the same terms. Both these employers were members of a Trade Association, one of whose rules was (20), "An employee leaving an employer shall, if he so desires, report the same to the Secretary, who shall advise all the members; and no other member of the association shall employ or supply him for 12 months." Under this rule the first employer Williams brought the second employer Hopkins before the Association, and the upshot was, though after considerable hesitation and objection by Hopkins, that the plaintiff was dismissed from his employment. The Judge said there was nothing behind this rule to enforce it. It had no sanction, and a member disobeying it could not even be expelled from the Association. 189 L. J. R. p. 1. He said however the rule was an unreasonable restraint of trade and void on authority of Mineral Water v. Booth, but it was not invalid ab initio in that it was an agreement to commit a tort, or that it was a conspiracy; and that it was not per se an offence at Common Law to make such an agreement unless the illegal means by which it would be enforced were prescribed. It seemed from the evidence that Hopkins yielded not to threats of any kind but to persuasion of his comembers, and as he had a perfect right to terminate the employment as he did, the plaintiff had no cause of action against those who merely persuaded him to do what he did. The Judge said this made all the difference; but what it may be asked was the compelling force behind the persuading eloquence to induce Hopkins to do what no doubt he had a right to do, but what he objected to do, unless it was fear of the combined or co-operative force that the whole Association could and doubtless would have brought to bear upon Hopkins if he had persisted in refusing to yield? This force was no where expressed. But was it absent? It is present in every Association of this sort. That is its nexus. Legislation on this subject is badly needed. The Law is in a muddle! Restraint of Trade. Film Artistes nom-de-guerre. In Hepworth v. Wernham Ryott, an important decision was arrived at by the Court of Appeal. A contract had been made by an Actor in photoplays that after the end of the employment he would not use the pseudonym by which he was theatrically known "Stewart Rome," and that the name should be for ever the property of the employer. It was held: (1) That it was a contract in restraint of trade. 5 1887 36 Ch. D. 465. 6 89 L. J. Ch. p. 69. Authorities cited: Nordenfeldt v. Maxim,' Mason's Case, Mitchell v. Reynolds." Famous Section 17, or Sale of Goods Act. An important point to solicitors was decided in Thirkwell v. Cambi,10 where it was held that a solicitor who is instructed to deny a contract is not an Agent to make or sign a note or memorandum in writing within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds (sec. 17) or the Sale of Goods Act, sec. 4. The solicitor in writing his repudiation referred to certain letters which, it was contended by the plaintiff, contained a sufficient memorandum of the contract to satisfy the statute; and that the signature of the solicitor for the defendant, though contained in a repudiation, was a signature "by the party to be charged therewith or his agent in that behalf." It was an ingenious point; and it became possible to raise it because the solicitor instead of merely repudiating proceeded to discuss anterior letters written by the plaintiff to defendant which, it was said, set out what he deemed to be the original contract or agreement. Gaming Debts. Golding v. Bradshaw " is a novel case. The plaintiff lost a bet to defendant and gave a cheque for it. The defendant endorsed it to a third party, who had notice of the nature of the transaction it represented. On presentation of the cheque it was paid by the plaintiff's bankers to the third party. Thereupon the plaintiff sued the defendant, the original payee for the amount, relying on the Gaming Act 1835. Sect. 1 of that Act declares any cheque or note, etc., given for a betting debt is void. Sect. 2 provides that in case of endorsement of such cheque and payment to a third party, the 71894 A. C. 535. 8 82 L. J. K. B. 1157-61. |