every man with regard to all the other knowledge he possesses. The sources from which we derive our information in these two cases are indeed different. In the one we trust revelation for ultimate facts; and in the other we trust our senses and our feelings. But in both cases, the range of our knowledge concerning these facts is precisely of the same extent, and bounded by similar limits. In both we may know clearly the facts themselves, and the relations they bear to each other, so far as is necessary for our comfort and the direction of our conduct. But whenever we attempt to advance a step farther either in the world of revelation or in the world of sense, and to determine the nature, the manner, and the cause of what is presented to us, we find our progress bounded by a line of impenetrable obscurity. You know that you are, and that you have a body and a soul. But can you explain the nature of these substances, or of the union that constitutes them one person, or of the means by which they mutually affect each other? You see other men around you, and you feel that by their words they can influence the resolutions and the passions of your hearts. But can you tell how this happens, or why mere sounds, which are but agitations of the air, have the power of producing such ef fects? You behold the earth covered with verdure, grass growing for cattle, and herb for the service of men. But can you tell either how the grass grows, or serves for nourishment, or changes into flesh and sinews and bones? No, my brethren, on these points, and all others of a similar kind, the most enlightened philosopher, though he may have unveiled some steps of the process, and learned to pronounce some hard names concerning it, is at bottom, and with regard to the real acting causes, as ig norant as the most uninstructed of the people. Your ignorance on these points, from being familiar to you, may pass unobserved; but it is not on that account less real. • If this then be the condition of all our knowledge, why should we expect that our knowledge of divine things should form an exception to the general law, and that the facts of revelation should be more explicable by us than parallel facts in the world of sense? These facts constitute all that is necessary to impress our hearts and direct our conduct; and they are recorded in scripture with sufficient clearness and precision. That God is, and governs the world; that though strictly one, he manifests himself under the three characters borne by the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost; that in the character of Son he interposed, in human form, to make atonement for sin, and to ransom from destruction the race he had created; that as the Holy Ghost, he renews them in the spirit of their mind, comforts them in sorrow, and aids them in the struggles of virtue: that men are destined for immortality; that the dominion which death exercises over them is to be subverted, and that they shall all be recalled from his cold embrace to stand before their Judge, and receive according to the deeds done in the body.-These are facts of which a Christian who be lieves the scripture can no more be ignorant, than he can be ignorant of the objects that strike his senses; and our inability to explain questions of speculative curiosity respecting them can no more intitle us to reject them, than our inability to explain similar questions respecting sensible objects can entitle us to reject the existence of the material world.' pp. 77-81. This reasoning seems just. Revelation becomes necessary, because our reason could not arrive at the knowledge of those Our truths that involve our present and future happiness. As it We must however dissent from Dr. F. when he asserts, (p. 82.) that pious and well disposed persons have often complained that the evidence of Christianity is insufficient to sup-port our faith. For if any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine whether it be of God.' Modern infidels make no pretensions to piety. They consider it as nearly allied to the monster whom Epicurus dared to encounter; and for their generous efforts to deliver men from the restraints, and deprive them of the consolations of piety, they assure themselves a place in the temple of fame on a level with that hero of philosophy. In fact, it is the gospel alone that produces piety. The most vigorous exertions of reason leave the character of God in such obscurity, afford so little encouragement to creatures of our stamp to appear in the divine presence, and so confine the range of the imagination, that the scripture, were it supported by but half its present evidence, must be very grateful to a man of a small portion of pious feeling. We must be contented to dismiss with our approbation the solution Dr. F. has supplied of the two remaining classes of doubts. It surprised us to meet with an observation so unphilosophical and pernicious as the following, from the pen of Dr. Finlayson. Our works,' (he says) • Have gradually formed within us the dispositions and powers which are then to operate unopposed, and by their exercise and the attainment of their objects, to constitute the chief part of the heavenly felicity.' p. 455. Instead of offering any remarks upon it ourselves, we shall make an extract from the excellent sermon on the extent of the divine law, in which he lays open the unsoundness of the remark we have just quoted. 'Actions in themselves, and separated from the motives which prompt them, have no moral quality whatever. They are natural effects of springs that operate within us, and follow these springs as necessarily as any other effect follows its cause. In themselves therefore they can be objects of neither praise nor blame. These attributes belong to them only in conse quence of their connection with certain inward principles of choice; and hence, to the conviction of all mankind, the same outward action may be either good or bad according to the quality of the principle which produced it. The observation that has now been made respecting external actions, is in a great measure true also respecting even the dispositions and habits of the mind. These are, in many cases, blind impulses, which in themselves are neither good nor bad. They receive a moral character only from the illuminating principle by which they are formed and directed. Virtue and vice are qualities of intelligent beings alone, and must therefore derive their origin from those intellectual powers of reason and conscience by which such beings are distinguished. From these observations it follows that the commandment of God for regulating our moral conduct must reach beyond our actions and dispositions, to the principles of choice by which such actions and dispositions have been formed. These principles it takes under its control, purifying them from every improper influence, and requiring that in all cases the choice which they make be conformable to the divine will, as announced to us by the voice of conscience, and the law from heaven. It is this sacred regard to the divine will-this inward conviction of duty which constitutes the essence of moral obligation, and which is therefore necessary to give to our actions dignity and value. Hence, in conformity with this doctrine, the scriptures invariably represent the heart as the seat of right and wrong, as containing the good treasure out of which a good man bringeth forth that which is good, or the evil treasure out of which an evil man bringeth forth that which is evil. They command us to keep the heart with all diligence, because out of it are the issues of life; they teach us that the heart is the object to which, in judging of our character, God will look; and they declare that its most hidden springs are subject to the control of his law: for the word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart. In estimating the moral worth of our conduct, therefore, we should not only see that the matter of our actions be right and conformable to rule: we must also take into account, as the chief circumstance, the living principle from which they flow. Unless we feel that they have proceeded either from an immediate sense of obligation, or at least from habitual dispositions formed originally on principles of duty, we can have no confidence in their value. Without this requisite they may perhaps be useful to the world, and conducive to our private comfort; but they cannot be morally good, nor commensurate with the commandment of God.' pp. 194-197. Several passages in the discourse on the death of Christ afforded us much pleasure, but we cannot extend our quotations. On the whole, these sermons possess in an eminent degree the first virtue of eloquence, perspicuity. Considered as discourses addressed to a mixed audience, it will strike every reader that some of the divisions are clumsy, and that several of the sermions might by a different arrangement have been made more instructive as well as more impressive The precise point of discussion is not always rendered so prominent, as to be obvious to every apprehension; and many of the reasonings are not so dilated and simplified, as to produce their full effect. Too great a compliment is paid to the intellect of the hearer, an error with which the reader, however, may not be displeased. There is also a more serious defect, the want of earnest and evident exertion to do good. Dr. F. instructs and convinces: but he does not move. He discusses the most important subjects with the coldness of a philosopher, instead of the ardour and enthusiasm of the Christian teacher. The close of his sermons, therefore, is in general the most exceptionable; he almost always fails to apply his subject to the conscience; and leaves the effect of the discourse to the reader's discretion, as if it were no part of the preacher's concern. The general quality of the publication, nevertheless, intitles it to attention from the discriminating reader, and to a respectable rank among the productions of the Scottish pulpit. Art. IV. Mathematical Tables: Containing the Logarithms of Numbers; Tables of Sines, Tangents, and Secants, both Natural and Logarithmic, to every Minute of the Quadrant; a Table of Versed-sines, both Natural and Logarithmic, to every Minute of the Semicircle; A Table of Sexagesimal Parts, to every Second Minute, and every two Third Minutes, reduced to the Denomination of a First Minute; and Supplementary Tables. To which is prefixed a Particular Account of the Nature and Use of Logarithms of Numbers, Sines, Tangents, Secants, and Versed Sines, with the Manner of their Formation. By George Douglas, Teacher of Mathematics; Author of a Translation of the Elements of Euclid, and of the Art of Drawing in Perspective. Royal 8vo pp. xxxviii. 166. Price 10s. 6d. Edinburgh, Mundell and Co. Richardson. 1809. MOST of our mathematical readers will very well recol lect, that, about twenty-five years ago, Dr. Hutton, of the Royal Military Academy, published, in a large octavo voInue, a valuable collection of Logarithmic Tables, accompanied with an elaborate and interesting Introduction containing a large and original history of the discoveries and writings relative to Logarithms and Trigonometry, together with a complete description and explanation of the Tables. During these twenty-five years, scarcely any other collection of Logarithmic tabl s has been published in England, except Michael Taylor's, printed in large quarto, under the superintendence of the Astronomer Royal, in 1792; while every year, almost, of the same period, has produced some paltry collection of Mathematical Tables from an Edinburgh press. This is a cu rious phenomenon, for which it would not be very difficult to account, and on some future occasion we may be induced, perhaps, to bestow some further notice upon it: but we have not room to enter upon the discussion here; Mr. George Douglas has provided us with employment enough of another kind. This gentleman, with a species of modesty almost unknown in England, yet which we should hope is not quite indigenous to the other side of the Tweed, has claimed for his Tables a preference over any other tables that are in circulation'-of course meaning to include the tables of Hutton, Taylor, Callet, and Prony. But he wishes to confine the comparison principally, it seems, to those which have been corrected and enlarged by Dr. Hutton, with indefatigable labour.' The Doctor', he says, is entitled to great praise for the pains he has taken, not only in comparing with other tables, but likewise for the many learned and ingenious remarks he has made in his introduction to that work.' Notwithstanding Doctor Hutton's merit in these respects, the Author of this collection, does not hesitate to enter into a competition, in preference of this collection, in point of accuracy and extensive usefulness, to Doctor Hutton's, or any other collection in circulation. In establishing this part of his claim of preference, he has shewn that the logarithm of any number is found to a greater degree of accuracy by the tables in this collection, than can be obtained by Hutton's or any similar collection, if the number exceeds four places of figures; which he has illustrated by several examples. And secondly, he has shewn, that when second and third minutes enter the calculation, that by the table of sexagesimal parts, the calculation is made by at least three times fewer figures than it can be done by the ordinary directions without these tables. In the third place, he states, that by the table of versed sines being extended to 180 degrees, the necessity of making a calculation when above 90 degrees, or working with the supplement, is avoided.' pp. i. ii. Yet he afterwards says, the Author has endeavoured to prove that the collection now of fered to the public, although comprehended in less than one half the compass of Hutton's collection, will carry calculations to a greater extent, and with more accuracy, than those of Hutton, or any other collection of like form which is now in circulation.? And again, Having thus claimed a competition and assigned reasons, the author rests the decision with the candid and learned calculator." How must the general reader, who peruses what he pleases, and only what he pleases, pity us poor reviewers, who have to examine Mr. Douglas's claims' and to make the comparison which he challenges! When a counterfeit guinea is placed before us, of which the exterior nicely imitates that |