Cleveland, the whole election would have turned upon the vote of West Virginia. This was so close that it was not known for several days after the election. Consequently, in the case supposed we should have had something very like a repetition of the TildenHayes contest of twelve years before. It must be remembered that the law of 1889, which was designed to provide more clearly than had previously been done for contested cases, was not yet enacted. No doubt, had the conjuncture arrived, we should have devised a way out of it, as we did in 1876. But a system under which such contests are bound to occur with great frequency ought to be done away with. To devise a more rational system, let us look into the question from another point of view.

The simplest method of electing a President would be by a count of the popular vote of the entire country, regardless of State lines. The proper authorities in every State certify to a central authority how many votes were cast by the voters of that State for each candidate. The candidate found to receive a majority of the whole number would be declared elected. If no candidate has a majority, the proceedings may be the same as at present in the case of no candidate receiving a majority of the electoral vote; if we choose to continue that part of the system.

An objection to the choice by count of the popular vote, pure and simple, is that the large States, and the States having large majorities for one party, would exercise too great an influence in the election. As a constitutional amendment must receive the votes of three-fourths of the States, it may be assumed that the smaller States would object to an amendment which increased the preponderance of the larger ones over them.

But there are several intermediate systems between a general count of the entire popular vote and a count by States pure and simple. The best of these intermediate systems is that of combining States and Congressional districts. At the present time, the people of each district vote for members of Congress. They could, on the same ballot, vote for President and Vice-President. Then, in each district, the candidate receiving a plurality of the votes would be entitled to have the one vote of that district counted for him. Besides this, the State would be entitled to two electoral votes, determined by the majority of the entire State. When, as is sometimes the case, one or more representatives are chosen by the State at large, each State would be entitled to an

equal number of electoral votes for President and Vice-President. This would give to each State precisely the power it now has; only, instead of that power being determined by never so small a majority in each State, it would be divided among the Congressional districts. The voting units would be smaller. The preponderance of the larger States would be lessened rather than increased, so that the smaller States would have fully the influence they now have. Such States as New York and Pennsylvania, instead of voting "solid" as they now do, would be sure to give a few Congressional districts to the other party, just as they elect a few members of Congress for the minority.

The change from the present system is so slight that it could be put into operation without difficulty. The votes in each Congressional district would be counted and certified to the authorities of the State, as they are now. The Presidential candidate of each district would be determined by the vote of that district; that of the State by the entire vote. These votes would be certified by the Executive to the President of the Senate, and counted in joint session, as the electoral votes now are.

This system seems to be the best and easiest that can now be adopted. But there still remains a defect in our present system, which would be worth curing at the same time. The Constitution provides that if no Presidential candidate receives a majority of the electoral vote, the choice between the three highest candidates devolves upon the Representatives, each State voting separately. A majority of all the States is now necessary to a choice. A State equally divided between two candidates would be left out from a majority, but would have to be counted in the whole number. The chances would, therefore, be against any election by the House, in the frequent case of a close division of parties. The Vice-President, chosen by the Senate, would then fill the office. But, even here, the possibility of failure would be very serious. A majority of the entire Senate, vacancies included, is necessary to the choice of a Vice-President. Vacancies and absentees sufficient in number to prevent a majority would be very possible. Then the fourth of March would arrive without a constitutional President.

The simplest way of guarding against this danger is by providing that a plurality of what we now call the electoral vote shall determine the choice of President and Vice-President. The obVOL. CLXXX.-No. 578.

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jections to this course have greatly diminished since the date of the adoption of the Constitution. It is a wholesome rule that, if a sufficient number of the minority cannot agree upon a candidate, the majority should rule. In any case, the evil of plurality rule is less to be dreaded than the danger of a non-election, which the majority rule might lead to.

It is undeniable that we are continuing an antiquated system of electing a President and Vice-President, fraught with wholly unnecessary and cumbrous formalities which may lead at any time to the defeat of the popular will or, worse yet, to a contest over the validity of an election. We have, up to the present time, been blind to all our narrow escapes from the danger. There is no real difficulty in devising and adopting a better system. Our hesitation only arises from a supposed sentiment against amending our Constitution. In view of the fact that the Constitution itself makes provision for amendments, there can be no rational ground for this sentiment. It is the spirit, not the letter, of our Constitution which has made it so successful in solving the greatest political problems with which our race ever had to deal, and in showing the world how civilized peoples may be governed. We only weaken this spirit, and do no honor to the Constitution or its founders, when we refuse to amend it in the way the document itself provides. To make the case against amendments weaker we have, during the present generation, strained the elasticity of the document to a degree which it would never have borne, were it not for the broad good sense of our Supreme Court in recognizing the fact that new conditions demand new constructions of law. Far from amending the Constitution being a source of danger, our willingness to do it will afford the surest guarantee of the perpetuity of the instrument, as well as show to the world that, in our national proceedings, we are not tied down by a blind and irrational adherence to antiquated forms of procedure.

SIMON NEWCOMB.

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT FOR
FOR RUSSIA.

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BY HANNIS TAYLOR, LL.D. (EDIN. AND DUB.), AUTHOR OF THE

ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITU

TION," ETC., ETC.

WITH a view to ascertaining the result of the recent conference of the presidents of the Zemstvos, the representative of the Associated Press at St. Petersburg interviewed Mr. Sauverin, the veteran editor of the "Novoe Vremya," who said:

"I certainly think the conference was highly significant. It shows the necessity for a departure from the present system. Personally, I do not agree with all the Zemstvoist proposals. The memorial embodies to the last word the science of constitutional government. I think some form of national representation is bound to come. . . It would not be a curtailment of the autocratic power to summon representatives of the people, but rather a strengthening of the Imperial authority, since it would enable the monarch to know the true needs and desires of his subjects. Ex-Minister of the Interior Ignatieff's idea of a Zemstvo Parliament to sit as a consultative body is worth considering as the logical development of the Zemstvos, which would be a ready-made electoral college for the land parliament. In my opinion, it would be preferable to have two houses. The higher should take the place of the present Council of the Empire, and a part of it should be elected and a part appointed. The Lower House should be composed of members, each representing a large constituency; otherwise, the population of 150,000,000 would necessitate a too unwieldy Lower House."

Here is a clear and definite admission, from one declaring his belief that "autocracy should be preserved," that the time has come when Russia should have a bicameral parliament to be composed of "an elective body to act in a consultative capacity to the sovereign, who should retain absolute freedom to follow the recommendations of the majority or minority, as he might think best." Mr. Sauverin evidently recognizes the maxim of Sir James Mackintosh that "constitutions are not made, they grow,"

when he adds: "My belief is that the changes should be introduced gradually. The first phase should be the introduction of the elected members to the Council of the Empire, which would be a useful initiation of our statesmen and people to representative institutions." In the presence of such reflections, students of the history of representative government naturally propound to themselves the question whether, in the light of that history, it is not probable that a parliament may be rapidly evolved out of the local institutions of Russia, in such a way that a representative assembly may be built up alongside of the Autocracy, at first purely consultative, and finally supreme in the state. All who are familiar with the history of the English constitution know that the Parliament of that country was evolved, through such a process, from germs embedded in the English township, origi nally a village community with a constitution identical with that of the Russian mir, the primary unit of Russian state organization.

Representative government is a Teutonic invention, of which the ancient world knew absolutely nothing. To the Teutonic invaders who settled down within the limits of the Roman Empire the modern world is indebted for the principle of representation, whereby large populations are enabled to extend the organization of natural life, without loss of vitality, through representative assemblies in which widely separated local communities cooperate with the central authority through trusted men elected to speak and act in their stead. The incurable weakness of the Roman political system was its lack of the equal and concerted action of widely diffused populations through the instrumentality of representation. That lack was supplied by the Teutons, who brought with them from the forest and the steppe the germs of the representative principle embedded in the organization of their local, self-governing communities. In every one of the modern European states that have arisen out of the settlements made by the Teutonic nations on Roman soil, a serious attempt has at some time been made in the direction of representative government. The remarkable fact is that, in every Continental state in which such an attempt was made, it ended at last in failure and disappointment. By the sixteenth century, nearly every effort in the direction of representative government upon the Continent of Europe had come to an end. In England only, among the Teu