Held, That, as it did not appear
from the report how the commissioner
arrived at the sum which he allowed,
or that he did not make the deduction
referred to, the exception would not
lie. The report should have been ex-
cepted to, as not stating the principle
on which the sum was allowed, or a
motion should have been made to
send the report back for correction.
Id.

4. A propeller having a canal-boat in
tow, which had sprung a leak while
being towed, cast her off in such a
way that she failed to reach a dock,
and drifted off into deep water, and
sank. She had a cargo of wheat, part
of which had been wet by the leak
before the boat was cast off. How
much was wet was in dispute:

Held, That, as it appeared that the
canal-boat could have been put into
shoal water near the dock at the time
she was cast off, the total loss of so
much of the cargo as was then unin-
jured was occasioned by the negli-
gence of the propeller;

That, on the evidence, 800 bushels
of the wheat was then wet and worth-
less, and that the loss was the value
of the cargo, less 800 bushels.
J. L. Hasbrouck,

DELIVERY OF CARGO.

See BILL OF LADING, 4.

DEMURRAGE.

See CHARTER, 1.

E

ESTOPPEL.

The

272

A libel in prize was filed, in June, 1865,
against the steamer Wren, in the Dis-
trict of Florida. The master, S., ap-
peared and filed a claim, as bailee for
the owner, alleging that L., a British
subject, was the owner, as appeared
by the register of the steamer. The
District Court condemned the vessel
as enemies' property, and a writ of
venditioni exponas was issued, and the

vessel was sold, and the proceeds were
deposited with the Assistant Treas-
urer of the United States, in New
York, subject to the order of the
Court. An appeal was taken from
that decree to the Supreme Court of
the United States, which reversed the
decree, and directed restitution of the
vessel to the claimant. F. and T., at-
torneys, in New York, directed and
had charge of this appeal, and paid
the expenses of it, and obtained the
mandate of the Supreme Court. They
then obtained a power of attorney
from L. and S., authorizing them to
collect the proceeds of the Wren, and
receive the restitution decreed. After
the decree in the Supreme Court, but
before the mandate was filed, C. and
others, the present libellants, by their
proctor, W., filed a libel, in the Dis-
trict Court of Florida, against L., and
issued a foreign attachment against the
proceeds of the Wren, as his property.
F. and T. thereafter employed an at-
torney in Florida, who filed the man-
date and a copy of the power of attor-
ney from L. and S. to them, and en-
tered a final decree in the prize case,
directing the payment of the money
to L., claimant. The same attorney
also entered a special appearance for
L., as respondent, in the suit brought
by C. and others, and moved to dis-
solve the attachment. In the mean
time, negotiations took place between
W., the attorney for C. and others, at
New York, and F. and T., looking to
a removal of that second litigation to
New York, and it was agreed that W.
should make no objection to the re-
moval of the fund to New York, and
that F. and T. ahould receive it under
their power from L. and S., and hold
it long enough to enable W. to take
such legal steps as he might be ad-
vised. Accordingly, instructions to
that effect were seat to Florida, the at-
tachment there was dissolved on the
entry of an absolute appearance for
L., and the funds were paid to F. and
T., in New York. Thereupon this suit
was commenced by W., for C. and
others, against L., and a foreign at-
tachment was issued against these
funds in the hands of F. and T., as the
property of L., and the funds were
duly attached. F. and T. thereupon
appeared, on the return of the attach-
ment. Interrogatories to them were

filed, to which they filed answers, de-
nying that they had any funds of L.
in their hands, and setting up, that,
before the commencement of the prize
suit, the Wren had been sold by L. to
one P.; that they had acted, in ail
that they had done, as attorneys for
P., and had never been retained by
L., and that the proceeds in question
were the property of P., and not of L.
This issue being brought to trial, the
libellants offered in evidence the com-
plete record in the prize case, and
the record in the other suit in the
Florida Court, and proof of the agree
ment between W. and F. and T.
F. and T. then offered in evidence
a bill of sale of the Wren from
L. to P., dated and recorded before
the commencement of the prize suit,
and proof of their retainer by P., and
not by L. P. was a member of the
firm of Fraser, Trenholm & Co., agents
of the Confederate States, at Liver-
pool:

Held, That the final judgment in the
prize case was a judgment that the
Wren was the property of L.;

That neither P. nor F. and T., who
had procured that judgment to be ren-
dered, could be heard now to allege
the contrary of the fact there ad-
judged;

That F. and T. were estopped by
what had taken place between them
and W., from saying, in this suit, that
the proceeds of the Wren were not
the property of L. Cushing v. Laid,

The owner of a bark filed a libel
against her cargo of hides to re-
cover freight. The hides were
shipped to Buenos Ayres, to be de-
livered at New York on payment of
freight at so much per pound. They
arrived in good order, and were tend-
ered to the consignee, to be delivered
on payment of $1,515 79, freight.
This amount was arrived at by taking
the weight stated in the invoice and
entry presented by the consignee at
the Custom House on his entry of the
goods. The bill of lading did not
state any weight. As the consignee
refused to pay the amount claimed,
the owner of the ship filed a libel
against the hides to recover the
freight, and the consignee gave a
stipulation for value, and took them.
On the trial, the consignee proved an
actual weighing of the hides after
they were delivered, in accordance
with which the freight would be
$1,417 01:

Held, That, in the absence of a
statement of weights in the bill of
lading, the ship was entitled to freight
only on the weight delivered, and
that the weight stated in the invoice
and entry was not conclusive on the
consignee;

That the ship is bound to weigh
the cargo, whenever a weighing is
necessary to enable her to compute
her freight;

An American register was obtained
for a British vessel, under the Act of
December 23d, 1852 (10 U. S. Stat, at
Large, p. 149), on the statement that
she had been wrecked off Cape May,
which statement was false, and that
repairs to an amount exceeding her
previous value, had been put on her,
a forged receipt for the payment of
such repairs being exhibited. This
American register was used by the
person claiming to be owner, and he
afterwards sold the vessel to a bona
fide purchaser:

Held, That the vessel was forfeited
to the United States, by virtue of the
27th section of the Act of December
31, 1792 (1 Stat. at Large, p. 298);

That this forfeiture was not de-
feated by a sale to a bona fide pur-
chaser. The Monte Christo,

See INFORMER.

FRAUD.

See EVIDENCE, 1.
FORFEITURE.
IMPORT ACT.

G

GENERAL AVERAGE.

See BILL OF LADING, 2.

I

IMPORT ACTS.

148

1. If an importer, on entering goods at
the Custom House, takes the oath

con-

that the invoice of the goods,
tains a just and faithful account of the
actual cost" of the goods, and is "in
all respects true," when the cost
stated in the invoice is not the actual
cost, the oath is a false paper, and
the importer knowingly makes the
entry by means of a false paper, and
the goods or their value are forfeited.
The United States v. Barnes, 183

2. A passenger by a steamer from a
foreign country had, among his per-
sonal baggage, three ordinary goods
cases, filled with new and dutiable
goods only, intended for sale as such.
They were landed on the wharf with
the personal baggage of the passen-
gers. They were not named in the
manifest of the vessel. No entry was
made of the goods, nor had any du-
ties on them been paid or secured to
be paid; and no permit had been
granted to land them, except the
general baggage permit issued for
the vessel, which authorized the in-
spector on board to "examine the bag-
gage of all the passengers, and, if
nothing be found but personal bag-
gage, permit the same to be landed,
and send all other articles not per-
mitted in due time to the appraiser's
stores." The cases were seized on
the wharf, and an information filed to
forfeit them, under the 50th section of
the Act of March 2d, 1799 (1 U. S.
Stat. at Large, 665), as landed without
a permit:

Held, That, on the above facts, the
jury must find a verdict in favor of
the Government. The U. S. v. Three
Cases, &c.,
558

In a bankruptcy proceeding, an in-
junction was issued, on a special pe-
tition of the petitioning creditors, en-
joining a firm, of which B. was a mem-
ber, and a firm, of which S. was a
member, from prosecuting suits com-
menced by such firms respectively
against the bankrupts, in Illinois. in
each of which suits attachments had
been issued, under which property of
the bankrupts had been attached.
The injunction was personally served
on B. and on S. After such service,
the proceedings under the attachments
were continued to judgment, and the
property was sold under execution.
Proceedings were taken to punish both
B. and S. for contempt in violating
the injunction. S. set up, in defence,
that the proceedings had been carried
on by assignees of his firm, the as-
signment being made by a member of
his firm then in Illinois, and who was
not served with the injunction. B. set
up that the further proceedings in his
suit had been conducted by assignees
of his firm, the assignment having
been made by one D., a clerk of B.'s
firm:

Held, That it was competent for the
bankruptcy Court to restrain these at-
taching creditors from further proceed-
ing against the property which they
had attached as the property of the
bankrupts;

That both B. and S. had violated
the injunction of the Court by the
further proceedings in the attachment
suits;

That each of them, to purge his con-
tempt, must show that he endeavored
to stop the suit of his firm in Illinois,
or that the claim had been, in fact, as-
signed before the injunction was
served, neither of which things had
been shown;

Under the 90th and 94th sections of
the internal revenue Act of June 30,
1864 (13 U. S. Stat. at Large, 224), as
amended by the Act of July 13, 1866
(14 Id. 150), and the 61st and 84th
sections of the Act of July 20, 1868
(15 Id. 152, 153), a completed sale or
a completed removal of manufactured
tobacco is a necessary preliminary to
the accruing, assessment and payment
of the tax upon it.

But the provision in the 48th sec-
tion of the Act of 1864, as amended by
the Act of 1866, which provides for
the forfeiture of goods "on which
taxes are imposed by the provisions of
law, which shall be found in the pos-
session or custody, or within control,
of any person or persons, for the pur-
pose of being sold or removed by such
person or persons in fraud of the in-
ternal revenue laws," does not require
that there should have been a com-
pleted sale or removal of such goods.

The provision in the said 48th sec-
tion, in respect to the forfeiture of raw
materials, is not dependent on the pro-
vision in regard to taxable articles, so
as to make the forfeiture of the raw
materials dependent on their being
seized in the possession of a person in
whose possession forfeitable taxable
articles are found.

Under the said 48th section the
corps delicti is the possession of the
specified property with the specified
fraudulent purpose or design, without
the doing of any overt act in respect
The U. S. v. A Quantity of To-

of it.

bacco,

68

2. Under the 94th section of the Act of
June 30, 1864, above cited, as amended
by the 9th section of the Act of July
13, 1866, tobacco made of leaves from
which part of the stems had been re-
moved, and to which an equal propor-
tion of other stems, prepared in a cer-
tain way, had been added, and which
had not been sweetened, was taxable
at forty cents a pound, after the 1st of
August, 1866.
Id.

3. A manufacturer of tobacco made a

pretended sale of a quantity of to-
bacco on the day before an Act in-
creasing the tax on it went into effect,
and paid the tax as on a sale. The
increased tax went into operation, and
was afterwards reduced again below
the former rate. After the reduction
he sold the tobacco, but made no re-
turn of the sale and paid no tax on it:

Held, That the transaction was ille-
gal, and that the manufacturer had no
right to pay the tax when he did.

It was also the course of business,
in his establishment, to remove from
the wholesale department to the re-
tail department a quantity of tobacco
at once, and to make a return and pay
tax on it as one sale, and not to make
any record, or return, or pay any tax
on the actual sales of it in the retail
department:

Held, That this was an illegal mode
of doing business, and that it was for
the jury to say what was the intent of
the manufacturer in adopting that
mode.
Id.

4. Under the 44th section of the internal
revenue Act of July 20, 1868 (15 U. S.
Stat. at Large, p. 142), and the joint
resolution of the same date, if a per-
son, having a wash and also a still on
his premises, capable of distilling,
does there distill fermented liquors,
his premises not being an authorized
distillery, all the personal property
found in the premises is forfeited, not-
withstanding that the product of the
establishment be not distilled spirits,
but vinegar. The U. S. v. Steen &
Cwergius' Factory,

172

5. The 48th section of the internal rev-
enue Act of July 20th, 1868, as amend-
ed by the 12th section of the Act of
June 6th, 1872 (17 U. S. Stat, at Large,
240), imposes a tax, to be collected by

affixing a stamp on each bottle, " on
all wines, &c., made in imitation of
sparkling wine or champagne, but not
made from grapes grown in the United
States." An information was filed
against certain wines, alleging that
they were imitation sparkling wines,
made "by the direct injection of car-
bonic acid gas, by a wholly mechan
ical process, into wines made from
grapes grown in the United States,
not in and as a part of the process of
fermentation and manufacture of said
last mentioned wines, but as a new
and additional process of manufacture,
by using such wines (the same being
already the completely fermented
juice of said grapes) with said car-
bonic acid gas injected therein as
aforesaid, to make a new product
known as and being an imitation
sparkling wine or champagne." The
claimant of the wine demurred to the
information:

Held, That the article was none the
less free from tax, as being "made
from grapes grown in the United
States," notwithstanding the carbonic
acid gas was injected by a separate
process of manufacture. The U. S. v.
One Case, &c.,

493

6. A manufacturer of cosmetics in New
York, having received an order from
a customer at Havana, put up the
goods and sent them, without any in-
ternal revenue stamp being affixed to
any of the boxes, to the wharf of the
Havana steamer, for transportation to
Havana. The owners of the steamer
gave a receipt for them. They were
then seized by the Government, and
an information was filed to forfeit
them, on the ground of their not hav-
ing stamps on the boxes. The goods
were not manufactured in the ware-
houses prescribed by the 28th section
of the internal revenue Act of March
3d, 1873 (12 U. S. Stat. at Large, 727),
and the 168th section of the Act of
June 30th, 1864 (13 Id. 296):

Held, That, under the 167th section
of the Act of June 30th, 1864, as
amended by the 1st section of the Act
of March 3d, 1865 (Id. 482), the goods
should have been stamped, although
they were intended for exportation,
and, not having been stamped, were
liable to forfeiture. The U. S. v. 236
Dozen Boxes, &c.,
543