alike, although in different degrees, to every individual owner of property in a state by reason of the suppression, in violation of the act of Congress, of free competition between interstate carriers engaged in business in such state; not such a direct, actual in

The bill also alleges "that many of said lands are vacant and unsettled and located in regions not at present reached by railway lines, and depend for settlement upon the construction of lines in the future; that it has heretofore been the practice of said Great Northern and Northern Pacific Railway Com-jury as that provided for in the 7th section panies, respectively, to extend spur lines in- of the statute. If Minnesota may, by an to territory adjacent to each of said roads, original suit, in its name, invoke the jurisas well as into new territory, for the pur- diction of the circuit court, because, alone, pose of developing such territory, as well as of the alleged remote and indirect injury to to obtain traffic therefrom; that such new its proprietary interests arising from the lines have been built in the past very largely mere absence of free competition in trade by reason of the rivalry heretofore existing and commerce as carried on by interstate between said companies for existing, as well carriers within its limits, then every state, as new, business; that under the consolida- upon like grounds, may maintain, in its tion and unity of control hereinafter set name, in a circuit court of the United forth such rivalry will cease, and many of States, a suit against interstate carriers enthe lands now owned by the state of Minne-gaged in business within their respective sota will not be reached by railroads for limits. Further, under that view, every inyears to come, if at all, owing to such com- dividual owner of property in a state may, bination and consolidation removing all upon like general grounds, by an original rivalry and competition between said com- suit, irrespective of any direct or special inpanies; that the settlement and occupation jury to him, invoke the original jurisdiction of said lands will add very much to their of a circuit court of the United States, to value, and such occupation will depend en- restrain and prevent violations of the antitirely upon the accessibility of railway lines trust act of Congress. We do not think and transportation facilities for marketing that Congress contemplated any such meththe products raised thereon; that if said ods for the enforcement of the anti-trust act. lands are sold and become occupied, they We cannot suppose it was intended that the will add very largely to the taxable value enforcement of the act should depend in any of the property of the state, and that said degree upon original suits in equity instilands cannot be so sold, or the income of tuted by the states or by individuals to prethe state increased thereby, without the con- vent violations of its provisions. On the struction of railroad lines to, or adjacent to, contrary, taking all the sections of that act the same." together, we think that its intention was to limit direct proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations of the antitrust act as cause injury to the general public, or to all alike, merely from the suppression of competition in trade and commerce among the several states and with foreign nations, to those instituted in the name of the United States, under the 4th section of the act, by district attorneys of the United States, acting under the direction of the Attorney General; thus securing the enforcement of the act, so far as direct proceed

It was further alleged that the state is the owner of, and has maintained at large expense, a state university, hospitals for the insane, normal schools for teachers, a training school for boys and girls, schools for deaf, dumb, blind, and feeble-minded persons, a state school for indigent and homeless children, and a state penitentiary; that a great portion of the supplies of every kind for such institutions must, of necessity, be shipped over the different lines of railway owned and operated by the Northern Pacific and Great Northern Railway Companies;ings in equity are concerned, according to that the amount of taxes which the state must collect, and the successful maintenance of its public institutions, as well as the performance of its governmental functions and affairs, depend largely upon the value of the real and personal property situated within the state, and the general prosperity and business success of its citizens; and that such prosperity and business depend very largely upon maintaining in the state free, open, and unrestricted competition between the railway lines of those two companies.

The injury on account of which the present suit was brought is at most only remote and indirect; such an injury as would come

some uniform plan, operative throughout the entire country. Possibly the thought of Congress was that by such a limitation upon suits in equity of a general nature to restrain violations of the act, irrespective of any direct injury sustained by particular persons or corporations, interstate and international trade and commerce, and those carrying on such trade and commerce, as well as the general business of the country, would not be needlessly disturbed by suits brought, on all sides and in every direction, to accomplish improper or speculative purposes. At any rate, the interpretation we have given of the act is a more reasonable one.

4. The sufficiency of the indictment as evidence of probable cause in proceedings for the removal, under U. 8. Rev. Stat. § 1014 (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 716), to another Federal district for trial, of a person there charged with an offense against the United States, cannot be impeached (if impeachable at all) by evidence tending to show that the grand jury did not have testimony before it sufficient to justify its action.

[No. 535.]

Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:

This case turns upon the efficacy of ar indictment in removal proceedings. The government offered no other evidence of petitioner's guilt. His counsel state in their brief:

"The controlling questions to be discussed on this appeal are whether the indictment offered in evidence before the commissioner can be regarded as conclusive evidence against the accused of the facts therein al

Argued March 9, 10, 1904. Decided April leged; whether it was competent at all as

evidence of such facts, and whether such indictment was entitled to be accorded any probative force whatever."

At the outset it is well to note that this is

not a case of extradition. There was no proposed surrender of petitioner by the United States to the jurisdiction of a foreign nation, no abandonment of the duty of protection which the nation owes to all within its territory. There was not even the qualified extradition which arises when one state within the Union surrenders to

Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: On July 23, 1903, a grand jury of the cir- another an alleged fugitive from its justice. cuit court of the United States for the east- There was simply an effort on the part of ern district of New York found and returned the United States to subject a citizen found an indictment under § 1781, Rev. Stat. (U. within its territory to trial before one of S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1212), charging its own courts. The locality in which an ofGeorge W. Beavers, an officer of the govern- fence is alleged to have been committed dement of the United States, with having re-termines, under the Constitution and laws, ceived money for procuring a contract with the government for the Edward J. BrandtDent Company. A warrant for the arrest

of the official was issued to the marshal of the district, and returned "not found." Thereupon a complaint, supported by affidavit, was filed in the district court of the United States for the southern district of New York, alleging the finding of the indictment, the issue of the warrant, the return "not found," and that Beavers was within the southern district of New York. Upon this complaint a warrant was issued, Beavers was arrested and brought before a commissioner. A hearing was had before that officer, and upon his report the district judge of the southern district signed an order of removal to the eastern district. Before this order could be executed Beavers presented his petition to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York for a writ of habeas corpus. After a hearing thereon the application for discharge was denied, and thereupon an appeal

the place and court of trial. And the question is, What steps are necessary to bring the alleged offender to that place and before

that court?

Obviously, very different considerations are applicable to the two cases. In an extradition the nation surrendering relies for future protection of the alleged offender upon the good faith of the nation to which the surrender is made; while here the full continued after the removal from the place protecting power of the United States is of arrest to the place of trial. It may be conceded that no such removal should be summarily and arbitrarily made. There are risks and burdens attending it which ought not to be needlessly cast upon any individual. These may not be serious in a removal from New York to Brooklyn, but might be if the removal was from San Francisco to New York. And statutory provisions must be interpreted in the light of all that may be done under them. We must never forget that in all controversies, civil or criminal, between the government and an individual, the latter is entitled to reasonable protection. Such seems to have been the purpose of Congress in enacting § 1014, Rev. Stat. (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 716), which requires that the order of removal be issued Assistant Attorney General Purdy for by the judge of the district in which the appellee. defendant is arrested. In other words, the

was taken to this court.

Messrs. Max D. Steuer, Bankson T. Morgan, and William M. Seabury for appellant.

*83

⚫82

removal is made a judicial rather than a more certain by two inquiries and two inmere ministerial act.

In the light of these considerations we pass to an inquiry into the special matters here presented. Article 5 of the amendments to the Constitution provides:

dictments. Within the spirit of the rule of giving full effect to the records and judicial proceedings of other courts, an indictment, found by the proper grand jury should be accepted everywhere through the United States as at least prima facie evidence of the existence of probable cause. And the place where such inquiry must be had and the decision of a grand jury obtained is the locality in which, by the Constitution and laws, the final trial must be had.

"No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger." While many states, in the exercise of their While the indictment is prima facie eviundoubted sovereignty (Hurtado v. Califor- dence, it is urged that there are substantial nia, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. ed. 232, 4 Sup. Ct. reasons why it should not be regarded as Rep. 111, 292), have provided for trials of conclusive. An investigation before the criminal offences upon information filed by grand jury, it is said, is generally ex partethe prosecuting officer, and without any although sometimes witnesses in behalf of previous inquiry or action by a grand jury, the defendant are heard by it-and the conthe national Constitution, in its solicitude clusion of such ex parte inquiry ought not for the protection of the individual, requires to preclude the defendant from every dean indictment as a prerequisite to a trial. fense, even the one that he was never within The grand jury is a body known to the com- the state or district in which the crime is mon law, to which is committed the duty of charged to have been committed, or authorinquiring whether there be probable cause ize the government to summarily arrest him to believe the defendant guilty of the offense wherever he may be found, transport him, charged. Blackstone says (vol. 4, p. 303): perhaps, far away from his home, and sub"This grand jury are previously instruct-ject him, among strangers, to the difficuled in the articles of their inquiry, by a ties and expense of making his defense. charge from the judge who presides upon the bench. They then withdraw, to sit and receive indictments, which are preferred to them in the name of the King, but at the suit of any private prosecutor; and they are only to hear evidence on behalf of the prosecution; for the finding of an indictment is only in the nature of an inquiry or accusation, which is afterwards to be tried and determined; and the grand jury are only to inquire, upon their oaths, whether there be sufficient cause to call upon the party to answer it. A grand jury, however, ought to be thoroughly persuaded of the truth of an indictment, so far as their evidence goes; and not to rest satisfied merely with remote probabilities: a doctrine that might be applied to very oppressive purposes."

The thought is that no one shall be subjected to the burden and expense of a trial until there has been a prior inquiry and adjudication by a responsible tribunal that there is probable cause to believe him guilty. But the Constitution does not require two such inquiries and adjudications. The government, having once satisfied the provision for an inquiry, and obtained an adjudication by the proper tribunal of the existence of probable cause, ought to be able, without further litigation concerning that fact, to bring the party charged into*court for trial. The existence of probable cause is not made

It is unnecessary to definitely determine
this question. It is sufficient for this case
to decide, as we do, that the indictment is
prima facie evidence of the existence of
probable cause. This is not in conflict with
the views expressed by this court in Greeno
v. Henkel, 183 U. S. 249, 46 L. ed. 177, 22
Sup. Ct. Rep. 218. There it appeared that
after an indictment had been found by a
grand jury of the United States district
court for the southern district of Georgia
the defendants were arrested in New York;
that on a hearing before the commissioner
he ruled that the indictment was conclusive
evidence of the existence of probable cause,
and declined to hear any testimony offered
by the defendants. Upon an application to
the district judge in New York for a re-
moval, he held that the indictment was not
conclusive and sent the case back to the
commissioner. Thereupon testimony was
offered before the commissioner, who found
that there was probable cause to believe the
defendant guilty, and upon his report the
district judge ordered a removal. We held
that, under the circumstances, it was not
necessary to determine the sufficiency of the
indictment as evidence of the existence of
probable cause, and that as the district
judge found that probable cause was shown
it was enough to justify a removal.
I' is further contended that-
"There was no jurisdiction to apprehend

*86

the accused, because the complaint on re- has no personal knowledge of the facts, he moval was jurisdictionally defective, in that may, with entire propriety, make the comit was made entirely upon information, with-plaint upon information and belief, stating out alleging a sufficient or competent source the sources of his information and the of the affiant's information, and ground for grounds of his belief, and annexing to the his belief, and without assigning any reason complaint a properly certified copy of any why the affidavit of the person or persons indictment or equivalent proceeding which having knowledge of the facts alleged was may have been found in the foreign country, not secured." or a copy of the depositions of witnesses having actual knowledge of the facts, taken under the treaty and act of Congress. This will afford ample authority to the commissioner for issuing the warrant."

The indictment alone was, as we have seen, a showing of probable cause sufficient to justify the issue of a warrant.

This contention cannot be sustained. The complaint alleges on information and belief that Beavers was an officer of the government of the United States in the office of the First Assistant Postmaster General of the United States; that, as such officer, he was charged with the consideration of allowances for expenditures, and with the procuring of contracts with and from persons proposing to furnish supplies to the said Postoffice Department; that he made a fraudulent agreement with the Edward J. Brandt-Dent Company for the purchase of automatic cashiers for the Postoffice Department and received pay therefor; that an indictment had been found by the grand jury of the eastern district, a warrant issued and returned "not found," and that the de-cerning what testimony was presented to, fendant was within the southern district of New York. This complaint was supported by affidavit, in which it was said:

"Deponent further says that the sources of his information are the official documents with reference to the making of the said contract and the said transactions on file in the records of the United States of America and in the Postoffice Department thereof and letters and communications from the Edward J. Brandt-Dent Company with reference to the said contract, *and from the indictment, a certified copy of which is referred to in said affidavit as Exhibit A, and the bench warrant therein referred to as Exhibit B, and from personal conversations with the parties who had the various transactions with the said George W. Beavers in relation thereto; and that his information as to the whereabouts of the said George W. Beavers is derived from a conversation had with the said George W. Beavers in said southern district of New York in the past few days, and from the certificate of the United States marshal for the eastern district of New York, indorsed on said warrant."

This disclosure of the sources of information was sufficient. In Rice v. Ames, 180 U. S. 371, 45 L. ed. 577, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 406, a case of extradition to a foreign country, in which the complaint was made upon information and belief, we said (p. 375, L. ed. p. 581, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 408): "If the officer of the foreign government

With reference to other questions we remark that, so far as respects technical objections, the sufficiency of the indictment is to be determined by the court in which it was found, and is not a matter of inquiry in removal proceedings (Greene v. Henkel, 183 U. S. 249, 46 L. ed. 177, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 218); that the defendant has there no right to an investigation of the proceedings before the grand jury, or an inquiry con

or what witnesses were heard by, that body.
In other words, he may not impeach an in-
dictment by evidence tending to show that
the grand jury did not have testimony be-
fore it sufficient to justify its action. Such
seems to have been the purpose of most, if
not all, of the testimony offered by the pe-
titioner in this case. As his counsel stated
during the progress of the examination be-
fore the commissioner: "We hold that we
have an absolute right in a proper proceed-
ing to expose what took place before the
grand jury. We don't do it at all in order
to make a disclosure of what transpired be-
fore a secret body. We do propose to show
what transpired before that grand jury so
as to show that there was not any evidence
upon which that body could have found an
indictment,—a legal, valid, lawful indict-
ment-against George W. Beavers. We
have no other purpose in calling this wit-
fore the grand jury." But the sufficiency
ness or any other witness who appeared be-
of an indictment as evidence of probable
cause in removal proceedings cannot be im.
peached (if impeachable at all) in any such
manner. Neither can a defendant in this
way ascertain what testimony the govern-
ment may have against him, and thus pre-
pare the way for his defense.
no other questions that seem to us to re-
quire notice.

There are

We see no error in the record, and the judgment is affirmed.