32D CONG....2D SESS.

My opinion, if your lordship will allow me to express it, regards this country, for the present is, that it will be rrun by American adventurers, and consequently bring her Majesty's Government disagreeable communicais with the United States, which possibly might be ided by an immediate negotiation with Mr. Castellon for protectorate and transit favorable to British interests. e welfare of my country, and the desire of its obtaining control of so desirable a spot in the commercial world, free it from the competition of so adventurous a race as North Americans, induce me to address your lordship th such freedom."

And Lord Palmerston, in a letter addressed to the British agents in Central America, asking Formation as to the boundaries of the Mosquito "You will also report what in gdom, says: our opinion is the line of boundary which her Majesty's Government should insist upon as absoately essential for the security and well-being of be Mosquito shore;" and without waiting for a ply, says, in a circular letter to the representaes of his Government, that "the right of the King of Mosquito should be maintained as exending from Cape Honduras down to the mouth f the river San Juan." The answer of ChatId, the English factotum in Central America, imoves on Lord Palmerston's exaggerated claim, d says that the Mosquito boundary should pass e river San Juan and reach even to Chagres; beuse, he says, "looking to the probable destiies of these countries, considerable advantages night accrue in after times by reserving the rights of Mosquito beyond the river San Juan," and ggests, as Manning had done, an "early asseron" of these claims.

The actual seizure with armed force of the port San Juan, the only terminus of the inter-oceanic mmunication on the Atlantic side, under pretext the right of the Mosquito King, and the knowlIge of the schemes and designs revealed by the Dove extracts, prompted Mr. Hise to make the fort to conclude his proposed treaty. In the fear * England, but under the pretexts of want of uthority, the administration of General Taylor could not even submit the convention to the Sense, and withheld it from the Senate on a call for it, sappears from Senate Journal, February 13th, 850. However, General Taylor did what Mr. uchanan had so singularly omitted to do. He anvered to the applications which the Nicaraguan public had addressed to this for protection gainst English encroachment, and says, after a cognition of the correctness of the positions ken by the Nicaraguan government, that "the presentations of Nicaragua had been received ith lively and painful interest," and that the nited States would coöperate to "vindicate her st territorial rights, and secure her peace and osperity." Assurances to the same purpose ere made by Mr. Clayton. How have they been deemed by him or his successor?

Mr. Squier received instructions from Mr. Clayn, from which may be gathered his intention to ake a treaty with Nicaragua, not wholly inconstent with our interests and the promises we had ade. Unfortunately, however, the treaty made arsuant to those instructions was suppressed by r. Webster. And more unfortunately still, Mr. layton made a treaty with England, which, uner the construction given by his successor, surndered the very rights it was intended to protect, d was fatal to the treaty negotiated by his own ent, under his own instructions. Mr. Clayton ys, after a masterly and conclusive argument ainst the right of the English under the Mosito King:

It is manifest, indeed, that the rights claimed by Great itain nominally in behalf of the Mosquito King, but really her own, are founded in repeated usurpations, which urpations were repeatedly and solemnly acknowledged d relinquished by her during the domination of Spain on American continent. Since that domination has ceased, ose claims could have had no other foundation for renewal an the supposed weakness or indifference of the governents invested with the rights of Spain in that quarter."structions of John M. Clayton, Secretary of State, to . Squier, Ex. Doc. 75, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. And again, giving his own views of the Clayand Bulwer treaty:

We have never acknowledged, AND NEVER CAN ACOWLEDGE the existence of any claim of sovereignty in Mosquito King, or any other Indian in America. Po so would be to deny the title of the United States to her n territory. Having always regarded the Indian title as nere right of occupancy, we can never agree that such a le should ever be treated otherwise than as a thing to be tinguished at the will of the discoverer of the country.

Foreign Policy-Cuba-Mr. Marshall.

Upon the ratification of the treaty, (the Clayton and Bulwer treaty,) Great Britain will no longer have any interest to deny this principle, which she has recognized in every other case in common with us. Her protectorate will be reduced to a shadow, "Stat nominis umbra," for she can neither occupy, fortify, or colonize, nor exercise dominion or control in any part of the Mosquito coast, or Central America. To attempt to do either of these things, after the exchange of ratifications, would inevitably produce a rupture with the United States. By the terms of the treaty neither party can protect to occupy, nor occupy to protect." Mr. Clayton further instructs Mr. Squier:

"We are willing to enter into treaty stipulations with the government of Nicaragua that both Governments shall protect and defend the proprietors who may succeed in cutting the canal, and opening water communications between the two oceans. All apprehensions may, and will be removed by the solemn pledge of protection given by the United States, and especially when it is known that our object in giving it, is not to acquire for ourselves any exclusive or partial advantage over other nations. Nicaragua will be at liberty to enter into the same treaty stipulations with any other nation that may claim to enjoy the same benefits, and will agree to be bound by the same conditions."

And yet again Mr. Clayton says as to boundaries-and in utter exclusion of the English Mosquito claim:

"Against the aggressions on her territory, Nicaragua bas firmly struggled and protested without ceasing, and the feelings of her people may be judged from the impassioned language of the proclamation of her Supreme Dictator, November 12th, 1848. The moment [says he] has arrived for losing a country with ignominy, or for sacrificing the dearest treasures to preserve it. As regards myself, if the power which menaces sets aside justice, I am firmly resolved to be entombed in the remains of Nicaragua, rather than survive its ruin.""

The eloquent appeal of the Minister of Nicarking than impressive of the disposition of an inagua to his government, is evidence not less strijured people to resist what they believe to be injustice and oppression. Will other nations interested in a free passage to and from the Pacific ocean by the way of the river San Juan and Lake Nicaragua, tamely allow that interest to be thwarted by such pretensions? Meaning of the Mosquito protectorate of Great Britain! "As it regards the United States, this question may be confidently answered in the negative."

Now, if all this means anything, it means to say that Nicaragua has a right to the line of proposed inter-oceanic communication, including the port of San Juan; and that we will protect this right, if she gives us the right of way-every line. The mere fact of treating with her about the matter, acknowledges her right. The instructions to Mr. Squier, provide that Nicaragua shall only "enter inlo treaty stipulations with other nations that may claim to enjoy the same benefit, and will agree to be bound by the same conditions.

This very condition of the treaty with Nicaragua, forces England either "to be bound by the same conditions, "an acknowledgment of the right of Nicaragua to the port of San Juan, or it cuts her off from the equal enjoyment "of the same benefits" of the transit route. Pursuant to these instruccarrying out their spirit and intention, fully and tions, Mr. Squier made a treaty with Nicaragua, fairly. I cannot give the treaty in full, but the following clause shows its character:

ART. 36. "It is expressly stipulated that the citizens, vessels, products, and manufactures of all nations, shall be permitted to pass upon the proposed canal, through the terri tories of Nicaragua, subject to no other, nor higher duties, charges or taxes, than shall be imposed upon those of the United States: Provided always, That such nations shall first enter into the same treaty stipulations and guarantees respecting said canal, as may be entered into between the State of Nicaragua and the United States."

The same provision is made in the treaty of commerce, negotiated at the same time. The right of way was granted by Nicaragua to American citizens; and this treaty, as is obvious, would bring all nations into league against England, if she refused to make the same. Had this treaty been adopted, Nicaragua would have been secured according to her prayer to us, and our solemn pledges to her, against the encroachments of England.

HO. OF REPS.

wise have had, to turn against us those very acts of Mr. Clayton, which, if unwise in the last degree, wanted yet the action of Mr. Fillmore and his Cabinet, to become altogether disgraceful.

Mr. Clayton, pending the negotiations above alluded to with Nicaragua, and no doubt, as he has often declared, for the purpose of concluding forever the British claims, of whatever character, which came in conflict with the rights of Nicaragua, committed the fatal error of treating with England in an affair in which she had no right. He intended, by the very terms of the treaty, to declare that she had no rights. Why, then, in the name of common sense, should he have treated about those rights as if they existed? But here is the article of the treaty on which all the outrageous claims of England are based, and by which, under the construction of this Administration, we are made to yield the whole question originally in dispute, and to stultify ourselves before

the world:

"ART. 1. The Governments of the United States and Great Britain hereby declare that neither the one nor the other will ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship canal; agreeing that neither will ever erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the same, or in the vicinity thereof, or occupy or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America; nor will either make use of any protection which either affords, or may afford, or any alliance which either has, or may have, to or with any State or people, for the purpose of maintaining or erecting any such fortifications, or of occupying, fortifying, or colonizing Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito coast, or any part of Central America, or of assuming or exercising dominion over the same; nor will the United States or Great Britain take advantage of any intimacy, or use any alliance, connection, or influence that either may possess with any State or Government through whose territory the said canal may pass, for the purpose of acquiring or holding, directly or indirectly, for the citizens or the subjects of the one, any rights or advantages in regard to commerce or navigation through the said canal, which shall not be offered on the same terms to the citizens or the subjects of the other."

Now, no doubt this appeared clear to Mr. Clayton, and no doubt he thought that by no greater sacrifice than the great principle of "non intervention by the Powers of Europe in the domestic affairs of the independent States of this continent," he had attained his object and avoided any collision construed the treaty as to make it an acknowlwith England. On the contrary, England has so edgment of all her most extravagant demands. Mr. Bulwer says, in a letter to Mr. Webster, that the agreement was not designed to affect the position of Great Britain as to the Mosquito kingdom--and, argues that the mere reference to protection contained in the treaty recognizes the right and the fact, and that England only meant to say that she would not exercise this protectorate so as to interfere with the proposed canal. Under this construction, England now occupies San Juan-now oppresses Nicaragua, and now sustains the very protectorate under which she had perpetrated all the wrongs we have pledged ourselves to redress. In further evidence of the construction put on this treaty by England, and also her mode of dealing with refractory republics, see this letter from the representative of England in Central America to the government of Nicaragua, 15th August, 1850:

"Instead of insisting on its supposed right to the Mos quito shore, Nicaragua would best consult her interest by at once making good terms with England-for resistance in this matter will be of no further avail. It is impossible that Nicaragua should be ignorant of her Britannic Majesty's relation to the Mosquito question, as it has before it the letter of Viscount Palmerston, of the date 15th April last, in which he declares, in the most clear and direct terms, the utter impossibility of acceding to the pretensions of Nicaragua. On the other hand, the treaty of Messrs. Clayton and Bulwer, about which you have so much to say, and in which you express so much confidence, expressly recognizes the Mosquito kingdom, and sets aside the rights which you pretend Nicaragua has on that coast. The true policy is for Nicaragua to undeceive herself in this respect, and to put no further confidence in the protestations and assurances of pretended friends, (viz. Americans.) It will be far better for her to come to an understanding, with out delay, with Great Britain, on which nation depends not only the welfare and commerce of the State, but also the probability of accomplishing anything positive concerning inter-oceanic communication through her territories, because it is only in London that the necessary capital for such an enterprise can be found."

32D CONG.....2D SESS.

s had forts for centuries, and which she still occupies. late as 1846, Costa Rica negotiated with Nicaragua for privilege of passing through this territory, and in 1848 de overtures for the purchase of it."

This plan for the partition of Nicaragua was esented to her Minister here. He resisted and postulated, but in vain; it was sent to Nicaraa, and, after being considered by the Governent, was replied to by the following decree:

e Director of the State of Nicaragua to its Inhabitants: Inasmuch as the Legislative Assembly has decreed the lowing:

The Senate and Chamber of Representatives of the State
Nicaragua, in Assembly convoked-
DECREES:

ART. 1. The State of Nicaragua does not accept the proet of convention or recommendatory basis, adjusted on 30th of April last, between his Excellency Daniel Web=r, Secretary of State of the United States, and his Excelcy J. F. Crampton, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister enipotentiary of her Britannic Majesty, in respect to the ritorial boundaries between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, d the separation of the Mosquito coast.

ART. 2. The State of Nicaragua is disposed to have the estion started, în connection with the points mentioned, -cussed before imperial arbitrators.

ART. 3. The State of Nicaragua protests solemnly against foreign interference in the affairs of its government, and ainst the use of force to coerce its will or violate its hts.

Given in the Hall of Sessions of the House of Represent-
ves, Managua, July 14, 1852.
AUGUSTIN AVILEZ, Rep. Pres't.
Rep. Sects.

JOAQUIN CUADRA,
MARIANI BOLANOS,
In the Executive Hall of the Senate, Managua, July 16,
MIGUEL R. MORALES, Senate Pres't.

52.

J. DE J. ROBLETO, Senate Sects. "T. GUERRA,

Therefore, let it be executed.

J. L. PINEDA, Supreme Director of the Government of Nicaragua. ANAGUA, July 19, 1852. A true copy:

CASTILLON, Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The following decree had been passed before wiz: in October, 1849) by the same authority: "The Legislative Chambers of the Republic of Nicaraa, in view of past events and existing circumstances, in onformity with the settled sentiments of the people which represents, solemnly declare :

"1. Their adhesion to the principle of the total exclusion · European interference from the domestic and internaonal affairs of the republican American States, as necestry to their peace and independence.

2. That the extension of monarchical institutions by onquest, colonization, or by a support of savage chiefs to overeignty, or savage tribes to national existence, or by ther means upon the American continent, is in opposition the interests of the republican American States, dangeras to their peace and safety, and an encroachment upon eir individual and collective rights."

And thus the affair was suspended; and nothing ut the firmness and decision of the Nicarauan government has saved us from the deep uilt involved in the projet just discussed. When I was discovered that this plan would be opposed y the Minister of Nicaragua, application was hade to his government for his recall; this was efused, as he was a long-tried and trusted repreentative, and the reasons of the demand were sked for; they were not given, but after the death f the then Secretary of State, as lately as the 0th of December, 1852, only the other day, the resent Secretary of State addressed a note to the Minister of Nicaragua, refusing to recognize him n his official character; thus proving the persistnce of this Administration in the same policy which had dictated the refusal to answer the inuiry contained in the letter to Mr. Webster, nserted above, and making the present Secretary of State a sort of administrator, de bonis non, of he unexecuted vengeance of his predecessor.

The last point to which I shall ask the attention of the committee, is the seizure by England of he islands of Roatan, Bonacca, &c., &c., in the Bay of Honduras. This has been completed in wo acts; on the 10th of August, 1851, the superntendent of the Balize took possession of, and ttached these islands as a dependency of the Balize.

.

In July, 1852, they were regularly_organized under the name of the "Colony of the Bay of Islands." That this is a manifest violation of the Clayton and Bulwer treaty, in the sense which it Dears on its face, does not admit of contradiction. But it is contended by the agents of England, that ander the explanations and exceptions and conditions between Mr. Clayton and Mr. Bulwer, hat British Honduras was not within the scope of that treaty, or its dependencies. Now, admiting this proposition, it is a fact known to every

The English did demolish some of their forts, but retained some of their establishments, which violation of the treaty of 1763 led to another war. This war was concluded by a treaty of peace in 1783, by which the English were allowed the privilege of cutting logwood in the district "lying be'tween the rivers Hondo and Balize, provided that 'the stipulation shall not be considered as derogating in anywise from the rights of sovereignty of the King of Spain." It also provides that all English subjects, "whether on the Spanish conti'nent, or in any of the islands whatever dependent upon it," shall retire within the district above defined. As the conditions of this treaty were violated by the English, another was entered into, in 1786. The first article of this treaty is this:

"His Britannic Majesty's subjects, and the other colonist, who have enjoyed the protection of England, shall evacuate the country of the Mosquitos, as well as the continent in general, and the islands adjacent, without exceptions situated beyond the line hereafter described as what ought to be the frontier of the extent of territory granted by his Catholic Majesty to the English, for the uses specified in the third article of the present convention.

"The English line, beginning from the sea, shall take the center of the river Libun, or Jabou, and continue up to the source of said river; from thence it shall cross in a straight line the intermediate land till it intersects the river Wallace, (Balize,) and by the center of the same river the line shall descend to a point where it will meet the line already settled and marked out by the commissaries of the two Crowns in 1783."

The third article provides that the English may cut certain woods, and "gather such fruits of the earth as are purely natural or uncultivated." And

further:

"But it is expressly agreed that this stipulation is never to be used as a pretext for establishing in that country any plantation of sugar, coffee, cocoa, or other like articles, or any fabric or manufacture by means of mills, or other machines whatsover, (this restriction, however, does not regard the use of saw-mills for cutting or otherwise preparing the wood,) since all the lands in question being indisputably acknowledged to belong to the Crown of Spain, no settlement of that kind, or the population which would follow, could be allowed."

In this settlement of boundaries, it will be observed that no islands are included; but as if to exclude all doubt upon that subject, the fourth article of the same treaty provides that the English shall use for certain purposes the island of Casina, of St. George's Key, but that "no fortifications shall be erected, or troops established there." Article fifth also provides that some small islands, (not, however, those now in dispute,) may be used by the English for the same purposes, and with the same restrictions as St. George's Key. "Spanish sovereignty over the country," and the exclusion of any system of government, either military or civil," by any other Power, are expressly provided for in article sixth. It is obvious, therefore, that the British claim to the Balize is a mere possessory right guarantied and limited by treaty, and for certain specific purposes, and it is equally obvious that the islands in dispute are not under the treaties, or in any sense dependencies of

66

HO. OF REPS.

to the State of Honduras, and were acknowledged as her territory by Great Britain herself in 1830, when England disavowed in plain terms the act of the superintendent of the Balize in seizing the island of Roatan. The treaty of 1814 refers to and revives the treaty of 1786 with all the boundaries and rights which it contained, and that treaty is the law of the case at the present day. And England has so recognized it to be by acts of Parliament as late as 1819, and now in force, which amends an act passed in 1817, in which these words occur:

"Whereas, grievous murders and manslaughters have been committed at the settlement in the Bay of Honduras, the same being a settlement for certain purposes in the possession, and under the protection of his Majesty, but not within the territory and dominions of his Majesty," &c.

As to the part we should take in any dispute between Guatemala and Great Britain, in regard to the Balize, I have said enough before to indicate my opinion; but upon the much clearer question arising from the seizure of these islands, which were not dependencies of the Balize, but of the State of Honduras, and which were not claimed as dependencies of Balize for a year after the Clayton and Bulwer treaty, and which therefore could not come within the doubtful reservations, secretly made by Messrs. Clayton and Bulwer explanatory, I do not see how Americans can differ. The treaty of 1814 is plainly violated; the Clayton and Bulwer treaty is as openly broken in the clause which provides, "that neither Great Britain nor the United States shall occupy, fortify, or assume, nor exercise dominion over any part of Central America."

We should take such action as would enforce the treaty, let the result be what it may. It would be no war for conquest, but for the maintenance of national honor and good faith. It would result in placing us in our natural position, as the protector of those republics which have been created by the force of our example, and which have a right to look to us for aid in those emergencies in which we are as deeply compromised as they. I believe such a war-even if there should be a war from the assertion of our manifest rights-would terminate with extended territory, augmented power, and increased influence in the world. If, in its results, the ties which would exist between ourselves and the States of Central America, as guardian and ward-if the sympathy of a common republicanism should be drawn yet closer even to a political union-I can see nothing of evil augury in the prospect. Not that I would desire to see war for this or any other purpose, but to avert injury and disgrace; but I believe that such a war, and for such a purpose, is as sound in policy as right in morals.

ACQUISITION OF CUBA.

SPEECH OF HON. V. E. HOWARD,
OF TEXAS,

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
January 6, 1853,

In the Committee of the Whole on the state of the
Union, on the duty of the United States to take
possession of and hold the Island of Cuba.
Mr. HOWARD said:

Mr. CHAIRMAN: I have risen to address some remarks to the committee in reply to the observations of the honorable gentleman from New York, [Mr. BROOKS,] the other day, touching the course of the Administration in relation to the subject of Cuba. I think he has done great injustice both to the law and to the facts connected with the course of conduct pursued by the Administration, and that he has also done injustice to the American citizens who were the victims of Spanish cruelty connected with this affair. It is manifest that the subject of Cuba is becoming one of great and growing national interest in this country. Its importance to my own State consists in this, that if Cuba was The limits laid down for the English in the in the hands of an adverse or unfriendly maritime treaty of 1786, were within the territory claimed Power of any great strength, it would be imposby and recognized by Spain, as belonging to Gua-sible for the States bordering on the Gulf of Mextemala, and that State has the undoubted right, derived direct from Spain, to sovereignty over it. By the same title the islands in dispute belonged

the Balize.

ico to get their products to market; our great staples must rot upon the wharves of our southern commercial cities. It is, therefore, a subject to

32D CONG.....2D SESS.

which we must direct our attention and dispose of in some form or other.

Now, sir, in relation to the expedition which was the subject of the gentleman's comments, I agree in one view expressed by him, and that is, that it was the duty of this Government to suppress all illegal private enterprises against Cuba, or any other foreign country. And, sir, it gives me pleasure to be able to say upon this occasion, that the Administration of Mr. Polk did suppress an illegal expedition that was contemplated shortly after our late peace with Mexico, and into which an effort was made to draw our soldiers on their

return.

The letter of Mr. Buchanan, the Secretary of State of Mr. Polk, which has been so improperly published by this Administration, shows that that Administration interposed and suppressed a contemplated expedition against Cuba; that it issued directions to the officers of the army, and to all its civil officers who could act on the subject, directing that measures be taken that any such expedition should be suppressed. The measures adopted were efficient, and in this respect, the conduct of Mr. Polk's administration stands out in bold and honorable contrast with the course of his successors, for two such enterprises have since been set on foot, and descents upon Cuba effected in both instances. If the present Administration did not permit this expedition to go out, they were at least guilty of great negligence in relation to the matter, for which they ought to be held responsible to a just public opinion. For, sir, I take it to be an absurdity to say that this Government, with all its power, could not arrest an expedition confined to a single steamer. use of ordinary diligence and exertion would have prevented that expedition from going out. Gentlemen on the other side cannot, therefore, accuse a Democratic Administration of this country of being negligent in relation to these expeditions against a neighboring Power; and in that respect, the Democratic party of this country stands in a much more favorable light, not only here, but elsewhere. I have no doubt that General Pierce will take efficient means to maintain and enforce the neutrality laws of the country.

The

in

While I am upon this subject, I may as well refer to another question. I am in favor of the Monroe doctrine; but I am not inclined to sustain certain resolutions that have been introduced into the other branch of Congress by one of the greatest statesmen of the country, which gives a formal notice to the world, that when any foreign Power attempts to settle or colonize on this continent, we will consider it an unfriendly act, a cause of war. I am not for abstract legislation on any subject. I do not see the propriety, by a joint resolution of Congress, of serving notice upon the whole world, after the manner of Richard Roe and John Doe in an action of ejectment, that whenever a colonization establishment, or any other settlement, shall be made upon this continent by a European Power, it shall be immediately a cause of war. I think that abstract legislation in all instances, is improper. The court which wanders beyond the record in deciding a case, judicial proceedings, generally has to retrace its steps; and when the legislator attempts abstract legislation in advance of the times, he commits a fault still greater, and more inexcusable. I prefer that each case should be left to its own circumstances. It is the part of wisdom to leave every case to be determined by its own circumstances. They will not only be a law for themselves, but find a means for their own peaceful solution. To attempt to determine this matter by legislation is not compatible with the theory of our Government. In the first instance, it is more properly a question for the diplomacy of the Government; and in the next place, if diplomacy fails, it is a question for the war-making power. To declare this policy by a law, in the shape of a joint resolution, would in a great measure take it out of the hands of our diplomatic agents, and limit the discretion of the President, to whose custody it has hitherto been confided. Sir, it must be apparent to every reflecting man, that the European Powers are much more likely to quietly concede Cuba to us if we do not thus ostentatiously assert such a principle by legislation, than they are to acquiesce in this doctrine so broadly stated as it has been put forth

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and thereby endanger the peace and security the slave States upon the Gulf, then it word the duty of this Government to interfere, and possession of the Island and hold it as an Âz. can State or an American province.

But, sir, I do not think that the Senate resolutions state the Monroe doctrine fairly. The Monroe doctrine is, that if colonization upon this continent by European Powers shall endanger our safety, shall conflict with our great national interests or peril our institutions, then it will be a cause of war; but it is not, as these resolutions seem to contemplate, that every settlement upon any sandbank on this continent is an offense, which is to result in war. I am opposed to any declaration, by legislative enactment or by joint resolutions of Congress, which would compel us in honor to go to war if a European Power should happen to take | possession of any unimportant or barren spot upon this continent. I am in favor of this doctrine, that whenever a European Power undertakes to make a colonial establishment here which interferes with our great national interests, our national safety, or our institutions, we will then resort to the last argument, if the last argument becomes necessary to free ourselves of the difficulty; but I do not go beyond that. I am in favor of a prac-by at once taking possession of the point of tical enforcement of the doctrine when any necessary case shall arise.

The southern States on the Gulf would be permit Spain, as a matter of revenge in the c a revolution by the Creoles, to abolish slavey that Island, with a view to the destruction of planters. They cannot permit such an ex to be successful so near their shores. The ins of self-preservation is too strong. This mes was threatened during the invasion of Lope never can succeed so long as slavery exists in United States; and any attempt of that sort, en by Spain or any other Power, will be followe an immediate seizure of the Island, either by Government or by the slave States on the G Mexico. There is no principle of internat law that would require a great Governmer: the United States to permit itself to be assailed through a small colonial dependenc another and distant Power. England has very prompt to protect herself from like daer ger. If Cuba had been as near her posses as ours, she would have seized it long sisa half the provocation.

On what principle do the British hold Go Malta, and several other strong positions,

But, sir, I am opposed to these resolutions for another reason. They are inadequate to the subject. They go upon the ground that we will not permit any foreign country to establish any settle-give them control over the commerce of the wo.. ment here; but at the same time that we permit Why, they have assumed them as being necess present establishments to remain as they are, to the protection of their own commerce. that we will never acquire Cuba without the con- this question of necessity, the policy of the G sent of Spain. Now, I am at a loss to understand ernment is well settled, if Cuba should ever say on what the Monroe doctrine, taking that view of from the dominion of Spain to that of ap the subject, is held to be based. If it has any Power. The danger to be apprehended to s sound basis, it must rest on a question of safety country and its institutions from the acquisitie that these colonial establishments interfere with Cuba by any other Power, as well as the inour commerce and institutions, and endanger the of England in relation to the subject, have stability of our Government. Well, if any exist- pointed out and made the subject of comme. ing establishment upon this continent interferes nearly every Administration for more than u in the same way, and is pregnant with the same years. These dangers were suggested by! dangers, is there not as much reason that an ex- Adams while Secretary of State in 182, isting establishment shall cease as there is that a official dispatches to our Minister to Madrid. new establishment or colony shall not be created? his dispatch to Mr. Forsyth, he says: The one principle is precisely as broad as the other, and controlled by the same reasons. Sir, it is not a sound principle of international law which is attempted to be asserted by the Senate resolves. The whole doctrine rests, and can be based upon nothing else than that we have a right, under the international code, to take all those precautionary measures which the safety of the nation requires. Therefore, sir, for one, while Cuba remains in its present position-while it remains quietly under the power of Spain-while its present domestic relations are continued and its internal policy does not endanger our safety-I see no necessity for our attempting any design upon it.

But, on the contrary, if the projects of England should ever take a definite form, which have continued from 1820 to the present time-if there should be danger that any great maritime power will take possession of Cuba, and thereby disturb our safety, by locking up the commerce of the Gulf, including as it does that of the valley of the Mississippi and eight or ten States, then, under the international code as laid down by Vattel, Wheaton, and others, and as the principle has been stated by Chancellor Kent, we would be justified in taking possession of Cuba, although we might in justice and fairness be afterwards compelled to make a fair compensation for it to Spain, if the necessity for such a measure was created without any fault on her part, and if her conduct towards us had been fair and just.

Chancellor Kent thus states the rule on this subject:

"Every nation has an undoubted right to provide for its own safety, and to take due precaution against distant as well as impending danger. The right of self preservation is paramount to all other considerations. A rational fear of an imminent danger is said to be a justifiable cause of war."-Kent, Vattel, b. 2, c. 4, section 49, 50.

I can well conceive that that necessity will probably arise. If any one of the great European Powers were to attempt to possess themselves of the Island, or if they were to attempt, what has been threatened, to change the institutions of the Island so as to make it a second St. Domingo, with a view of striking a blow at slavery in the United States,

"The present condition of the Island of Cuba has en much attention, and has become of deep interest t Union. From the public dispatch and other papes a you will receive with this, you will perceive the gran continued injuries which our commerce is sufferte pirates issuing from thence, the repeated demands upon the authorities of the Island for their suppressioni i the exertions, but partially effectual, of our own against them." "From various sources m tions have been received here, that the British Goversi have it in contemplation to obtain possession of the lan "There is reason also to believe that the political condition of the Island is a subject of much c and of informal deliberations among its own inhala there, observing the course of events, and perhaps end ing to give them different directions."

that both France and Great Britain have political m

In his dispatch of April, 1823, Mr. Adams comments upon the designs of England, wid inhabitants maintaining an independent gr erence to the Island; upon the impossibility d ment, alleging, that "their only alternative pendence must be upon Great Britain or upor United States." In commenting upon the re sity of Cuba to the United States, he says:

"Such, indeed, are, between the interests of that isa. and of this country, the geographical, commercial, st

and political relations, formed by nature, gathering

cess of time, and even now verging to maturity, that looking forward to the probable course of events, short space of half a century, it is scarcely possible to res the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Fe Republic will be indispensable to the continuance an tegrity of the Union itself."

After Mr. Adams was elevated to the President he maintained his policy in relation to Cuba, was substantially repented to our Minister to Sp in 1825, by his Secretary of State, Mr. Clay. D 1827, our Minister to Spain, Mr. A. H. Ever gave information to the Government of an e of England to revolutionize Cuba, based met dispatch of the Spanish Minister at London. Spanish Minister admitted to Mr. Everett, his Government had received information of the efforts of England. Mr. Everett says in hist patch of December 12th, 1827:

"I then mentioned to Mr. Salmon that, according information which the Government of the United Sa had received, the object of the plan was to place the Is under the protection of Great Britain; but that the form

32D CONG....2D SESS.

declaration of independence was to be adopted, in order o avoid awakening the jealousy of the United States; that he United States would not, of course, be deceived by this artifice; that they could not view with indifference these movements of the British Government, considering it, as hey did, as a settled principle, that the Island must in no event pass into the possession of, or under the protection of any European Power other than Spain."

Mr. Van Buren, as Secretary of State, in 1829, n his dispatch to our Minister to Spain, alluded to the designs of England and France with reference to Cuba and Porto Rico. With reference to he importance of the former to the United States, ne said:"

Acquisition of Cuba-Mr. Howard.

Hence if the use of the Havana be even at the disposal of an enemy while in the hands of a neutral Power, each and all of these interests could be with difficulty defended, even by a superior naval force, and never guarantied against severe losses. While from it, as a United States port, a squadron of moderate size would cover the southeast and Gulf coasts, protect the foreign and inshore traders, and secure the lines from New Orleans or New York to the Pacific States by way of the Isthmus-its occupation would necessarily be the object of every expedition, military or naval, preliminary to any attempt on the southern trade or territory."

The rule of international law for which I am

contending, is thus stated by Mr. Wheaton:

"Of the absolute international rights of States, one of the most essential and important, and that which lies at the foundation of all the rest, is the right of self-preservation." It is not only a right with respect to other States, but a duty with respect to its own members, and the most solemn and important which the State owes to them. This right necessarily involves all other incidental rights which are essential as means to give effect to the principal end."

that no change should take place in its condition which night injuriously affect our political and commercial standng in that quarter. Other considerations, connected with a certain class of our population, make it the interest of the southern section of the Union that no attempt should be made in that Island to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave population, the result of which could not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United States."

Mr. Forsyth, as Secretary of State, in his dispatch in 1840, repeated the views of his predecessors, and warned our Minister to be on the look-out against the designs of England on Cuba, of which the Government had been advised. Mr. Webster, in his dispatch as Secretary of State, to our Minister to Spain, says:

"The archives of your legation will show you that the subject of the supposed designs upon the Island of Cuba by the British Government is by no means new, and you will also find that the apprehension of such a project has not been unattended to by the Spanish Government."

In January, 1843, Mr. Webster communicated to our Consul at Cuba, the contents of a communication which he had received from a "highly respectable source," as to renewed designs of England upon Cuba. The writer makes statements about the designs of the British Ministry and British abolitionists, to bring about a revolution in Cuba, and erect it into a "black military republic, under British protection." He remarks, says Mr. Webster, "if this scheme should succeed, the influence of Britain in this quarter, it is remarked, will be unlimited. With six millions of blacks in Cuba, and eight hundred thousand in her West India islands, she will, it is said, strike a death blow at slavery in the United States. Intrenched at Havana and San Antonio, posts as impregnable as Gibraltar, she will be able to close the two entrances to the Gulf of Mexico, and even prevent the free passage of the commerce of the United States over the Bahama Banks, and through the Florida channel." And although Mr. Webster says the Government neither indorses nor rejects these views, they are so stated by him as to show that they made a deep impression on his own mind.

It is apparent from all this correspondence, that it is the settled policy of the Government that Cuba is not to pass from Spain without coming under our own jurisdiction, and that the Island is not in a position to permit it to be an independent government without making it dangerous to our commerce, institutions, and national safety. Since this correspondence, our immense Pacific commerce has arisen, which passes within sight of Cuba.

A very accomplished officer of the Navy, Lieutenant Dalghren, in his report on the subject of fortifications, has expressed an opinion, which is obviously true, that, with all the fortifications we can place on our coast, we cannot protect our commerce in the Gulf of Mexico, with Cuba in the possession of a hostile Government. Indeed, Cuba is far more necessary to us, than Gibraltar or Malta is to England.

Mr. Dalghren says:

"The true and only key, however, to the defense of these shores and to the immense interest there collected, is the Havana. The island to which it belongs enters its western extreme into the Gulf, leaving but two passages for vessels, so narrow as to be commanded with the greatest facility; these are the great thoroughfares of trade, and the mail steamers from New Orleans to California and New York. NEW SREIES.-No. 6.

The European Powers are estopped from denyextent, by having repeatedly acted upon it. By the treaty of Utrecht the French Government was compelled to demolish the fortifications at Dunkirk, because dangerous to others. By the treaty of Paris of 1815, France was compelled to demolish the fortifications of Huningen, and agree never to renew them, because dangerous to Basle. The doctrine of self-defense and self-preservation was the alleged justification of the combination of the Protestant Powers against Louis XIV., and for all the coalitions formed by the allied Powers against France, and more recently for the Congress of Troppau and Laybach, in relation to the Neapolitan revolution in 1820; for the Congress of Verona in relation to the affairs of Spain, and one of the grounds for British interference in the affairs of Portugal in 1826; for the interference of the Christian Powers in favor of Greece, principally on the ground that the contest encouraged piracies, and interfered with commerce; for the interference of Austria, Great Britain, and Russia, in the affairs of the Ottoman Empire in 1840. I do not mention these instances with approbation, but to show the existence of the right in a proper case, and that neither England, France, nor Spain, can complain of its exercise. England has seized possession after possession in India, on the ground that each instance was necessary to the preservation of her other possessions in that country.

The right of a government to take all necessary measures for its safety and self-defense consistent with reason and justice to other Powers, is stated more strongly by European writers than by our own. Vattel asserts that "since, then, every nation is obliged to preserve itself, it has a right to everything necessary to its preservation." * **"A nation or State has a right to everything that can help to ward off imminent danger, and keep at a distance whatever is capable of causing its ruin; and that from the very same reasons that establish its rights to the things necessary to its preservation.

HO. OF REPS.

Astatic possessions. We have been made to feel her power and weight in Mexico, in connection with the Tehuantepec route.

I dissent altogether from the position of the President that it would be inexpedient for us to acquire Cuba, if Spain consents to our acquiring it by treaty or purchase. I hold that it is our highest national interest to become the possessor of that Island as soon as we can by cession from Spain. I cannot see the danger of sectional agitation from its acquisition which is anticipated by the President. There are ten men in the United States now in favor of acquiring Cuba, where there was one in favor of the annexation of Texas at the time of the Tyler treaty. The commercial class of the North generally are in favor of the measure as soon as it can be honorably accomplished. It is obvious that the northern States would be largely benefited by it in a commercial point of view. It is, in my opinion, a great mistake to suppose the acquisition of Cuba would give rise to any fresh agitation of the slavery question. If the Island were in our possession, we should effectually suppress the slave trade, and to that extent, its transfer to us would not only diminish slavery, but arrest a traffic which results in an annual loss of the lives of colored persons, nearly, if not quite equal in number, to those reduced into slavery by the trade. If Cuba were converted into a black republic, it would soon become a mere harbor for pirates, and the northern States would be the first to cry for the acquisition of the country. There is no danger that the North would risk the consequences of rejecting Cuba. They have too much interest in the preservation of the Union; far more than the South. Their whole commercial and manufacturing prosperity rests upon it. We have passed that crisis for the present century.

Neither is there any danger from the character of the population in Cuba. With the aid of the thousands which would flock there from every portion of the United States, they would have no difficulty in working our system. The admission of a free press, and the Protestant religion, would work wonders in the Island in a short time.

I will proceed now to the course of the Administration, which was the subject of the remarks of the honorable gentleman from New York, [Mr. BROOKS,] the other day, touching the treatment which the prisoners taken in the Lopez expedition received by the Spanish authorities of the Island.

I repeat, that I am not a defender of the Lopez expedition, nor of any similar adventurers. But there are many things to be said in extenuation of that unfortunate occurrence. Cuba is, no doubt, oppressed by one of the worst governments on earth. It is more arbitrary than that of the Czar, and less humane because it is governed by officers from Old Spain, whose object is to amass wealth by oppressing the people by burdensome and onerous exactions. General Lopez, an ardent lover of liberty, was inspired with the ambition of freeing his country from this intolerable despotism. He pursued his high purpose with an energy, perseverance and courage, worthy of a better fate. He missed the fame and renown of one of the liberators of the age, only because his efforts were unfortunate. While the leader of a revolution is canonized by success, the unfortunate conspirator is covered with obloquy, and his name shrouded in disgrace. Narciso Lopez perished ignominiously by the garote, but his blood watered a soil that will yet bear the fruits of liberty, and a monument to his memory will hereafter be erected over the spot where he fell, by the hands of freemen. Every revolution generally has a victim before

success.

Cuba is even now in a transition state. It cannot continue long in its present condition. Revolts will continually occur there, for the seeds of liberty have been sown in that devoted Island. The people will be restive under the onerous and oppressive exactions of Spain. With the present commercial policy of that country, the revenues collected from the Island will not pay the army and navy necessary to keep the people in subjection. It is not, therefore, in my opinion, possible for the Island to long remain a dependency of Spain, and we can never with safety permit it to pass out of her dominion without becoming a portion of the United States. Cuba_requires our utmost vigilance. The effort of England and France to induce us into a treaty in relation to the Island; the fact that those Powers combined to place fleets there under pretense of guarding its coast; the fact that England has assumed to erect a colony on the islands off the coast of Central America, and has now a considerable fleet in the Gulf and off the coast of Cuba, under the pretense of arresting the slave trade, all demand our vigilance, and preparation for any emergency. There is no doubt that, since the discovery of gold in Australia, England has, with increased interest,pendence was promulged. There is no doubt that turned her attention to the Gulf of Mexico and the Isthmus, as a line of communication with her

It has been the policy of the authorities of Cuba to represent that the Creoles of the Island did not sympathize with the movement of Lopez. But the reverse is well known; an extensive revolt was at one time planned and organized. That is proved by the multitude of arrests and banishments, by the fact that all the prisons in the Island were crowded to overflowing. After the failure of the first expedition this organization was, to a great extent, broken up. A reorganization took place just before the second expedition of Lopez, and at one place, at least, a declaration of inde

the extent of this movement was greatly exaggerated, and that the revolt was by no means as