émies in Brussels on November 22 last. The gathering was thoroughly cosmopolitan in character; but, although it included many of the world's ablest financiers, it was obliged to adjourn with the confession of its inability to achieve any tangible results in the way of remedying the acknowledged evils of fluctuation and depreciation of the white metal, and, as some even think, without the prospect of reassembling. Many schemes were submitted, but none were adopted. No views on the general question were expressed, save by individual delegates; no experiment was advised, no plan of relief propounded; nor was any compromise accepted or even proposed. Great Britain, pressed by the exigencies of her subjects in India and the cotton-milling districts of Lancashire, offered plans intended to enhance the price of silver; and some of the Continental delegates did the same; but none, not even the Americans, suggested a complete system by which gold and silver could be used as money on equal terms. The instructions to the British delegates prevented them from binding their Government, by vote or speech, to any particular line of action. Chancellor von Caprivi has stated in the Reichstag, that the German delegates were similarly restricted, for the Government, the National Liberals, the Centrists, and even the Socialists of Germany favor the gold standard. France dared not risk independent action; and the other countries of the Latin Union, although these are the largest holders of silver, showed a similar reluctance to join America in an agreement for its extended use. The silver question seems thus to stand in about the position it occupied when the invitations to the Conference were issued the United States being left to solve the problem for itself and in its own way.

Although no definite action was taken, unmistakable evidence was found that the anxiety to escape from the evils of monetary disturbance is moulding the policy of European Governments, and particularly of Great Britain. Her trade interests with the East are deeply affected; and the adop

tion of bimetallism is even now put forward by many as a necessary condition of the solution of the Irish problem. The value of gold has risen 50 per cent since 1871; and, as the tenants contract to pay their rent in gold, the productive power of their holdings must be proportionately increased. The landlords also suffer because mortgages and the like must be satisfied with the appreciated standard. This view of the necessity of a bimetallic standard in order to save the Irish farmers from ruin, is supported by the opinions of Archbishop Walsh and Sir G. L. Molesworth, one of the British Indian delegates.

The uncertainty as to the prospects of silver in America played an undoubted part in rendering negative the results of the Conference. The Sherman Act of 1890, whereby the United States purchases 54,000,000 ounces of silver annually, is perhaps the most important temporary monetary expedient ever brought into play. It has admittedly failed to accomplish its object; and sentiment toward it is changing. The New York Chamber of Commerce has formally petitioned Congress for its repeal; and a bill to that effect was introduced in the Senate on December 7 by Senator Hill of New York. The artificial stimulation of production is invariably accompanied by an uncertainty as to the actual ratio of gold and silver values, which deprives experience and foresight of half their power to deal with impending dangers; and, as long as this uncertainty continues, it is beyond the power of any one to tell how far we are from, or how near we are to, the natural ratio. Besides, whether justified or not, the opinion has prevailed in Europe, that Free Coinage in the United States is a possibility of the near future; and, with the hope thus indulged, that the United States may open up an unlimited market for the surplus silver of other countries, relieving them of the load which the depression of silver imposes upon their commerce, it is perhaps not unnatural that the latter should hesitate somewhat to assume risks which the sequel may possibly show to have been totally unnecessary.

History of the Decline in Silver. Our readers have already followed the movement which led up to the recent Conference, and they know its objects (see Vol. I., pp. 373 and 503, and Vol. II., pp. 79, 129, and 220). How ever, a brief retrospective glance will, at this stage, materially aid us in comprehending the subject. For over fourteen years, the United States has tried to keep up the price of silver by legislation, but has failed. On August 12 last, the price fell, as we have noted, to 377% pence per ounce; and this was followed by a further decline, on December 28, to 3734 pence per ounce, the lowest point ever yet reached.

It was in 1878 that the American policy of silver purchase was begun by the enactment of the Bland Silver Act, compelling coinage of $2,000,000 per month. At that time the price was over 54 pence per ounce; and in that year, the United States produced less than 35,000,000 ounces. By the end of 1878, the average price had fallen to 50 pence, and, although it rose to over 52 pence in May, 1882, its tendency on the whole since that time has been downward. In 1883, the average was 50.59 pence; in 1885, 48.66 pence; in 1888, 42.88 pence; and in 1889, 42.67 pence. In the meantime, 291,272,019 ounces had been purchased at an average cost of about 53 pence per ounce. In 1890, it was pleaded that if government purchases were increased, the metal would rise to the level of par with gold; and the Sherman Act, still in force, was passed, by which purchases were increased to 4,500,000 ounces per month. A temporary rise in price followed, so that the average for 1890 was 47.71 pence. In 1891, however, it was only 45.08 pence; and, during 1892, the movement has been steadily downward to a point unprecedentedly low. Taking the figures up to November 1 last, the United States has purchased under the Act of 1890, 120,479,981 ounces of silver at a cost of $116,783,590. And altogether since 1878, she has bought 411,752,000 ounces at a cost of $424,982,852. At the present price, this silver would realize, if it could be sold, only $338,666,020. At the same time,

the production of the metal has increased, the country producing last year nearly 60,000,000 ounces.

But

The causes of the decline in the price of silver are various. Among them, as we have pointed out, are the largely increased production and speculation stimulated by the artificial demand created and the uncertainty as to the future of the metal. even before the policy of purchase was adopted, a marked decline had begun. The German change to a gold standard in 1873 was the initial measure. It created a demand for about £80,000,000 sterling in gold, and threw upon the market some £54,000,000 in silver. For two centuries previously, gold and silver had fluctuated but little in relative value, being always convertible at about 15%1⁄2 to 1. It is true that some countries, e. g. England, had since 1816 used only gold as a legal tender, while in Germany and the East silver had been the only metal so used; but, occupying an intermediate position, there stood France and the other countries which in 1865 formed the Latin Union, where both metals, at the fixed ratio of 151⁄2 to 1, might be used in legal tender, and be received at the mints in unlimited quantities. During this period, the mints of the United States also were open to both metals at the ratio of 16

to I.

Thus, for many years, the evils of fluctuation, now so marked, were practically unknown. But since the demonetization of silver in Europe some twenty years ago, following Germany's change of standard, the course of the market for silver has been generally downward and unsteady. The evil has been aggravated by several other causes-artificial inflation, already mentioned; the low cost of production, which, in some American mines, is only a little over one-third of the present reduced price; and more recently, the sale in India of some 7,000,000 ounces of silver a month for gold with which to pay the interest on the public debt.

Should Europe return to her old policy, resuming the use of silver as legal tender upon a fixed ratio to gold, and at the same time opening her mints with equal freedom to the coin

age of both metals, no doubt much of the evil resulting from the present loss of the par of exchange would be removed. Experience shows that as long as that system was in force, the ratio of value varied but little notwithstanding the variations in production and use of the metals. Although a return to the old order was not to be expected, it was hoped that some international compact might be made as a result of the recent Conference at Brussels, whereby the powerful influences of Governments, which determine the monetary use of the metals, might be effectively enlisted in some broad scheme for the restoration of silver and the maintenance of its parity of ratio with gold. It is admitted on all hands that something must be done, and that quickly. Silver cannot very long retain its present anomalous position. It must either be rehabilitated in some degree, or pass out of monetary use except in the Far East.

The American Proposals.

The following countries besides the United States were represented at Brussels: Great Britain, India, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Hungary, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Russia, Servia, Roumania, and Mexico. The following is the full list of American delegates: Senators Allison, of Iowa, and Jones, of Nevada; Congressman McCreary, of Kentucky; H. W. Cannon, President of the Chase National Bank, of New York; President Andrews, of Brown University; E. O. Leech, Director of the Mint; Professor Ronald P. Falkner, of the University of Pennsylvania; T. W. Cridler; T. T. Keller; and J. T. Morgan. M. Beernaert, the Belgian Prime Minister, opened the proceedings with an inaugural address of welcome. On motion of Mr. Terrell, the United States Minister to Belgium, M. Montefiore Levi, a Belgian delegate, was unanimously chosen to preside at the Conference.

As the United States had invited the Conference, it fell to the American delegates to open the discussion and submit a line of procedure. This was done by Senator Allison, in behalf of

his colleagues, at the second session on November 25. After a few preliminary remarks of a general nature, in the course of which it was declared that the United States had no desire to press the adoption of any plan embarrassing to any other Government, but desired, above all things, a full and free discussion of the whole subject, the following general plans of international bimetallism were submitted for discussion-first, the plan of M. Moritz Levi, proposed to the Monetary Conference of 1881; second, the plan of the late Professor Adolph Soetbeer; and, third, the American proposals, which were embodied in the following resolutions:

1. That the re-establishment and maintesilver, and the continued use of both as nance of a fixed parity between gold and coined money of full debt-paying power, would be productive of important benefits to the world.

2. That these ends can be accomplished by removing the legal restrictions which now exist on the coinage of silver into full legal tender money, and restoring by international agreement the parity of value between the metals which existed prior to 1873 this Conference. at such a ratio as may be decided upon by

3. That the essential provisions of such an international arrangement should be (a) unrestricted coinage of both gold and silver into money of full debt-paying power, (6) fixing the ratio in coinage between the two

metals, (c) establishing a uniform charge, if any, to the public, for the manufacture of gold and silver coins.

The British Proposals.

The greatest interest in the proceedings centered around the discussion of the plan submitted November 28 by Alfred de Rothschild, one of the British delegates. Mr. de Rothschild is a Director of the Bank of England, and is head of the English branch of the great banking house of Rothschild. Although arguing, as did his colleagues subsequently, that it was impossible for Great Britain to depart from her present monometallic gold standard, he yet recognized the need of some action calculated to raise the price of silver and improve its present monetary position. this end he proposed that the United States should continue, as at present, to purchase silver at the rate of 4,500,

try in favor of abolishing a system under which silver has been forced down to the lowest price on record, in spite of the fact that that system was designed to raise the value of the metal. It is conceded that the international adoption of the Rothschild proposal might temporarily raise the market value of silver; but the cooperation of foreign Governments would cease should silver rise to 43 pence (about 94 cents), and the further burdens of keeping up the market would fall upon the United States alone, without the latter country being brought any nearer a final solution of the problem. Besides, a treaty giving effect to the proposal, would bind the United States not to repeal the Silver Act of 1890 for at least five years; and such a treaty would be opposed by a considerable section of the United States Senate, as well as a large share of opinion in the financial circles of the country. Among the Republican Senators, Mr. Sherman has already opposed the continuance of the purchase policy; while an important section of the Senate look with disfavor upon any tentative scheme which would delay for years all action by the United States in the direction of free coinage.

The fate of the Rothschild proposal was therefore not unexpected. On the votes of the delegates from France, Italy, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and Russia, it was rejected by the Committee. In the course of the discussion, Mr. Cannon informed the delegates, that unless the Conference should make some disposition of the question at issue, it was more than probable that America would be unwilling to continue her purchases at the present rate of 54,000,000 ounces per year. He also pointed out that under existing legislation in the United States there were no means of limiting the production of silver; for the imposition of a tax on its production would not only interfere with private rights, but would necessitate the establishment of elaborate customs regulations along the Mexican and British borders, to prevent the smuggling of the ore and metal.

On December 6, Mr. de Rothschild

withdrew his scheme from the further consideration of the Conference.

Various Other Plans.

Several other proposals besides the American and British were discussed. Professor Soetbeer's plan, already mentioned, is to establish one gramme of fine gold as the international unit of value, and to stop the minting of coins containing less than 5.8065 grammes of pure gold. The circulation of foreign coin of less than the new standard will be prohibited by the countries signing the agreement, and gold coin of inferior value will be withdrawn within five years. Private individuals will be allowed to coin gold upon the payment of an agreed seigniorage. Gold certificates may be issued against gold held in reserve. The plan also includes the coinage of silver in the proportion of twenty value units of that metal to one of gold; but private individuals will not be allowed free coinage of silver. By the withdrawal of small gold coins and notes, it is thought an enlarged field will be offered for silver. This plan, or some modification of it, was looked on with much favor by many of the delegates, although it is confronted with the formidable difficulty of ascertaining just what proportion of the total amount of silver to be taken should be allotted to each of the countries.

The plan submitted by the Danish delegate, C. F. Teitgen, included the coinage of silver five-franc, four-shilling, or dollar pieces, rated to gold according to the price of silver in the year preceding the adoption of the agreement, with a seigniorage of ten per cent. A permanent International Commission should be appointed to fix the initial price; and, if the price of silver should fall five per cent below the coinage ratio, the Commission should have authority to fix a new ratio and order the recoinage of the pieces. These coins will be legal tender internationally, and redeemable at any time in gold from the country issuing them; and banks will be allowed to issue notes against them when held in reserve.

After the withdrawal of the Roths