Case, and in Poud v. Railroad Co., 112 N. Y. 186. Jan. 14, 1890. Ottenot v. New York, L. & W. Ry. Co. Opinion by Earl, J. Finch and Gray, JJ., concur. Ruger, C. J., and Andrews and Peckham, JJ., concur in result. Reversing 2 N. Y. Supp. 722.

RAILROADS-STREET -NEGLIGENCE QUESTION OF FACT.-In an action against a street-railroad company for negligent injury, there was evidence that plaintiff, a boy of thirteen, in crossing the street at a crossing, which was blocked by one of defendant's down-town cars, stepped on the platform of the car to avoid a passing truck; that the conductor kicked at him, and to avoid the kick, plaintiff, without looking to see if a car was coming, jumped on the other track, and was run over by an uptown car. Held, that the questions of negligence and contributory negligence were for the jury. Clark v. Railroad Co., 113 N. Y. 670. Dec. 17, 1889. McCann v. Sixth Ave. R. Co. Opinion by Danforth, J. Earl and Finch, JJ., dissenting. Reversing 3 N. Y. Supp. 418.

RELEASE-BREACH OF CONTRACT-ESTOPPEL. - De. fendant contracted to build a ship for a company which assigned its rights to plaintiff before receiving the ship. Pending the adjustment of accounts between plaintiff and the assignor it was agreed that plaintiff should pay the balance of the price to testator, and the latter should deliver to a third person two bills of sale -one to plaintiff, and one to its assignor - and should receive a receipt conditioned that one of the bills should be delivered to the one entitled to the ship, and the other returned to plaintiff. The receipt also contained a condition that the bill of sale should not be delivered to plaintiff, unless plaintiff's assignor ao* * * quitted testator "for full performance of the contract * * * for the building of said ship." Held, that plaintiff's acceptance of the bill of sale estopped it from maintaining an action for breach of contract, on the ground that testator had not built the ship according to contract. Reed v. Randall, 29 N. Y. 358. Dec. 20, 1889. Oregon Imp. Co. v. Roach. Opinion by Earl, J. Affirming 6 N. Y. Supp. 502.

WILL- -TESTAMENTARY POWERS - EXECUTION.-(1) Testator gave all his property to his wife in trust, to apply the income to her own use during her life, and at her death the estate to be divided among her four sons, a daughter, and the issue of a deceased son, in such shares as she might by will appoint, and, in default of such direction and appointment, the estate to go to such beneficiaries above mentioned, in six equal shares, the issue of the deceased son to take one share. Should either of the beneficiaries die before his or her intended share vested, his or her issue to take such share. By a codicil he directed "that on the death of my said wife the share of my estate to go to our son James and our grandson Charles shall be held by my surviving executors in trust for them during their lives,✶ * * and at their respective deaths the principal shall go to their issue, if any; if none, then the same shall fall into my general estate, or as my said wife shall by will direct." Held, that the power of appointment given the wife by the codicil was contingent upon the death of James or Charles after the death of the widow, and did not give her power to appoint the share of either of them who might die in her life-time to any other than the beneficiaries named in the will. (2) A codicil to the widow's will, void because appointing to persons not authorized by the busband's will, which does not in terms revoke the appointments contained in the will, does not render void a lawful appointment contained in the will of the whole estate to persons who were the objects of the power given by the husband's will. A revocation of an earlier disposition of a will by a later one, or by a

codicil, on the grouud of repugnancy, is never anything but a rule of necessity, and operates only so far as is requisite to give the later provision effect. We have said that in distinct and unqualified terms. Pierpont v. Patrick, 53 N. Y. 595. But no revocation could give effect to this codicil. We have said, again, that where provisions are repugnant it is our duty to preserve the paramount intention of the testator, at the expense, even, of some subordinate particulars. Taggart v. Murray, 53 N. Y. 233. There is no possibility of mistaking what that paramount purpose of Mrs. Austin was. Most of all, she desired to execute the power of appointment with which she was intrusted, and distribute the estate in accordance with that authority. She did so by her will, but in the end preferred to give a reversion to the Oakes children, if she lawfully might. That preference was wholly subordinate to the execution of her power, and no violence is done to her intention if, that failing, the disposition of her will is suffered to stand; for I deem it beyond a reasonable doubt that if she had known what we now know, that an appointment to the daughter's children was not within her authority, she never would have made it, but would have suffered the disposition of her will to remain. In Churchill v. Churchill, L. R., 5 Eq. 44, the testator, exercising a special power, appointed a fund property to his three daughters, who were ob. jects of the power, and then, by a later provision, limited the share of each daughter to a life-estate, with remainder over to her children, who were not objects of the power. Lord Romilly held that "as the subsequent condition and restriction are simply void, the original gift remains unaltered and unaffected by that which has in truth no efficacy whatever." In Duguid v. Fraser, L. R., 31 Ch. Div. 449, the testator gave to his sister a fund for life, with power to divide it by will between her husband and children, as she might determine. She made a will effecting such a division. After its execution one of the sons died, and by a codicil she bequeathed his share in trust for his children, who were not objects of the power. The court held the last appointment void, but held, also, that, since there were no words of revocation, the bad appointment could not serve to revoke the good one. The appellant's counsel criticize this case severely. They say that it is opposed to the American doctrine, and cite three authorities for their assertion: 1 Redf. Wills, 288; Westcott v. Cady, 5 Johns. Ch. 344; Lynch v. Pendergast, 67 Barb. 501. No one of these sustains it in any respect or degree. The first holds the familiar doctrine that will and codicil must be read together. Nobody, as yet, has disputed that. The two cases cited were instances in which the later and repugnant provisions were valid; and, to give them the effect to which they were therefore entitled, it was necessary to treat as revoked certain prior provisions, and nobody doubts that. The counsel further say that the decision was only that of a single judge, and was never reviewed by an appellate court. That might weaken its authority, if any well-considered case had been de. cided to the contrary; but even then its justice and good sense would remain. It is again insisted that in the case cited the gift in the codicil could only take effect by way of revocation pro tanto of the gift in the will, which had au effect over all the funds, unless the codicil had altered it, while here there was a new provision, and the will did not affect the whole fund. We have already held that the codicil can only take effect, if at all, by way of revocation, and that the will does dispose of the whole fund. Jan. 14, 1890. Austin v. Oakes. Opinion by Finch, J. Modifying 1 N. Y. Supp. 307.

WILLS-CONSTRUCTION - EVIDENCE-TRANSACTIONS WITH DECEDENTS.-(1) Testator gave his real estate, which he estimated at certain values, to different de

visees. To his wife he gave the use of his farm for life, with remainder to her children. He valued the farm at $15,000. He gave his residuary estate "to the same parties, in the same ratio and propertion as are given and specified in the foregoing bequests." By a codicil, after stating that he had given a life estate in the farm to his wife, with remainder to her children, he provided: "In lieu and instead of said bequests, I do hereby give the said L. (testator's wife), and her heirs, $8,000," etc. Held, that the codicil did not deprive the wife of her right to share in the residue of the estate, but simply substituted the $8,000 for the farm, and gave her a different proportion of the residue of the estate; and that her "heirs" or "children' took the same estate in this sum that they would have taken in the farm under the original will. (2) The fact that one of the legatees died before the death of the testator does not affect the question of distribution or vary the proportions; but his legacy lapsed and fell into the residue, and his proportion of the residuary estate passed to his next of kin. (3) Where plaintiff contends that his intestate, a deceased legatee, is enti tled to part of the share of defendants, who were also legatees by virtue of an agreement between them, and a conversation which took place prior to the agreement between intestate and one of the defendants, and in which intestate urged a compromise by which his share should be increased, and all opposition to the probate of the will should be withdrawn, is in evidence without objection, testimony of defendants, that they believed and relied on intestate's representations when they signed the agreement, is competent, and is not objectionable as evidence of transactions with a decedent, as it is nothing which intestate could contradict as a witness, if living. Jan. 14, 1890. Hard v. Ashley. Opinion by Gray, J. Reversing 6 N. Y. Supp. 69.

WITNESS-TRANSACTIONS WITH DECEASED PERSONS PARTIES TO NEGOTIABLE PAPER.-(1). In an action on a joint note against the surviving maker and the executors of the deceased maker, the surviving maker having an interest in rendering his co-defendant liable as well as himself, is as to transactions that occurred between himself and such deceased maker, tending to show the latter's liability, an incompetent witness by the Code of Civil Procedure of New York, section 829. (2) Where the executor testifies in his own behalf in regard to matters about which plaintiff is prohibited from testifying, the prohibition is thereby removed; the section excepting the case “where the executor is examined in his own behalf." Dec. 17, 1889. Wilcox v. Corwin. Opinion by Danforth, J. Reversing 3 N. Y. Supp. 317.

ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT deCISIONS.

DAMAGES-BREACH OF CONTRACT-LEASE.-The defendant contends that the rule in actions on covenants in leases, express or implied, is that, where the plaintiff has paid no rent or other expense, only nominal damages can be recovered. Such a rule once prevailed. It was adopted in analogy to actions on covenants in deeds of real estate, and it now prevails to a limited extent in the State of New York. Conger v. Weaver, 20 N. Y. 140. In that case Denio, J., not regarding the rule with favor, with apparent reluctance considered that it was too firmly established in that State to be disturbed. In Mack v. Patchin, 42 N. Y. 167, Smith, J., says: "But this rule has not been very satisfactory to the courts in this country, and it has been relaxed or modified more or less, to meet the injustice done by it, to lessees in particular cases." In Pumpelly v. Phelps, 40 N. Y. 59, it is declared that the rule

should not be extended, but limited strictly to those cases coming wholly and exactly within it. In both those cases the circumstances are enumerated which will take cases out of the operation of the rule. They are so numerous as to well nigh abrogate the rule itself. In England the rule has been repudiated, and such ac tions are placed upon the same footing with other actions on contracts. Williams v. Burrell, 1 Man., G. & S. 402; Lock v. Furze, 19 C. B. (N. S.) 96. In this State the rule has not been adopted, and we are not disposed to adopt it. We think it better to discard the rule, so as to be in a position to determine all such cases upon the general principles applicable to other contracts. In that way we think we shall be the better prepared to do justice in each case as it arises. We suppose the correct rule to be that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the rent paid, and the difference between the rent agreed to be paid and the value of the term, together with such special damages as the circumstances may show him to be entitled to. Trull v. Granger, 8 N. Y. 115. Conn. Sup. Ct. Err., Sept. 13, 1889. Cohn v. Norton. Opinion by Carpenter, J.

MALPRACTICE.-In an action for malpractice in the treatment of a broken leg it appeared that in setting the leg and in its treatment defendants exercised ordinary care and skill, and used means and appliances usually used by skillful physicians in such cases; but when the patient was discharged they gave him no instructions as to the care of the injured leg. There was also evidence to show that the bones were not well knit when the patient was discharged. The leg soon be came bent, and finally had to be amputated. Held, that the failure to give instructions as to the care of the leg was negligence for which they were liable. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 28, 1889. Beck v. German Klinik. Opinion by Beck, J.; Robinson and Granger, JJ., dissenting.

MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY OF MASTER-EMPLOYMENT OF SURGEON.-Where a brakeman is injured in the discharge of his duties, and a competent surgeon, called with the conductor's consent, attends him, the conductor has no authority to engage additional surgeons on behalf of the railroad company. The conductor had no authority to employ other sur geons, for his authority was special, not general, and it did not extend beyond the duty created by the emergency which required him to act. With that duty his authority arose, and with it terminated. He had authority to do what the emergency demanded, in or der to preserve his injured fellow employee from seri ous harm; but he had no authority to do more. When the company had procured the services of a competent surgeon, it did all that it was morally or legally bound to do; and the conductor could not impose upon it any greater obligation. We hold that the conductor did have authority to at once employ the surgical aid demanded by the urgency of the occasion; but we hold also that his authority did not extend beyond this limit. Railroad Co. v. McMurray, 98 Ind. 358; Railroad Co. v. Brown, 107 id. 336; Railroad Co. v. Stockwell, 118 id. 98. In the case of Railroad Co. v. Brown, supra, the distinction is drawn between cases where the conductor may bind the company and cases where he may not; and this case belongs to the latter class. The authority of the conductor was exhausted when a competent surgeon was procured; and he could not, as the agent of the company, employ additional surgeons. If the urgency of the case demanded additional surgical aid, the surgeon called might possibly be justified in summoning it; but as held in Railroad Co. v. Brown, supra, if additional assistance is required, the surgeon first called must include the expense in his charges. It is immaterial whether Dr. Judah was called by a brakeman or by the conductor

in person; for if he was called by the direction, express or implied, of the conductor, or if the conductor confirmed what had been done, he could not subsequently employ another surgeon. It is possible that Dr. Smith may be entitled to compensation for one visit that made in obedience to the telegram-for it may be that he had a right to act upon it at once; but when he found the injured man attended by a competent surgeon, he had no right to continue to give the case attention, and charge the company. He was bound to know that when the agent, who possessed limited, special authority, had procured the services of a competent surgeon, his authority was exhausted; and if, with this knowledge, he continued to give the injured man attention, he did it at the expense of some other person than the agent's principal. Ind. Sup. Ct., Nov. 5, 1889. Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Smith. Opinion by Elliott, C. J.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-NEGLIGENCE OF STREET COMMISSIONER.-The commissioner of street cleaning of the city of New York is an agent of the city, and not an officer of the general public, and the city is therefore liable for his negligent acts in the course of his official duties. The injuries to the dumping-boat for which the libellants seek to recover damages were caused by the carelessness of those in charge of the steam-tug belonging to the respondents. Their negligent acts were committed while they were engaged in removing refuse from the streets. These persons were under the immediate employment of the commissioner of street cleaning of the city of New York. That officer, as the head of that municipal department, had the custody of the tug. By act of the Legislature known as the "Consolidation Act" he is charged with the duty of keeping the streets cleaned, and removing refuse, as often as the public health and the use of the streets may require," and is invested with authority to engage and discharge at his discretion all the employees necessary for the performance of the duties of the department. The only legal question in the case which merits notice is whether the city is liable for the negligence of the employees of this department. If the duties delegated to him by law are such as primarily devolve upon the city, as a municipal or corporate obligation, he and his subordinates are the agents of the city, and the respondents are liable for their acts of misfeasance or non feasance done in the course of their ordinary employment. It does not seem reasonable to treat the commissioner as an officer of the general public rather than of the city. His duties, unlike those of the officers of the departments of health, charities, fire and police, although performed incidentally in the interest of the public health, are more immediately performed in the interest of the corporation itself, which is charged with the obligation of maintaining its streets in fit and suitable condition for the use of those who resort to them, Many cases are reported in the decisions of the State courts in which the city of New York has been held responsible to persons who have sustained injuries in consequence of obstructions which have been negligently suffered to intercept the safe use of the streets. The obligation of the city to keep its streets in such condition that those who use them may do so safely has been repeatedly declared, and the failure to remove ice or snow or dangerous accumulations of any kind by the proper authorities is a breach of that obligation. See Providence v. Clapp, 17 How. 161; Todd v. City of Troy, 61 N. Y. 506. The duty of cleaning the streets necessarily comprehends the duty of removing such accumulations. It is quite immaterial that the powers and duties of the commissioner are plenary, and within their sphere exclusive of the authority of other officers of the city. The real question is whether his duties are such as primarily rest upon the municipality itself.

Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U. S. 540; Ehrgott v. Mayor, 96 N. Y. 264. The precise question has been resolved against the contention of the respondents in the case of Engle v. Mayor, not reported, a decision of the Superior Court of New York city in October, 1885, in which Ingraham, J., said: "And the defendant here claims that the power exercised by the street cleaning department, under the provisions of this act, is governmental and public, and comes within the principle established by the case of Maxmillian v. Mayor, etc., 62 N. Y. 160. The municipal corporation of the city of New York, having the powers conferred upon it respecting streets within its limits, owes to the public a duty to keep said streets in a safe condition; and this duty rests upon an express or implied acceptance of the power, and is stated by the court in the case of Maxmillian v. Mayor, etc., supra, to be a duty with which the city is charged for its own corporate benefit, to be performed by its own agents, as its own corporate act. Conrad v. Trustees, 16 N. Y. 158. In Lloyd v. Mayor, etc., 5 N. Y. 375, the Court of Appeals expressly held that the power and duty to clean sewers in the city is clearly ministerial, and falls within the class of private powers; and that the corporation was liable for the negligence of one of its agents employed to perform such duty. In this case it is shown that the pilot of the tug-boat was employed by the street cleaning department in the removal from the streets of the city, street sweepings, ashes and garbage. Acting as such, under the authorities above cited, he was the agent of the city in the performance of the duty with which the city is charged for its own corporate benefit, and the city was liable for the negligent use of its property by its own servant or sub-servant, Lee v. Village of Sandy Hill, 40 N. Y. 442. By the verdict of the jury in this case it is established that the injury sued for was caused by the negligence of the pilot of the said tug, and I think that the city is liable." U. S. Circ. Ct., S. D. N. Y., Aug. 12, 1889. Barney Dumping-Boat Co. v. Mayor, etc., of New York. Opinion by Wallace, J.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.

THE New York State Bar Association enters on the fourteenth year of its existence under many fortunate and gratifying circumstances, among which may be mentioned its large and rapidly-increasing membership. Yet it is not large numbers alone that will give the association permanent success. It is the high character and professional standing of its members upon which it depends for its success. Therefore, a zealous, conscientious scrutiny into the character and standing of persons proposed for membership, frequently resulting in rejections, has been exercised by the committee on admission and by the executive committee. Thus the association has now a membership in all the cities and most of the villages in the State, exerting a combined influence at once prac. tical and useful.

It was a saying of one of the most sagacious and successful politicians known in the history of this State, that a few representative men in each county, acting in concert in promoting the interests of a party, were more effective than a multitude, without organization, This is fully illustrated in the operation of the State Bar Association. Frequent communication between all its members and the secretary, and other officials, has resulted most favorably in attaining many of the objects which led to its formation.

While the bar of the State is so numerous, while its members are apparently so accessible, the members are yet, in many senses, so personally remote from

each other, that some effective measures of association are necessary. It is no fine-drawn conception that for the legal profession there is the same advantage and strength in association and organization that there is in association and organization in other professions.

The interest in the annual meetings of the association is felt throughout the State. This is manifested by the continued large increase in the members who attend them, and the thirteenth year of our existence closed with the largest and most brilliant meeting ever held in the city of Albany.

The great attractions of our annual banquets are exhibited in the largely increasing numbers who attend them, and in the evident pleasure derived from them.

It is certain that lawyers, amid the dry and wearing details of their practice, need the unbending enjoyment and social pleasures of occasions like our annual banquets. The wit and humor, blended with happy mental efforts that give such gusto to them, have a salutary influence upon their health and spirits.

"For my part," said one of the most learned and distinguished members of our profession, "I am always glad to seize any occasion which gives an opportunity to eat a good dinner with my brethren of the bar. It would be far better if we would more frequently' do as adversaries do at law, strive mightily but eat and drink as friends,' therefore let us seize every occasion to repeat a good festive occasion."

It is true that there are persons who, in their reverence for gravity and a dignified presence, object to the banquet, on the grounds that gregarious eating and drinking is plebeianism, and then after-dinner accompaniments, however witty, brilliant and epigrammatic, are wanting in that decorous reserve and dignity, which so well sets off the character of respectable lawyers. 'But, though every knave should assume gravity, every grave man is not a knave; though every fool may seldom laugh, yet every man who laughs is not a fool; we may be serious and honest as well as merry and wise. Gravity is often the disguise of insipid conceit."

The ablest and most impressively eloquent speeches of Webster, Clay, Choate, Wirt, Seward and other great American orators and jurists, were not all delivered to "listening senates," or in the forum. Many of their most famous efforts were after-dinner speeches.

The peculiar charm of such addresses is their apparent spontaniety, their flow of thought, the delicacies, proprieties and grace of diction, which seem to come of themselves. That this is not the extravagant picture of a laudator temporis acti, an appeal is made to the history of both ancient and modern oratory in support of these assertions.

Among the matters that have been transmittted to the executive committee during the year for its action there are many of the highest importance, among which are the following:

A resolution providing for the appointment of a committee to devise a method of relief for the crowded condition of the calendars of the circuit of the Supreme Court, in the First Department, and the delays incident thereto. This resolution was adopted by a unanimous vote of the committee, and very soon after its adoption, President Arnoux, under the power conferred upon him by it, appointed a committee composed of the ablest lawyers and judges in the first judicial district. They immediately entered upon the discharge of their important duties, and while they have as yet made no special report, it is understood they have made practical progress in their work, and it is certain in the near future some plan will be reported by them, which will have the effect designed by the mover of the resolution.

The thirteenth annual report of the proceedings of the association will show that the question, "What

shall be done for the relief of our courts?" has taken a wide range. The question is intensified in interest by the fact that the common delays in the trial or final disposition of cases amounts to a practical denial of justice. The average suitor must reap the fruit of litigation within a reasonable time after bringing his action, or suffer much inconvenience, if not great loss.

The present condition of the Court of Appeals, divided as it is into distinct divisions, each independent of the other, presents considerations of grave import ance. While thus far no particular embarrassments have arisen, and the procedure of both divisions have been exceedingly satisfactory, it is evident that this arrangement must necessarily be only temporary. The Supreme Court has been weakened by placing so many of its members on the bench of the Court of Appeals, largely reducing its working force, causing great embarrassment in the disposition of causes at the Trial Terms, and in the Special and General Terms. These subjects are now practically before the State Bar Association, whose members will make active, and it is believed successful efforts to remove the diffi culties referred to.

Another resolution offered, perhaps of still greater importance, was adopted, providing for the enumeration of all the lawyers in the State, to be prepared by the committee on admissions. After the adoption of this resolution, early in June last, the secretary transmitted copies to the vice-presidents of the association, the chairmen of all the committees, and to the members of the committee charged with the duties of the enumeration. It is gratifying to state that these gentlemen entered upon the discharge of their duties with industry, practicability and determination, and the result has been that the New York State Bar Association has in its rooms a full and perfect list of all the lawyers in the State of New York, the time and place of their admission to the bar, their specialties, and such other facts connected with them as is necessary to present a fair history of the profession in the State. In no case however does the report come to any invidious conclusion, or make any criticism whatever upon character. A careful examination of this list will profoundly impress the reader with the general high character of the members of the profession in the Empire State. Even a passing examination of the report exhibits a class of men, in every county, of the highest characteristics, of excellent learning, having all the attributes that constitute the character of gentlemen and lawyers. It is no affectation to say that it is hardly possible at the present time for a really dishonest man to prosper in the profession.

Another measure adopted by a resolution of the executive committee needs more than a passing remark for its importance, not only in regard to the present, but to the past and the future. I allude to a resolution authorizing the president of the association to appoint a committee of arrangements, to adopt measures for celebrating, on the first Tuesday of February, 1890, the one hundredth anniversary of the judiciary department of the national government by the organization of the United States Supreme Court, in the city of New York. The action of that committee will be so well described by President Aruoux, in his annual address, that I am only required to state that the importance of celebrating the organization of the Supreme Court of the United States, which may well be called the binding ligature of the general government, is so great that we can hardly imagine any other event in the history of our nation of equal magnitude. To the New York State Bar Association will be accorded the lasting honor of taking the initial step in this great celebration.

The actual increase in our membership during the year has been largely in excess of that of any other

year, and quite as large, perhaps, as is conducive to the healthful growth aud prosperity of the institution. During the past year over two hundred have been added to the roll of the association, as our annual reports will show. A comparison of our membership with that of ten years ago shows that its increase since that date has been over three hundred per cent, and that the largest increase has been within the last four years.

Contributions of works of art to the association during the year have been frequent, generous and of the highest order. The list is too large to be detailed in my report, but I venture to name among them a most excellent portrait of Daniel Cady, a name suggestive of profound learning, and of all that is illustrious and great in the character of an American lawyer. The name of Cady in our jurisprudential architecture is like a strong, beautiful column, of the Tuscan order, combining strength, beauty and utility in proportion. This portrait was presented to the association by Isaac Lawton, Esq., of the city of New York.

Scarcely less than this can be said of a beautiful portrait of the Hon. Addison Gardiner, presented to the association by the Hon. Bradley B. Burt, of Oswego. Addison Gardiner, like Daniel Cady, was one of the founders of our legal system-a contemporary of John Duer, John C. Spencer, Benjamin F. Butler and many other men whose names are so bright in our constellation of great and departed jurists of the State. Another valuable work of art, full of historic memories, has been presented to the association. This is a portrait of Chancellor Reuben H. Walworth who, so far as equity law is concerned, may be termed the Bentham of America. Great in learning, great in the practicability of his learning, in the peculiar formation of his mind for dispensing equity law, and the last of the chancellors of the State of New York. This valuable portrait was presented to the association by Charles M. Davison, Esq., of Saratoga, the grandson of the great chancellor.

A very well-executed portrait of Ogden Hoffman has also been presented to the association by Charles A. Atcheson, Esq., of the city of New York.

Even the shadows of such great lawyers and jurists in the rooms of our association bring up thoughts, reminiscences and suggestions, healthful and chastening, not only to our members, but to the profession generally.

As has well been said, "it is a sacred trust to preserve adequate memorials of great lawyers who in the past have adorned the New York State bar, but whose memories are a fast vanishing tradition. How true it is that the reputation of lawyers, no matter how distinguished, is, after death, like a world of receding echoes!" Without such conscientious, votive offerings, nothing would be left to speak of the learned and illustrious judge, the successful lawyer and applauded orator save, perhaps, a traditional anecdote and a laudatory notice in contemporaneous memoirs." Upon whom, if not upon our association, devolves the duty of preserving a record of the lives, services and genius of the bench and bar of our great State? In this connection permit me to say that a most excellent measure has been proposed, and it will doubtless be carried into practical effect of procuring the portraits of the three revisers of the statutes of the State of New York, John Duer, John C. Spencer and Benjamin F. Butler. To use the language of a venerated jurist of this State: "I cannot speak of these men without praising them. Their very names are the highest eulogy. They were the beginners of what I call the essence of all reform in the law, putting it into distinct propositions, so that the people as well as the lawyer could understand it."

The question of the increase of the library of the as

sociation has become one of vital importance. By a legislative act the members of the association have the use of the State law and general library. It would seem therefore that a separate library for the association is not so vitally necessary; but, on a second consideration, it will appear that a central department for the association in the Capitol of the State, which has been one of the causes of its success and influence, should possess in its own right a large and valuable library. A very valuable nucleus for such a library has already been formed. This, with the works of art and other valuable materials gathered in the rooms at Albany, is strong evidence of the permanency and usefulness of the institution. Its rooms are a favorite place of resort, not only for the members of the association, but for other members of the profession from distant parts of the State having business in the Court of Appeals.

The disbarment of unworthy members of the profession has during the year occupied considerable of the attention of the association, particularly that of the committee on grievances. A full history of the questions that have arisen in the matter of disbarments during the year is interesting and instructive, developing many curious facts. Several of these cases are the result of deep and bitter professional hatred in which one party sought the action of the grand jury in the war he was waging against his antagonist, while the other invoked the aid of the State Bar Association in removing from the profession a detested and troublesome rival. In one case professional hatred was so insiduously concealed in the apparent good faith which prompted the proceedings for disbarment that it was with great difficulty discovered by the committee. These instances exhibit the wisdom of the rule adopted by the association in such cases, never to entertain proceedings for disbarment until after the case has been brought before the General Term in the district in which the accused resides, in the form of a complaint, to which an answer has been made tendering an issue which the court pronounces meritorious. There are several cases of disbarment before the association which the Supreme Court has certified as meritorious.

A bill was introduced in the Senate last year by Senator William H. Robertson, one of the vice-presidents of the association, providing that the expenses of the association incurred in proceedings for disbarment be paid out of the moneys appropriated for the court expenses of the county in which the case is heard. Owing to the lateness of the period in which the bill was introduced, it did not become a law; but a similar bill has been presented to the present session of the Legislature, and will, if it has not already, become a law. Other legislative acts might be mentioned which will probably be passed in aid of the association. It is gratifying to state that in both branches of the Legislature very many of the members belong to the New York State Bar Association, so that whatever meritorious bills are introduced for the advantage of the association will receive able legislative support.

During the year the honored names of S. S. Cox, Newton W. Nutting, Orlow C. Chapman, John F. Seymour and Mortimer Southworth have been stricken from the roll of the association by the band of death, and mournfully transcribed in its mortuary record.

It is the teaching of inspiration that "no man liveth and no man dieth unto himself," therefore in the death of these eminent and estimable members, much has gone from us; enough to make us reverent mourners far into the future. But much remains, and perhaps the best. Though they rest from their labors, they live in the memory, the beauty and excellence of their lives. But it would be the work of supererogation to dwell on this theme, since the very able chairman of the committee on legal biography, Hon. Charles A.