ors, who, so far as resident in the State of Massachusetts, were brought into relations with the assignee and with each other which precluded them from enforcing their claim against the property of the assignor conveyed by the assignment, and rendered the effort to do so a violation of the rights and equities of the other creditors, and an absolute infraction of the law of their own domicile. Nor was there any law or policy of the State of New York contravened by the insolvent proceedings in question, or in itself inimical to the title of the assignees. In Lawrence v. Batcheller, 131 Mass. 504, the defendant, Batcheller, a citizen of Massachusetts, had brought suits by attachment in other States against one Paige, also a citizen of Massachusetts, indebted to defendant, and in embarrassed circumstances, and garnished and ultimately collected, various amounts due to Paige. Paige subsequently went into insolvency, and his assignees sued Batcheller at law to recover the money. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the assignees could not recover, because, as the attachments were made prior to the time when the assignment in insolvency took effect, and, having been made in other States, were not dissolved by the proceedings in insolvency, and were valid by the laws of the States where they were instituted, they prevailed over the insolvency assignment, the statutes of Massachusetts not making a title so acquired void or voidable, at the election of the assignees in insolvency. And the court, holding that courts of law will not always afford a remedy in damages for all wrongs which courts of equity might prevent, said: "Courts of equity recog recognize at all; and it is often on this ground that defendants in equity are enjoined from prosecuting actious at law." The distinction between the action as brought and Dehon v. Foster was treated as obvious. What has been said is in harmony with the rule announced in Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307, and 7 law has no legal operation out of the State in which the law was passed. This is a reason which applies to citizens of the actual situs of the property, when that is elsewhere than at the domicile of the insolvent, and the controversy has chiefly been as to whether property so situated can pass even by a voluntary conveyance. In Warner v. Jaffray, 96 N. Y. 248, the debtor, residing in New York, made a general assigument for the benefit of creditors to the plaintiff. He owned personal property situated in Pennsylvania, which was attached by New York creditors, having no actual notice of the assignment, before the assignment had been recorded in Pennsylvania. A statute of that State provided that assignments of property situated there, made by a person not a resident therein, might be recorded in any county where the property was, and would take effect from its date, "provided that no bona fide purchaser, mortgagee or creditor, having a lien thereon before the recording in the same county, and not having previous actual notice thereof, shall be affected or prejudiced." It was held that an injunction should not be granted against the New York creditors from prosecuting their attachment suits in Pennsylvania. The assignment, said the court, was a mere voluntary conveyance, and "did not operate upon the creditors of the assignor, nor place them under any obligations. It left them entirely free to act. They could utterly refuse to have any thing to do with it, and retain their claims, and enforce them in their own time, as best they could, against their debtor. The assignee became a trustee for such creditors of the assignor only as chose to accept him as such; and with out their assent the assignment did not bring the cred-nize and enforce rights which courts of law do not itors into any relation with the assignee or with each other. The law did not take this insolvent's property for distribution among his creditors, but its distribution was his own act. Any one of his creditors could, notwithstanding the assignment, enforce his claim against any property of the assignor not conveyed by the assignment, without violating any rights or equi-id. 139. In that case, Bates, who lived in New York, ties of the other creditors." The law of Pennsylvania was then referred to; and it was shown, as the fact was, that such an assignment was recognized in Pennsylvania, but that to give it effect before it had been recorded where the property was would have been in contravention of the law of the State. Upon this ground the court distinguished Ockerman v. Cross, 54 N. Y. 29, where "it was held that a voluntary assignment by a debtor residing in Canada, valid by the laws of his domicile, and not invalidated by any law of this State, was valid here, and operated to transfer the assignor's property situated here. That the decision would have been different if the assignment had been in contravention of our laws or policy is fully recognized in the opinion of the court." And so, also, the court distinguished the case of Bagby v. Railroad Co., 86 Penn. St. 291. There a receiver had been appointed in the State of Virginia of the property of the railroad company; and at the time of such appointment there was due to it, from a debtor in Pennsylvania, a certain sum of money, which the receiver claimed. But after his appointment a creditor residing in Virginia went to the State of Pennsylvania, and there commenced suit against the railroad company, and attached the debt due it; and it was held that the receiver was entitled to the debt. And the Court of Appeals said: The transfer of the title to the receiver was not in contravention of any law of Pennsylvania; and hence it was held that, as against a citizen of Virgina, bound by its laws, the appointment of a receiver, binding upon him there, would, by comity, be held to be binding upon him in Pennsylvania." executed and delivered to Vau Buskirk, who lived in the same State, a chattel mortgage on certain iron safes which were then in the city of Chicago. Two days after this, Green, who was also a citizen of New York, being ignorant of the existence of the mortgage, sued out a writ of attachment in the courts of Illinois, levied on the safes, and subsequently had them sold in satisfaction of the judgment obtained in the attachment suit. There was no appearance or contest in this attachment suit, and Van Buskirk was not a party to it, although he could have made himself such party, and contested the right of Green to levy on the safes, being expressly authorized by the laws of Illinois 80 to do. It was conceded, that by the law of Illinois, mortgages of personal property, until acknowledged and recorded, were void as against third persons. Subse quently, Van Buskirk sued Green in New York for the value of the safes mortgaged to him by Bates, of which Green had thus received the proceeds. The courts of New York gave judgment in favor of Van Buskirk, holding that the law of New York was to govern, and not the law of Illinois, although the prop erty was situated in the latter State, and that the title passed to Van Buskirk by the execution of the mort gage. The cause was then brought to this court, and first considered upon a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion overruling that motion. The cause then came on to be heard upon the merits, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York was reversed. This court held that as, by the laws of Illinois, an attachment on personal property would take precedence of In the case in hand, the Supreme Judicial Court of an unrecorded mortgage executed in another State, Massachusetts thought it proper to grant the injunc- where recording was not necessary, the judgment in tion, since it was a case of the taking by the law of the attachment would be binding, though the owner of the insolvent's property for distribution among his credit-chattels, the attaching creditor and the mortgage But the whole argument of the court is, that because Butler, Hayden & Co. were citizens of Massachusetts, they were under some superior obligation to the law of Massachusetts, and to be governed by the rights that law conferred, which prevented them from availing themselves of the law of New York that gave them this superior right. creditor might all be residents of such other State; and Mr. Justice Davis, speaking for the court, said: "It should be borne in mind, in the discussion of this case, that the record in the attachment suit was not used as the foundation of an action, but for purposes of defense. Of course, Green could not sue Bates on it, because the court had no jurisdiction of his person; nor could it operate on any other property belonging I do not deny the general principle that a party to Bates than that which was attached. But as, by the found within the jurisdiction of a court, and subject law of Illinois, Bates was the owner of the iron safes to its process, may be restrained and enjoined from dowhen the writ of attachment was levied, and as Greening certain things in some other jurisdiction because the thing which he might attempt to do is opposed to the principles of equity or to the law of the place where he is found; and such might be the law in this case, but for the provision of the Constitution of the United States and the act of Congress, both of which are recited in the opinion of the court, which require that the "records and judicial proceedings of a State, authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court in the United States as they would have by law or usage in the courts of the State from whence such records are or shall be taken." The record introduced from the court of New York in this case had the effect in that State to could and did lawfully attach them to satisfy his debt in a court which had jurisdiction to render the judgment, and as the safes were lawfully sold to satisfy that judgment, it follows that when thus sold the right of property in them was changed, and the title to them became vested in the purchasers at the sale. And, as the effect of the levy, judgment and sale is to protect Green, if sued in the courts of Illinois, and these proceedings are produced for his own justification, it ought to require no argument to show that when sued in the court of another State for the same transaction, and he justifies in the same manner, he is also protected. Any other rule would destroy all safety in derivative titles, and deny to a State the power to regu-give Butler, Hayden & Co. a lien on the indebtedness late the transfer of personal property within its limits, and to subject such property to legal proceedings." It will be perceived that it was manifestly inadmissible to hold that after Van Buskirk had permitted Green to go to judgment in a proceeding in rem, which appropriated the property as belonging to Bates, he could then get judgment against Green for the conversion of what had so been adjudged to him, an adjudication which Van Buskirk had voluntarily declined to litigate in the proper forum, and had not sought in his own State to prevent. It was a contest between two individuals claiming the same property, and that property capable of an actual situs, and actually situated in Illinois. The attachment was not only levied in accordance with the laws of Illinois, but the laws of that State affirmatively invalidated the instrument under which Van Buskirk claimed. Clearly, then, the law of the domicile of Van Buskirk, Green and Bates could not overcome such registry and other positive laws of Illinois as were distinctively coercive. Hervey V. Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664; Walworth v. Harris, 129 id. 355. In the case at bar, the attachment suits have not gone to judgment, and the assignees in insolvency have proceeded with due diligence as against these creditors, citizens of Massachusetts, who are seeking to evade the laws of their own State; nor is there any thing in the law or policy of New York opposed to the law or policy of Massachusetts in the premises. We find no infringement of the Constitution in the rendition of the decree, and it is accordingly affirmed. Mr. Justice Brewer took no part. of Aaron Claflin & Co. to their creditor, Bird, which in that court would have ripened into a judgment and been enforced. That was the faith and credit which the laws of New York gave to that proceeding. It initiated a right. It established a lien; and there was no power in the courts of Massachusetts to interrupt the course of these proceedings to the final result. That is to say, there was no power to do this directly. Had it the right to do it by seizing the persons of Butler, Hayden & Co. in Massachusetts, and compelling them there to forego the advantage which they had secured in the State courts of New York? When therefore Butler, Hayden & Co. were sued in equity in the courts of Massachusetts, and there was produced the record of these proceedings in the court of New York, the question was presented to the courts of Massachusetts what effect they would give to those proceedings. Now, they did not give the effect which the laws of New York gave to them. Neither the law nor the usage in the courts of New York admitted of such proceeding as that taken in the courts of Massachusetts. If there was any error in the proceedings in the court of New York, that error was subject to correction, in due course of law, in courts of justice of the State of New York, and Butler, Hayden & Co. had a right to insist on the validity of their proceedings being tested by the courts, and governed by the laws, of the State of New York, and not by those of Massachusetts. It is no answer to this to say that Butler, Hayden & Co. were citizens of Massachusetts, and were found within its jurisdiction. The higher law of the Constitution of the United States places this restraint upon the courts of Massachusetts in dealing even with their own MILLER, J. (dissenting). I dissent from the judg-citizens; and, if her citizens have obtained rights in ment and opinion of the court in this case. I am of opinion that the proceedings in the State court of New York, whether they be considered as the bona fide action of Fayerweather for his own benefit or as merely representing the interests of Butler, Hayden & Co., were efficient in establishing a lien on the indebtedness of Aaron Claflin & Co., of New York, which, by the laws of that State, was superior to any right then held, or which could be acquired afterward, by the assignees in insolvency of Daniel C. Bird. Indeed, it is not questioned in the very learned opinion of the court in this case, that if Butler, Hayden & Co. had been permitted to go on with their proceeding in New York, they would have secured an order in the court in which the proceedings were pending, that the garnishees, Aaron Claflin & Co., should pay the amount of their indebtedness to the plaintiff in that action, the courts of New York which have become a part of the records and judicial proceedings of those courts, no difference how the law under which those rights are established may be opposed to the law of the State of Massachusetts, they are to be respected by the courts of Massachusetts, because they are effectual over the parties and subject-matter in New York, and because the Constitution of the United States and the act of Congress of May 26, 1790, assert the principle that the courts of Massachusetts must give full credit, by which is meant the same effect, to the proceedings in New York which that State gives to them. The constitutional provision which makes this declaration is part of article 4, and it is in immediate connection with its second section, which declares that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." The meaning of this is to prevent conflicts between courts of the different States over the same matters, by establishing the rule that whatever is done or decided in one State shall be respected in every other State, when properly proved before it. It is one feature of the general idea which is found all through the Constitution. These are the principles established after a most vigorous contest by the case of Green v. Van Buskirk, twice before this court, and reported in 5 Wallace, 307, andid. 139. In that case, both the contesting parties lived in the State of New York, and were citizens of that State. Each asserted a paramount title to certain safes which were in the city of Chicago. Green, although a citizen of New York, with Van Buskirk, levied in the State of Illinois an attachment on these safes, on which Van Buskirk had a chattel mortgage executed in the State of New York, but not recorded in Illinois. Green proceeded with his attachment, and bought the sales under it, which he converted to his own use in Illinois. Afterward he was sued by Van Buskirk, in the State of New York, for this conversion; and he set up and relied on the proceedings in the attachment suit in Illinois as a defense. The Supreme Court of New York held that as between its own citizens, its law upon the subject of chattel mort. gages, which was the claim Van Buskirk had on the safes, should prevail, while Green insisted that the law of Illinois, where the proceedings in the attachment took place and where the safes were, should govern. In the case as it first presented itself in this court, a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction was made, which the court overruled on the ground that the case was to be governed by the law of Illinois, under the Constitution of the United States and the act of Congress already referred to. The case afterward came on in 7 Wallace, upon the further question whether the laws of Illinois were such as to give Green a right to that proceeding, and the court held that they were; that the attachment, judgment and sale in Illinois were valid, and that the State courts of New York were bound to give them effect in the proceeding of Green v. Van Buskirk. The only difference between that case and the one now under consideration is that at the time the court in Massachusetts intervened and undertook to prevent Butler, Hayden & Co. from pursuing their case in the courts of New York there had been no judgment in favor of that company. But I am at a loss to see why the right established by Butler, Hayden & Co. in the courts of New York is not as much to be respected, and the same effect given to it, according to its nature, as if the judicial proceeding had ripened into a judgment. It is very clear, that but for the injunction against Butler, Hayden & Co., they would have got such a judgment, and would have obtained their money; and, if they had been sued in Massachusetts for violating the laws of Massachusetts on that subject, it is equally clear, according to Green v. Van Buskirk, that the proceedings in the New York court would have been a good defense. I think therefore that the judgment of the court, and the principles of the opinion, are erroneous, and are opposed to the former decisions of this court. FIELD and HARLAN, JJ., concur in this dissent. CONTRACT—GRANT—PUBLIC POLICY – TO DIVIDE LAND. WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT, DEC. 3, 1889. CHIPPEWA VALLEY & S. Rr. Co. v. CHICAGO, ST. PAUL, M. & O. Rr. Co. A contract between two railroad companies, by which one of them, in consideration of contingent compensation, CASSODAY, J. This action is brought to enforce the specific performance of the contract or contracts set forth in the foregoing statement. By virtue of those contracts the plaintiff claims the right to the equal undivided one-fourth of all the lands and the avails thereof granted to the State for the purpose of aiding in the construction of a railroad from Superior to the junction near Veazie-a distance of about sixty-two miles and said to contain four hundred thousand acres of land, of the value of $2,000,000. The State granted all of those lands to the Portage and Superior company in 1874, for the purpose named and upon the conditions set forth in said statement; and that company continued to hold the same down to the time of executing the first of said contracts, January 10, 1882. It had failed however to construct any portion of the sixty-two miles of road between Superior and the junction, as required by such grant, and it had also failed to construct any portion of the road from the State line at Genoa to said junction, as required by such grant. It was moreover then insolvent and wholly unable to complete any part of either of such roads, and the owner of nine-tenths of the bona fide stock of that company was then offering to sell the same to different parties, and particularly to the Chip. pewa, St. Paul and Omaha companies, respectively. The fact of such insolvency and default on the part of the Portage and Superior company, and the further fact that the time limited in the grant for its completion of the entire road would expire about May 1, 1882, had prior to the execution of the contract, January 10, 1882, induced the Chippewa company 'in its own be half, and in the interest of the St. Paul company and the Omaha company, respectively, to apply to the Legislature, then about to convene, for said grant, and to ask that the same be conferred upon its company; but in view of the fact that should these companies, respectively, enter into a contest before the Legisla ture for such grant, they might thereby defeat each other, and prevent any disposition of the same, it was deemed advisable by them to enter into an arrangement whereby such conflicting interests should be harmonized, and but one road constructed over the proposed route, with running arrangements for both, as set forth in the statement made. To secure such objects, the written contract of January 10, 1882, was made and executed as stated; and thereupon, and in pursuance of said contract, the Chippewa and St. Paul companies ceased all negotiations for the purchase of said stock, and made no application to the Legislature for said grant, and rendered to the Omaha company "all such reasonable and proper assistance as they were able to give in the premises," and "in good faith in all respects observed, performed, and to their utmost ability carried out, the terms and provisions of said contract;" that the Omaha company was thereby enabled to purchase said stock and obtain said grant from the Legislature by virtue of chapter 10, Laws of 1882. The contract executed June 10, 1882, was a substantial copy of the one executed January 10, 1882, including dates, except as set forth in the foregoing statement. The validity of chapter 10, Laws of 1882, has recently been challenged, on the ground that the grant to the Portage and Superior company in 1874 gave to that company the right to earn the land therein granted, and was in the nature of a contract, which the State Legislature could not impair, and also upon the ground that the Legislature passing the act had been influenced or misled by false representations made to its members respecting the intentions, financial condition, etc., of the Portage and Superior company. The conclusions reached by Mr. Justice Harlan, in an elaborate and well-fortified opinion, were to the effect that the question of such undue influence and misrepresentation was not one to be determined by courts or juries upon evidence; and that assuming the act to have been unconstitutional and void, as impairing the obligations of contracts, yet that, after the time for constructing the road by the Portage and Superior company had fully transpired, the Legislature had confirmed such revocation and resumption of the grant, and the conferring of the same upon the Omaha company by chapter 29, Laws of 1883. Trust Co. v. Railway Co., 39 Fed. Rep. 143. In this case however we must assume, what counsel on both sides have assumed, that chapter 10, Laws of 1882, was a valid grant to the Omaha company. The right of the Portage and Superior company was, at most, nothing more than to earn the lands granted, upon the terms specified therein. The important question here presented for consideration is whether the agreements contained in the second contract, and here sought to be specifically enforced, are valid. We are all agreed that the validity of that contract stands upon the same basis as the first, since it was made without any other consideration aud is substantially the same as the first, so modified as to include the Chippewa company as a third party, as it was understood in the negotiations, and at the time of making the original contract, that the St. Paul company in fact represented the Chippewa company as well as itself. Especially would this be so if the Omaha company is forced to rely for its title upon the act of 1883, instead of the act of 1882, as suggested in the case cited. The only considerations for the agreements here sought to be enforced are such as are specified in the fourth subdivision of each of the contracts. The mere option given in the third subdivision cannot be regarded as a consideration, much less a separate and independent consideration. The clause there into which the arguments have mainly been directed, as found in the second contract, reads as follows: "In consideration of the above agreements, the said parties of the second and third parts hereby agree that they will not make any effort to procure said lands to be granted to them, or either of them, or aid or assist any other party to procure the same, except the party of the first part, and that they will render to said party of the first part all reasonable and proper assistance which they may be able to give in procuring said land grant to be given to the party of the first part by the Legislature, and will aid said party of the first part in any negotiations which it may set on foot with the said Chicago. Portage and Superior Railroad Company for the purpose of acquiring the same." The able and learned counsel for the plaintiff insists that the presumption is always in favor of the legality of contracts, and hence that the "effort," "aid," ," "assistance" and services thus agreed to be made, rendered and performed must be regarded as such only as were not illegal, improper or vicious; and then it is assumed that if such effort, aid, assistance and services were lawful in themselves, then it was competent for the Chippewa and St. Paul companies, respectively, to contract with the Omaha company to make, render and perform the same. port of this contention, the same counsel suggests numerous things which the Chippewa and St. Paul companies, respectively, might innocently have done under the contract. Among these, it is claimed that such company, 46 or what is the same thing, its man In sup aging officers," might legally and properly have refrained from negotiating for the purchase of said stock or the property of the Portage and Superior company, and advised the parties in charge thereof to negotiate with the Omaha company; that it was competent for such company or its managing officers to have stated, either publicly or privately, to its friends, either in or out of the Legislature, that its interests would be advanced by granting the Omaha company's application for said grant;" or have stated "to any of its friends, or any member of the Legislature, that if the grant was made to the Omaha company it would have the effect of extending" its "lines or the right to run on the Omaha road to Lake Superior; or expressed "its opinion and desire and wish that this grant should be made to the Omaha company." The fallacy of this contention, if fallacy it be, consists in assuming, that if these several things were not in themselves a violation of law or good morals, then it was competent for the Omaha company, in consideration thereof, to legally bind itself by the agreement in question to the effect, that in case of its obtaining the land grant, it would give “ one equal fourth part ' thereof, also the "right, franchises and property" of the Portage and Superior company, and the "contract of lease" therein mentioned, as therein specified. In an action on a contract not to prosecute a criminal, the most eminent English judge who never reached a a higher position than chief justice of the Common Pleas, unless by declining to be made lord chancellor, approvingly quotes a text-writer, to the effect that a person could not bind himself legally by a "promise to pay money to a man not to do a crime." Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils. 350. A few years later, Lord Mausfield, C. J., in behalf of the King's Bench, said: "Many contracts which are not against morality are still void, as being against the maxims of sound policy." A third of a century ago this court, while conceding that an agreement for compensation for certain services in securing the passage of an act, as for instance, making a public argument before a committee of the Legislature, or before the Legislature itself, if permitted to do so, might be enforced, nevertheless held that "an agreement to prosecute and superintend in the capacity of agent and attorney, a private claim before the Legislature, is against public policy and void, and no action can be maintained thereon, or for services thus rendered." Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200. "To prosecute aud superintend my claim for certain services, as contractor to the State, for the construction of the Portage canal," were the words of the written contract. It contained however the provision that "such claim to be brought before the Legislature in such mode and manner as my said agent and attorney may choose to have the same presented;" and the compensation therein agreed upon was ten per cent on the whole amount which the State might allow. In deciding the case, Whiton, C. J., speaking for the whole court, including the present chief justice, said: "We know of no way by which a person who is not a member of the Legislature can prosecute or superintend a claim before that body, except by means of the members themselves, or some of them. He could not therefore comply with the contract on his part without resorting to personal solicitation with the members of the legislative body. We therefore think that the contract was, by its terms, an agreement to pay money for a consideration which is inconsistent with public policy, and that the agreement is for that reason void." The learned counsel for the plaintiff insists that the case was wrongly decided, and we are asked to reconsider and overrule it, or at least distinguish it from the case at bar. It is certainly inconsistent with counsel's theory of the presumptive legality of such contracts. Upon that theory, the "mode and manner" of presentation, prosecution and superintendence might have been confined to such services as might have been legally contracted for. It is true, the learned chief justice writing that opinion only cited two adjudications in support of the conclusions reached; but these cases have frequently been sanctioned by other courts, and he certainly might have cited others which had been previously made, sanctioning the same principles. Fuller v. Dame, 18 Pick. 472; Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152; Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & S. 315; Filson v. Himes, 5 Penn. St. 452; Harris v. Roof, 10 Barb. 489; Marshall v. Railroad Co., 16 How. 314; Wildey v. Collier, 7 Md. 273; Rose v. Truax. 21 Barb. 361. Besides, the case of Bryan v. Reynolds, supra, has been expressly sanctioned in well-considered opinions by at least three courts of high authority, Powers v. Skinner, 34 Vt. 274; Lodge v. Crary, 98 Ind. 238; Sweeney v. McLeod (Or.), 15 Pac. Rep. 278. The case of Bryan v. Reynolds, supra, has also been cited approvingly in Melchoir v. McCarty, 31 Wis. 254. In the leading case of Fuller v. Dame, supra, the acts to be done, and for which the owner of certain lands was to pay a compensation, were the getting up of a joint-stock company, the purchase of such lands, and the procuring of a terminal depot to be located and constructed thereon by a railroad company. Such cases are undoubtedly regarded as analogous, in principle, to an agreement to pay compensation for procuring legislation. In that case there was no stipulation for secrecy, much less for publicity, and counsel invoked the same presumption of innocence which is here contended for. In considering it, Shaw, C. J., said: "It was strongly pressed by the counsel for the plaintiffs that when a contract is made in general terms, broad enough to include things lawful and unlawful, it shall be presumed that they intended those only which were lawful. * * The law goes further than merely to annul contracts, where the obvious and avowed purpose is to do or cause the doing of unlawful acts. It avoids contracts and promises made with a view to place one under wrong influences-those which offer him a temptation to do that which may injuriously affect the rights and interests of third persons." He then illustrates how a person might lawfully solicit a bequest or devise in favor of a friend, or lawfully propose a marriage, but that "any promise of reward made to him to induce him to do this, or any promise made afterward in consideration of such service, would be void. This is founded upon the general consideration of fitness and expediency, Such advice and solicitation, in whatever form the agency may be exerted, are understood to be disinterested, and to flow from a single regard to the interests of the parties. They are lawful only so far as they are free and disinterested. If such advice and solicitation, thus understood to be pure and disinterested, may be justly offered from mercenary motives, they would produce all the consequences of absolute misrepresentation and falsehood." In Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441, similar illustrations were made, and it was held that "a contract to take charge of a claim before Congress, and prosecute it as an agent and attorney for the claimant, * * * is void." Then, after distinguishing such a contract from one for purely professional services, the court held: "Though compensation can be recovered for these (professional services) when they stand by themselves, yet when they are blended and confused with those which are forbidden, the whole is a unit and indivisible, and that which is bad destroys the good;" and hence compensation can be recovered for no part." To the same effect is Meguire v. Corwine, 101 U. S. 113. In Wildey v. Collier, supra, the agreement for compensation, sought to be enforced, was for procuring favorable action of the governor; but it was held void, as against public policy. The court said: "The reasons are obvious. They are designed to protect the exercise of this power from abuse through the intervention of designing persons, and although in the particular instance no improper influences may have been resorted to, the public interest in such questions requires that the principle should be enforced in all cases. * * * The same reason applies with equal force in support of claims for obtaining the passage of laws by the Legislature." In the case of Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, supra, it was said by the court: "It matters not that nothing improper was done or was expected to be done by the plaintiff. It is enough that such is the tendency of the contract; that it is contrary to sound morality and public pol icy, leading necessarily, in the hands of designing and corrupt men, to improper tampering with members, and the use of an extraneous secret influence over an important branch of the government. It may not corrupt all; but if it corrupts or tends to corrupt some, or if it deceives or tends to deceive or mislead some, that is sufficient to stamp its character with the seal of reprobation before a judicial tribunal." In Rose v. Truax, supra, the contract under which compensation was sought was merely "to use his influence, efforts and labor in procuring the passage of a law by the Leg islature;" but it was held to be void as against public policy, and as the contract was entire it was wholly void, and hence no recovery could be had either upon the contract or quantum meruit, even for legitimate services. To the same effect as the above cases are Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543; Frost v. Inhabitants of Belmont, Allen, 152; McKee v. Cheney, 52 How. Pr. 144; Gil v. Williams, 12 La. Ann. 219; Usher v. McBratney, 3 Dill. 385; Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45; Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261; Iron Co. v. Extension Co., 129 id. 643. In speaking of the principle applicable to an agreement for compensation for procuring a contract from the government, in Tool Co. v. Norris, supra, Mr. Justice Field tersely observed: "It (such principle) has been asserted in cases relating to agreements for com. pensation to procure legislation. These have been uniformly declared invalid, and the decisions have not turned upon the question whether improper influences were contemplated or used, but upon the corrupting tendency of the agreements." 2 Wall. 54. On another page he states: 'It is sufficient to observe, generally, that all agreements for pecuniary considerations to control the business operations of the government, or the regular administration of justice, or the appointments to public offices, or the ordinary course of legislation, are void, as against public policy, without reference to the question whether improper means are contemplated or used in their execution. The law looks to the general tendency of such agreements, and it closes the door to temptation by refusing them recognition in any of the courts of the country." 2 Wall. 56. These principles are reasserted by the same learned justice in Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U. S. 261, 264. In the case at bar it is urged that the efforts to be made, the aid and assistance to be given, and the services to be rendered were expressly limited by the contract to such as were "reasonable and proper." In Marshall v. Railroad Co., supra, the proposed plan of Marshall, which was the basis of the contract under which he claimed compensation for the services rendered, contained this clause: "I contemplate the use of no improper means or appliances in the attainment of your purpose. My scheme is to surround the Legislature with respectable and influential agents, whose persuasive arguments may influence the members to do you a naked act of justice. This is all." He then illustrates by mentioning an ex-State senator and expresiding officer of that body. 16 How. 318. So in Lodge v. Crary, supra, the stipulation was only for the use of "all proper persuasion." So in Sweeney v. |