pellant; Jonas P. Farnum, as receiver, respondent, v. E. K. Hart and others, appellants; George W. Brayton, respondent, v. Darwin W. Sherman, as surviving executor, appellant; Thomas Lacy, respondent, v. Sophronia A. Getmau, executrix, appellant; Elsie R. Feitner, respondent, v. Richard J. Lewis and another, appellants. OTHER DECISIONS. -- Judgment of General Term modified, and as modified affirmed with costs of the estate-James C. Austin, appellant, v. Jane Oaks, respondent. Judgment affirmed without costs to either party Thomas R. Rutherford, as assignee, respondent, v. Marianna Bion and others, appellants.- Same as above Same v. Julius Schattman.- -Orders of General and Special Terms reversed, award set aside and proceedings remitted to the commissioner for further proceedings in accordance with law, costs in all courts up to this time to be paid by the city of Yonkers - In re taking easement in certain property for construction of a sewer in Yonkers.- Appeal dismissed with costsFarmers' Loan and Trust Company, respondent, v. Bankers and Merchants' Telegraph Company and others, respondents.- -Appeal dismissed with costsIn re petition of John A. Roebling's Sons to vacate sale, etc.- -Judgment reversed and new trial granted upon appeal of Leurendus B. Ashley and Susan M. Ashley, while upon the appeal of Zipporah Wilcox the judgment to be entered shail direct the executor to distribute the assets in his hands in accordance with the principles set forth in the opinion - Jeannie T. Hard and others, respondents, v. Leurendus B. Ashley and others, appellants, and Christopher C. Davison, executor, and others, respondents. Judgment affirmed with costs to respondents out of the estate-In re settlement of the accounts of Enos G. Laney, as administrator.Judgment and order of General Term affirmed with costs to respondents In re estate of Webster Wagner, deceased, and In re judicial settlement of the accounts of James D. Taylor, as executor. Judgment modified and as modified affirmed Catharine S. Herman, as executor, respondent, v. Charles H. Roberts, appellant. Order of General Term reversed and judgment entered on report of referee affirmed with costs in all courts to defendants 1 Dan S. Richards and another, assignees, respondents, v. Elmira La Tourette and others, appellants.Order of General Term modified and comptroller directed to issue his warrant for the payment to the university of all interest from the investment remaining in his hands up to the amount of the $25,000 appropropriated in each year respectively. If the amount is not agreed upon the order to be settled on noticePeople, ex rel. Cornell University, appellant, v. Ira Davenport, as comptroller, respondent. Judgment of General Term reversed, that of Special Term affirmed with costs in Supreme Court and this court-In re judicial settlement of accounts of George W. Chancey, trustee, etc.; John E. Delaney, appellant.Judgment reversed and complaint dismissed with costs -Church of St. Monico, respondent, v. Mayor, etc., of New York, appellant.-Judgment affirmed with costs in this court to the respondents against the appellants In re will of Edward D. Hesdra.- -Motion deniedAnnie Carr, as executrix, appellant, v. John C. Risher, respondent.Motion to amend remittitur. Motion denied with costs-In re will of Mary Hall, deceased. Appeal dismissed on argument - People, appellaut, v. Samuel B. Hill, respondent. SECOND DIVISION. AFFIRMED WITH COSTS. In the following appeals the judgment was in each case affirmed with costs: James Bigler, respondent, v. Edwin Atkins, appellant; Josephine Boyce, respoud ent, v. Manhattan Railway Company, appellant; Charles Condert and Cecile L. Fougera, as administra tors, respondents, v. Isador Cohn and others, appellants; William J. Cruikshank, respondent, v. William Gordon, appellant; Augustine Daly, respondent, v. John Stetson, appellant; Lucy A. Dunham, respondent, v. John Townshend and others, appellants; Daniel B. Fayerweather and others, appellants, v. Phoenix Insurance Company, respondent; Webster Gillett, respondent, v. Francis M. Gillett and another, appellants; Josephine L. Haberstro, respondent, v. John M. Bedford and another, appellants; Sarah J. Hamill, respondent, v. Lewis Roberts and others, appellants; Althea How, respondent, v. Rome, Watertown and Ogdensburg Railroad Company, appellant; Andrew McClure, appellant, v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., respondent; Charlotte B. Miller, respondent, v. Ocean Steamship Company of Savannah, appellant; Abram V. Inonis, respondent, v. Francis A. Fales; Goshen National Bank, appellant, v. Wm. Brigham and another, respondents; Ellen O'Donnell, respondent, v. Robert McIntyre, appellant; Clara Phillips, respondent, v. Town of Fishkill, appellant; Riley Reed, appellant, v. Wm. H. Nichols and another, respondents; Emily J. Smith, respondent, v. Jeremiah B. Rogers, appellant; Wm. F. Taylor, respondent, v. Eliza Millard, appellant; Edward Van Orden, respondent, v. Wm. D. Andrews and others, appellants; Irving Wright, respondent, v. Harriett E. Roberts and others, appellants; George Peabody Wetmore, appellant, v. Catharine W. Bruce, respondent; Catharine Wright, respondent, v. Mutual Benefit Life Association of America, appellant. JUDGMENTS REVERSED. In the following appeals the judgment was in each case reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event: Herman Rosenberg and others, respondents, v. Hugo Block and others, appellants; Mary L. Todd, respondent, v. Union Dime Savings Institution, appellant; Arthur B. Thompson, respondent, v. Joshua C. Sanders, appellant; Fairbank Canning Company, respondent, v. Seth X. Metzger and another, appellants; New York Land Improvement Company, appellant, v. Wm. S. Chapman, respondent; Sarah Wransky, respondent, v. Dry Dock, East Broadway, etc., Railroad Company, appellant. OTHER DECISIONS. Motion is denied without costs to either party except in so far as it was consented to by defendant's attorney-Clarence R. Conger and others, appellants, v. New York, West Shore and Buffalo Railroad Company, respondent.- -Appeal dismissed with costsRauall G. Comerhoven, appellaut, v. George W. Ball, respondent.Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event-Mary A. Gordon, respondent, v. Herman H. Memann and others, appellants. Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event-Thomas Halpin, respondent, v. Phoenix Insurauce Company, appellant.-Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event-Charles E. Hovey and another, appellants, v. John Elliott and others, respondents.- -Order reversed with costs and the purchaser directed to complete the contract-In re application of George N. Ladue and others for leave to sell real estate of Pomeroy Ladue and another, infants.Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event, unless the plaintiff, within twenty days, stipulate to reduce the judgment by deducting therefrom $1,700, with interest on $900, from February 1, 1880; on $400, from January 1, 1882, and on the balance from April 1, 1882, in which event the judgment as so modified is affirmed without costs to either party in this court-Elizabeth D. Vail, respondent, v. Wm. M. Reynolds, appellant. The Albany Law Journal. THE ALBANY, JANUARY 25, 1890. CURRENT TOPICS. HE general exercises at the thirteenth annual meeting of the New York State Bar Association in this city on Tuesday last were very largely attended and very interesting. Harmanus Bleecker Hall was filled to its utmost capacity at half-past two o'clock. Probably two thousand people were present, mostly men, attracted by the magnetic personality of Mr. Ingersoll. Judge Arnoux, the president, gave a brief, pertinent and interesting address, stating the work of the year, the public needs pressing upon the attention of the association, and the hopes and expectations for the coming year. The increase of membership during the last year was the largest in the history of the association. The association has induced the court to strike from its rolls two attorneys convicted of felony, and has arranged the approaching celebration of the centenary of the Federal Supreme Court. The Judge pointed with just pride to the long list of members eminent in law and in politics, and predicted for it increased influence and usefulness. Judge Arnoux has been a very active and efficient president, and is one who has made success for himself in life by obeying the Scripture injunction, "Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might." There are few men in the profession who so unselfishly give their time and talents to public needs, in so practical and beneficial a manner. able practical suggestion at this point, it seems to us, is his recommendation to give the convict the fair value of his labor in prison above the expense of his keeping. What right, he asks, has the State to confiscate the convict's labor? No right, we say, any more than to steal his purse, save the right of the strong hand. A few hundred dollars saved for the discharged prisoner may help him away from the scene of his crime — back to which the stupid State pays the expense of his travel and help him to begin a new and unimpeded life of honesty. There is nothing so unchristian in a professedly Christian community as its pharisaic treatment of discharged convicts. (Mr. Ingersoll did not say this, but he might have said it, and every hearer, including the Christian clergymen who sat before him, must have coincided.) Our readers will be well rewarded next week by perusing this philanthropic address. Not all of them probably will agree with Mr. Ingersoll's somewhat fantastic doctrine of private eminent domain, by which, for example, the owner of many acres of land shall be compelled to sell part to his neighbor who has less, wants more, and is willing to pay the full value. In his anxiety to furnish every needy family with a home, Mr. Ingersoll would apparently compel another man to give up part of his home. Doubtless too our readers will note the speaker's remarkable avoidance of any recommendation, among the means of diminishing crime, of a more stringent regulation of the traffic in strong drink, and of a more general discouragement of its use by the better and richer classes. We kept thinking that Mr. Ingersoll was coming to this, but he never arrived. Perhaps he thought of the approaching "banquet" in the evening, and that any present allusion to the topic of strong drink would seem an anti-climax. in America, of sound heart and strong brain, castBut so it was, that the most eloquent popular orator Mr. Ingersoll is a very adroit, eloquent, witty and powerful speaker, and on this occasion he fully sat-ing about for some solution of this dreadful probisfied popular expectation although he was pretty closely confined to his notes. However one may disagree with him, it is impossible for the moment to resist his evident sincerity and his stirring appeals. Of his address, "Crimes against Criminals," we may ungrudgingly say that it was imbued with a noble spirit of humanity, and was in the main wise and lem, utterly forgot or cautiously ignored the palpable and notorious source of nine-tenths of all the and crime under which this planet groans. Mr. poverty, ignorance, brutality, misery, despair Ingersoll's treatment of his theme in this particular reminded us of the policeman who collars the innocent small boy while the big ruffian skulks away under his nose. We fain would hear Mr. Ingersoll discourse on temperance. discreet in its recommendations. With most of it we found ourselves in thorough sympathy. We unhesitatingly indorse his bold assertion that our system of criminal punishment is a failure. Crime is constantly increasing, and is keeping pace with the in- The most respectable assemblage ever gathered at crease of pauperism and insanity. His denunciation the Executive Mansion in this city was there Thursof degrading punishments, like the whipping-post, as day evening of last week. It was composed excludemoralizing to the man and society that inflict as sively of lawyers, we believe. It is true there well as to the criminal who endures, is in exact ac- were a few State officials present, but they were record with what we have always written in these deemed by being lawyers. Nearly all the judges in columns. We accede to his denunciation of capital this vicinity and many of the prominent lawyers punishment as comparatively impracticable and were present, except a few unavoidably detained wholly inefficient. Above all, we heartily coincide by "the grip." The belle perhaps we might say with his denunciation of the course of society in the bud-of the evening was Judge O'Brien, who abandoning the discharged convict to disgrace, has just taken his seat on the Court of Appeals coldness and aversion, and the certainty of a relapse bench, and this occasion was devised by the coninto crime from despair and revenge. A very valu-siderate governor to introduce the shy young debu VOL. 41 No. 4. tante to Albany's most select, intelligent and reputable society. There was no other lady present. (We are sorry there was not at least one other, although the governor was a genial and attentive host.) The recipient of this unusual but well deserved honor seemed quite at his ease. In fact, as one of our city newspapers remarked of his demeanor on his first appearance on the bench, "he did not seem nervous." Indeed we do not know why he should. The time for nervousness passed with election day. His opponent need not feel nervous, either, for he is in the same court by a providential arrangement, and likely to be there just about as long. So both were pleased, and so was everybody else, except those who thought they ought to have been preferred. The venerable Judge Comstock and the youthful Judge Parker were present, representing the extremes of age. Doubtless This is an eminently proper course, due to the cause of public justice, and necessary to the future usefulness of the judge himself. There seems to be no dispute whatever about the facts, for they are admitted by the judge. It is the part of decency and fair play to suspend judgment on the matter, and not to take it for granted that a magistrate of such excellent reputation has all at once willfully gone astray in a manner so certain to be discovered. Nemo repente fuit turpissimus. It is well enough at the start to inquire why, if the judge meant any wrong, he was so punctilious at the outset to refuse to sign the decree, because the attorney of record for Mrs. Flack was known to him to be also the general counsel of the sheriff? And also to bear in mind that there is no pretense that he knew that the referee was a brother-in-law of that counsel. And also, contrary to first rumors, that there is no pretense that Meek's name was suggested to him in the proceeding. We mention this point simply to show, that as in most other cases, there are two sides, and to suggest that it is well to hear the other side before condemning a reputable magistrate. The most noteworthy article in the January Green Bag is "Women Lawyers in the United States," by Miss Lelia J. Robinson. We have the pleasure of the author's acquaintance, and have a high esteem for her. Her article is very interesting, and is illustrated with a baker's dozen of portraits. Among the most attractive of these is that of Mrs. J. Ellen Foster, who is an effective temperance lecturer, and who, if we are not mistaken, once addressed the Albany Law School. Mrs. Laura De Force Gordon, of California, is also a fine-looking woman, but we are sorry to learn that she once got a fellow off for most of those present were equally willing to become judges if the insistent State should demand it. There was very little scandal talked; no horse and no stocks; but we heard a good deal of habeas corpus and certiorari and mandamus and other equally recondite subjects. One or two gentlemen in our hearing candidly admitted that they had just been most absurdly and unexpectedly beaten by the judges present, but we heard no statutory profanity. There was a generous repast, but no healths were drunk, and yet everybody seemed pretty well. Indeed our governor, although not exactly a theoretical prohibitionist, is a model practical temperance man, who believes that intelligent gentlemen can enjoy themselves for an hour or two without any thing stronger to drink than an innocuous punch, but we must confess that "the smoke of their torment" went up from nearly every mouth. The governor sets an excellent example in the mat-killing an innocent man by mistake for his wife's ter of strong drink, and if well followed it would be publicly beneficial, and save a great deal of legislating and vetoing. Chastened mirth ruled the hour. The lawyers were all on an equal footing and a steady footing. And whatever their political differences, all voted the governor and the new judge gentlemen and agreeable companions. We deduce from this occasion a new and potent argument for increasing the number of the judges of the Court of Appeals. Mr. Roger A. Foster has succeeded in reversing the decision at Special Term that "Sleuth" is not a valid trade-mark as applied to books concerning detective officers. We commented on his interesting brief some time ago. Judge Macomber delivers the opinion, in which the most notable sentence is the last: " Happily no point is made by considerate counsel which requires us to look into the matter of these several publications." He derives "Sleuth " from the Icelandic "slot," a track in the snow. We advise our readers not to put their nickels in it. The New York City Bar Association have recommended the Legislature to examine into the matter of Judge Bookstaver's conduct in the Flack divorce case. seducer. He ought to have been twice hanged. Then there are our esteemed sister editors, Mrs. Bradwell and Waite, of Chicago, and the veteran and redoubtable Belva, of Washington, who came nearer being president than many men. Another lady who narrowly escaped political honors is Mrs. Marion Todd, who in 1882 ran in California for attorney-general on the Greenbag - we beg pardon – Greenback ticket. It is somewhat remarkable however that the article gives no information or even hint as to the age of any of these ladies. Probably a sisterly feeling on the part of the writers, or perhaps a precautionary measure. But it is safe to say - using the kind feminine phrase in that case made and provided that they are all twenty-eight if a day. Many of the ladies chronicled here formed law partnerships with their husbands, but such arrangements are apt to be broken up by the introduction of a stranger, and “ 'domestic duties" intervene to distract the attention of the wife. But we find here the portrait of a young lady who suits us down to the ground. She looks as if she knows how to get the money on a check payable to her or We have half a mind to send her our photograph, with a view to opening correspondence. Her color would harmonize very well with ours - Miss der. Mary A. Greene. She will probably receive many offers of partnership. We would like nothing better than to lecture to fifty such young women at the Albany Law School on the congenial subject of the domestic relations. It is agreeable to learn that so many women have been admitted to practice law, and we do not know anybody, except an occasional old dunderhead devotee of the common law, who has any thing to say against it. Let all women learn and have the right to support their stupid husbands, say we. IN NOTES OF CASES. [N Summerlot v. Hamilton, Supreme Court of Indiana, November 9, 1889, a father and son sold their partnership business as general merchants, the son bought a stock of drugs in the firm name, and this business was, under a different name and in another building, carried on for about eight months, when plaintiff, who had become a partner in it, sold his interest to the son, taking a note in the old firm name of the father and son. Held, that even if the plaintiff had no notice that the former partnership was dissolved, and that the father had no interest in the drug business, the note would not bind the father. The court said: "The instruction assumes that the purchase by one of three partners of the interest of one of the others in the firm business is such a transaction as authorizes the purchaser to bind the third partner without his knowledge or consent. This assumption was completely erroneous. Such a transaction has no relation to the conduct of the business of the firm. Partners are not agents for each other in transactions which relate to the formation or dissolution of the firm, or concerning the disposition of the firm property to each other. Williams v. Lewis, 115 Ind. 46; Blaker v. Sands, 29 | Kan. 551. The purchase by one partner of the interest of another in the firm property is not a partnership transaction. Love v. Payne, 73 Ind. 80; Graves v. Kellenberger, 51 id. 66. The execution of the note having been denied under oath, it was essential to the plaintiff's right of recovery that he should prove that it was given in a transaction within the scope of the partnership business. Lucas v. Baldwin, 97 Ind. 471. Besides being erroneous as applied to this case, the charge was in direct conflict with an instruction previously given at the appellant's request, which stated the law correctly, as follows: Even though you should find that John J. Summerlot and William Summerlot were partners, and had formed a partnership for the purpose of carrying on business as dealers in drugs and other articles of merchandise, such a partnership would not give John J. Summerlot implied authority to purchase the share of said Hamilton in said business, either on his own account or on that of himself and William Summerlot, and execute their joint note therefor. The consent of William Summerlot to carry on a partnership with the other two would not give either of the others implied authority to purchase the interest of one of them on the credit of himself and William.' After giving the instruction last above set out, which stated the law correctly, at the request of the defendant the court gave the other instruction, which is incorrect, and in direct hostility to the one first given. The effect of a sale by one partner of his interest in the business, whether it be to one of the continuing partners or to a stranger, is a dissolution of the firm, and the purchasing partner has no implied authority to sign the name of the remaining partner to an obligation without his own consent. One who takes a note with knowledge that it is so given cannot claim that he had no notice of the want of authority of the partner who signed the note. Unless the continuing partners subsequently ratify the transaction in some way, those who did not consent will not be bound." In Allen v. South Boston R. Co., Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, November 29, 1889, the treasurer of a corporation, also engaged in business as a broker, was employed by plaintiff to purchase shares of stock in the corporation. He informed plaintiff that he had purchased the stock, and delivered to her a certificate. He entered in the transfer-book of the corporation a transfer of the stock to plaintiff from himself as agent. In fact, he had no stock as agent or otherwise, all the stock of the corporation having been previously issued, and the issue to plaintiff being a fraudulent overissue. Held, that the fraud on the part of the treasurer being for his own benefit, and against the plaintiff as well as the corporation, plaintiff could not be charged with knowledge thereof, on the ground that he was acting as her agent in the purchase of the stock. The court said: "The general rule is that notice to an agent while acting for his principal, of facts affecting the character of the transaction, is constructive notice to the principal. Suit v. Woodhall, 113 Mass. 391; Sartwell v. North, 144 id. 188; Bank v. Cushman, 121 id. 490; Distilled Spirits, 11 Wall. 356. There is an exception to this rule when the agent is engaged in committing an independent fraudulent act on his own account, and the facts to be imputed relate to this fraudulent act. It is sometimes said that it cannot be presumed that an agent will communicate to his principal acts of fraud which he has committed on his own account in transacting the business of his principal, and that the doctrine of imputed knowledge rests upon a presumption that an agent will communicate to his principal whatever he knows concerning the business he is engaged in transacting as agent. It may be doubted whether the rule and the exception rest on any such reasons. It has been suggested that the true reason for the exception is that an independent fraud committed by an agent on his own account is beyond the scope of his employment, and therefore knowledge of it, as matter of law, cannot be imputed to the principal, and the principal cannot be held responsible for it. On this view such a fraud bears some analogy to a tort willfully committed by a servant for his own purposes, and not as a means of performing the business intrusted to him by his master. Whatever the reason may be, the exception is well established. Kennedy v. Green, 3 Mylne & K. 699; Espin v. Pemberton, 3 De Gex & J. 547; Rolland v. Hart, L. R., 6 Ch. 678; In re Bank, L. R., 5 id. 358; Cave v. Cave, L. R., 15 Ch. Div. 639; Kettlewell v. Watson, L. R., 21 id. 685, 707; Innerarity v. Bank, 139 Mass. 332; Dillaway v. Butler, 135 id. 479; Atlantic Mills v. Orchard Mills, 147 id. 268; Howe v. Newmarch, 12 Allen, 49. This case seems to us to fall within the exception. Although the fraudulent act of Reed may not have been committed with the intention of cheating the plaintiff, yet that was its legal effect, and it was a fraudulent act committed by him for his own benefit, the actual effect of which would have been to wholly avoid the transaction if the plaintiff had known of it. The present cases, we think, fall within the principle that where one of two innocent persons must suffer loss from the fraud of a third the loss must be borne by him whose negligence enabled the third person to commit the fraud. The defendant cannot be compelled to issue new certificates, or to recognize the old ones as valid, because to do so would cause an over-issue of its capital stock, but it is liable in damages.” In Maywood v. Logan, Supreme Court of Michigan, November 15, 1889, an action to recover rent of premises leased to defendant for a dwelling-house, it appeared that when the tenant hired the premises, the well of water on the premises which defendant's family used was polluted by the carcass of a dead dog, so that they became sick, and he was put to expense in caring for them, for services of physicians, nurses, etc. Plaintiff's attention was called to the bad quality of the water after defendant had gone into possession, he made an examination, and found the dog there, but did not communicate the fact to defendant. Held, that defendant could recoup the damages suffered. The court said: "Plaintiff was advised of this fact, but caused the pump to be put back, and the covering nailed down, leaving the carcass of the dog in the well. He then informed Mrs. Logan, wife of the defendant, that there were some rotten boards in the well, and that she better not use the water for cooking and drinking, but that it was all right for washing and scrubbing. He gave her no intimation of the real situation. who had before been well, became sick with malaria, and nurses and physicians were paid $43 for their care. After the family moved out, and discontinued the use of this water, the children recovered. The dog was in the well at the time the premises were rented. Before the defendant had arranged for taking possession of the premises he talked to plaintiff about this well, and whether the pump was all right, and was assured that it was. * * * The jury, by their verdict, have found that the plaintiff knew of the presence of the dead animal in the well, and that he concealed all traces of it from the defendant and his family. It was there when the tenant's term commenced. When the plaintiff learned that this water was so polluted, his duty toward his tenant was to make the fact known, and, if the fact had become known to the tenant, he would have been justified in removing from the premises, and terminating the tenancy, if the cause could not have been removed. It would have amounted to an eviction, after which the tenant would not be liable for the rent. It was a great wrong for the plaintiff, after discovering the condition of affairs, to conceal the facts, and permit the defendant and his family to continue the use of the water for any purpose, and such concealment amounted to a fraud upon the rights of the tenant. tion of the pump in the well. It was evident to the *Special inquiry was made as to the condi * * * * * landlord that the tenant intended to use the water known of its polluted condition at the time of the for family purposes, and though he may not have leasing, he did know that the tenant was attaching importance to this well of water as a part of the premises to be leased, and assurances impliedly were given by him that it was all right. He owed duty to the defendant, as landlord, to see that the premises were in a healthful condition, or at least to disclose any fact within his knowledge which tended to make the premises unhealthful, and not fit for habitation. By his concealment of the pollution of the water, and permitting the family to use it in ignorance of the fact, he made himself liable to damages for all the injuries which would naturally follow." LAW AND DOCTORS IN NEW YORK. The family used the water three or four days for THE tea and cooking, and washing potatoes, etc. Within a week or two defendant's family heard rumors that a dog was found dead there, and the defendant went to the plaintiff, and inquired as to the truth of these rumors. The plaintiff denied them, and said there was no dog there, and said the water was all right for washing or purposes of that kind, but probably was not as good as might be for drinking or cooking purposes. The family, after these inquiries, continued the use of the water, the children pumping and drinking it. The real facts were not discovered until the middle of October, when defendant moved out. During this time the children, II. HE second classification, that of expert testimony, is very important. This is a development of our modern civilization, which I sometimes think bas grown beyond the original design of this class of testimony, and much evidence is now classed as expert which would not have been admitted as such fifty years ago. The growth of what I may call "specialism" has broadened the field of expert testimony by giving persons who make a special study of a particular branch of knowledge the advantage of possessingpresumably-fuller and more exact information than Another can be acquired by the general student. peculiarity of expert testimony is that it permits the expression of opinions upon the facts given in evidence by witnesses, contrary to the general rule of evidence that witnesses must state facts and not opinions. In a case involving mental capacity, a non-expert witness |