Page images
PDF
EPUB

Such an event might justly be regarded as dangerous to ourselves, and, on that ground, to have called for decided and immediate interference by us. The sentiments and the policy announced by the declaration, thus understood, were, therefore, in strict conformity to our duties and our interest.

Sir, I look on the message of December, 1823, as forming a bright page in our history. I will neither help to erase it, or tear it out; nor shall it be, by any act of mine, blurred or blotted. It did honor to the sagacity of the government, and I will not diminish that honor. It elevated the hopes, and gratified the patriotism, of the people. Over those hopes I will not bring a mildew; nor. will I put that gratified patriotism to shame.

But how should it happen, sir, that there should now be such a new-born fear, on the subject of this declaration? The crisis is over; the danger is past. At the time it was made, there was real ground for apprehension: now there is none. It was then possible, perhaps not improbable, that the allied powers might interfere with America. There is now no ground for any such fear. Most of the gentlemen who have now spoken on the subject, were at that time here. They all heard the declaration. Not one of them complained. And yet, now, when all danger is over, we are vehemently warned against the sentiments of the declaration.

To avoid this apparent inconsistency, it is, however, contended, that new force has been recently given to this declaration. But of this, I see no evidence whatever. I see nothing in any instructions or communications from our government changing the character of that declaration in any degree. There is, as I have before said, in one of Mr. Poinsett's letters, an inaccuracy of expression. If he has recited correctly his conversation with the Mexican minister, he did go too far: farther than any instruction warranted. But, taking his whole correspondence together, it is quite manifest that he has deceived nobody, nor has he committed the country. On the subject of a pledge, he put the Mexican minister entirely right. He stated to him, distinctly, that this government had given no pledge which others could call upon it to redeem. What could be more explicit? Again, sir: it is plain that Mexico thought us under no greater pledge than England: for the letters to the English and American ministers, requesting interference, were in precisely the same words. When this passage in Mr. Poinsett's letter was first noticed, we were assured there was and must be some other authority for it. It was confidently said he had instructions, authorising it, in his pocket. It turns out otherwise. As little ground is there to complain of anything in the Secretary's letter to Mr. Poinsett. It seems to me to be precisely what it should be. It does not, as has been alleged, propose any cooperation between the government of Mexico and our own. Nothing like it. It instructs our ministers to bring to the notice of the Mexican government the line of policy which we have marked out for ourselves-acting on our own grounds, and for our own interests; and to suggest to that government, acting on its own ground, and for its own interests, the propriety of following a similar course. Here, sir, is no alliance, nor even any cooperation.

So, again, as to the correspondence which refers to the appearance of the French fleet in the West India Seas. Be it remembered, that our government was contending, in the course of this correspondence with Mexico, for an equality in matters of commerce. It insisted on being placed, in this respect, on the same footing as the other South American States. To enforce this claim, our known friendly sentiments towards Mexico, as well as to the rest of the new States, were suggested-and properly suggested, Mexico was reminded of the timely declaration which had been made of these sentiments.-She was reminded that she herself had been well inclined to claim the benefit, resulting from that declaration, when a French fleet appeared in the neighbouring seas; and she was referred to the course adopted by our government on that occasion, with an intimation that she might learn from it how the same government would have acted if other possible contingencies had happened. What is there, in all this, of any renewed pledge, or what is there of anything beyond the true line of our policy? Do gentlemen mean to say that the communication made to France, on this occasion, was improper? Do they mean to repel and repudiate that declaration? That declaration was, that we could not see Cuba transferred from Spain to another European power. If the House mean to contradict that-be it so. If it do not, then, as the government had acted properly in this case, it did furnish ground to believe it would act properly, also, in other cases, when they arose. And the reference to this incident or occurrence by the Secretary, was pertinent to the argument which he was pressing on the Mexican government.

I have but a word to say on the subject of the declaration against European colonization in America. The late President seems to have thought the occasion used by him for that purpose to be a proper one for the open avowal of a principle which had already been acted on. Great and practical inconveniences, it was feared, might be apprehended, from the establishment of new colonies in America, having a European origin and a European connexion. Attempts of that kind, it was obvious, might possibly be made, amidst the changes that were taking place, in Mexico, as well as in the more Southern States. Mexico bounds us, on a vast length of line, from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean. There are many reasons why it should not be desired by us, that an establishment, under the protection of a different power, should occupy any portion of that space. We have a general interest, that through all the vast territories rescued from the dominion of Spain, our commerce might find its way, protected by treaties with governments existing on the spot. These views, and others of a similar character, rendered it highly desirable to us, that these new States should settle it, as a part of their policy, not to allow colonization within their respective territories. True, indeed, we did not need their aid to assist us in maintaining such a course for ourselves; but we had an interest in their assertion and support of the principle as applicable to their own territories.

I now proceed, Mr. Chairman, to a few remarks on the subject of Cuba, the most important point of our foreign relations. It is

the hinge on which interesting events may possibly turn. I pray gentlemen to review their opinions on this subject before they fully commit themselves. I understood the honorable member from South Carolina to say, that if Spain chose to transfer this Island to any power in Europe, she had a right to do so, and we could not interfere to prevent it. Sir, this is a delicate subject. I hardly feel competent to treat it as it deserves; and I am not quite willing to state here all that I think about it. I must, however, dissent from the opinion of the gentleman from South Carolina. The right of nations, on subjects of this kind, are necessarily very much modified by circumstances. Because England or France could not rightfully complain of the transfer of Florida to us, it by no means follows, as the gentleman supposes, that we could not complain of the cession of Cuba to one of them. The plain difference is, that the transfer of Florida to us was not dangerous to the safety of either of those nations, nor fatal to any of their great and essential interests. Proximity of position, neighbourhood, whatever augments the power of injuring and annoying, very properly belong to the consideration of all cases of this kind. The greater or less facility of access itself is of consideration in such questions, because it brings, or may bring, weighty consequences with it. It justifies, for these reasons, and on these grounds, what otherwise might never be thought of. By negotiation with a foreign power, Mr. Jefferson obtained a province. Without any alteration of our Constitution, we have made it part of the United States, and its Senators and Representatives, now coming from several States, are here among us. Now, sir, if, instead of being Louisiana, this had been one of the provinces of Spain proper, or one of her South American colonies, he must have been a madman, that should have proposed such an acquisition. A high conviction of its convenience, arising from proximity, and from close natural connexion, alone reconciled the country to the measure. Considerations of the same sort have

weight in other cases.

An honorable member from Kentucky, (Mr. WiCKLIFFE,) argues, that although we might rightfully prevent another power from taking Cuba from Spain, by force, yet if Spain should choose to make the voluntary transfer, we should have no right whatever to interfere. Sir, this is a distinction without a difference. If we are likely to have contention about Cuba, let us first well consider what our rights are, and not commit ourselves. And, sir, if we have any right to interfere at all, it applies as well to the case of a peaceable, as to that of a forcible, transfer. If nations be at war, we are not judges of the question of right, in that war; we must acknowledge, in both parties, the mutual right of attack, and the mutual right of conquest. It is not for us to set bounds to their belligerant operations, so long as they do not affect ourselves. Our right to interfere, sir, in any such case, is but the exercise of the right of reasonable and necessary self-defence. It is a high and delicate exercise of that right; one not to be made but on grounds of strong and manifest reason, justice, and necessity. The real question is, whether the possession of Cuba by a great maritime power of Europe, would seriously endanger our own immediate security, or our essential interests.

:

I put the question, sir, in the language of some of the best considered state papers of modern times. The, general rule of national law, is, unquestionably, against interference, in the transactions of other States. There are, however, acknowledged exceptions, growing out of circumstances, and founded in those circumstances. These exceptions, it has been properly said, cannot, without danger, be reduced to previous rule, and incorporated into the ordinary diplo macy of nations. Nevertheless, they do exist, and must be judged of, when they arise, with a just regard to our own essential interests, but in a spirit of strict justice and delicacy also towards foreign States. The ground of these exceptions is, as I have already stated, selfpreservation. It is not a slight injury to our interest; it is not even a great inconvenience, that makes out a case. There must be danger to our security, or danger, manifest and imminent danger, to our essential rights, and our essential interests. Now, sir, let us look at Cuba. I need hardly refer to its present amount of commercial connexion with the United States. Our statistical tables, I presume, would show us, that our commerce with the Havanna alone is more in amount than our whole commercial intercourse with France and all her dependencies. But this is but one part of the case, and not the most important. Cuba, as is well said in the report of the Committee of Foreign Affairs, is placed in the mouth of the Mississippi. Its occupation by a strong maritime power would be felt, in the first moment of hostility, as far up the Mississippi and the Missouri, as our population extends. It is the commanding point. of the Gulf of Mexico. See, too, how it lies in the very line of our coast-wise traffic; interposed in the very highway between New York and New Orleans.

Now, sir, who has estimated, or who can estimate, the effect of a change, which should place this Island in other hands, subject it to new rules of commercial intercourse, or connect it with objects of a different and still more dangerous nature? Sir, I repeat that I feel no disposition to pursue this topic, on the present occasion. My purpose is only to show its importance, and to beg gentlemen not to prejudice any rights of the country by assenting to propositions, which, perhaps, may be necessary to be reviewed.

And here I differ again with the gentleman from Kentucky. He thinks that, in this, as in other cases, we should wait till the event comes, without any previous declaration of our sentiments upon subjects important to our own rights or our own interests. Sir, such declarations are often the appropriate means of preventing that which, if unprevented, it might be difficult to redress. A great object in holding diplomatic intercourse, is frankly to expose the views and objects of nations, and to prevent, by candid explanation, collision and war. In this case, the government has said that we could not assent to the transfer of Cuba, to another European State. Can we so assent? Do gentlemen think we can? If not, then it was entirely proper that this intimation should be frankly and seasonably made. Candor required it; and it would have been unpardonable, it would have been injustice, as well as folly, to have been silent, while we might suppose the transaction to be contemplated, and then to complain of it afterwards. If we should have a subsequent right

to complain, we have a previous right, equally clear, of protesting; and if the evil be one, which, when it comes, would allow us to apply a remedy, it not only allows us, but it makes it our duty, also, to apply prevention.

But, sir, while some gentlemen have maintained, that on the subject of a transfer to any of the European powers, the President has said too much, others insist that on that of the Islands being occupied by Mexico or Colombia, he has said and done too little. I presume, sir, for my own part, that the strongest language has been directed to the source of greatest danger. Heretofore that danger was, doubtless, greatest, which was apprehended from a voluntary transfer. The other has been met, as it arose; and, thus far, adequately and sufficiently met. And here, sir, I cannot but say that I never knew a more extraordinary argument than we have heard on the conduct of the Executive on this part of the case. The President is charged with inconsistency; and, in order to make this out, public despatches are read, which, it is said, militate with one another.

Sir, what are the facts? This government saw fit to invite the Emperor of Russia to use his endeavours to bring Spain to treat of peace with her revolted colonies. Russia was addressed on this occasion as the friend of Spain; and, of course, every argument which it was thought might have influence, or ought to have influence, either on Russia or Spain, was suggested in the correspondence. Among other things, the probable loss to Spain, of Cuba and Porto Rico, was urged; and the question was asked, how it was, or could be, expected by Spain, that the United States could interfere, to prevent Mexico and Colombia from taking those Islands from her, since she was their enemy, in a public war, and since she pertinaciously, and unreasonably, as we think, insists on maintaining the war; and since these Islands offered an obvious object of attack? Was not this, sir, a very proper argument to be urged to Spain? A copy of this despatch, it seems, was sent to the Senate, in confidence. It has not been published by the Executive. Now, the alleged inconsistency is, that, notwithstanding this letter, the President has interfered to dissuade Mexico and Colombia from attacking Cuba; that, finding or thinking that those States meditated such a purpose, this government has urged them to desist from it. Sir, was ever anything more unreasonable than this charge? Was it not proper, that, to produce the desired result of peace, our government should address different motives to the different parties in the war? Was it not its business to set before each party its dangers and its difficulties in pursuing the war? And if, now, by anything unexpected, these respective correspondences have become public, are these different views, addressed thus to different parties, and with different objects, to be relied on as proof of inconsistency? It is the strangest accusation ever heard of. No government, not wholly destitute of common sense, would have acted otherwise. We urged the proper motives to both parties. To Spain we urged the probable loss of Cuba; we showed her the dangers of its capture by the new States; and we asked her to inform us on what ground it was, that we could interfere to prevent such capture, since

« PreviousContinue »