1878 v. Canada, to these other licenses, and had subjected them, SEVERN with the latter, to the control of the municipalities. THE QUEEN. They had, at least for that Province, become ejusdem generis. In Lower Canada the revenue derived from them had ceased to be appropriated for the general use of the Government, in order to form part of the seigniorial indemnity fund, for the purpose of paying off the dues of the censitaires which the Government had undertaken to pay. Without attaching more importance than is necessary to the application of the rule of ejusdem generis, is it not more logical to suppose that the Imperial Legislature, finding already in some of the laws these licenses treated as of the same kind as other licenses, did likewise, and dealt with them as belonging to the one class; and, therefore, should we not apply in construing this 9th paragraph the rule of ejusdem generis? Otherwise, we must come to the conclusion that the insertion of the word "auctioneer," which, no doubt, was put in to give the Local Government a further source of revenue, would have the effect of giving to the Local Legislature an unlimited power to tax by means of licenses. This cannot have been the intention of the Imperial Parliament. They cannot, by the insertion of that word, have made a provision which would have the effect of destroying the financial system of both the Dominion and the Provinces established by the Constitution. The intention was no doubt that they should have a limited signification in accordance with the distinct powers so carefully allotted to the Federal and Local Governments. Moreover, I am far from admitting that the word other," coming immediately after an enumeration, can always have that broad meaning; on the contrary, I am of opinion that it should nearly always be accepted in a restricted sense, and that the cases in which its v. signification is absolute and unlimited are exceptional. 1878 This is the rule as laid down by Chief Justice Erle SEVERN in the case of Williams v. Golding (1), when construing THE QUEEN. the words "other person ;" and by Lord Campbell, Chief Justice, in the case of Reed v. Ingham (2), while interpreting the words "other craft." See also the case of The East London Waterworks Co. v. The Trustees of Mile End Old Town (3); and the case of the King v. The Justices of Surrey (4). Besides, if these words "and other licenses" should not be construed (which I do not admit) according to the above ordinary rule, would it follow that there is not to be found in the Constitutional Act itself, taking a general view of it, as well as of certain of its provisions, a mode of solving this question conformably to the spirit of the Act, rather than according to the views of the learned Counsel of Her Majesty? First, was it not the clear intention of the Imperial Parliament to establish two distinct Governments, with special and exclusive powers, in order to avoid all conflict between the different authorities? To prove this it is not necessary to refer to the circumstances before the present state of affairs. The clear and precise terms of the Constitutional Act itself are sufficient to show this. It may be as well, however, to remark, that the British North America Act contains in substance hardly anything more than the Quebec resolutions, their object at that time being, most. certainly, to constitute two distinct Governments with different and exclusive powers. This is also, in effect, what the new Constitution provides for, especially by sections 91 and 92, which distribute the legislative power to the Dominion and Provincial Legislatures. (1) L. R. 1 C. P. 77. (3) 17 Q. B. 521. 1878 The 91st section gives to the Federal Parliament the SEVERN general power of taxation, a sovereignty over all subTHE QUEEN,jects, except those specifically mentioned in section 92, as being subjects exclusively belonging to the Local Legislatures. We find, among the exclusive powers given to the Federal Parliament, the power of regulating trade and commerce. This power, being full and complete, cannot be restricted, unless by some specific provision to be found in the British North America Act. For this reason, the relative position of the Provinces towards the Federal Parliament is far different from that of the States towards the United States Congress. Here the power to regulate trade and commerce, without any distinction as to interior and exterior commerce, belongs exclusively to the Dominion Parliament, whilst, in the United States, Congress has power only to deal with exterior or foreign commerce, commerce between the different States and that with the Indian tribes. The States, not having delegated to Congress the power of regulating interior commerce, still have power to legislate on it as they please. We should not, therefore, look to the numerous decisions rendered on the laws relating to the interior commerce as precedents applicable to the present case, but rather to the decisions given on laws passed by the State Legislatures which happened to come in conflict with the power of Congress to deal with exterior commerce. There is a decision, rendered as early as 1827, which has always been looked upon as being the true construction of that article of the Constitution of the United States which gives Congress power to regulate exterior commerce, and which is very applicable to the present case. It is that rendered in the case of Brown v. State of Maryland (1). In order to raise revenue to (1) 12 Wheaton 419. meet the expenses of the State, the Legislature of Mary- 1878 land passed a law, by which, amongst other things, im- SEVERn porters of foreign merchandise enumerated in the law, THE QUEEN. or such other persons as should sell by wholesale such merchandize, were directed to take out a license, for which they were to pay $50, before selling any of the imported goods, subjecting them, in case of neglect or refusal, to forfeit the amount due for the license and to a penalty of $100. Brown, who was an importer residing in the city of Baltimore, refused to pay this tax, and an information was, in consequence, laid against him before the State Court, which declared the law to be valid and condemned him to pay the penalty prescribed. This judgment was appealed by means of a writ of error to the Supreme Court, which Court, for the reasons so ably propounded by the learned Chief Justice. Marshall, declared the law void as coming in conflict with the power of Congress to regulate exterior com merce. The question here naturally arises, what was the extent of that power? This question was considered at great length in the case of Gibbons v. Ogden (1), by Chief Justice Marshall, who answered it as follows: It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than are prescribed by the Constitution. Since this is the law in the United States, there is an additional reason why it should be so declared here, where our Constitution does not acknowledge, as in the United States, a division of power as to commerce. The law declared void in the case of Brown v. The State of Maryland was of the same kind as the one (1) 9 Wheaton 231. 1878 SEVERN V. THE QUEEN. enacted by the Province of Ontario. The only difference was that that law reached the importer, whilst the law under consideration here is directed against the manufacturer. But is there not a perfect analogy between the two parties? Have not both the importer and the manufacturer the one object, viz.: to sell their goods? Both, the first by purchasing in a foreign market, the latter, by his industry, have filled their stores with goods which they cannot put into commercial circulation until they have paid the duties imposed upon them. The importation of foreign goods, no doubt, is subject to the regulations of trade and commerce, but not more so than manufactured articles which are subject to the excise laws. If the Local Government have the right to tax the latter, they have the same right to tax the importer, by prohibiting him, as it is contended they have the right to prohibit the manufacturer, from selling his merchandise if he has not previously taken out a license allowing him to sell. If this contention is well founded, the payment of the custom and excise duties would not be all that the importer and the brewer would have to calculate upon before offering their goods for sale, for they would also have to pay another duty in the shape of a license fee. It is also contended, that in this case the Federal Government having regulated only the manufacture of the beer, it was in the power of the Local Government to regulate its sale. The following answer could be made to this argument, viz. : that if the Federal Government, in the exercise of its power, has not deemed it necessary to restrict the sale of beer, it was because its intention was to leave it free. The regulations need not consist only of |