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exponas, in the last named suit of Stockdale v. Hansard, and on the 21st of January, 1840, the LANDERS House resolved, that the execution had been levied in contempt of the privileges of the House, and that the Sheriff should be ordered to return the amount. After that, and after they had again appeared at the Bar, and after the resolutions had been communicated to them, the House resolved:

That William Evans, Esq., and John Wheelton, Esq., having been guilty of contempt and breach of the privileges of this House, be committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms attending this House, and that the Speaker do issue his warrant accordingly.

They were thereupon taken into custody for not returning the money in obedience to the order of the House. The resolutions of the House affirmed that the power of publishing such of its reports, votes and proceedings, as it might deem necessary, was an essential incident to the constitutional functions of Parliament, more especially of that House as the representative portion of it; that, by the law and privileges of Parliament, the House had the sole and exclusive jurisdiction to determine upon the existence and extent of its privileges, and that the institution, or prosecution of any action, suit or other proceeding, for the purpose of bringing them into discussion, or decision, before any Court, or Tribunal, elsewhere than in Parliament, was a high breach of such privilege, and rendered all parties concerned therein amenable to its just displeasure and to the punishment consequent thereon. Other resolutions were passed, having reference to a report published by Messrs. Hansard, under the orders of the House, respecting the islands of New Zealand, and declared that to bring, or assist in bringing, any action against the Messrs. Hansard for such publication, would be a breach of the privileges of the House. They also directed Messrs. Hansard not to defend an action

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These resolutions are referred to in the case of The WORTH. Sheriff of Middlesex (1), having been passed on the 30th May, 1837, and the 1st of August, 1839.

To get over the difficulty, an Act was passed on the 14th April, 1840, 3 & 4 Vic., Chap. 9.

The privileges and powers contended for by the House of Commons, and the refusal of Lord Denman and the Court of Queen's Bench to yield assent to these pretensions, naturally attracted the attention of the leading legal minds in England, and when the case of Kielley v. Carson came on for discussion and consideration before the Committee of the Privy Council in 1842, the great lawyers before whom the case was then argued, were, no doubt, fully prepared to consider it in all its bearings, and pre-eminently qualified to decide it, from their high legal attainments, and most of them having also been members of the House of Commons.

Fenton v. Hampton, in 1858 (2), was an appeal to the Queen in Council from a decision of the Supreme Court of Van Dieman's Land. Present: Lords Justices Knight Bruce, Turner, Pemberton Leigh, and L. C. Baron Pollock. The opinion of the committee was delivered by Pollock, C.B. The case was for the committal for contempt of a person not a member of the Legislative body (the Comptroller-General of Convicts in the Island), for refusing to give evidence before a committee, and to attend at Bar when ordered. The committal was by the Legislative Council of the Island, the only legislative body in the Colony, and which had been created by Statute. The Chief Justice in the Island (Fleming) held, that the Council had no power to commit for contempt, and that the warrant, being general, was bad. Horne, J., held, that the law of Parliament (1) 11 A. & E. 273.

(2) 11 Moore P. C. C. 347.

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was introduced as part of the law of England, and that there was power to commit for contempt; but he also LANDERS held the warrant was bad, as the plaintiff had had no opportunity of defence, it not appearing he had been called to the Bar to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. The leading counsel, in arguing the case before the Committee, were Thesiger and Kelly, Q. C.'s. Pollock, C. B., in giving the opinion of the Committee, directly repudiated Mr. Justice Horne's position, that the Lex et consuetudo Parliamenti had been introduced by the Statute introducing the Law of England, and also rejected the ground that it was an incidental power, and said there was no distinction between that Legislature created by Imperial Statute and those of Jamaica and Newfoundland created by the Crown. He said:

If the Legislative Council of Van Dieman's Land cannot claim the power they have exercised on the occasion before us, as inherently belonging to the supreme legislative authority which they undoubtedly possess, they cannot claim it under the Statute as part of the common law of England (including the Lex et consuetudo Parlia menti), transferred to the Colony by the 9 Geo. 4, chap. 83, sec. 24. The Lex et consuetudo Parliamenti apply exclusively to the Lords and Commons of this country, and do not apply to the supreme Legislature of a Colony by the introduction of the common law therein.

This case seems applicable to the extent of approving of Kielley v. Carson, and shewing Beaumont v. Barrett not supportable on the grounds of usage or statute.

Dill v. Murphy (1) was an appeal from the Supreme Court of Victoria to the Privy Council. Present: Lords Cranworth and Chelmsford, and Lords Justices Knight Bruce and Turner, February, 1864. The case arose on a committal for contempt in publishing a libel on a member of the House of Assembly. The statute of the

(1) 1 Moore P. C. C. N. S. 487; S. C. 10 L. T. N. S. 170.

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That the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly of Victoria respectively, and the committees and members thereof respectively, should hold, enjoy and exercise such and the like privileges, immunities and powers as, and the privileges, immunities and powers of the said Council and Assembly respectively, and of the committees and members thereof respectively, were thereby defined to be the same as, at the time of the passing of the Constitution act, were held, enjoyed and exercised by the Commons House of Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland, and by the committees and members thereof, so far as the same were not inconsistent with the Constitution act, whether such privileges, immunities or powers were so held, possessed or enjoyed by custom, statute, or otherwise.

By the same act, printed copies of the Journals of the House of Commons were made prima facie evidence upon any inquiry touching such privileges, immunities, &c.

That act received the Royal assent in 1857, before committing of the trespasses complained of in the suit. The question raised under the pleadings on demurrer was, whether by the statute referred to, the privileges contended for were sufficiently defined by the words used. The opinion of the Committee was delivered by Lord Cranworth, holding that under the words of the act, the Colonial Legislature had the same power to commit that the House of Commons had in England. Kielley v. Carson, and Fenton v. Hampton were referred to in argument, and their authority not in any way questioned.

Doyle v. Falconer (1)—before the judicial Committee of the Privy Council; present: Lord Westbury, Sir James William Colville, and Sir Edward Vaughan Wil

L. R. 1 P. C. App. 328.

liams-is the next case in the order of time before that 1878

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tribunal, and is very important. It was an appeal from LANDERS the Court of Common Pleas of Dominica. The action was brought by the plaintiff (the respondent), a member of the House of Assembly of Dominica, against the appellant, the Speaker, and two members of the House.

The material facts were set out in the pleas of the defendants, and were to the following effect, that the plaintiff, when debating a question before the House contrary to its established rules and practice, was called to order by the Speaker, persisted in his speech, and addressed insulting words to the Speaker, which, pursuant to motion, were noted down as follows: "Who the devil are you to call me to order? You are a disgrace to the House." It was thereupon resolved, that the plaintiff had been guilty of a high contempt of the House, and that he should be held in such contempt until he should have apologized. The defendant (the Speaker), therefore called on him to apologize. He refused to do so, saying he had said nothing requiring an apology, and continued to address the House. The Speaker again called on the plaintiff for an apology, when he replied: "You may tell me that I am in contempt one hundred times if you like, but I will speak. You may move it one hundred thousand times. I repeat what I have said: you are a disgrace to the House, you were expelled from the House for robbery; the minutes. of 1845 can shew it." The House, by resolution, referred to what had before taken place, and to the fact, that whilst he was in contempt he interrupted and obstructed the business before the House, and it was thereupon resolved, that the plaintiff, for his disorderly conduct and contempt of the House, be taken into the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms, and that the Speaker do issue his warrant committing the plaintiff to the common gaol during the pleasure of the House;

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