"You could not have a better sponsor," Roosevelt rejoined. "Lose no time in having him speak a word for you." Dewey at once enlisted the favor of Senator Proctor, whose influence with the President secured him the appointment.1 In a Japanese harbor on January 3, 1898, Dewey took over the command of the Asiatic squadron and hoisted his broad pennant on the Olympia. In his accurate and modest account of his work, written soon after his return to Washington in 1899,2 he told of the careful preparation that he made for an attack on the Spanish fleet in the Philippines. Before he heard of the disaster to the Maine, the news of which reached him on February 17, he had decided to take the squadron to Hong Kong. An evidence of the common working of two minds bent on war is Roosevelt's despatch to Dewey of February 25, 1898. "Order the squadron In the event of dec to Hong Kong. Keep full of coal. laration of war Spain, your duty will be to see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands." In Dewey's account of the interchange of hospitalities among the ships assembled at Hong Kong during the month of March, he related a conversation that he had with Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of the Kaiser, who remarked "that he did not believe that the powers would ever allow the United States to annex Cuba." "We do not wish to annex Cuba," Dewey answered, "but we cannot suffer the horrible condition of affairs, 1 Dewey, Autobiography, 168. 'Dewey, Autobiography, vi. This account was not published until 1913. Dewey, Autobiography, 179. which exists at present in that island at our very doors, to continue, and we are bound to put a stop to it." "And what are you after? What does your country want?" the Prince asked jokingly on another occasion;1 and, although a word in jest, it represented the European attitude which could see in our action only a desire to acquire a rich territory. Having served under Farragut, Dewey looked upon him as a master. "Valuable as the training of Annapolis was," he wrote, "it was poor schooling beside that of serving under Farragut in time of war.' On April 25 came this word from Secretary Long: "War has commenced between the United States and Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against Spanish fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use utmost endeavors." Two days later Dewey set sail, on his 600-mile voyage to Manila Bay. The Hong Kong newspapers stated that Manila was impregnable, and in the Hong Kong club which was British, whose members were in thorough sympathy with the United States, it was not thought that Dewey would be successful in his attack. Arriving off Manila, he signalled for all the commanding officers to come on board his flag-ship and said to them, "We shall enter Manila Bay to-night, and you will follow the motions and movements of the flag-ship which will lead." 4 That night (as he told the story) he asked himself, 1 Dewey, Autobiography, 185. Dewey, Autobiography, 50. The New American Navy, Long, i. 182. 'Dewey, Autobiography, 206. "What would Farragut do?" and he thought he would have done exactly as proposed.1 On April 30 at 11.30 P.M., with all lights masked, the gun crews at their guns, Dewey entered the South Channel, and with eminent success ran by the batteries. After half of the squadron had passed, a battery opened fire but none of the shots took effect. Now he was in Manila Bay in which was the Spanish fleet that he must "capture or destroy." "In action," Dewey wrote, "we had six ships to the Spaniards' seven, but we were superior in class of vessel and in armaments." Proceeding across the bay at slow speed at 5.15 in the morning of May 1, his squadron was fired upon by three batteries at Manila, two at Cavité and by the anchored Spanish fleet. Still Dewey went forward to the attack, leading the column with his flag-ship Olympia; the rest of his command followed with a distance of 400 yards between ships. Two submarine mines exploded, but they were two miles ahead, "too far to be effective." 5 At 5.40 A.M., when two and one half miles away from their objective, the Spanish fleet, Dewey said to his captain, "You may fire when you are ready, Gridley." At once the squadron opened fire. Firing without cessation as they moved, three runs were made from the eastward and two from the westward; the length of each run was about two miles. Approaching on the fifth run, when nearest, within 2000 yards, this rapid 6 1 Autobiography, 60. 'Dewey's report, May 4. Appendix to the report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, 70. This will be referred to as Crowninshield. Autobiography, 203; see also 212, 213. Cavité was ten miles from Manila, had 5000 people, a navy yard, arsenal and fortifications. Lodge, The War with Spain, 53. 5 Report, Crowninshield, 70. Autobiography, 214. and concentrated fire-"smothering," he called it demolished the Spanish fleet. At 7.35 A.M., an erroneous report was made to the Commodore that his ship was short of ammunition; this caused him to withdraw the squadron from action, and gave his men time for breakfast, as they had made the fight on coffee served in the early morning. All but one of the Spanish fleet, however, had been destroyed, and as Dewey naïvely remarked, “Victory was already ours, though we did not know it." At 11.16 A.M., he returned with the squadron to the attack. "By this time," he said in his report, "the flag-ship and almost the entire Spanish fleet were in flames, and at 12.30 P.M. the squadron ceased firing, the batteries being silenced and the ships sunk, burnt, and deserted." The Spaniards lost at least thirteen vessels: three were sunk, eight burned [only seven of these were in line of battle]; two tugs and a number of small launches were captured. Their casualties were 381 men. In Dewey's squadron none was killed and only seven slightly wounded. "The squadron," he reported, "is in as good condition now as before the battle."4 "The completeness of the result," wrote Senator Lodge, "which is the final test, gives Manila a great place in the history of naval battles and writes the name of George Dewey high up among the greatest of victorious admirals." The rapid and concentrated fire of the Americans destroyed the Spanish fleet. This disconcerted the Spaniards whose valor was remarkable but whose fire was hasty and inaccurate. Dewey told the secret of his suc 1 Autobiography, 218. 2 Crowninshield, 70. The War with Spain, 67. cess. "It was," he wrote, "the ceaseless routine of hard work and preparation in time of peace that won Manila." It looked "so easy' after it was all done." 2 But let one imagine Dewey with his Americans on the defence in the position of the Spaniards with their many resources and incentive to preparation, and let one conceive the Spanish admiral and his fleet the attacking party, and the result would have been just the contrary. But in truth the Spanish admiral would not have attacked, nor would any American of "the respectable commonplace type." 3 To attack a foe seven thousand miles from a base was a risk too great to take for any commander who did not pattern after Nelson and Farragut, as defeat or even "failure to gain a decisive victory" would have been a disaster. Dewey was long-headed as well as daring and took into account all the conditions of the game. "In the event of defeat," he wrote, "no ship of our Asiatic squadron would have been afloat to tell the story." 5 Honors and congratulations came. The President made him a rear-admiral. Congress thanked him, his officers and men. In writing to him, his "old friend" John Hay spoke of his "mingled wisdom and daring." Roosevelt, who appreciated Dewey before and admired him greatly after the battle, cabled, "Every American debtor." • is your It was the "man behind the gun" that did the business. The Spanish Captain-General in his war proclamation 1 Autobiography, 231. The War with Spain, 62. Roosevelt Autobiography, 231. • Admiral Luce, cited by Dewey, Autobiography, 189 n. Dewey, Autobiography, 229. |