The Attorney General vs. Railroad Companies. vate interests. But the framers of the constitution, for greater security, added to these original jurisdiction over great public interests, for reasons already assigned. In a government like ours, public rights of the state and private rights of citizens often meet, and may well be involved in a single litigation. So it may be in the exercise of the original jurisdiction of the court. But it is safe to say that the constitution is content to intrust purely private rights to the appellate and superintend ing jurisdictions given, and to have granted the original jurisdiction of this court for the better and prompter and more authoritative protection of public interests. This is its primary and controlling object and character. This is very plainly implied by the grant of the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto and certiorari, as is well reasoned in Attorney General v. Blossom. And, plainly recog nizing the intention of the constitution to vest in this court one jurisdiction, by several writs, to be put to several uses, for one consistent, congruous, harmonious purpose, we must look at the writ of injunction in the light of that purpose, and seek its use in the kindred uses of the other writs associated with it. Noscitur a sociis is an old and safe rule of construction, said to have originated with as great a lawyer and judge as Lord Hale, peculiarly applicable to this consideration. Lord Bacon gives the same rule in a more detailed form, more emphatic here. Copulatio verborum indicat acceptationem in eodem sensu. Here are several writs of defined and certain application classed with one of vague import. We are to be guided in the application of the uncertain, by its certain associates. The joinder of the doubtful writ with the defined writs operates to interpret and restrict its use, so as to be accepted in the sense of its associates; so that it and they may harmonize in their use, for the common purpose for which it is manifest that they were all given. And thus, in this use and for this purpose, the constitution puts the writ of injunction to prerogative uses and makes it a quasi prerogative writ. The Attorney General vs. Railroad Companies. There is the less difficulty in reaching this construction, and giving definite meaning to the jurisdiction of injunction, because of the very contrast between this writ and mandamus. The latter commands. The former forbids. Where there is nonfeasance, mandamus compels duty. Where there is malfeasance, injunction restrains wrong. And so near are the ob jects of the two writs, that there is sometimes doubt which is the proper one; injunction is frequently mandatory, and mandamus sometimes operates restraint. In these very motions it was argued on one side that the remedy of the state is by mandamus, on the other that it is by injunction. And it is very safe to assume that the constitution gives injunction to restrain excess, in the same class of cases as it gives mandamus to supply defect; the use of the one writ or the other in each case turning solely on the accident of over-action or shortcoming of the defendant. And it may be that where defect and excess meet in a single case, the court might meet both, in its discretion, by one of the writs, without being driven to send out both, tied together with red tape, for a single purpose. This view excludes jurisdiction of injunction in private suits, between private parties, proceeding on private right or wrong. In excluding them, we feel quite assured that we are only giving effect to the very purpose and limit of the constitution in the grant of jurisdiction. And we were aided in arriving at this conclusion, by decisions of the supreme court of Missouri, in somewhat analogous cases, excluding original jurisdiction of causes of merely private interest. State v. Stewart, 32 Mo., 379; State v. Lawrence, 38 id., 535; Foster v. State, 41 id., 61; Vail v. Dinning, 44 id., 210; State v. Vail, 53 id., 97. In our view, the jurisdiction of the writ is of a quasi prerogative writ. The prerogative writs proper can issue only at the suit of the state or the attorney general in the right of the state; and so it must be with the writ of injunction, in its use as a quasi prerogative writ. All may go on the relation of a private person, and may involve private right. It is the duty The Attorney General vs. Railroad Companies. of the court to confine the exercise of its original jurisdiction to questions publici juris. And hereafter the court will require all classes of cases, as it has hitherto done some, in which it is sought to put its original jurisdiction in motion, to proceed upon leave first obtained, upon a prima facie showing that the case is one of which it is proper for the court to take cogni zance. Although the writ of injunction was at no time properly a jurisdictional writ, and it has long been held to be a judicial writ only, used to give effect to the general jurisdiction of courts of equity, yet in the early history of the English Chancery, the use of the writ rested on a jurisdiction of its own, borrowed from the Roman law by the churchmen who first sat in that court. 1 Spence, 668. And this early use of the writ as a quasi jurisdictional writ has aided us in giving to it the construction and use in the constitution, which we adopt. We ought, perhaps, earlier in the discussion, to have indicated another section of article VII of the constitution, which has aided our conclusion. Section 8 gives jurisdiction to the circuit courts, original in all matters, civil and criminal, within the state, not excepted in the constitution or thereafter prohibited by law, and appellate from all inferior courts and tribunals, and supervising control over the same, and also power to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, injunction, quo warranto, certiorari and all other writs necessary to carry into effect their judgments, etc., and a general control over inferior courts and jurisdictions. A great jurisdiction, comprehending, as C. J. STOW remarked, in Putnam v. Sweet, the united powers of the English courts of the King's Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer and Chancery. The same writs are granted to those courts as to this. It is impossible for a lawyer to suppose that they are granted in the same sense and with the same measure of jurisdiction, to this court as to those courts. Such a proposition would shock the legal sense of any professional man. And the distinction is to be looked for, and is readily The Attorney General vs. Railroad Companies. found, in the general constitution and functions of those courts and of this. The writs are given to the circuit courts as an appurtenance to their general original jurisdiction; to this court, for jurisdiction. Those courts take the writs with unlimited. original jurisdiction of them, because they have otherwise general original jurisdiction. Other original jurisdiction is prohibited to this court, and the jurisdiction given by the writs is essentially a limited one. Those courts take the prerogative writs as part of their general jurisdiction, with power to put them to all proper uses. This court takes the prerogative writs for prerogative jurisdiction, with power to put them only to prerogative uses proper. The circuit courts take the writ of injunction with all the powers and uses of the English Court of Chancery. This court takes it as an integral element of its jurisdiction of prerogative writs. And it would be a rude and criminal emasculation of the judicial charter of the state, to disfranchise this court of all jurisdiction or use of injunction, as it would be a wild and reckless delusion, undiscerning the symmetrical distribution of judicial powers in the constitution, to attribute to this court the same jurisdiction and uses of the writ which the circuit courts have. And so the difficulty which seemed so great, becomes so little, and is overcome, as difficulties often are, by being directly met and carefully examined. And thus we find that SMITH, J., was more apparently than really inaccurate in Attorney General v. Blossom, when he classed injunction with the other writs given, and called the whole group prerogative and original writs. For, in our view of its use, the injunction given to this court seems to become a quasi prerogative writ, and founds jurisdiction as if it were an original writ. It is certainly competent for the constitution to give new writs, or to put old writs to new uses; to make any writ, by the use to which it puts it, prerogative or original; and to found jurisdiction on any writ, as in case of a prerogative or original writ. And this it appears The Attorney General vs. Railroad Companies. to have done, in effect, with the injunction which it gives to this court. We therefore hold that this court has original jurisdiction of an information on behalf of the state in the nature of an injunction bill in chancery, in all cases coming within the scope of the original jurisdiction conferred on this court by the third clause of section 3, article VII of the constitution, in which injunction is the appropriate remedial writ. The original jurisdiction of the court by way of injunction being thus settled, no question was made on the argument, and it is not perceived how any could well be, of our jurisdiction to entertain the informations in these causes, if they make a case for equitable cognizance. II. But equitable jurisdiction of such informations was denied. It was argued that courts of equity have no jurisdiction, at the suit of the attorney general, to enjoin usurpation, excess or abuse of corporate franchises. This question was argued very ably and at large, and has been carefully considered, although we have had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that courts of equity have such jurisdiction, and that it is a very beneficial jurisdiction, almost essential to public order and welfare. It was hardly denied that the English court of chancery entertains jurisdiction in such cases; and indeed the English books leave little room for such a denial. But it was said that, in England, the attorney general has a right to elect his forum, legal or equitable. And it is so said in some of the cases. Attorney Gen'l v. Mayor of Galway, 1 Molloy, 103. But it appears to us that this logically follows, everywhere, upon equitable jurisdiction to restrain corporate violations of charters or other public law. In such cases there is always a remedy at law. The attorney general may proceed at law by quo warranto to forfeit the charter of the offending corporation; and, if there be a penalty, as often happens, he |