Morrow vs. Wood. enforce obedience to her comWe do not think she had any can see no necessity for cloth and that she had the right to mands by corporal punishment. such right or authority, and we ing the teacher with any such arbitrary power. We do not really understand that there is any recognized principle of law, nor do we think there is any rule of morals or social usage, which gives the teacher an absolute right to prescribe and dictate what studies a child shall pursue, regardless of the wishes or views of the parent, and, as incident to this, gives the right to enforce obedience even as against the orders of the parent. From what source does the teacher derive this authority? From what maxim or rule of the law of the land? Ordinarily, it will be conceded, the law gives the parent the exclusive right to govern and control the conduct of his minor children, and he has the right to enforce obedience to his commands by moderate and reasonable chastisement. And furthermore, it is one of the earliest and most sacred duties taught the child, to honor and obey its parents. The situation of the child is truly lamentable, if the condition of the law is that he is liable to be punished by the parent for disobeying his orders in regard to his studies, and the teacher may lawfully chastise him for not disobeying his parent in that particular. And yet this was the precise dilemma in which the defendant's boy was placed by the asserted authority on the part of the parent and teacher. Now we can see no reason whatever for denying to the father the right to direct what studies, included in the prescribed course, his child shall take. He is as likely to know the health, temperament, aptitude and deficiencies of his child as the teacher, and how long he can send him to school. All these matters ought to be considered in determining the question what particular studies the child should pursue at a given term. And where the parent's wishes were reasonable, as they seem to have been in the present case, and the teacher, by regarding them, could in no way have been embarrassed, her conduct in not respecting the order given the boy was unjustifiable. If Morrow vs. Wood. she had allowed the child to obey the commands of his father, it could not possibly have conflicted with the efficiency or good order or well being of the school. The parent did not propose to interfere with the gradation or classification of the school, or with any of its rules and regulations, further than to assert his right to direct what studies his boy should pursue that winter. And it seems to us a most unreasonable claim on the part of the teacher, to say that the parent has not that right, and further to insist that she was justified in punishing the child for obeying the orders of his father rather than her own. Whence, we again inquire, did the teacher derive this exclusive and paramount authority over the child, and the right to direct his studies contrary to the wish of the father? It seems to us it is idle to say the parent, by sending his child to school, impliedly clothes the teacher with that power, in a case where the parent expressly reserves the right to himself, and refuses to submit to the judgment of the teacher the question as to what studies his boy should pursue. We do not intend to lay down any rule which will interfere with any reasonable regulation adopted for the management and government of the public schools, or which will operate against their efficiency and usefulness. Certain studies are required to be taught in the public schools by statute. The rights of one pupil must be so exercised, undoubtedly, as not to prejudice the equal rights of others. But the parent has the right to make a reasonable selection from the prescribed studies for his child to pursue, and this cannot possibly conflict with the equal rights of other pupils. In the present case the defendant did not insist that his child should take any study outside of the prescribed course. But, considering that the study of geography was less necessary for his boy at that time than some other branches, he desired him to devote all his time to orthography, reading, writing and arithmetic. The father stated that he thought these studies were enough for the child to take; and he said he was anxious the boy should obtain a good knowlVOL. XXXV.-5 Morrow vs. Wood. edge of arithmetic in order that he might assist in keeping accounts. He wished to exercise some control over the education of his son, and it is impossible to say that the choice of studies which he made was unreasonable, or inconsistent with the welfare and best interest of his offspring. And how it will result disastrously to the proper discipline, efficiency and well being of the common schools, to concede this paramount right to the parent to make a reasonable choice from the studies in the prescribed course which his child shall pursue, is a proposition we cannot understand. The counsel for the plaintiff so insist in their argument, but, as we think, without warrant for the position. It is unreasonable to suppose any scholar who attends school, can or will study all the branches taught in them. From the nature of the case some choice must be made and some discretion be exercised as to the studies which the different pupils shall pursue. The parent is quite as likely to make a wise and judicious selection as the teacher. At all events, in case of a difference of opinion between the parent and teacher upon the subject, we see no reason for holding that the views of the teacher must prevail, and that she has the right to compel obedience to her orders by inflicting corporal punishment upon the pupil. The statute gives the school board power to make all reedful rules and regulations for the organization, gradation and government of the school, and power to suspend any pupil from the privileges of the school for noncompliance with the rules established by them or by the teacher with their consent; and it is not proposed to throw any obstacle in the way of the performance of these duties. But these powers and duties can be well fulfilled without denying to the parent all right to control the education of his children. These views are decisive of this case. Under the circumstances, the plaintiff had no right to punish the boy for obedience to the commands of his father in respect to the study of geography. She entirely exceeded any authority which the law gave her, and the assault upon the child was unjustifiable. Crerar and others vs. Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company. For these reasons the judgment of the circuit court must be reversed, and a new trial ordered. CRERAR and others vs. MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY. GARNISHMENT. (1-4) Amendment of pleadings in garnishment. Power of the court over the proceedings. (5) Liability of garnishee who delivers debtor's property to a receiver appointed in another suit. APPEAL. (6) Order not appealable. 1. By the terms of the statute (R. S., ch. 125, sec. 37; Tay. Stats., 1446, § 41), “the court may, before or after judgment, in furtherance of jus tice, and upon such terms as may be proper, amend any pleading or proceeding * by inserting other allegations material to the case," etc. Held, that this power of amendment applies to the proceedings and pleadings in garnishment. 2. Sec. 49, ch. 130, R. S. (Tay. Stats., 1480, § 52), declares that the affidavit for process of garnishment “shall be deemed the complaint in the action against the garnishce, and his answer taken on his examination shall be his answer in such action." Held, that there is nothing in this which forbids the court to allow the filing of an amended answer by the garnishee, when that will be "in furtherance of justice." [3. Per DIXON, C. J.: (1.) In an action of garnishment, where justice to the garnishee or to the plaintiff demands it, the court may direct an issue to be made up in the usual form of complaint and answer, as is done on appeals from county boards of supervisors, etc., where no statutory provision is made for the forming of such issues. (2.) It is one of the inherent powers of the court to so mouid and direct the proceedings after the cause has come into it, as best to secure justice between the parties.] 4. Where the garnishee was a railroad company, and some of the facts stated in its amended answer were not known to the agents examined in its behalf, at the time of such examination, and could not then be readily ascertained, and other material facts occurred subsequently Crerar and others vs. Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company. to such examination: Held, that the allowance of the amended answer was clearly in furtherance of justice. 5. If a garnishee, after service of process upon him, delivers property of the principal debtor to a receiver subsequently appointed in another action to take charge of all the property of such debtor, he does so at his peril, but will have the right to allege and show that such receiver was entitled to the possession of such property as against the plaintiff in garnishment. 6. The order allowing an amended answer in this case, not being an abuse of discretion, held not appealable. APPEAL from the Circuit Court for La Crosse County. On May 20, 1872, the plaintiffs recovered judgment in the circuit court for La Crosse county, against the Southern Minnesota. Railroad Company, for $15,159.58. A transcript of the judgment was docketed in Milwaukee county, and on October 26, 1872, an execution was issued thereon to the sheriff of that county. On the same day the Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company was summoned as garnishee. The company appeared before the court commissioner, by its officers, who testified, in substance, that the garnishee was not indebted to the principal defendant on October 26th, but the said defendant was then indebted to the garnishee; and that at that time, October 26th, there were certain freight cars on the road of the garnishee, marked "S. M. R. R.," which were presumed to belong to the Southern Minnesota Railroad Company, and which had been received by the garnishee to deliver to said company, but that they knew nothing as to their ownership. The plaintiffs gave the garnishee verbal notice that they should take issue upon said answer; and after such issue had been noticed for trial several times, the garnishee served notice of motion for leave to file and serve a supplemental answer. This answer alleged, in substance, that at the time of the garnishment, the garnishee was not indebted to the principal defendant, but the latter was indebted to the garnishee in the sum of over $6,000; that the cars in possession of the garnishee were in the course of transportation of through freight |