money loaned by the bank at the time of the transaction to whomsoever the conveyance may be made; that the bank is forbidden to accept such security, and it is void in its hands.

The contract to pay the money, and the collateral conveyance for security, are separable contracts, and so far independent that one may stand and the other fall.

In the present case, the money was loaned on the faith of the deed of trust, and that instrument is void in the hands of the bank, but the note, as evidence of the loan of money, is valid against Mrs. Matthews personally. With this latter contract the State court did not interfere. It enjoined proceedings

under the deed of trust against the land, and did no more.

Its judgment in that matter ought, in my opinion, to be affirmed.

INDEX.

ACCOUNT. See Written Instrument, Reformation of, 1.

ACTION. See National Bank, 2.

ADMIRALTY. See Practice, 4; Statutes, Construction of.
Two schooners were sailing down the Delaware River, when a steamer
proceeding in the same direction, at the rate of eight or nine miles
an hour, was, in daytime, approaching near enough to them to ren-
der it necessary to make calculations to keep out of their way. They
were in parallel courses, not far apart, beating upon their starboard
tack, and nearing the Jersey bank. Instead of going outside of
them, she, without seasonably slackening her speed, attempted to
pass between them, and came into collision with and sunk the one
nearer the bank, as the latter, having run her starboard tack and
come about on her port tack, tacked again before she was under full
headway to avoid colliding with the other schooner, which was still
properly on her starboard tack. Held, that the steamer was liable.
The " Abbotsford," 440.

ADMISSIONS. See Evidence, 1.

ADVERSE TITLE. See Purchase-money, Suit to enforce Lien for Pay-
ment thereof, 2, 3.

1. The court adheres to its ruling in Bowen v. Chase (94 U. S. 812),
touching the title to certain lands whereof Stephen Jumel was some-
time the owner, which were conveyed upon certain trusts to the
separate use of Eliza Brown Jumel, his wife, with a general power
of appointment during her lifetime, and of the several appointments
made thereunder to Mary Jumel Bownes by said Eliza, who sur-
vived her husband, which ruling declares that the title to the prop

APPOINTMENT, POWER OF (continued).

erty situate in New York City passed on her death to said Mary in
fee, except a tract of sixty-five acres on Harlem Heights, in regard
to which no opinion was expressed. Bowen v. Chase, 254.
2. An appointment under a power is an intent to appoint carried out,
and, if made by the last will and testament of the donee of the
power, the intent, although not expressly declared, may be deter-
mined by the gifts and directions made, and if their purpose be to
execute the power, the instrument must be regarded as an execu-
tion.

Blake v. Hawkins, 315.

3. A., who had a power to appoint a fund in the hands of B., made her
will, wherein she declared her intention thereby to execute all pow-
ers vested in her, particularly those created in her favor by certain
deeds executed in 1839, whereby she became entitled to appoint
that fund. Following this declaration were various gifts of pecu-
niary legacies for charitable purposes, amounting to $28,500, and
also provisions for the payment of certain annuities. Special dis-
position and appropriation were made of her personal property,
which consisted of household furniture, carriage and horses, a grow-
ing crop upon a farm, a small sum of cash in hand, some petty debts
due her, and about sixty slaves, the latter constituting nearly nine-
tenths of the value of the whole. Certain real estate was also
to be sold, and the proceeds applied to a specific purpose. The
will declared that if it should appear at her decease that the be-
quests exceeded the amount of funds left, the first five only (those
to charities) should be curtailed until brought within the assets.
The fund in the hands of B. was not more than sufficient to pay the
legacies. Held, 1. That it was the intention of the testatrix that
the legacies to charitable purposes and to pay annuities should be
paid, but not from the proceeds of the personal property which she
owned in her own right, and specifically appropriated. 2. That the
will was an execution of the power, and it appointed the whole fund
to her executors. Id.

4. The "deed of explanation" (supra, p. 317) executed in 1845 was
effectual, and its operation was to reduce the annuity charged upon
the lands in the deed of 1839 proportionately as A. reduced the fund
charged by her appointments or outlays, so as to make the annuity
in each and every year equal to six per cent interest on so much of
said fund as remained unappropriated or unexpended by her in
each and every year respectively. Id.

APPRAISEMENT. See Lands, Condemnation and Appropriation thereof
for Public Uses, 3-5.

APPROPRIATIONS BY CONGRESS. See Lease.

ARKANSAS. See Taxation, 8.

ARREARS OF PAY AND BOUNTY. See Criminal Law, 3.

ASSIGNEE IN BANKRUPTCY. See Bankruptcy; Jurisdiction. 3;
Limitations, Statute of, 2.

1. It is only through the instrumentality of his assignees that creditors
can recover, and subject to the payment of their claims, the property
which the bankrupt fraudulently transferred prior to the adjudica-
tion in bankruptcy, or which he conceals from, and fails to surren-
der to, his assignees. Glenny v. Langdon, 20.

2. Assignees of the bankrupt are subject to the control and direction of
the proper court, and it may, for good cause shown, compel them to
take the requisite steps for the full and complete protection of the
rights of his creditors. Id.

ASSIGNMENT. See Claims against the United States; Letters-patent, 17.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL, SUIT BY, IN THE NAME OF THE
UNITED STATES. See Constitutional Law, 5-7; Practice, 1;
Union Pacific Railroad Company, 1, 9.

BANKRUPTCY. See Assignee in Bankruptcy; Process, 1, 2; Jurisdiction,
3, 5, 8, 9.

A., in due course of legal proceedings, recovered, March 14, judgment
against B., a merchant who, the preceding day, had made an as-
signment of all his property for the benefit of his creditors. An
execution was forthwith sued out upon the judgment, and levied
upon certain goods, part of the property so assigned. On the peti-
tion of a creditor, filed March 31, alleging that B. had committed
acts of bankruptcy by fraudulently suspending and not thereafter
resuming payment of his commercial paper duc January 1, and by
making said assignment, B. was by the proper court adjudged to be
a bankrupt, and his estate conveyed in the usual form by the register
to the assignee in bankruptcy, who filed his bill against A. to deter-
mine the title to the proceeds of the sale of the goods, which by
consent had been made without prejudice to the rights, if any, of
A. by the levy of the execution. Upon the hearing it appeared by
the proofs that the assignment by B. was made in good faith to
secure the distribution of his property among all his creditors.
Held, that A. acquired no priority by the levy, and that the assignee
in bankruptcy is entitled to the proceeds. Reed v. McIntyre, 507.

BIGAMY. See Constitutional Law, 1; Indictment.

BILL OF EXCEPTIONS. See Practice, 4.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES. See Na-
tional Bank.

BOND. See Surety.

BURDEN OF PROOF. See Insurance, 4; Letters-patent, 9.

CALIFORNIA. See Estoppel, 1; Jurisdiction, 7; Mexican Land-Grants;
Mining Claims, 3-5.

CAPITAL STOCK. See Taxation, 8-10.

CHALLENGE. See Juror, Challenge of.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

1. Where a claim against the United States was allowed by the proper
officers of the treasury, and a part thereof paid to the assignees of
the claimant, upon his receipt for the whole sum, the United States.
when sued by them for the balance, cannot, on the ground that the
assignment was not executed in the manner prescribed by law, set
up as a counter-claim the amount so paid. McKnight v. United
States, 179.

2. The United States, by paying a part of the claim to the assignees, did
not waive its right to withhold from them the residue. Id.
3. A., in whose favor the allowance was made, being then indebted as
surety on an official bond given to the United States, the amount of
such indebtedness was properly retained by the Treasury Depart-
ment as a set-off to await the final adjustment and settlement of the
accounts of his principal. Held, that the Court of Claims was
bound to adjudge accordingly. Id.

COLLATERAL SECURITY. See Evidence, 3; Taxation, 5.
COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS. See Letters-patent, 15.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Criminal Law, 1; Direct Tax, 3; Guar-
dian, Embezzlement of Pension-money by.

1. Sect. 5352 of the Revised Statutes, which declares bigamy committed
in the Territories a crime against the United States, and prescribes
its punishment, is in all respects constitutional and valid. Rey-
nolds v. United States, 145.

2. The scope and meaning of the first article of the amendments to the
Constitution discussed. Id.

3. A provision of the statutory code of Georgia which took effect Jan. 1,
1863, enacts that private corporations are subject to be changed,
modified, or destroyed, at the will of the creator, except so far as the
law forbids it, and that in all cases of private charters thereafter
granted the State reserves the right to withdraw the franchise,
unless such right is expressly negatived in the charter. Two rail-
road companies created prior to that date, each of which enjoyed by
its charter a limited exemption from taxation, were consolidated
by virtue of an act of the legislature passed April 18, 1863, which
authorized a consolidation of their stocks, conferred upon the consoli-
dated company full corporate powers, and continued to it the fran-
chises, privileges, and immunities which the companies had held by
their original charters. Held, 1. That by the consolidation the
original companies were dissolved and a new corporation was created,
which became subject to that provision of the code. 2. That a sub-
sequent legislative act, taxing the property of such new corporation
as other property in the State is taxed, was not prohibited by that