牛 as a nation; they are not to be feared as such by us. It must be a long time before they can engage, or will concur in any material expence. A Stamp act, a Tea act, or such act that never can again occur, could alone unite them; their climate, their staples, their manners, are different; their interests opposite; and that which is beneficial to one is destructive to the other. In short, every circumstance proves that it will be extreme folly to enter into any engagements, by which we may not wish to be bound hereafter. It is impossible to name any material advantage the American States will, or can give us in return, more than what we of course shall have. No treaty can be made with the American States that can be binding on the whole of them. The act of Confederation does not enable Congress to form more than general treaties: at the moment of the highest authority of Congress the power in question was withheld by the several States. No treaty that could be made would suit the different interests. When treaties are necessary, they must be made with the States separately. Each State has reserved every power relative to imports, exports, prohibitions, duties, &c., to itself. But no treaty at present is necessary. B. Why England would not make a Commercial Treaty, 17851 One of the greatest weaknesses of the Confederation was the reservation by the several states of all the important powers over finance, foreign relations, and similar subjects. Consequently the Congress of the Confederation was unable to levy taxes or to make treaties without first securing the consent of all the states. "We are one nation today, and thirteen tomorrow," said Washington; "who will treat with us on those terms?" Whether the ostensible reason urged by the Duke of Dorset was the real one or not, the fact remained that England refused to negotiate a commercial treaty with us. GENTLEMEN, Paris, March 26, 1785. Having communicated to my Court the readiness you expressed in your letter to me of the 9th of December, to remove to London, for the purpose of treating upon such points as may materially concern the interests, both political and commercial, of Great Britain and America; and having, at the same time, represented that you declared yourselves to be fully authorized and empowered to negotiate, I have been, in answer thereto, instructed to learn from you, 1 Letter from the Duke of Dorset to the American Commissioners. Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States of America, 1783-9 (Washington, 1837), I, gentlemen, what is the real nature of the powers with which you are invested, whether you are merely commissioned by Congress, or whether you have received separate powers from the respective States. A committee of North American merchants have waited upon his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to express how anxiously they wished to be informed upon this subject, repeated experience having taught them in particular, as well as the public in general, how little the authority of Congress could avail in any respect, where the interests of any one individual State was even concerned, and particularly so where the concerns of that particular State might be supposed to militate against such resolutions as Congress might think proper to adopt. The apparent determination of the respective States to regulate their own separate interests, renders it absolutely necessary towards forming a permanent system of commerce, that my Court should be informed how far the Commissioners can be duly authorized to enter into any engagements with Great Britain, which it may not be in the power of any one of the States to render totally fruitless and ineffectual. I have the honor to be, &c., DORSET C. British Merchants sure of the American Market, 17761 While Dean Tucker was very bitter against the colonists for rebelling against the mother country, he urged the people of England to accept separation philosophically, as they would lose nothing in the way of trade. The long credit secured by Americans from English merchants would always lead them, he argued, to prefer British goods to those of any other country. ANSWER 5. The Trade of Great-Britain with the Colonies rests on a much firmer Foundation than that of a nominal Subjection by Means of Paper Laws and imaginary Restrictions: A Foundation so very obvious, as well as secure, that it is surprising it hath not been taken Notice of in this Dispute. The Foundation, I mean, is, the Superiority of the British Capitals over those of every other Country in the Universe. As a signal Proof of this, let it be observed, that the British Exporter gives long Credit to almost every Country, to which he sends his Goods; but more especially he used to do so to North-America: Yet when he imports from other Countries, he receives no Credit. On the Contrary, his general Custom is, either 1 A Series of Answers to Certain Objections against Separation from the Rebellious Colonies. By Josiah Tucker (Glocester, 1776), 30−1. to advance Money beforehand, or at least to pay for the Goods as soon as they arrive. Hence therefore it comes to pass, that the Trade of the World is carried on, in a great Measure, by British Capitals; and whilst this Superiority shall last, it is morally impossible that the Trade of the British Nation can suffer any very great or alarming Diminution. Now the North-Americans, who enjoyed this Advantage to a greater Degree than any others, by purchasing Goods of us at long Credit, and then selling the same Goods to the Spaniards for ready Money, will find by Experience, that in quarrelling with the English, they have quarrelled with their best Friends. Let them therefore go wherever they please, and try all the Nations on the Globe. When they have done, they will suppliantly return to Great-Britain, and entreat to be admitted into the Number of our Customers, not for ours, but for their own Sakes. D. Advantages of the English Market to Americans, 17831 Writing several years after Dean Tucker, Lord Sheffield used the same argument against making a commercial treaty with the United States, namely that the superior credit facilities they enjoyed in England would bring them to that market in preference to any other. Other reasons were also given, such as the ability to secure best in London an assorted general cargo. As a matter of fact American trade returned generally into the old channels after the war and was carried on chiefly with England. At least four-fifths of the importations from Europe into the American States, were at all times made upon credit; and undoubtedly the States are in greater want of credit at this time than at former periods. It can be had only in Great Britain. The French who gave them credit, are all bankrupts: French merchants cannot give much credit. The Dutch in general have not trusted them to any amount; those who did have suffered; and it is not the custom of the Dutch to give credit, but on the best security. It is therefore obvious from this and the foregoing state of imports and exports, into what channels the commerce of the American States must in 1 Observations on the Commerce of the American States. By Lord John Sheffield (2d edition, London, 1784), 200-7, 263-4, 272. * This credit was so extensive, and so stretched beyond all proper bounds, as to threaten the ruin of every British merchant trading to America in the year 1772. The long credit given to America, the difficulty of recovering debts (which from the feebleness of the new governments, must become still more difficult) greatly prejudiced our trade with that country, and made bankrupts of almost three-fourths of the merchants of London trading to America, particularly to Virginia and Maryland. It is said that more goods have been sent to America in 1783 than that country could possibly pay for in three years. evitably flow, and that nearly four-fifths of their importations 1 will be from Great Britain directly. Where articles are nearly equal, the superior credit afforded by England will always give the preference. The American will, doubtless, attempt to persuade the British merchant to be his security with foreigners; but it is certain many foreign articles will go to America through Great Britain, as formerly, on account of the difficulty the American merchant would find in resorting to every quarter of the world to collect a cargo. The Americans send ships to be loaded with all sorts of European goods. A general cargo for the American market cannot be made up on such advantageous terms in any part of the world as in England. In our ports, all articles may be got with dispatch - a most winning circumstance in trade; but wherever they carry fish, and those articles for which England cannot be the entrepot, they will take back wine, silk, oil, &c. from Spain and Portugal, and the Mediterranean.2 But 1 Notwithstanding the resolves of Congress, and all the disadvantages arising from the war, British manufactures, to a vast amount, had the preference, and in great part supplied America, though burdened with double freight, double port charges and commission, and a circuitous voyage through a neutral port. Besides, what went to the Americans through Halifax, New York, South Carolina and Georgia, many ships which cleared for New York and Halifax at the ports of London, Bristol, Liverpool, Scotland, and Ireland, went at great risque, and in the face of act of Congress, directly to North America. These facts being notorious, can it be supposed, our manufactures being so much better, so much cheaper, and so much more suitable, as to support themselves against all these disadvantages in war, that they will not occupy the American markets in peace? And no small advantage may arise to this country from the distrust the French and Americans have of each other in commercial matters. The French fearing to consign their goods to Americans, sent out factors; while the latter, equally jealous, sent their own people to transact their business in France, where several houses were established during the war, which since the peace are settled or settling in England. American agents were also in Holland to little advantage. The Americans must seek the commerce of Britain, because our manufactures are most suitable. Few trading Americans speak any foreign language; they are acquainted with our laws as well as with our language. They will put a confidence in British merchants, which they will not in those of other nations, with whose people they are unacquainted, as well as with their laws and language. They have impressions of the arbitrary proceedings of the French; they will recollect, that when they went to the French islands, they were not permitted to sell the provisions, &c., they had imported, until the French merchants had sold all theirs; that the French took their goods at what price they pleased, and charged them as they thought proper for their own. 2 It is not probable the American States will have a very free trade in the Mediterranean; it will not be the interest of any of the great maritime powers to protect them there from the Barbary States. If they know their interests, they will not encourage the Americans to be carriers. That the Barbary States are advantageous if we maintain the carrying trade, half the commerce of the American It States, or less than half, without the expence of their government and protection, and without the extravagance of bounties, would be infinitely better for us than the monopoly, such as it was. ... What was foretold in the first edition of this work, has now [1784] actually happened. Every account from America says, that British manufactures are selling at a considerable profit, while other European goods cannot obtain the first cost. Every day's experience shews, that this country, from the nature and quality of its manufactures, and from the ascendancy it has acquired in commerce, will command three-fourths of the American trade. The American merchants solicit a correspondence, and beg for credit, because, while they feel their own want of capital, they know that our traders are more liberal, and our goods cheaper and better, than any in Europe. And the only danger is, not that the American merchants will ask for too few manufactures, but that they will obtain too many. The American consumers have been impoverished by an expensive war, which has bequeathed them many taxes to pay; and they will not be more punctual in their remittances at a time when they are associating against the payment of old debts. It may be for our interest to run some hazard, however, at the renewal of our correspondence, by accepting a trade which is pressed upon us by willing customers. But how far it may be prudent for the British merchant to comply with orders, till the several States hold out some regulations, that will give them security, is a question. . . . It is well known, that numbers of our merchants have been made bankrupts through the bad payment of the Americans. E. Trade between England and the United States, 1784-17901 That Dean Tucker and Lord Sheffield were right in saying that the political separation of the colonies from the mother country and the refusal on the part of England to negotiate a commercial treaty with the United States would not materi to the maritime powers is certain. If they were suppressed the little States of Italy &c. would have much more of the carrying trade. . . . The Americans cannot protect themselves from the latter; they cannot pretend to a navy. In war, New England may have privateers, but they will be much fewer than they have been; they will be few indeed, if we do not give up the Navigation Act. The best informed say, not less than three-fourths of the crews of the American privateers, during the late war, were Europeans. 1 A Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America. By Timothy Pitkin (2d edition, New York, 1817), 30. |