as let, with a request to notice, which from motives of gallantry we cannot pass over. It is entitled: "National Citizen Tract, No. 1. Who planned the Tennessee Campaign of 1862? or Anna Ella Carroll vs. Ulysses S. Grant: a few generally unknown facts in regard to our Civil War. By Matilda Joslyn Gage." The substance of this pamphlet is that the plan and suggestion of that campaign, executed by Gen. Grant, were made by Anna Matilda, then "a young girl of Maryland." Her "bright wit" and " transcendent military genius" taught it to her, and she laid it before the war depart Marshall, upon whose great names I relied for support, and from whose opinions I quoted as sustaining my position. Lord Mansfield held, that as there were no regular courts of judicature in Nova Scotia, and Capt. Gambier might never go there again," the venue could be laid in England, notwithstanding the action was local. So, it may be argued, that as Mr. Middleton or Mr. De Courcy might never again go to New Jersey, jurisdiction should be taken of the case. But he went further and said, that in respect to the question of jurisdiction, the real and substantial distinction was between actions in rem and actions for dam-ment, and they foully adopted it without giving her ages merely; but he said there was also a formal distinction, arising out of the different modes of trial, between actions transitory and local. The doctrine in question arose out of this formal technical distinction, and not out of a real and substantial distinction. Chief Justice Marshall, after passing a high encomium upon the great judicial abilities of Lord Mansfield, admits the soundness of his argument, and says that he himself could never perceive any reason for this doctrine, other than a technical one, but that sitting there upon the Circuit, he could not venture to disregard it. Mr. Cowles says, that the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have settled the law upon this subject. This I concede, but the question is, whether those decisions are founded upon principle and sustained by reason whether they are founded upon a rock or upon the sand. I hope Mr. Cowles does not approve of the decision made by the former court in Telegraph Co. v. Middleton; that an injury to telegraph poles situated in a public highway can only be committed by an entry upon the "realty," and that an action of trespass quare clausum is the proper form of action when forms of action prevailed. It is too much to expect of an overburdened court to perform, not only its own duties, but also the duties of counsel. I may say, with entire truth, and without claiming extraordinary intelligence, that I knew, or supposed I knew, the intent with which Mr. Throop made the provision for the place of trial of actions relating to real property situated in a foreign State. It was to provide for the place of trial of certain equitable actions relating to real property, of which the Court of Chancery claimed jurisdiction. The question whether an action is local or transitory is to be determined, not by the common-law rules of venue, but by the rules prescribed by the Code. An action for injury to real property (other than waste or nuisance) must be tried in the county in which one of the parties resided at the commencement of the action, and is not required to be tried in the county wherein the land is situated; it is therefore a transitory action; and being an action transitory, it makes no difference whether the land is situated in this or in another State, if the case is one of which jurisdiction can be taken. Besides, the Code expressly provides, that where the land is situated without the State, the action must be tried in the county where one of the parties reside-that is, if it can. But I lay no stress upon the mere words of the Code. For that would be a strange doctrine to hold, that because no place of trial has been designated, no jurisdiction or cognizance can be taken of an action. we. credit, and Gen. Grant jumped into fame on the execution of it. Pity that Anna Matilda was too modest to sign her name to the original communication. Here is a second Joan d'Arc, and a conclusive answer to the Evening Post's standing query whether woman ever invented any thing. Anna Matilda prints firstclass recommendations. Chief Justice Chase thanks her for her "great and patriotic services," without specifying them. Gerritt Smith calls her the country's "wise and faithful and grandly useful servant," without saying in what employment. Reverdy Johnson "never heard it doubted" that she was "the first to advise the campaign on the Tennessee." Nor more did Ben Wade says her services were so great as to "throw a shadow over the reputation of some of our would-be-great men." No doubt, if she did any thing at all. Cassius M. Clay says her case stands out unique, for she "towered above all our generals in military genius." But Ben Wade is her right bower, for she has five testimonials from him. Old Ben never could resist a woman. As for the rest, we know of no similar tributes to genius, except in the case of the newspaper press on the "Sweet singer of Michigan." But why is all this thus? Why, Matilda Ann wants a pension, and Congress is so mean it will not grant it. Now our advice to Matilda Anu is to drop the pension notion and to strike for the presidency. We hereby nominate her for 1884. (N. B. We shall not expect any thing more than the attorney-generalship.) The Ohio Law Journal is a new legal periodical, published at Columbus, weekly, in quarto of eight pages. Our neighbor starts out robustly in the matter of legal criticism, announcing that the conclusions reached in Ducker v. State, ante, 182, Davis v. Clinton Water Works, ante, 124, and Kincaid v. Hardin County, 21 Alb. L. J. 462, "are epochs in the law, to say the least," and that the first is wrong. We fail to see any thing novel or startling in the last two, and think them right. The first is certainly debatable. We wish the new enterprise all the success imaginable, but it must " light" on the judiciary at the outset. The American Law Review for September contains a leading article by William Green, ou Stare Decisis, and one on American Civil Code, by George Merrill. The Virginia Law Journal for September has a leading article on Patrick Henry Aylett. go Mr. Lillivick did not think much of the French "langwidge." We do not entertain a similar contempt for the Italian, and the struggles of our learned and esteemed contemporary, the Rivista Penale, of Florence, with our language, are entitled to praise. We said, some time ago, "In the New Jersey Legislature there is a spasm concerning capital punishment." The Rivista translates this thus: "Che nel Corpo Legislativo dello Stato di New Jersey v'e grande fervore (spasm.")-- A lawyer in Connecticut has discovered a new and neat way of avenging himself on an editor who published offensive articles against him. He did not cane, cowhide, shoot, stab, challenge, or sue him, but he invaded his printing shop and pi'd his forms and cases. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1880. CURRENT TOPICS. 'N a supplement to the Pacific Coast Law Journal, discharge of Dennis Kearney by the Supreme Court of California. He says the cases (6 universally hold that after judgment in a criminal case of a court of competent jurisdiction, the prisoner cannot be discharged upon habeas corpus." This statement must be supplemented by the condition, "and having jurisdiction to render the judgment under some circumstances." The cumulative sentences in the Tweed case, and the re-sentence after expiration of the first sentence in the Lange case, were reviewed upon habeas corpus by the Court of Appeals of this State and the Federal Supreme Court respectively. 60 N. Y. 559; S. C., 19 Am. Rep. 211; 18 Wall. 175. In the former the court said, in substance: "Jurisdiction of the person of the prisoner and of the subject-matter are not alone conclusive, but the jurisdiction of the court to render the particular judgment is a proper subject of inquiry; and while the court or officer cannot, upon return to the writ, go behind the judgment and inquire into alleged errors and irregularities preceding it, the question is presented and must be determined whether, upon the whole record, the judgment was warranted by law, and was within the jurisdiction of the court." In the latter the court observe: "It is no answer to say that the court had jurisdiction of the person of the prisoner, and of the offense, under the statute. It by no means follows that these facts make valid, however erroneous it may be, any judgment the court may render in such a case." The American Law Review, in speaking of the Kearney decision, oracularly says: "Set it down to the account of an elective judiciary." The London Law Times says: "An incident in the Bristol County Court raises a question which we think is of the utmost moment to the bench and the bar. A son of the judge appeared as counsel before him, and the counsel on the other side declined to go on with the case, as we gather, on that ground alone. We think the judge was wrong in suggesting that this step could in any sense be an insult to him." The Law Journal says, on the same incident: "In the United States the impression has taken so deep a hold that an attempt has actually been made to pronounce a father disqualified, on the ground of interest, to try a case in which his son is engaged. Such views of the situation are, it is needless to say, altogether without foundation. Judges' sons cannot be ostracised from the bar because their fathers were eminent lawyers before them. We do not for a moment believe that a single case on record has been decided in favor of a particular party because that party happened to be represented by the judge's But both journals agree in the conclusion VOL. 22. No. 12. son." that the constant practice would be improper. The Times says: "To say that a barrister should never appear in a court presided over by his father may be unreasonable. But we most emphatically condemn the practice of barristers adopting a court in which to practice over which their fathers do preside or may preside alone." And the Journal says: "This appearance is not of sufficient importance to be taken into account in ordinary cases; but still, if a son attach himself constantly to the court of his father as a Queen's counsel in equity attaches himself to a vice-chancellor, it must be admitted that an impropriety is committed." The difficulty in the case is four-fold: first, that a judge will always be presumed by the populace to lean in favor of his son; second, that the son will get business from the force of this presumption; third, that the judge will unconsciously be biased in his favor; or fourth, that the judge will do his son's client injustice from the fear of such bias. However pure, the judge and the son will always stand in danger. We think it would be better for everybody that a judge should read Chief Justice Ryan's remarks on nepotism, and should decline to hear a cause in which his son is counsel or attorney. If we were a judge, and had a son who insisted on appearing before us as counsel, we should insist on disappearing. It is stated that a good old Irish gentleman lately landed at New York with his five sons, all dressed in knee breeches and worsted stockings, being driven from their native land by a tyrannical government which insisted on vaccinating them against their will. There is a statute in this State for the vaccination of children as a condition of admission to the public schools; but our emigrant had probably learned that it is not enforced, or his children had already graduated. There are also certain provisions for vaccination at quarantine, but from these he probably did not stand in danger. The school law might well be added to our chapter of deadletter laws. We are reminded of this topic by the recent issue of a pamphlet Report of Laws, Provisions and Methods for securing general Vaccination throughout the Country, by Elisha Harris, M. D., secretary American Public Health Association. This report says: "In the State of New York, a compulsory statute has for eleven years remained a dead letter in the general statutes. It was made applicable to every school district in the State, and was left to execute itself. It has not been applied in a town or district, and has the present autumn (1875) been fanned into life in a single small city, only to discover its utter inadequacy, for it reposes in school-boards the duty of providing for and conducting public and mandatory vaccination, and of assessing the cost thereof upon the tax payers." A similar old law in Massachusetts was long ago repealed, "and the statute in New York requiring the certified and registered vaccination of all pupils in the public schools has remained a dead letter, except in so far as the sanitary and school authorities, acting together in the cities of New York, Brook lyn, Elmira, and Rochester, have secured a partial compliance with the statute." The Scotch, it seems, are the most vaccinated of any people, being perhaps thereto incited by their traditional cutaneous prompting. Dr. Harris says "the cities of New York and Providence vie with each other in the effort to secure the vaccination of all their young children," but Providence has the advantage of a perfect registration of births, obtained by canvassers, and gives gratuitous vaccination every Saturday. As to compulsion, he observes: "If vaccination is an unqualified blessing only when skillfully administered; if prejudice and resistance against it are the outcome of faultiness and indiscretion in the application of it; and if the universal and almost unexceptional vaccination of the entire population in any State or city can be secured by means of special expertness and tact of skillful medical and sanitary officers, then a resort to legal prosecutions certainly should be only a dernier resort for overcoming any particular wanton resistance to the law. Experience warrants the conclusion that excepting at the times when small-pox is invading a community, and in the rare instances of wanton recklessness, actual compulsion by legal proceedings, by penalties, etc., may not be expedient, and that even the mandatory language of compulsion is unnecessary; for in the few persons, and the extremely few parents, who obstinately resist and scorn the offer of vaccination for themselves or their families, such abnormal and vicious obstinacy is made angrily uncontrollable by the bare assertion of force and authority." "A writer for the New York Graphic publishes a computation indicating American expenditure for judicial services to be, in the aggregate, larger than that of England. Thirty-four judges discharge the law business of England and Wales, at an aggregate cost of less than $1,000,000, the population served being about 25,000,000; while New York State alone employs over 450 judicial officers, at a compensation of more than $1,000,000, to administer justice to a population of 5,000,000 people. Expense per capita in the British kingdom less than four cents; in New York, over twenty-five cents. Justice costing five times more in free New York than in monarchical England." Nothing can be more unfair than this statement. It is not true that "34 judges discharge the law business of England and Wales." We do not know how many judicial officers there are, but the number is vastly greater than that. That number represents only the superior judges. We dare hazard the conjecture, that reckoning on the above principle of embracing judges of local courts in both countries, England has many times that number. We have recently stated our belief that the litigation of New York is greater than that of England. In an article entitled The Decline of Circuit Life, in the current number of the Law Magazine and Review, we find some statistics, from which we learn that the county courts in England, during the year ending December, 1877, tried 10,232 causes. This undoubtedly represents the bulk of the civil causes, and it includes 318 equity actions, 115 admiralty actions, and 575 actions sent from the high court of justice. The city of New York alone supplies about that number of causes annually, in the Supreme, Superior, Common Pleas, and Marine Court. We wish that some of our London contemporaries would supply us with statistics showing the number of judicial officers and the amount of litigated business in England, and we would then take pains to collect the like here. The Albany Times says: "The attention of Gov. Cornell has been called to the case of Harriet Merrihew, recently sentenced to Sing Sing prison for life for poisoning her husband in Lewis county. On being taken to Sing Sing she was refused admittance, no female prisoners having been received there since the passage of the law of 1877 directing the removal of all female prisoners from that prison to a penitentiary. The woman was taken back to the Lewis county jail, where she now is. The question raised is as to how she can be resentenced; whether the court can reconvene itself, or whether the Governor must issue a proclamation reconvening it. The Governor has referred the matter to the attorney-general and the judges passing the sentence, for their opinion." It would seem that all that is necessary is to send the prisoner to another prison where they will hospitably receive her. specification of a particular prison is not necessary to a valid sentence, at common law or under our statutes. This is settled in Weed v. People, 31 N. Y. 465. "The law determines the prison, and the court have no authority to incarcerate the prisoner in any other." The specification of Sing Sing prison was therefore mere surplusage, and can be disregarded, and the statutes will determine where the lady should go. There is no need of a new sen tence. The The courts have enjoined a fiend in Pennsylvania, who proposed to introduce "memories of the Pirates of Penzance," into the repertory of the domestic piano and the itinerant hand organ. The original "Pirates" is in manuscript, not published and not copyrighted, and the heartless man in question published snatches of it, from recollection of the performances, adding perpetrations of his own, all under the above title. His counsel argued: "The airs of the opera in question have been given to the ears of large audiences, so that they could go home and play them over on the piano or the flute; thus the airs have become public property. Now the author of this publication has gone home, and recalling only the melody, the upper notes of the score, has arranged a piano accompaniment for it which is entirely original. It has been held that to produce a piece of music for the piano from an opera score is an original work. The only question, therefore, is, had the author of this work, having heard the airs, the right to use them in this way? This opera not being copyrighted, the property of the author in it is simply the author's right at common law in his work, that is, his right to keep his manuscript in his strong box; for this was his only right until the statute of copyright enlarged his property, limiting at the same time its duration. The defendant has not infringed this common-law right of the author." But the court held otherwise, and the musical pirate has "gone home" to think it over. We never heard of a more righteous and considerate decision that is, hardly ever. THE - NOTES OF CASES. HE Supreme Court of Georgia entertain a different view of the meaning of the word "extraordinary," from the New York courts. The latter are very liberal in their construction of the word in the statute for extra allowances for costs. The former, in Cox v. Hillyer, February, 1880, 10 Rep. 260, interpreting the phrase "extraordinary motion or case," in the statute concerning new trials in criminal cases, hold that it means "such as do not ordinarily occur in the transaction of human affairs, as when a man has been convieted of murder, and it afterward turns out that the man he was charged with having killed is still alive; or where a man has been convicted on the testimony of a witness who is afterward found guilty of perjury in giving that testimony, or from some providential cause, and cases of like character." Speaking of the particular case, they say: "The newly-discovered evidence relating to the physical condition of the defendant at the time of his trial, as well as that relating to the main issues involved in the case on that trial, is merely cumulative in its character, and would hardly pe sufficient of itself to have authorized the court to have set aside the verdict in an ordinary motion for a new trial; it is certainly not sufficient to authorize an extraordinary motion for a new trial to be made." In National Exchange Bank v. Watson, 13 R. I. 78, the court upheld an ante-nuptial settlement as against creditors, the grantee being innocent, although an untrue consideration was stated, the deed was not recorded, and the grantor made repairs and improvements on the estate conveyed. They said: 'Marriage is deemed in law a valuable consideration. A conveyance, therefore, in consideration of marriage, stands upon a different footing from a voluntary conveyance. All the authorities agree to this extent, at least, that a man, though indebted, may settle a portion of his property on his intended wife, and that in the absence of fraud, the settlement, if no more than a reasonable provision for the wife, will be upheld against existing as well as subsequent creditors. Campion v. Cotton, 17 Ves. Jun. 264, 271, 272; Armfield v. Armfield, Freeman (Miss.), 311, 316; Croft v. Arthur, 3 Des. 223, 232; Buckner v. Smyth, 4 id. 371, 372; Davidson v. Graves, Riley's Eq. 232, 235-238; Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Pet. 348, 393; Marshall v. Morris, 16 Ga. 368, 373, 374; Smith v. Allen, 5 Allen, 454, 458; Bonser v. Miller, 5 Or. 110, 112." "In Magniac v. Thomp son, 7 Pet. 348, 393, Judge Story says: 'Nothing can be clearer, both upon principle and authority, than the doctrine that to make an ante-nuptial settlement void as a fraud upon creditors, it is necessary that both parties should concur in or have cognizance of the intended fraud. If the settler alone intended a fraud, and the other party have no notice of it, but is innocent of it, she is not, and cannot be, affected by it."" "It does not appear that Mrs. Watson knew, or had any reason to believe, that Mr. Watson was insolvent, or indebted even, or that she had any knowledge of his pecuniary condition, except that which she admits in her answer, that he told her he was in easy circumstances and abundantly able to make the conveyance, and that he was regarded in the community as a man of property." In Pennsylvania Co. v. Miller, 35 Ohio St. 541, it was held that: (1) The implied undertaking of a carrier to insure the safety of baggage does not extend to the contents of a trunk, consisting of samples of merchandise, which the passenger, a travelling salesman, carries to facilitate his business in making sales. (2) But the carrier, by taking the property into his charge and putting it in his warehouse for safe-keeping, assumes the relation to it of an ordinary bailee, and he is bound to take such care of the property as a man of ordinary prudence would of his own, under like circumstances. Counsel cited in support of the first holding: "Macrow v. R. R. Co., I. R. 6 Q. B. 612; Railroad Co. v. Shepperd, 8 Exch. 30; Cahill v. Railroad Co., 13 C. B. 818; Phelps v. Railroad Co., 19 id. 321; Wilson v. Railroad Co., 56 Me. 60; 9 Wend. 85; Pardee v. Drew, 25 id. 459; Hawkins v. Hoffman, 6 Hill, 586; Stoneman v. Railroad Co., 52 N. Y. 429; Perley v. Railroad Co., 65 id. 374; Sloman v. Railroad Co., 67 id. 208; Weeks v. Railroad Co., 72 id. 50; S. C., 28 Am. Rep. 104; Jordan v. Railroad Co., 5 Cush. 69; Collins v. Railroad Co., 10 id. 506; Stimpson v. Railroad Co., 98 Mass. 83; id. 371; Railroad Co. v. Shea, 66 Ill. 471; Railroad Co. v. Carrow, 73 id. 348; S. C., 24 Am. Rep. 248. To these may be added: Alling v. Boston & Albany Railroad Co., 126 Mass. 121; S. C., 30 Am. Rep. 667. In support of the second holding, counsel cited: Cincinnati & Chicago R. R. v. Marcus, 38 Ill. 219; Ind. R. R. Co. v. Oehm, 56 id. 293; Camden & Amboy R. R. v. Baldauf, 16 Penn. St. 67; 2 Redf. Am. Railw. Cas. 267; 2 Smith and Bates' Am. Railw. Cas. 357; Minter v. Pacific R. R. Co., 41 Mo. 503; Butler v. Hudson River R. R. Co., 3 E. D. Smith, 571; Hannibal R. R. Co. v. Swift, 12 Wall. 262; Bartholomew v. St. Louis R. R., 53 Ill. 227; S. C., 5 Am. Rep. 45; Dexter v. Syracuse, Binghamton & New York R. R. Co., 42 N. Y. 326; Phillips v. Earl, 8 Pick. 182; 4 Bing. 218; Relf v. Rapp, 3 W. & S. 21. Mich. S. & N. A nice question was decided by the Exchequer Division, in Winspear v. Accident Ins. Co., 42 L. T. (N. S.) 900. The policy insured against "any personal injury caused by accidental external visible policy. But we do not accede to this argument; and we think that a case of death by drowning is a case of death by accident within the meaning of the policy for which the defendants are liable." Huddleston, B., in the principal case was "not without considerable doubt," but "after some hesitation " coincided with the chief baron. He observed: "It cannot be said in this case that the injury was caused directly by the epileptic fit. It was caused by immersion in the water and the consequent suffocation which was the direct cause of the death, and therefore it does not come within the clause of the policy by which the directors seek to protect themselves in case of the insured's death arising from disease or from exhaustion consequent thereupon." W OPPONENTS OF THE CODE. E lately paid our compliments to Chief Justice Ryan, of Wisconsin, on some admirable passages in his address to the law class of the University of his State. The learned gentleman's opinion of the New York Code of Procedure, conveyed in the same address, does not so much commend itself to our minds. He says: "This State is suffering to-day from a notable instance of unwise and unhallowed tampering with the common law. The system of pleading and proceeding in the courts of the common law, which had grown up with generations of lawyers and survived them, matured by the experience of ages, rested in the surest principles of logic and of law. It was, in some things, over means, within the intention of the policy and its provisions, and the direct effect of such injury should occasion his death within three calendar months from the happening of such injury;" it being further provided that no claim should be made | under the policy "for any injury from any accident unless such injury should be caused by some outward and visible means, of which proof satisfactory to the directors could be furnished, and that the insurance should not extend to * ** * * any injury caused by or arising from natural disease or weakness or exhaustion consequent upon disease, or any medical or surgical treatment or operation rendered necessary by disease; or to any death arising from disease, although such death may have been accelerated by accident." Whilst the policy was in force, W., in crossing and fording a stream or brook, was seized with an epileptic fit, and fell down in the said stream, and then and there, whilst suffering such fit, was drowned. He did not sustain any personal injury to occasion death other than drowning. Held, that a recovery could be had by his executors. Kelly, C. B., could "not bring himself to entertain a shadow of doubt in the matter." The inquiry was, what was the causa causans? "If there be a meaning in words, and if the English language admits of a statement with a plain and grammatical meaning of the cause of an individual's death, it is to my apprehension clear that here drowning was the cause, and the only cause, of the death of the insured. The drowning may have been occasioned by the deceased having falling down in the water from the fit of epilepsy, and that fit may have been | technical. It had excrescences and absurditiesoccasioned by a constitutional habit of body, making it dangerous for him to expose his limbs to the action of cold water, the one cause preceding the other, and being what logicians call the causa sine quâ non, but for which the death would perhaps not have happened, but not being in the proper sense of the word the actual proximate cause of death. The real causa causans in this case was the influx of water into the deceased man's lungs, and the consequent stoppage of his breath, and so he was drowned. Any thing which led to that, such as his being, if he were, subject to epileptic fits, or being seized with a fit while crossing the stream, would be a causa sine quâ non. If he had not had the fit he probably would have crossed the stream in safety, but that does not make the fit the causa causans, the actual proximate cause of his death." The question then arose, was a death by drowning within the policy? On this point, the learned judge quoted from Trew v. Ry. Passengers' Ass. Co., 6 H. & N. 839, where Cockburn, C. J., said: "Mr. Lush ingeniously puts it that, to be within the policy, the death must be from some vis major, from something without; that where the cause is one that would produce immediate death without any outward lesion, it is not a case within the policy, and therefore that the policy does not apply to the case of a death by the action of water. If this be correct, the case of a man who fell from the top of a high house, or one who fell overboard from a ship, or a case of suffocation by fire, would not be within the faults which embarrassed or impeded justice. But these were frailties not essential to the system, which might be easily weeded out from it. Elsewhere they have been, leaving the hereditary wisdom, the adjudicated certainty of the system, redeemed from its defects. But in several States, as in this, it has been arbitrarily abolished — sacrificing the essential wisdom of the system for its accidental faults. And under pretense of simplifying the administration of law, and facilitating justice, there has been substituted for it a crude and mischievous theory, which, attempting to dispense with skill, dispenses with certainty and security, embarrasses the processes of the law, unsettles much, far beyond its purpose, which was settled before; has vastly increased litigation and its cost; has impeded justice, and added to the uncertainty of the law. If it survive, it will need exposition for generations of judges, before its innovations, in all their scope and effect, will be settled; and then it will be more or less of an evil, as the courts shall have given it, more or less, of likeness to the system which it displaced. Its simplicity is a cheat. It is loose, not simple. Its plainness is a fraud. It is vague, not plain. It makes the remedies of the law a paradise of doubt and ambiguity." An eminent South Carolina lawyer says, as we learn from the Virginia Law Journal, that "the system would convert any bar in the country into a set of pettifoggers." The Journal falls in with these eminent authorities, but has the candor to admit |