General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; the China Sea and south into Malaysia. In the light of the various documents and discussions at that time, the most critical move was that [3289] which might go into the Gulf of Siam, and the southern one of these posts would very definitely relate to that. That was somewhat beyond our normal air capability of reconnaissance, although we did send some, I believe, in the general direction toward Camranh Bay at one period for three days.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, do you know why that action was not reported to you? Would not that be very material to your thinking?

General MARSHALL. Well, that would be material to my thinking. yes, sir; but on the other hand, I did not have brought to my attention every detail of Navy reconnaissance.

Senator FERGUSON. The next states:

Report measures taken to carry out President's views. At same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by both Army and Navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

General MARSHALL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. This was for information of CINCAF, which would be Admiral Hart, would it not?

General Marshall. Yes, sir.

[3290]

being car

Senator FERGUSON. Did you, prior to the 7th, get any information on his report as to what reconnaissance was ried out, as far as the Army was concerned? General MARSHALL. I do not recall, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not have any recollection on that?
General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you have given, at the end of your memorandum-it is on page 5 of Exhibit 16-you specifically make certain recommendations there.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "That the dispatch of United States Armed Forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved." General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, that does not concern the voluntary air corps.

General MARSHALL. No, sir, because that was under China's pay, and control.

Senator FERGUSON. That was under the Chinese and not our movement, as you interpreted the other day.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain and our own forces,

That was your recommendation, was it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether we were furnishing [3291] and supplies to Borneo or any of the other islands? Did not your first report indicate that we were?

General MARSHALL. In that report I gave a specific example of furnishing ammunition to the Chinese Government which had been reserved for Iceland. I think it involved 7,000 rounds, and we gave them 40,000 of those, or maybe it was 3,000, one or the other. That

was to be sent by General MacArthur from Manila, and we would replace them by shipment at the same time from San Francisco. Senator FERGUSON. Was that under Lend-Lease?

General MARSHALL. I assume it was, sir. I was getting it out, and the details were being taken care of by someone else.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know what it was under?

General MARSHALL. I think it was under Lend-Lease, but my action was to get them started.

Senator FERGUSON. Your report of 1941, your first report indicates bombs were also furnished.

General MARSHALL. I do not believe that is quite what it was, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you explain it?

General MARSHALL. It was necessary, we felt, to have the ability to land, and gas, and arm the B-17's to the south of the Philippines, for two reasons: One was in case [3292] we had to fly them in from Hawaii by that front, and the other one was that when you are operating strategical bombing planes of that type, their capacity is greatly increased for carrying bombs, and in range if they have some place they can shuttle to, and shuttle back from.

Therefore, we directed General MacArthur to take up with the governments concerned the proposition of preparing strips that would accommodate the B-17's and that he, General MacArthur, stock those strips with gasoline and bombs.

Senator FERGUSON. That was just anticipating, wasn't it, that if we got into any war. we would be using these other bases, and we would be using the ABCD plan, the Singapore plan?

General MARSHALL. To that extent, yes, sir. The same thing is really covered in the ABC-1 and 2 plans.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. The point here was that the B-17's would be greatly restricted in what they did from the Philippines if they had no landing points other than in the Philippine Islands, and therefore, it was essential, in my opinion-and I think I personally directed this myself that is my recollection-that these arrangements be made at Rabaul, Port Moresby, Port Darwin, Balikpapan [3293] Borneo and Singapore.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when that material was furnished to those places?

General MARSHALL. The records show, and I know this, the deliveries were made and efforts to develop the strips were under way at Rabaul, at Port Moresby and Port Darwin before the outbreak of the war. My recollection is, and the records will undoubtedly show, that the ship with the gasoline and bombs for Balikpapan, for Borneo and for Singapore, was just about to sail at the outbreak of the war. Senator FERGUSON. Going back just a moment to page 39 of exhibit 37, if those lookout ships, those men-of-war, saw convoys of Jap troops moving, for instance, in the Gulf of Siam across to KraGeneral MARSHALL. What page, please?

Senator FERGUSON. On page 39 of Exhibit 37.

General MARSHALL. I have it, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. If you would have known that Saturday morning, the 6th, that ships were moving across the Gulf of Siam, to

the Kra Peninsula, would that change your thinking, as far as the alert of the Army was concerned, that is, as to what the Army should be doing?

General MARSHALL. No, sir; I do not think it would.

[3294]

Senator FERGUSON. You had done then everything up to that point, and that would not have changed your mind at all? General MARSHALL. I do not think it would have, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not think it would have?

General MARSHALL. It is more a confirmation than anything else. Senator FERGUSON. A confirmation. Your next is, of course, the aid to the voluntary corps, and you explained that.

The next sentence is "that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan." Had there been any ultimatum, or why did you and Admiral Stark put that terse sentence there, that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan?

General MARSHALL. I would assume that there had been some such discussion. I do not recall now.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whom the discussion was with? General MARSHALL. My assumption would be that a discussion would be with Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, Colonel Knox, and probably Admiral Stark and myself present.

Senator FERGUSON. Did the President confer with you on that point of whether an ultimatum was to be delivered?

[3295] General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir. I might say here that Admiral Stark and myself were always on the side of trying to gain as much time as we possibly could, while I assume, and I am certain that Mr. Hull, Mr. Stimson, Colonel Knox, and presumably the President only had the consideration of the great policies for which this Government stood, that were involved, as well as the military status in the way of potential power.

further

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether you had any discussions with Mr. Knox, Mr. Stimson, or anyone else after that in relation to an ultimatum? That is very strong language, "that no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that specifically.

The only recollection I can go on now is these continued discussions as to what measures might be taken while upholding the dig nity of the United States and at the same time fend off hostile action in the Pacific. Now as to the question of ultimatum or not, I do not recall that, although we made specific statements in regard to it, and it must have been a discussion of that specific nature.

[3296] Senator FERGUSON. That would indicate that at least you had been consulted as to whether or not an ultimatum should be given?

General MARSHALL. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you had given a direct recommendation that no ultimatum should be given?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. The next is the joint board Washington meeting. "Secret minutes of meeting, November 3, 1941."

Major General William Bryden was there, the Deputy Chief of Staff, and Major General Arnold was there. Do you recall getting informa tion at that meeting? It was immediately prior to your memo of

the 5th.

General MARSHALL. Allow me to look at it.

Senator FERGUSON. I think you were there.

General MARSHALL. Yes; I was present at the meeting, as it shows there. I am looking at the minutes to see whether I can get any reminder.

On the bottom of page 2 I find this heading: "Action of the United States in the Far East in support of China."

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to have you read that and get what your reaction was as of the time that it was given in your presence on the 3d.

[3297]

General MARSHALL (reading):

At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-Shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be warned against movement into Siberia.

Senator FERGUSON. I would like to ask you some questions about that. Does that refresh your memory about that being brought up, about the note of the 17th?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

[3298]

Senator FERGUSON. Was there any discussion as to whether or not that was an ultimatum or not an ultimatum?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What is your opinion as to it?

General MARSHALL. I would say, in reading this and thinking while I was reading aloud, that the desire for the ultimatum was coming from China particularly, by General Magruder.

Senator FERGUSON. Going up and reading the sentence, "He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression."

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Apparently that was Schuirmann's opinion, and he said he was speaking at the request of Admiral Stark. General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now was that your opinion?

General MARSHALL. All I can think of at this particular moment, sir, in regard to that is we were probably discussing [3299] largely economic exactions or restrictions in order to influence Japan. Senator FERGUSON. What I am asking now, General, is, was it your opinion that we had issued an ultimatum on the 17th to Japan? That is just what Schuirmann says, and I will read it again.

General MARSHALL. I am familiar with that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. What I am not familiar with is the terms of the President's message. I do not know what I knew about it at that time.

Senator FERGUSON. I cannot hear you.

General MARSHALL. What I am not familiar with was the terms of the President's message to the Japanese Government.

Senator FERGUSON. I will read it to you.

General MARSHALL. What I do not know that I knew at the time was the exact expressions in that message. Your question is, did I think that was an ultimatum?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. I cannot answer that. I do not recall whether I knew exactly what he had said or not. I presume probably I had heard the message, but I have no accurate memory of what I thought at that minute. I received this information, and I think the record will have to speak for [3300] itself.

Senator FERGUSON. In your recollection on what was being said by Schuirmann, Captain Schuirmann, did you or did you not consider that the message of the 17th was an ultimatum?

General MARSHALL. I have no recollection of that, sir.
Senator FERGUSON. Now the minutes further state:

He further stated-that is Schuirmann-that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department.

What was your answer to that?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall what my answer to that was, other than the joint memorandum of Admiral Stark and myself. Senator FERGUSON. And that ended by saying

General MARSHALL. That no ultimatum be issued.

Senator FERGUSON. That no ultimatum be issued, be delivered to Japan. Would you say then that you had advised against further warnings by the State Department?

General MARSHALL. I would say that at that particular time our advice was that no ultimatum be issued. Now what you mean by "further warnings" is open to considerable interpretation.

[3301] Senator FERGUSON. I just have the language of the joint board.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out what happened at that meeting. Here is what Mr. Hull wanted to know: "Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we cannot back them up." Were we in a position at that time, in your opinion, to back up additional warnings? General MARSHALL. That meeting was on what date? Senator FERGUSON. On the 3d day of November 1941. General MARSHALL. We were not.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you express yourself at that time, when this question was brought up, along the same line?

up,

General MARSHALL. I do not recall, sir. The expressions of my views must be those of the memorandum, which followed shortly thereafter.