General MARSHALL. I knew they were not agreeable. I knew that we were having trouble about scrap iron. We were having trouble about oil in connection with the Japanese actions out in the Far East, and I regarded the whole situation as fraught with very dangerous possibilities.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, there was a good deal of talk going on at that time here in America intended to get the Government to ban the shipment of gasoline and oil and scrap iron to Japan, and to stop sending them supplies, but there wasn't any formal export ban early in 1940, was there?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall that there was.

Mr. KEEFE. My record shows that the ban on export of aviation fuel to Japan didn't come until August 1, 1941.

But at least there was a lot of talk about it, sir, you know that.
General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That necessarily went back to Japan and created tension; is that right?

General MARSHALL. Presumably it went back to Japan, yes, sir.

[3563]

Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, General Marshall, you became concerned. enough about what you learned from G-2 and Jap intercepts, and so on, that you decided that the time had come to alert the Army forces in Hawaii on the 17th of June 1940?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you sent the message that has been heretofore referred to, signed "Adams," which I shall not burden the record with reading again.

Now, I have listened carefully to the questions that were asked you with reference to that alert and I fail to recall where you have testified as to the specific facts and the specific evidence that you had in your hands at that time which prompted you to issue that alert warning. Will you now state what evidence you had in your hands at that time to indicate the possibility of a trans-Pacific raid on the 17th of June 1940.

General MARSHALL. I think I testified before, and if I didn't I testify now, that the information on which that alert was based came largely through some magic messages. I have not those particular messages here. They were brought to my attention by Gen. George V. Strong, who was then at the head of the War Plans Division, with the [3564] recommendation that the garrison there be alerted against the possibility of such a raid.

Mr. KEEFE. I understood you to give that testimony, General, heretofore, but that doesn't answer my question.

What was the information that came to you?

General MARSHALL. Mr. Keefe, I will have to attempt, through General Strong, to get those messages together. I don't know what they are right now.

Mr. KEEFE. It must have been something of a critical character
General MARSHALL. Presumably so.

Mr. KEEFE. You knew that any time you took action out at Hawaii, they had a mass of spies out there that were in constant contact with their homeland and that everything that was done was reported back to Japan practically the moment it happened?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That is conclusively shown and demonstrated, is it not? General MARSHALL. I think that is a fact.

Mr. KEEFE. So that when you issued this alert, and put Oahu on a practical war footing on the 17th of June 1940, did you consider that to be in the nature of an overt act against Japan?

[3565]

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you have anything that you took from Magic that would indicate that the Japs might have so considered it?

General MARSHALL. I have not the magic message here. I will have to check back and find what it might have been, talk to General Strong and get him to advise me as to the basis of his recommendation to me for that particular message.

Mr. KEEFE. So we can be clear on this, I would like to have the specific information, not the general conclusion that you came to on the 17th of June; not your conclusion, but I would like to have the specific information that General Strong gave you prompted you to issue that alert order on June 17.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. As a result of that alert order given to the Army, General Herron in command, he went on an all-out alert, did he? General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. That meant that a lot of things happened immediately; ammunition was issued for all the guns?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. The guns were loaded, ready for action, their crews were at their stations?

[3566] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Reconnaissance was extended inshore and distant reconnaissance?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Through the cooperation of the Navy?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Searchlights were on at night, and such detection apparatus as they had was on 24 hours a day, wasn't it?

General MARSHALL. I don't recall the details as to searchlights or the detection.

Mr. KEEFE. I recall because I have some pictures showing it here. I would be glad to show them to you.

General MARSHALL. I was speaking about all night.

Mr. KEEFE. I don't know that they were on all night, but searchlights are used for defense, are they not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I was merely commenting on the fact you said searchlights were on all night.

Mr. KEEFE. There was a lot of artillery rumbling over the islands, troops moving from one place to another, patrols out, signal wires stretching over the island, communications systems rapidly laid, just as in wartime; isn't that true?

General MARSHALL. That is true. [3567]

Mr. KEEFE. That continued on out there in Hawaii for some time, did it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; quite a few weeks.

Mr. KEEFE. In fact, on the 18th of June, General Herron in response to your order for an alert, as appears on page 3 of these communications between the War Department and General Herron, said:

All anti-aircraft observations and security of detachments in position with live ammunition and orders to fire on foreign planes over restricted areas, and in defense of any essential installations. Some local interest in ammuniaion issues, but no excitement. Navy in-shore and off-shore air patrols in operation. I suppose that if a Jap plane did come over, they would fire on it, wouldn't they?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Would that be an act of war?
General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. If a Jap submarine came near the Harbor and they sunk it, would that be an act of war?

General MARSHALL. I assume it would be; yes, sir. Certainly for the submarine crew.

Mr. KEEFE. Pardon me?

General MARSHALL. It would be an act of war.

[3568]

war?

Mr. KEEFE. Well, would it have been considered an act of

General MARSHALL. I think it would; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is 3 minutes to 3, Mr. Keefe.

General MARSHALL. May I read one paragraph from a letter to me from General Herron on June 24, 1940, in connection with your question?

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

General MARSHALL. I won't have time for the whole letter, but I will read one paragraph apropos of what has been said:

This is to report that the Hawaiian portion of your domain is quiet this morning.

I will omit the next there to save time.

I have been highly gratified by the promptness and the precision with which the planes got off the ground every morning promptly at 4:30.

I omit again.

A week ago to-day

That would be the 17th

I gave the command for a surprise alert, which went off smoothly and efficiently. In view of the disturbing state of the world, I thought the command might as well get accustomed to having live ammunition, but did not realize how much this would excite the postwar portion of the Army. [3569] However, they are all quieted down now, as is the city which buzzed for a couple of days. Some of the young people throught that M-day had come, and two or three young couples that had intended to get married this month hustled around and did it once, just as in 1918.

Mr. KEEFE. That is the same letter in which General Herron said to you in the last paragraph:

Your crack that "yesterday we had time but no money and that today we have money but no time" is good and has made a great hit in particular with the civilians.

General MARSHALL. I wasn't going to read that, Mr. Keefe.
Mr. KEEFE. I will suspend, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. We promised to relieve General Marshall at 3 o'clock. The Chair expresses regret that we haven't been able to conclude with the General today. You have been very kind, General, to put yourself at the disposal of the committee. It looks like you will have to come back tomorrow.

General MARSHALL. At 10 o'clock?

The CHAIRMAN. At 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.
General MARSHALL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel, what witness do you want now?

[3750]

he left off.

Mr. MITCHELL. General Miles had better start back where

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, before we question General Miles further, can we get this secret report in?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair feels that inasmuch as General Marshall is not to be back until tomorrow morning, it would give more time to consider that if we waited until tomorrow before putting it in as an exhibit.

Senator FERGUSON. Is there any question about the report, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. Chairman, I was just looking it over to see what this book contains so as to describe it in the record. I have done that. The CHAIRMAN. What disadvantage will result in allowing this to await tomorrow?

Senator FERGUSON. The only thing is if we can get it read into the record now, General Marshall will have the record, which apparently he gets, because he made corrections in it, and then he would be able to know about this and we could question him further in the morning. That was my purpose for bringing it up now.

[3571]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman-if you will permit, Senator; the same purpose could be served, if counsel places the document in General Marshall's hands and so let him be familiar with it when he comes back at 10 o'clock in the morning. Mr. MITCHELL. We can do that.

Senator FERGUSON. What is the objection to having it read into the record?

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Senator: Isn't it a fact that many of the things that are in that report which you are now offering have not been gone into by the committee and are changed by the Clausen report which you do not offer?

Senator FERGUSON. AS I view this report, as I stated before, a board was appointed in conformity with a statute passed by Congress. That board's function was to render a report. They rendered a report. They rendered it in two parts. One part was a top secret report. The other was a report. Because the war was on part of that report was published. Part of the report was not published. That is, the 18 pages of the top secret report.

Now, before General Marshall leaves for China, it is essential that the committee be given an opportunity to examine him if they desire, and it, therefore, should become a part of the record. It is an official paper filed by a board in conformity with the statute.

[3572] Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Chairman, may I make an obser

vation in answer to that?

1

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman from Michigan this morning talked about this being a statutory board. The fact is that the direction of the Congress was to the Secretary of War personally to make an investigation. That is the way the act reads. I have it here and we had better get it into the record at this time.

It reads:

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe.

Now, then, subsequently the Secretary of War, as a medium for obtaining information, named three generales who conducted certain hearings. They had a Major Clausen as an assistant recorder. Then the Secretary of War stated that in order to continue his investigation and in order to cover certain material which was not covered by the board, he would delegate the assistant recorder of the board to go around the world to take this testimony.

That testimony, taken by Major Clausen, was not considered by the Army Pearl Harbor board. The report is here. It explains in great detail, and, as the Senator from Michigan [3573] knows, corrects great many errors which appear in the Army Pearl Harbor proceedings.

All we want is the ultimate truth and why put part of it in when you are not putting it all in?

Senator FERGUSON. I have no objection to the Clausen report going in. In fact, I want the Clausen report in.

The CHAIRMAN. The offering of this particular report raises the question whether all of these reports, regardless of whether they are statutory or otherwise, should be offered as exhibits and become a part of the record.

The Chair sees no harm that could result by awaiting our meeting tomorrow to determine that matter, and in the meantime if counsel can show these 18 pages to General Marshall instead of taking the time to read them into the record now, the same purpose would be accomplished and he could be examined about it.

The Chair hopes that the decision on that may go over to tomorrow, because it may turn out that all of these reports might be filed as exhibits so that we have the benefit of all of them.

Mr. KEEFE. I concur in what the chairman has said; insofar as I am concerned, I am perfectly willing to have all this material go in.

So far as the Clausen report is concerned, that was a [3574] report made to the Secretary of War and consists of a lot of affidavits and some conclusions based thereon. It is a reexamination of witnesses who appeared before the Army board and testified under oath. Now, I am perfectly willing, so far as I am concerned (and I expect, too, to examine some of these witnesses as to the changes which they made in their testimony when they testified under oath before the Army and Navy Court, and then changed their testimony when they gave an affidavit in various parts of the world to Colonel Clausen.

I am perfectly willing that the Clausen affidavits be submitted, and also that the Navy Court of Inquiry record and all connected with it, be submitted, and any other reports, the Hewitt report and the Hart