No, things were getting pretty critical at that time, were they not? General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And I assume, General Marshall, that it is a fair statement that you as Chief of Staff were very worried about the situation in the Pacific and what might happen?

General MARSHALL. Very much so.

Mr. KEEFE. You knew at that time that we were not prepared for a war in the Pacific, didn't you?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you tried to make that clear, did you not, all along? General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You wanted any possibility of a war in the Pacific to be held off and stalled, I believe you used the word "stalled" in your testimony, as long as possible?

General MARSHALL. I probably did.

Mr. KEEFE. That was your attitude, wasn't it?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And it was the attitude of Admiral Stark, too, was it not?

[3649]

General MARSHALL. According to statements I recollect of his, that was his attitude.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, you had frequent discussions back and forth and were on terms of intimacy almost daily with him?

General MARSHALL. I am not saying he did not, sir, I said according to statements that he made that I heard that was his attitude.

Mr. KEEFE. General Marshall, you may have had private conversations back and forth that are not reflected in statements. What I am trying to get is the actual state of mind.

General MARSHALL. I think I confused you, Mr. Keefe. I was merely endeavoring not to testify for Admiral Stark. What I said was that according to statements I heard him make that was his attitude. Mr. KEEFE. He made those statements to you?

General MARSHALL. Either to me or in my presence.

Mr. KEEFE. I see. Well, then, a constant revision of war plans was going on all this time, wasn't there?

General MARSHALL. I would have to qualify that somewhat, sir The war plans had been formally agreed upon so far as our own government was concerned. What we were concerned with at those times was the means for implementing the war plans.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

[3650] General MARSHALL. The distribution of material and the distribution of personnel.

Mr. KEEFE. You had to get supplies and you were faced with the dilemma of the allocation of those supplies, were you not?

General MARSHALL. That was the great dilemma throughout all of this period.

Mr. KEEFE. Where they should go.

General MARSHALL. Where they should go.

Mr. KEEFE. There was an insistent demand for supplies to be sent to the Allies on the European front?

General MARSHALL. Very insistent.

Mr. KEEFE. And likewise you knew that there had to be some supplies, too, at strategic points in the Pacific?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you were trying to take whatever available supplies there were and to make the best use of them and see that Panama and Hawaii and MacArthur out there at Manila got whatever it was possible to send them?

General MARSHALL. Those were the critical decisions that I had to make at that time.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did any person influence your decision as to the distribution of these supplies?

General MARSHALL. Well, I could not say that, sir. [3651] Pressure was brought on to me from numerous directions, inside the Government, outside the Government and a little free-handed advice.

Mr. KEEFE. You were being hit from all sides, weren't you?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. That had been going on for about a year and a half and it reached a peak at this time. All the commanders, of course, every commander wants all that he can possibly use for his own interests in carrying out his own mission and, naturally, they were making their pressures as well as the Russian Government and the British Government and the people of the Netherlands East Indies and the Chinese Government. They were to me direct, they were to the State Dpartment I am quite certain, they were to the President, they were to any influence they thought might achieve the results they desired.

Mr. KEEFE. You were convinced, were you not, as early as August 1941 that if the current of events continued as they had up to that time we would inevitably be drawn into a war with Japan as a matter of necessity?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. It was my reaction at that time.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Can you state whether it was the reaction of Admiral Stark?

[3652] General MARSHALL. I could not testify as to that, sir. Mr. KEEFE. Did you ever discuss that situation with him?

General MARSHALL. That specific factor I do not recall. It is probable that I did.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you ever discuss it with Mr. Stimson?
General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I am quite certain I did.

Mr. KEEFE. Was he of the same opinion from the expressions that he gave to you?

General MARSHALL. I hesitate to try to recall just what his opinions were. He was deeply concerned. He regarded the situation. as critical and it was a daily, almost hourly, trouble in his mind as to what was the proper course of this Government.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, General Marshall, you well knew the character of the Japanese during this whole period?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And the double talk that they were engaged in, did you not?

General MARSHAL. I assume that you have to read all diplomatic exchanges of theirs with a grain of salt.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, maybe that is a bad expression, double talk, but as I look at this correspondence I can think of nothing that more aptly describes it. You were getting their [3652A] talk from

their intercepts and then you had what they were telling Mr. Hull openly in these negotiations?

General MARSHALL. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you knew that it was double talk, did you not, at that time?

General MARSHALL. That was my impression except that there is one message there, in their magic, I have forgotten the particular message, it is in the latter part of November, where they go into the matter, I think, of the date, the limiting date of November 25. Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Well, we will get to that.

General MARSHALL. When they use the expression "to make impossible further diplomatic relations."

Mr. KEEFE. Yes. Now, the War Department and the Navy Department, I gained the impression from the conversation up to date, were called upon to implement the diplomatic representations. Did you so understand it?

General MARSHALL. I do not believe I would put it quite that way, sir. We were notified of the diplomatic conversations and it was left to us to find what should be done to back them up. Also, we were consulted as to whether we were prepared to back up the possible consequences of certain diplomatic moves should they be made. Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you advise the State Department [3652B] that you were not prepared?

General MARSHALL. I advised Mr. Hull, I think personally, some time in September that December 5 was the earliest date that I could figure when we would be reasonably prepared, particularly in the Philippines.

Mr. KEEFE. And Admiral Stark. I believe you testified the other day, thought some time in February?

General MARSHALL. He mentioned along the 1st of February, I think, from the viewpoint of the Fleet.

Mr. KEEFE. And that the Fleet was not prepared at that time to meet reasonable eventualities in the Pacific?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. And you figured if things came along as you planned you perhaps could get things out there to reasonably prepare our defenses in the Pacific by the 5th of December?

General MARSHALL. I thought we would have the troops, and particularly the planes.

Mr. KEEFE. And you were very concerned particularly to see that diplomatic negotiations did not cause a break before that time, so that you could be prepared?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, all this time this great mass and volume of communications as evidenced by all this mass of exhibits was taking place? [36520] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. But fundamentally and reduced down to a thing that the man on the street can understand, you were concerned with getting our defenses ready in the Pacific to meet the situation which you were convinced as early as August was inevitable and you thought that if you could stall this thing along until the 5th of December you could get those defenses fairly ready to meet what you could see coming, is that a fair statement?

General MARSHALL. Roughly that, sir, with this addition: I had thought that if we could build up and might have been able to build up by December 5 our defenses in the Philippines it might discourage the Japanese from any hostile action because it would be too hazardous. Mr. KEEFE. Because from all the indications that you could see they were moving down south?

General MARSHALL. That their purpose was a southern campaign. Mr. KEEFE. And the Philippines were on their flank?

General MARSHALL. And the Philippines were on their flank.

Mr. KEEFE. And if you could build up the defenses in the Philippines sufficiently you thought it would deter them from proceeding along down the course you thought they had been [3652D] General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. I thought it would deter them from any overt act.

pursuing?

Mr. KEEFE. Did you think that the development of the defenses in the Hawaiian area would deter them?

General MARSHALL. I thought the existing defenses in the Hawaiian Department would deter them from an effort directed at Hawaii. Mr. KEEFE. Was it your opinion in the summer of 1941 that the very presence of the Fleet out there at Hawaii would act as a deterrent? General MARSHALL. I thought that that had a deterrent effect. Mr. KEEFE. Now, as the events progressed, General Marshall, all through the summer of 1941 and in the fall of 1941 there was no evidence so far as the Japs were concerned that they were being deterred by the presence of the fleet, was there?

General MARSHALL. The Japs continued throughout that period to make moves which were unopposed at that time, of course, due to the inability of the Indochina people and the Eastern Thailand people to oppose them and the Chinese themselves to oppose them, so they continued definitely with their various moves throughout that period. I might add that in [3652E] speaking of building up the defenses of the Philippines sufficient to cause the Japanese to hesitate, if not to give up the idea of an overt act, I still assumed that they would take as much as they could get, you might say, for nothing by their various infiltration moves that were then in progress in Indochina specifically.

Mr. KEEFE. Do you know Stanley Hornbeck?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir; I know him.

Mr. KEEFE. You knew he was counsellor to the State Department? General MARSHALL. I was aware of that fact, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. You were in conferences in which he participated, were you not, during this period?

General MARSHALL. I do not specifically recall his presence. He may have been present. I do not recall any discussion with him personally myself.

Mr. KEEFE. Did you ever get any confidential memorandum from him?

Genral MARSHALL. I may have. I do not recall right now, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. I have before me what appears to be some memoranda prepared by Mr. Hornbeck on December 1 of 1941, which Harmon Duncombe, Lieutenant Colonel, says he understood were addressed to the Army and Navy.

[3652F] Now, I have asked, I will say, of counsel for all those communications. I have been furnished with two. Will the counsel make a further statement now if he can find the communications that passed from Mr. Hornbeck?

Mr. GESELL. We are making that search and the State Department has communicated with Mr. Hornbeck in the Netherlands directly. We have furnished the committee so far with the memos that have been located.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for one question so that I may ascertain something from counsel? Mr. KEEFE. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Is it true, counsel, that the Army records show that there are no-or the Navy records show that there are no Hornbeck statements in their records? Is that what you said?

Mr. GESELL. They have so reported.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So that as we now understand it, the committee counsel are unable to get any of the Hornbeck statements from the Navy?

Mr. GESELL. That is correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And from the Army other than those that have been distributed?

Mr. GESELL. That is correct.

[3653] ally?

Senator FERGUSON. Have they been distributed gener

Mr. GESELL. No. We are trying to get all of them together before we distribute them.

Senator FERGUSON. They haven't been distributed then?

Mr. GESELL. I think we gave them to Mr. Keefe when they came in because it was his request and I think Mr. Keefe has the ones that have come from the Army.

Mr. KEEFE. I have them before me.

Senator FERGUSON. I am sorry to interrupt but I wanted to get that on the record.

Mr. KEEFE. I have a letter, photostatic copy of a letter dated December 1, 1941, addressed to the Hon. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, signed by Stanley K. Hornbeck, in which it says (reading):

I send you herewith for your strictly personal and strictly confidential information-but for whatever use you may care to make of the thought contained, without quotation or attribution-a copy of a memorandum of date November 5 which was made immediately after a conference the participants in which were the Secretary of State, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, the author of this memorandum being present.

Do you recall that conversation?

General MARSHALL. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. It was on November 5, 1941, General Marshall, [3654] according to Mr. Hornbeck's letter to the Secretary of War. Now, this memoranda reads as follows, and I quote:

There are two points in particular to which, in my opinion, the War Department and the Navy Department, in their estimate of the Far Eastern situation and its problems do not give sufficient consideration.

Now, to interject at this point, who was this man Hornbeck and what was his business?

General MARSHALL. I think you said he was the counsellor of the State Department.