The VICE CHAIRMAN. You would not have any further information to give us on that point? General MILES. No, sir. As to the growth of that activity I have no further information to give. The VICE CHAIRMAN. That was my recollection, that he stated about 10,000 people in this country and about 30,000 in England were at one time during the war required to handle this decoding and translating process of these intercepted Japanese messages and that is about your understanding? General MILES. That is my recollection of what the General testified. The VICE CHAIRMAN. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. It is 4 o'clock and I don't know how much longer it will require to conclude with General Miles, but if we could stay a few minutes longer and conclude with [4172] him it might be desirable to do so. Is the committee willing? The VICE CHAIRMAN. I think Senator Lucas has some questions, too. Senator FERGUSON. I have some, too. The CHAIRMAN. What is the wish of the committee, to conclude with General Miles? Well, without objection we will go on for a few minutes. Go ahead, Senator Lucas. Senator LUCAS. General Miles, I became rather curious about that pouch that the Congressman from Wisconsin was talking about a little while ago. Have you got one of those pouches left down there in the Department where you sealed up these magic messages? General MILES. I have not seen one for many years, sir, but I think they still have them. Senator LUCAS. What kind of a pouch was that? I would like to get a little more information on it. There seems to be a very much mooted question around here about the pouch. Just describe it to me if you can. General MILES. Why, it was a brief case very similar to that, that we had made by Becker & Co., I think, here in Washington. Senator LUCAS. Becker & Co. General MILES. Yes. Senator LUCAS. Where do Becker & Co. live, or where do they produce this, what city? [4173] General MILES. They are a leather shop on Connecticut Avenue. Senator LUCAS. Right here in Washington? The CHAIRMAN. They are on F Street. Senator LUCAS. Are you sure now that we are not on F Street? It is very important to find out just where Becker & Co. is. The CHAIRMAN. Camalier & Buckley are on Connecticut but Becker is on F Street. Senator LUCAS. What kind of a key did that pouch have, General Miles? General MILES. What, sir? Senator LHCAS. What kind of a key did this pouch have? General MILES. Well, the point was to get two keys which were quite separate from any other two keys for each pouch. That was the only point about insuring that they had the proper pouches. 79716-46-pt. 3- -39 Senator LUCAS. Do you still think you could find one of those things, one of those keys and one of those pouches and bring them up here before the committee so that we can inspect them? General MILES. I will try to do so, sir. Senator LUCAS. I think it is very important to the de- [4174] termination of this Pearl Harbor hearing and investigation, the type of pouch and the type of key you had at that particular time and as one member of the committee I would like to have you bring it in if you can find it. I want to inspect it thoroughly because it will have a great deal to do with my final judgment, what kind of pouch and key you had at that particular time. Now, General Miles, one more question or two that I want to ask you. As G-2 you had under your control all of the magic messages that came in and all other information of every type and character, irrespective of where it might come from, with respect to what was going on at that particular time in our relations in the Far East. General MILES. Yes, sir. Senator LUCAS. Now, I want to ask you this question based upon all of that information that you had: Did you as Chief of Staff possess any information prior to December the 7th definitely pointing to an attack upon Pearl Harbor? Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman described the witness as Chief of Staff. Senator LUCAS. I mean as G-2. General MILES. I did not, sir. Senator LUCAS. Did you have any specific and advance information as to the precise hour or day that Japan would [4175] attack this country or the British or the Dutch prior to the time that it happened? General MILES. Only as what one might infer from the 1 o'clock message that we received on the 7th of December. Senator LUCAS. I am not asking for your inferences or your impli cations. I am asking you whether you had any specific and direct information? General MILES. The answer is no, sir. Senator LUCAS. And what information that you obtained as head of G-2, which was practically all the intelligence information of the country, was transmitted to-not all of it, but the principal parts of it, or anything that you deemed important was transmitted on to the Chief of Staff? General MILES. What is the question, sir? Senator LUCAS. I say any information that you obtained as head of the Intelligence Department of the War Department at that time, if you believed that it was important enough you saw that the Chief of Staff got that information? General MILES. I did, sir. Senator LUCAS. And in turn the Chief of Staff saw that the Secretary of State or the President of the United States obtained that information? General MILES. Presumably so. Senator LUCAS. And the Secretary of War as well? [4176] General MILES. Presumably so. Senator LUCAS. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. Senator FERGUSON. General Miles, this may refresh your memory about this insurance. You were not able to see the Honolulu papers. Did you take the New York Times? General MILES. Yes, sir; I personally took the New York Times. It was also taken by my division. Senator FERGUSON. Well, on August the 25th, 1941, on page 8 of the New York Times the headline is: Lloyd's stop writing Hawaiian bomb insurance policy, by the Associated Press. Honolulu, August 24th. Lloyd's of London has discontinued writing bombing insurance for this outpost of the United States Pacific defense. W. B. Brandt of San Francisco, Lloyd's Pacific Coast representative, said new insurance was being refused "not because of fear of war but because of possible sabotage. Rates on bomb insurance here have risen from 10 to 50 cents for a hundred dollars protection. Policies total more than ten million dollars," Mr. Brandt said. Now, if you would have seen that and you knew that a note was delivered after the President returned from the Atlantic conference parallel with England's note, would that [4177] have been of any significance, that Lloyd's of London had stopped writing bomb insurance on Hawaii? General MILES. Well, Senator, I knew, of course, which was common public knowledge, that in those years, particularly after the first blitz of London, there was a lot of insurance business done in war risk and bombing of all sorts. That Lloyd's had offered bombardment insurance in Hawaii and then had withdrawn the offer would not of itself have been particularly significant, only that they found certain people out there that would take up their bet and then when they recovered enough money they withdrew. I would certainly not have connected it with the rather secret message which the President of the United States had given on his return from Argentia to the Japanese admiral. I would certainly not have assumed that that was known to Lloyd's. Senator FERGUSON. Did you know at that time that the British Government was very close to Lloyd's and this was at a time that Mr. Churchill had returned from the conference? General MILES. I had heard that the British Government was pretty close to Lloyd's, yes, sir; but I did not know of my own knowledge and I do not remember ever suspecting that the British Government turned over their rather important secrets about the results of a meeting with the President of the United States to Lloyd's. I certainly would not have [4178] assumed it without some definite knowledge. Senator FERGUSON. Well, as I understand it, you had no knowledge whatever about this Lloyd's stopped writing, as the headline says, Hawaii bomb policies. General MILES. I do not recall that at all. Senator FERGUSON. I think you ought to see this. I think it will just refresh your memory if you come and see it, the way it is written, right under the picture. Does that refresh your memory in any way? It is in right under the picture that has, "Keeping the Soviet soldiers in touch with events.' General MILES. No, sir; I do not now recall either the picture or that particular article. Senator FERGUSON. Just one more question about the winds message. Was that in the purple code or the secret code messages, or was that in the so-called embassy_code which was, as a remark has been made in the record, "even the Dutch could break." Did you ever hear that expression before, "Even the Dutch could break it"? General MILES. I think I have, Senator. I do not remember, sir. I would have to look that up, Senator. Senator FERGUSON. Well, would you do that and find out on that? [4179] General MILES. That is the wind code message? Senator FERGUSON. Yes. General MILES. The two of them? know whether or not there was Senator FERGUSON. Yes.1 Do you any sabotage at all at or after the attack in the Hawaiian Islands? General MILES. After or before? Senator FERGUSON. Yes. General MILES. I believe that there was very little sabotage. I might note, however, that Senator, from my point of view I was not talking only of sabotage. You will notice that in my G-2 message I spoke of subversive activities which include sabotage and espionage. Senator FERGUSON. Is that all you included under that? General MILES. Well, propaganda to destroy the loyalty or morale of our troops, any other subersive activity but principally sabotage and espionage. Senator FERGUSON. Did you spend more time on that than you did on the other magic, and so forth, your department? Did they spend more time on espionage and counterespionage, and so forth, rather than on the magic? General MILES. Well, magic, Senator, as, of course, you know, was only one part of our intelligence branch, the branch that was charged with getting information and collat- [4180] ing information, analyzing it and distribuating it. The other big branch of the Military Intelligence Division was counterintelligence. I think we spent more time, however, and devoted more effort on the getting of information and its final distribution than on the counterintelligence as we call it; in other words, the prevention of subversive activities of all kinds against the United States. [4181] Senator FERGUSON. How many people had you in the magic department at the time of Pearl Harbor? General MILES. I cannot tell you accurately, sir. Colonel Bratton undoubtedly can when he comes to the stand. Senator FERGUSON. That is all. The VICE CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have any further questions? Mr. GESELL. Just a few questions, Mr. Chairman, to straighten one or two matters in the record. You have been asked, General Miles, whether the reference to sabotage in General Short's reply to General Marshall's message would have resulted if that message had been routed to you as a matter of course. You recall that message says, "Report department alerted to prevent sabotage." Would not that reply be routed to you? General MILES. The reply was not routed to me. The reply was routed, undoubtedly, by whoever handled it, which I never knew, by number. In other words, it was a reply to a numbered telegram of the War In Hearings, Part 5, p. 2074, Mr. Gesell makes the statement that "both messages— SIS Nos. 25432 and 25392-were sent not in the 'purple' code, but in the code known as 'J-19.'" Department and the reply was sent to that division of the General Staff, in this case the Chief of Staff, who had signed the original message. Mr. GESELL. Now with respect to sabotage, do you know of any acts of sabotage that were committed at Hawaii before or during the attack by any Japanese-American or Japanese [4182] aliens on the Island? General MILES. I do not, sir. Mr. GESELL. With respect to the question of whether or not you were ordered by General Marshall not to send magic to the field, there is a contradiction, I believe, in the testimony between you and General Marshall. I understood you to say General Marshall ordered you not to send magic to the field, and I understand General Marshall to say you were authorized to send magic to the field as long as you did not send it in the form of a directive command. What is the fact in regard to that? General MILES. I do not think, sir, that I did testify that I was ever ordered by General Marshall not to send magic to the field. If I did, I was certainly wrong. Mr. GESELL. I may have misunderstood you. General MILES. What I did testify to was General Marshall's very keen interest, as well as my own, to preserve the secret of magic, and I felt sure he wanted it limited to as few people as possible, that really had to get the information that magic was conveying. Mr. GESELL. So that we understand it clearly, there was no order of General Marshall, or anyone superior to you, written or oral, which prevented you from sending the summary or gist of the magic message to the field? [4183] General MILES. That is correct, sir. Mr. GESELL. Now one other matter I think we should clarify. You have been questioned at some length as to whether or not you knew of certain messages which President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull handed to the Japanese Ambassadors. It is a fact, is it not, that those messages, the formal messages that appeared in the various publications we have here, when they were transmitted by Secretary Hull or President Roosevelt to the Japanese, were in turn submitted by the Japanese to their government through magic? General MILES. Yes, sir. Mr. GESELL. And that as a result of reading magic you knew at that time of every message that was handed by Secretary Hull or President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassadors? General MILES. There again, sir, I question whether I have ever testified that I did not know of diplomatic exchanges between the United States Government and the Japanese Government or the Japanese Ambassadors here. If I have given that impression I certainly regret it. I did know it through my liason with the State Department in general terms. I did know it on the Japanese side through magic. What I did testify to, counsel, was that I was not in [4184] the group or called in for consultation or discussion by the group of higher policy-making individuals of the Government as between themselves and with the President of the United States. Mr. GESELL. I was not referring to that testimony. I recall specifically your testimony in response to a question by Senator Ferguson that you did not know of the oral message handed by President |