I further stated we were more likely to make the Japanese feel that we meant business if a train were assembled and the fleet returned to the Pacific coast, the complements filled, the ships docked, and fully supplied with ammunition, provisions, stores, and fuel, and then stripped for war operations. The President said in effect, "Despite what you believe, I know that the presence of the fleet in the Hawaiian area, has had, and is now having, a restraining influence on the actions of Japan." I said, "Mr. President, I still do not believe it, and I know that our fleet is disadvantageously disposed for preparing for or initiating war operations." The President then said, "I can be convinced of the desirability of returning the battleships to the west coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American people and the Japanese Government that in bringing the battleships to the west coast we are not stepping backward." This is embarrassing. Later I asked the President if we were going to enter the war. He replied that if the Japanese attacked Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies we would not [684] enter the war, that if they even attacked the Fhilippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, but that they could not always avoid making mistakes and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war. Mr. MITCHELL. Does that complete your statement of the conversation? Admiral RICHARDSON. That is about all of it. Mr. MITCHELL. Do you want to adjourn? The CHAIRMAN. Four o'clock having arrived, the Chair thinks we might recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. (Whereupon, at 4 p. m., a recess was taken until 10 a. m., Tuesday, November 20, 1945.) [685] PEARL HARBOR ATTACK TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1945 CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe. Also present: William D. Mitchell, general counsel; Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford, and John E. Masten, of counsel, for the joint committee. [686] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order. Mr. Mitchell, you were examining the witness when we adjourned. You may proceed. Before you proceed, Mr. Mitchell-this is not necessarily on the record. (Discussion off the record.) The CHAIRMAN. All right, Mr. Mitchell. Mr. MITCHELL. Very well. TESTIMONY OF ADM. JAMES OTTO RICHARDSON (Resumed) Mr. MITCHELL. Admiral Richardson, in the correspondence which you have there appears to be a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations dated October 9, 1940, made by you. That was the day following this visit with the President? Admiral RICHARDSON. It was. Mr. GEARHART. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if counsel will permit me to interpose. Last week I requested from Admiral Inglis a chart which he said he would have ready for me yesterday showing the disposition of the ships in the Pacific from May 1941 to December 7, 1941. I would like to have that at this moment, if I could. Mr. MITCHELL. I am informed that they have been working [687] on it; they ought to have it any time; they haven't sent it yet. Mr. GEARHART. I am most anxious to have it before I am permitted to examine the witness now on the stand. I want to ask him questions concerning those figures. So if a chart can be supplied me, I will appreciate it very, very much. The CHAIRMAN. I am satisfied that Admiral Inglis and the Navy Department will make the chart available as soon as possible, and as soon as it is available it will be presented here.1 'Exhibit No. 86. Go ahead, Mr. Mitchell. Mr. MITCHELL. You made that memorandum of October 9, 1940. following your visit the day before with the President? Admiral RICHARDSON. I did. In order that the Chief of Naval Operations might be informed as to the decisions of the President and as to his views as expressed to me. Mr. MITCHELL. The first item on that memorandum is: "Go ahead with assembly of train." What does that mean? Admiral RICHARDSON. There had been some discussion as to assembling auxiliary vessels, transports, repair ships, supply ships. I had urged that it be done as one evidence of our intention to be prepared. The President stated that [688] we would go ahead with the assembly of a train. Mr. MITCHELL. Item 2 is: "Have we fuel oil in Samoa adequate to fill four old light cruisers?" Is that a question the President asked, or one you wanted to know about? Admiral RICHARDSON. The Fresident asked me. I knew we did not have it. So I wanted the Chief of Naval Operations informed that he might find it necessary or advisable to have a supply of fuel oil in Samoa. Mr. MITCHELL. Item 3: Give me a chart showing British and French bases or possible bases for surface ships, submarines, or airplanes in islands in the Pacific east of the international date line. Was that another request from the President? Admiral RICHARDSON. No. That was a request by me, as I remember it. Mr. MITCHELL. Then, in paragraph 4, you stated: The British Ambassador stated that Ghormley That is Admiral Ghormley, is it? Admiral RICHARDSON. It is Admiral R. L. Ghormley. Mr. MITCHELL (reading): -was busy transmitting to the Department information regarding technical materials, and the [698] British Admirality felt that they should have offices prepared for staff conferences. Were you reporting a thing that the President had said to you? Admiral RICHARDSON. I was. Mr. MITCHELL. No. 5: The British believe the Germans will attempt to occupy Dakar from Spain overland through Africa. Under that, in brackets, "F. D. R." What does that mean? Admiral RICHARDSON. "F. D. R." belongs to the next paragraph. The first is a bit of information. The next, the sixth paragraph is intended to read: I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, can be convinced of the desirability, because that is what the President stated to me. I can be convinced of the desirability of retaining the battleships on the West Coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American peo ple, and the Japanese Government, that in bringing the battleships to the West Coast we are not stepping backward. That was informing the Chief of Naval Operations what the President had said? Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true. I was at that time, just before going to Washington, on board a flagship on the west coast with approximately one-third of the battleships. We had returned to the west coast for replenishment and for recreation and for overhaul and, if my memory serves me correctly, I was at that time flying my flag on the New Mexico. Mr. MITCHELL. Item 7, the last on the memo, is this [reading]: The President indicated that he might approve sending a Division of old Light Cruisers to visit Mindinao as a gesture. He did not appear favorably disposed toward sending a stronger force. That was just passing on to the Chief of Naval Operations an item of information? [691] Admiral RICHARDSON. It was. Mr. MITCHELL. Going back now, Admiral, to July 1940, prior to this visit in October 1940, you made a visit to Washington in July 1940, did you? Admiral RICHARDSON. At my suggestion, before I left the west coast for the Hawaiian area, I was ordered to proceed by air to Washington for a conference with the Chief of Naval Operations and the President. I actually started and France capitulated and my trip was delayed. I later came by air, arriving in Washington on July 8 and departing from Washington for Honolulu on July 11. Mr. MITCHELL. The appointment book at the White House states that on July 8 you had a luncheon engagement with the President at 1 p.m.; on July 11 another appointment with the President at 12 noon. What is your memory about that? Admiral RICHARDSON. As to the appointment on July 8, I had lunch with the President and talked with him for 2 or 3 hours and my mission at that time was primarily to find the thought back of our retention in Hawaii, to explore and endeavor to ascertain, if possible, the duration of our stay and, from my point of view, stress the necessity of increasing the number of men in the Navy because we were at that time building a very large Navy; we had on board ship [692] approximately 85 percent of the number of men required to man the ships. In normal times, in normal peacetimes, you can build a destroyer quicker than you can train the men to man them. Therefore, I was very strongly of the opinion that all the ships in active commission in the fleet should have on board them all the men that they could carry in order that the ships themselves might be prepared and that nucleus crews should be trained for the new ships, because they would be required whether we had peace or had war. I was also desirous of securing the retention of officers in the fleet without the normal change of duty. Mr. MITCHELL. Were those the subjects that you discussed with the President? Admiral RICHARDSON. They were. Mr. MITCHELL. Do you want to state in your own way, as near as you can recollect, what the general tenor of the conversation was? 79716-46-pt. 1—20 Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, the President was rather loath to in crease the number of men because he felt, as expressed to me, that m of mechanical trades in civil life could be quickly inducted and mad adequate sailormen if their services were suddenly required. Mr. MITCHELL. What about the second appointment at [693] 12 noon on July 11 with the President? Do you remember about that and what was said? Admiral RICHARDSON. I believe that that-well, I know that that meeting lasted only a few minutes and I went by to tell the President good-bye and no subjects of any moment were discussed. Mr. MITCHELL. Did you have any appointment with Mr. Hull or Mr. Welles, or both of them, during July 1940? Their record shows an appointment on July 9. Admiral RICHARDSON. During that visit I saw Secretary Hull and Under Secretary Welles and talked to both of them at the same time, or, rather, I talked to Secretary Hull in the presence of Under Secretary Welles for an hour or so. I saw Senator Byrnes on the 10th of July. I had lunch with General Marshall on the 10th of July. I saw Dr. Stanley Hornbeck on the 11th of July and outside of naval personnel I think those were the only officials that I saw. I wanted to see the then Congressman Scrugham, who was chairman of the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee of the House that handled naval appropriations, but he was not in town. Mr. MITCHELL, Do you remember the subject of your discussion with Mr. Hull on that meeting of the 9th of July, what the general tenor of it was? [694] Admiral RICHARDSON. I saw Mr. Hull to fully explore and learn all that I could as to why the fleet was retained in Hawaii, how long they would probably stay there and what the future intentions were, because I had been directed to retain the fleet in Hawaii and anounced that it was retained there at my request and naturally, since I had made no such request, I wanted to know what was back of the whole thing. I also felt so strongly the need for men that I wanted to impress on both the Secretary of State and the Under Secretary of State that I felt that they should assist insofar as possibly they could in seeing that the fleet was fully manned. Mr. MITCHELL. In this correspondence file is a letter from you to Admiral Stark dated June 22, 1940, dated at Lahina Roads, is it? Admiral RICHARDSON. Lahaina Roads. Mr. MITCHELL. Will you please look at that? Admiral RICHARDSON. I cannot find that. Mr. MITCHELL. Well, I will hand it to you, my copy. Admiral RICHARDSON. I have it. My letter? Mr. MITCHELL. Your letter. Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes; I have it. Mr. MITCHELL. Your letter refers to the fact that General Herron, then commanding the Hawaiian department, had [695] re ceived an alert from the War Department. Do you remember that incident? Admiral RICHARDSON. Vividly. Mr. MITCHELL. Was any alert ordered from Washington for the Navy at the same time? Just go on in your own way and tell us about it, Admiral. |