Senator BREWSTER. May I be permitted to speak? Admiral RICHARDSON. On the 7th of May in a letter to me he says: Just hung up the telephone after talking with the President and by the time this reaches you you will have received word to remain in Hawaiian waters for a couple of weeks. When the Fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the delay will not be over two weeks, but I cannot tell) He said: Of course, you know the thought behind the above Mr. MURPHY. Well, you stopped at "but I cannot tell" in the second line in the second paragraph, did you? Admiral RICHARDSON. That is right. Mr. MURPHY. Then you go from there to where? [755] Admiral RICHARDSON. The fourth paragraph? Of course, you know the thoughts behind the above and that is that the Italian situation is extremely delicate, the two weeks ahead regarded as critical; then ????? nobody can answer the riddle just now. Mr. MURPHY. Where is Admiral Stark's position in that? [756] Mr. MURPHY. All right. Admiral RICHARDSON. It is manifest that he trusted that the fleet would not remain there long. Mr. MURPHY. Well, where is his position, I mean as to whether it should or not? Can you refer to anything in writing at any time, anywhere, where Admiral Stark states his position to you that he is in agreement with you, or that he disagrees with the proposition of having the fleet there? Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, whatever he said I firmly believe that he wholeheartedly agreed with me. Mr. MURPHY. But can you give us a reference to anything in writing anywhere? If so, state it. Senator BREWSTER. I refer you, Admiral, to the letter of May 22 to you, the first paragraph of which is [reading]: Replying to your letter of May 13th in which I think Admiral Stark made his position very clear. Admiral RICHARDSON. Unfortunately, I have not a copy of that letter. Mr. MURPHY. May I suggest to the Chairman that inadvertently the Chair has overlooked that this would be the turn of Senator Brewster, the Senator from Maine, to examine the witness. The CHAIRMAN. Well, the Chairman exercised his right [757] at the beginning and I examined following the examination of counsel and did examine the Admiral but not upon this point. Mr. MURPHY. I beg your pardon, you misunderstood me. I meant that after Mr. Clark it would then have been the turn of Senator Brewster. Senator BREWSTER. I have placed no objection to your examining the Admiral. Mr. MURPHY. And then I would follow. Senator BREWSTER. That is quite all right, Congressman Murphy, and I hope you will accept my suggestion which is simply in the interest of saving time. The CHAIRMAN. The Chair is subject to correction. In the absence of Mr. Clark the next in order by the alternation would have been the Senator from Maine, Mr. Brewster. Senator BREWSTER. I am quite willing to let Mr. Murphy proceed. The CHAIRMAN. I apologize to the Senator from Maine for that omission. Senator BREWSTER. I know that my rights are being saved, Mr. Chairman. Mr. MURPHY. Now, do you have the letter of May 22 suggested by the gentleman, the Senator from Maine? Admiral RICHARDSON. I doubt if I can find anywhere a specific statement saying: I am opposed to retaining the [758] fleet in the Hawaiian area. Mr. MURPHY. Can you find a specific statement saying that he agrees with you categorically? Admiral RICHARDSON. This is what he says on the 22d of May. [Reading :] When we sent our dispatch it looked as if Italy that means the dispatch to return it looked as if Italy were coming in almost immediately and that a serious situation might develop in the East Indies, and that there was a possibility of our being involved. However, the recent "blitzkrieg" events in Europe have certainly altered the picture for the time being. Personally I think it has made more remote (for the moment at least) the question of a westward movement of the fleet. I agree with the tenor of your letter and you will be glad to know I had already so expressed myself. Mr. MURPHY. That is the only written memorandum to which you can refer? Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, I— Mr. MURPHY. I mean is that the only one? Admiral RICHARDSON. Congressman Murphy, since the receipt of this correspondence I have been almost constantly in attendance here. If I had time to search through all of the papers carefully I have no doubt that I would find suffi- [759] cient evidence of his con currence with me as to convince anyone. Mr. MURPHY. If you find it will you produce it, please? Mr. MURPHY. Now, then, you had a meeting with the President about which you prepared a memorandum in October of 1940. Did you prepare any memoranda after the previous meetings! Admiral RICHARDSON. I did not. Mr. MURPHY. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster? Senator BREWSTER. Pursuing further the question which the Congressman has been asking, I think it should be clear what was the representation in your letter to which Admiral Stark expressed his view on. It was, as I understand it, your letter of May 13, in which you used the following language [reading]: I feel that any move west means hostilities. I feel that at this time it would be a grave mistake to become involved in the West where our interests, although important, are not vital, and thereby reduce our ability to maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere which is vital. If the Fleet is to go west it can only start, properly prepared, from the West Coast where it can be [760] docked, manned, stocked and stripped, and a suitable train assembled. Rest assured that although I am entirely without information I realize your position, and I want you to know that if the situation becomes such that higher authority decides we should go West, all of us are ready to give all we have. That is the end of the quotation from your letter, to which I understand Admiral Stark in his letter of May 22 replied. [Reading:] I agree with the tenor of your letter and you will be glad to know I had already so expressed myself. Would that lead you to believe, or would that leave you in any doubt, Admiral Richardson, as to the position of Admiral Stark in this matter? Admiral RICHARDSON. I was never in any doubt about his position. Senator BREWSTER. And what was the situation, Admiral, of the fleet? With the fleet which you had at Pearl Harbor-was it what would be considered in naval parlance as a fleet? Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, it was a combatant fleet but it did not have in company with it the auxiliaries that would be essential to active operations. Senator BREWSTER. So that if there were hostilities [761] that should develop, what would have been the mission of the fleet under any plans that were in existence? Admiral RICHARDSON. Under the existing plans it would have been necessary for the fleet to return to the west coast to mobilize, assemble a train, fill the ships with the regulation number of personnel, provisions, supplies, stores, fuel, strip the ships of needless articles which necessarily appear on a ship during a long period of peace and prepare them for offensive operation. Senator BREWSTER. State whether or not the fleet on December 7 was in such a condition as would have required its return similarly? Admiral RICHARDSON. It had been more comletely prepared for war action because before I returned to Pearl Harbor with a portion of the fleet, arriving thereon the 6th of December, we had placed in storage a lot of inflammable material that we carried in time of peace. The ships had been degaussed. The CHAIRMAN. Had been what? Admiral RICHARDSON. Degaussed. The CHAIRMAN. I don't get that word. Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, it is a French word which means running a coil of wire around them which energized will probably prevent the magnetic field of the ship from exploding a magnetic mine. [762] Senator BREWSTER. Under the plans existing prior to December 7, so far as your own knowledge goes, what was it contemplated should be the mission of the Navy during the earlier period any hostilities with a Western Pacific power? of Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, the plans then in existence were called the "Orange" plan or the "0-1" plan and it was, in my opinion, a fairly sound plan theoretically, but the time element bore no relation to reality and some time in October I wrote a comprehensive letter to the Chief of Naval Operations presenting my conception of the then existing "Orange" plan, which is in the hands of the committee. Senator BREWSTER. That was in 1940? Admiral RICHARDSON. 1940. Senator BREWSTER. And did that contemplate some manner of of fensive action by the fleet? Admiral RICHARDSON. It did, early action to reconnoiter and attack some of the mandated islands and a progressive step-by-step movement westward with the taking, eventually, of Truk in a time stated that absolutely could not be realized. Senator BREWSTER. I want to quote to you, because I think we all are going to be vitally concerned with this matter of naval defense. You were Assistant Chief of Naval [763] Operations during 1937 and 1938 under Admiral Leahy? Admiral RICHARDSON. One year. Senator BREWSTER. I am quoting from Admiral Leahy's statement before the Naval Affairs Committee on the function of the Navy, as I think it will contribute to this matter, and I want to know whether you would agree with this concept. I quote Admiral Leahy on the first page of his testimony at the 1938 hearings. [Reading:] In defending our territory in war, we cannot assume an attitude of passive defense and simply beat off an attack at one place and later at another. In such a case we would see our coasts blockaded, our outlying possessions seized, our commerce, both coastwise and foreign, driven off the seas, and we would undergo the costly experience of finding the war lasting just as long as the enemy willed it; that is, until he had attained every objective and everything he wanted. The only way that war, once begun, can be brought to a successful conclusion is by making the enemy want to stop fighting-by injuring him before he reaches our shores so badly that he will be anxious to make peace. Prompt and effective injury to an enemy, at a distance from our shores, is the only correct strategy to be employed. [764] We have outlying possessions in Alaska, the Hawaiian Islands, Guam, Samoa, Panama, Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The Philippine Islands are still United States territory and will remain so until complete independence is attained. All of these outlying island possessions are more or less vulnerable, and their defense depends upon two factors. One is a local defense by mobile forces and fortifications. The other, and the dominant factor, is sea power. A superior Navy can prevent powerful attacks being made on all those island possessions that lie closer to our home territory than they do to those of an enemy or enemies. A sufficient Navy can keep open the lines of supply to the defenders of such possessions, and, if they are secure in their own local defenses against minor attacks, the Navy can use them as bases from which to operate against the enemy or enemies. Defense of those possessions-Guam, the Philippines and Alaska-which lie nearer to the home territory of another power or powers than they do to the continental United States, is dependent solely upon sea power and the ability of sea power to support forces in those areas. [765] I presume you would be in full agreement with that? Admiral RICHARDSON. Complete accord. Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Now, I have here an exhibit which has been furnished us, which is extracts from the joint Army and Navy war plan, Rainbow No. 1. That is a part of the extracts from joint Army and Navy war plan, Orange 1938. I assume that was in the process of development year by year, but this does not contain any of the tasks that were assigned under section 6 and others. In section 6, the presentation apparently con fines itself to the defense plans of the Hawaiian area without includ ing therein anything regarding the tasks which I assume were the function of the Navy to carry out, the task forces, or tasks. Admiral RICHARDSON. That is true. What is the date of that! Senator BREWSTER. This one is dated 1938, the Orange plan. I think that was Orange No. 1. This was approved, it says, by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy August 14, 1939, verbally by the President October 14, 1939, by the Joint Board April 10, 1940. That is April 10, 1940, brought down current. That was finally Rainbow No. 1. You have that before you, do you? Admiral RICHARDSON. I have it. Senator BREWSTER. Now, whether or not [766] Admiral RICHARDSON. But, Senator Brewster, these are copies of extracts from plans that were modified from time to time. They are not complete; some of them were made after I left the fleet; some of them were in process of being made, so any questions that I answer with respect to this is certainly to be most confusing because here is one that is dated March 28, 1941. I know nothing about it. Senator BREWSTER. I think my question won't involve, perhaps, any confusion. The point which I wish to inquire about is whether or not the appointment of the tasks as they are called, which I assume were the functions of the Navy, the affirmative tasks, would be essential to an appraisal of the responsibility of the commanders in that area? Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, I think it would be but it would not be anything other than confusing to consider any other plans than the plans that were in existence on the 7th of December 1941, about which I know nothing. Senator BREWSTER. Well, I don't intend to enter into that field. My point is in attempting to appraise the responsibility of those who were in authority at Pearl Harbor, as to whether or not their responsibility in taking aggressive action with the fleet under their charge must not necessarily be known in order to determine as to the wisdom of their course at any given time? [767] Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, of course, no plans ever made by the Army or the Navy of the United States visualized their being put in effect without either a declaration of war or an attack upon us, so if you take the joint Army and Navy Basic Plan Orange 1938, that was the basic plan on which the Navy drew its war plan and on which the Army drew its war plan. Senator BREWSTER. Well, reading these excerpts, these extracts I have given you, which are apparently exclusively of a defensive character, one might draw the impression that the Navy had no function than to be there at Pearl Harbor and assist in its defense. That, of course, would not be a warranted conclusion, would it, Admiral? The Navy had another job to do under all plans, did it not? Admiral RICHARDSON. Oh, absolutely, and the Navy's job was to be aggressive. Senator BREWSTER. That is right. Admiral RICHARDSON. Now, the pages of this refer specifically to the joint responsibilities of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area and it does not refer, as I can find here, to anything about what the fleet is going to do. Senator BREWSTER. Well, over on page--I should say it is No. 2. For instance, on that first page we have section 1. We then have section 2 on the first page. There is no [768] section 3 apparently. It becomes section 4, then section 5, section 6. Then we |