to say that you simply inquired as to the reason but you took no steps to facilitate the prompter translation?

General MILES. I assured myself that the men and facilities were doing all that they could do to get those messages out promptly. I was not able to furnish them with any additional specialists, nor with any additional equipment.

I do not like to go into the details of even the fact that I knew about the methods we used; I cannot.

Mr. GESELL. No; we do not expect you to.

General MILES. But I think it is safe to say that they are not easy to reproduce.

Mr. GESELL. Well, was any effort made to get additional manpower of this specialized type that may have been required?

General MILES. I think that manpower was being provided as fast as the two services could provide it. It had to be very specially trained manpower.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall ever having discussed with the Chief of Staff the desirability of increasing the forces and facilities for the interception and translation of these messages?

General MILES. No, sir, I do not recall bringing that matter up to the Chief of Staff.

Mr. GESELL. Turning to this exhibit 2, which I believe [2109] is still before you, General Miles, I want to direct your attention to certain messages which were sent prior to the seventh but translated subsequent to the seventh.

There is a message on page 17, for example

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask, when you say "sent" you mean sent from

Mr. GESELL Sent from Tokyo to Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. Sent from Tokyo to Honolulu?

Mr. GESELL. Tokyo to Honolulu or Washington, a Japanese mes

sage.

The CHAIRMAN. They are all Japanese messages?

Mr. GESELL. They are all Japanese messages.

On page 17 the message of November 24, where Tokyo was advised concerning mine laying operations outside Pearl Harbor, the maneuvering activities of the U. S. Fleet and the time that the vessels lay in harbor.

On page 19 the message of November 28 where Tokyo was advised that there was usually one cruiser in the waters south of Pearl Harbor and one or two destroyers at the entrance of the harbor.

The message on page 20 of December 1 where more detailed information concerning fleet maneuvers in operational areas was given, with schedules of departures and return of battleships.

[2110] The message on page 21 of December 2, where Tokyo asked for information concerning barrage balloons and antimine nets. The message on page 22 of December 3 where an agent in Honolulu sent detailed information concerning land signals to be given by flashing lights, ads in newspapers, and so forth.

The message on page 26 in December, an urgent request for information as to movements of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor since the 4th of December.

The message of December 6, on pages 27 and 28, where Honolulu gave Tokyo further information concerning barrage balloons and stated:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

And further stated:

In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets.

And, finally, the message on page 29 of December 6th, where Honolulu reported:

It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

[2111] Now, with those messages in mind is it fair to state that if facilities had been available for the more prompt translation of these intercepted messages we would have had more than ample data in our hands to indicate that there was to be a surprise attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor?

General MILES. Those messages would certainly have indicated the strong possibility, if not actual probability, of such an attack.

I think I failed to state, sir, that it was not only a question of personnel and facilities here in Washington for the decoding and translation of those messages, but also very definitely out in the field. Those messages had to be picked out of the air by intercepting stations. They were not all picked up by the same station. There was no one station that could have picked them up.

**In fact, I understand now that the best intercepting station for the few messages emanating from Japan itself was Manila.

Now, some of those intercepting stations had teletype facilities by which they could promptly transmit the message intercepted to Washington. Some did not. Some of the messages were received in Washington by air mail.

So we had not only a question of personnel and facilities and a very rapidly growing traffic to handle it in Washington, but also the actual intercepting of the message in the field [2112] and the trans

mission of those messages to Washington.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask counsel one question? Those messages that you read last are messages that were sent from Tokyo or Honolulu and were not translated or decoded until after Pearl Harbor?

Mr. GESELL. That is right. They are all Japanese messages which were not in translated form available, as far as these records show, prior to the attack.

Senator LUCAS. Thank you, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. Counsel does not want to leave the impression that all the messages referred to are in that category, because there were several that were translated before.

Mr. GESELL. I took it Senator Lucas referred to this last bit of reading and not the first messages I have discussed.

Senator LUCAS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask counsel whether he has indicated in his questions how far back prior to Pearl Harbor these messages went out that were not translated until after Pearl Harbor? Did you indicate that?

Mr. GESELL. I have indicated in most instances the date that the message was sent out. I think the ones to which I referred were all sent subsequent to November 24, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. And prior to the 7th of December?

[2113] Mr. GESELL. And prior to the 7th of December.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, in that connection, I think it might be helpful if counsel will be kind enough to point out, the first one on page 16 of the exhibit, dated November 24, 1941, shows that was translated December 16, 1941. That is what counsel has in mind, is it?

Mr. GESELL. That is correct.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. And running all the way through this exhibit to page 31 it shows messages received and translated from a' few days to a few weeks after they were received.

Mr. GESELL. That is correct; and quite a number on the 8th and the 10th and the 11th and some of them later than that.

General MILES. In the desire to make the record accurate it might be pointed out, I think, that certainly the message on page 26 from Tokyo to Honolulu, which was dated Tokyo, December 6, could not possibly have been translated even with the best facilities until early in the morning of the seventh. Tokyo on the 6th-yes, it might be on the 5th, that is right. And from there on the messages are dated the 6th of December.

Mr. GESELL. General, I meant to ask you

Mr. GEARHART. That is Tokyo time on the 6th?
General MILES. Tokyo and Honolulu.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes.

[2114] Mr. GESELL. I meant to ask you, General, a little earlier. After the war started did the War Department change its procedure in respect of transmitting to the area commanders information from these magic sources?

General MILES. I believe not, sir; not to my knowledge. That was always regarded up to the termination of the Japanese war as a very important vital military secret.

Mr. GESELL. Now, I wish to read a paragraph to you from your affidavit given to Col. Henry C. Clausen under date of August 16, 1945 and ask if you will give to the committee a full statement concerning the matters covered in this paragraph. The paragraph reads as follows:

Concerning the testimony I gave before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. 8 August 1944, as corrected by my letter, 18 August 1944, I wish to add that I avoided any statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret sources then called 'Magic', or any intimation that such sources existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the Board, Brig. General Russell A. Osmun and then Colonel Carter W. Clarke, of G-2, War Department, transmitted to me instructions from the Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any facts concerning [2115] the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of that form of information or intelligence in the period preceding 7 December 1941. Accordingly, I obeyed that instruction.

General MILES. That statement is literally correct. I regret that it was worded that way because it has been twisted out of its meaning entirely and I think very unfairly to the Chief of Staff.

What happened, of course, was preceding that I appeared before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in early April 1944, when we were in the

midst of our war with Japan. We were approaching the crisis, if you like. We had not landed in Leyte, we had not fought the battle for the Leyte Gulf. We were in the midst of a great war and this was a military secret of incalculable value to the United States in that war, the secret that we could break that code and were breaking that code. It might well have been worth to us many thousands of valuable American lives. I knew that perfectly well.

I am sorry I mentioned the Chief of Staff because under no conditions would I have appeared before the Army Board or any other group and intimated in any way the existence of that secret without specific authority of the Secretary of War or the Chief of Staff. Now, when I made that affidavit to Colonel Clausen the [2116] situation had changed entirely. The war with Japan was over; Japan had surrendered. Colonel Clausen came to my headquarters in Boston with the written authority from the Secretary of War to take my testimony on any and all subjects.

He suggested, however, that the affidavit which he himself wrote from the conversations that he had had with me, all under oath, he suggested that my affidavit, which became part of his record, be tied in with my testimony before the Grunert Board, the Army Board, and I think he drafted or maybe I drafted that paragraph that the counsel has just read.

That, gentlemen, is the whole situation there. I was not gagged by the Chief of Staff or in any way suggesting that I should do anything to cover up anything other than this vital military secret that we were all guarding with the greatest of care.

[2117] Mr. GESELL. General Miles, the Army Boad held top secret sessions at which magic information was discussed by a number of witnesses. Were you called to testify in the top secret sessions relating to magic?

General MILES. I was not.

Mr. GESELL. You were aware that such sessions were held, were you not?

General MILES. Not at that time, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, General Miles, I want to turn to another subject. You referred to your liaison with the State Department, which I gather was maintained by you and by officers acting under your direction, and you indicated that information was transmitted in both directions, that G-2 gave information to the State Department and the State Department gave information to G-2.

General MILES. Yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. I want to ask you some specific questions concerning information which may or may not have been given by the State Department to G-2. The first question has to do with the modus vivendi, which I believe you have become familiar with, at least sitting here waiting for your turn to testify. Do you recall whether or not the Department of State discussed with you, or officers acting under your direction, the question of the modus vivendi, and whether or not that should or should not be submitted in a note to the [2118] Japanese Ambassadors?

General MILES. I have no recollection of any such occurrence. I feel very sure that I would have remembered it had I been consulted, and I feel very certain of being able to make the statement that I was not consulted.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, you were not advised, were you, in any way, when the decision was reached by the State Department to send the 10-point note and not to send the modus vivendi on November 26, 1941?

General MILES. I was not, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Did the Department of State advise you, to your recollection, that they had received information from various representatives in South American countries to the effect that the Japanese representatives to those South American countries had been sounding out South American governments as to their attitude in the event of war between the United States and Japan?

General MILES. I have no recollection of that, sir. I would have to check the records to see if it was ever transmitted through my liaison officer from the State Department.

Mr. GESELL. The exhibit in evidence indicates that at least some of that information was sent to military authorities, and I wondered if it had been a matter of any [2119] discussion, or had come to your attention specifically?

General MILES. I do not remember at this time having those matters brought to my attention.

Mr. MURPHY. Will counsel state what exhibit that is?

Mr. GESELL. Exhibit 31.

With respect to the message to the Emperor, do you recall any consultations or any information coming to you from the State Department concerning that message?

General MILES. I do not.

Mr. GESELL. Would you have been the officer that the State Department would have been most likely to consult under the liaison conditions which prevailed at that time, or did that come under the province of that other department of the General Staff?

General MILES. The liaison, Mr. Gesell, was maintained for the exchange of information. It did not, of itself, include any provision for consultation with the Military Intelligence Division by anyone. Generally speaking, the Military Intelligence Divsion was not consulted on the actions or decisions arrived at by the State Department.

Mr. GESELL. Do you know whether other officers of the War Department were consulted in that connection?

General MILES. I only know through listening to testimony that I have heard in this room.

[2120] Mr. GESELL. Do you recall whether or not the War Department, and specifically the Military Intelligence Division, was consulted or whether its opinion was asked by the Department of State or the President, as to the appropriateness of applying embargoes and freezing orders against the Japanese?

General MILES. I can recall no action on which the Military Intelligence Division was consulted by the Department of State in those

matters.

Mr. GESELL. Do you recall discussing those problems in memoranda submitted to the Chief of Staff?

General MILES. I do.

Mr. GESELL. I notice, referring to exhibit 33, a series of memoranda on that subject. No. 7 of July 25, 1941, particularly paragraph 9, and item No. 9, memorandum of August 16, 1941