Opinion of the Court. 333 U. S. Second. It is here contended that the Commission's order did not manifest a clear purpose to authorize the exemption of appellant from obedience to the state's domestic corporation policy. We have no doubt that the Commission intended its order to have this effect. Its final order expressly stated that, subject to a condition not here relevant, it approved and authorized "the purchase... and the operation" by the appellant of the South Carolina and other railroad properties. Furthermore, the Commission discussed the South Carolina requirements in its report and therein made findings that compliance by appellant with them "would not be consistent with the public interest." These references were made to the South Carolina provisions, according to the Commission's report, in response to the appellant's suggestion that it would "avoid complications" if the Commission's report showed "on its face that our order is intended to override them." Third. Respondents contend that the Commission lacked statutory authority to enter an order which would permit a Virginia corporation to operate these railroad lines in and through South Carolina contrary to that state's constitutional and legislative policy. They point to the broad powers states have always exercised in excluding foreign corporations and in admitting them within their borders upon conditions. They also emphasize the importance of this regulatory power to the states, and urge that, in the absence of express language requiring it, § 5 should be construed neither to restrict that state power nor to authorize the Commission to override state enactments. Recognizing the force of these arguments in general, we note the following circumstances which render them inapplicable in this case. Congress has long made the maintenance and development of an economical and efficient railroad system a matter of primary national concern. Its legislation must be 118 Opinion of the Court. read with this purpose in mind. In keeping with this purpose Congress has often recognized that the nation's railroads should have sound corporate and financial structures and has taken appropriate steps to this end. The purchase of this very railroad by appellant resulted from extensive reorganization proceedings conducted by the Interstate Commerce Commission and federal district courts in accordance with congressional enactments applicable to railroads. In furtherance of this congressional policy these agencies approved reorganization plans which called for the purchase and operation of these properties, including the portion in South Carolina, by appellant, as a Virginia corporation. This Court has previously approved a Commission order entered in a § 5 consolidation proceeding which granted a railroad relief from state laws analogous to the state requirements here. Texas v. United States, 292 U. S. 522 (1934). Most of the reasons which justified the Commission's order in that case are equally applicable here. Furthermore, since that case was decided Congress has given additional proof of its purpose to grant adequate power to the Commission to override state laws which may interfere with efficient and economical railroad operation. By § 5 (11) of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by the Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 908, 49 U. S. C. §5 (11), Congress granted the Commission "exclusive and plenary" authority in refusing or approving railroad consolidations, mergers, acquisitions, etc. The breadth of this grant of power can be understood only by reference to § 5 (2) (b) which authorizes the Commission to condition its approval upon "such terms and conditions and such modifications as it shall find to be just and reasonable." All of this power can be exercised in accordance with what the Commission may find to be "consistent with the public interest." The purchaser of railroad property with Commission approval is Opinion of the Court. 333 U.S. authorized by § 5 (11) "to own and operate any properties . . . acquired through said transaction without invoking any approval under State authority," and such an approved owner, according to that paragraph, is "relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws and of all other restraints, limitations, and prohibitions of law, Federal, State, or municipal, insofar as may be necessary to enable them to carry into effect the transaction so approved . . . and to hold, maintain, and operate any properties acquired through such transaction." This language very clearly reposes power in the Commission to exempt railroads under a § 5 proceeding from state laws which bar them from operating in the state or impose conditions upon such operation. The state court nevertheless thought that the last sentence of § 5 (11) negatived a congressional purpose to empower the Commission to relieve railroads from state laws such as South Carolina's. That sentence reads: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to create or provide for the creation, directly or indirectly, of a Federal corporation, but any power granted by this section to any carrier or other corporation shall be deemed to be in addition to and in modification of its powers under its corporate charter or under the laws of any State." We see nothing in this sentence that detracts from the broad powers granted the Commission by § 5. In fact, the language of the sentence appears to support the Commission's power here exercised. Although the sentence bars creation of a federal corporation, it clearly authorizes a railroad corporation to exercise the powers therein granted over and above those bestowed upon it by the state of its creation. These federally conferred powers can be exercised in the same manner as though they had been granted to a federally created corporation. See California v. Central Pacific R. Co., 127 U. S. 1, 38, 40-45. Here, just as a federally created railroad corporation could for federal purposes operate in South Carolina, so can this Virginia corporation exercise its federally granted power to operate in that State. Other arguments of respondent have been considered and found to be without merit. Appellant is entitled to the injunction it sought. The judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court denying the injunction and dismissing the complaint is reversed, and the cause is remanded to that court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. FUNK BROTHERS SEED CO. v. KALO CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. No. 280. Argued January 13, 1948.-Decided February 16, 1948. 1. Certain product claims of Bond Patent No. 2,200,532, on certain mixed cultures of root-nodule bacteria capable of inoculating the seeds of leguminous plants belonging to several cross-inoculation groups, held invalid for want of invention. Pp. 128-132. 2. Discovery of the fact that certain strains of each species of these bacteria can be mixed without harmful effect on the properties of either is not patentable, since it is no more than the discovery of a phenomenon of nature. P. 131. 3. The application of this newly-discovered natural principle to the problem of packaging inoculants was not invention or discovery within the meaning of the patent laws. Pp. 131-132. 161 F.2d 981, reversed. In a patent infringement suit, the District Court held certain product claims invalid for want of invention. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 161 F. 2d 981. This Court granted certiorari. 332 U. S. 755. Reversed, p. 132. Opinion of the Court. 333 U.S. H. A. Toulmin, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was D. C. Staley. J. Bernhard Thiess argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Sidney Neuman and M. Hudson Rathburn. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 1 for a declaratory adjudged invalid. This is a patent infringement suit brought by respondent. The charge of infringement is limited to certain product claims of Patent No. 2,200,532 issued to Bond on May 14, 1940. Petitioner filed a counterclaim asking judgment that the entire patent be The District Court held the product claims invalid for want of invention and dismissed the complaint. It also dismissed the counterclaim. Both parties appealed. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the product claims were valid and infringed and that the counterclaim should not have been dismissed. 161 F.2d 981. The question of validity is the only question presented by this petition for certiorari. Through some mysterious process leguminous plants are able to take nitrogen from the air and fix it in the plant for conversion to organic nitrogenous compounds. The ability of these plants to fix nitrogen from the air depends on the presence of bacteria of the genus Rhizo 1 The product claims in suit are 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, and 14. Claim 4 is illustrative of the invention which is challenged. It reads as follows: "An inoculant for leguminous plants comprising a plurality of selected mutually non-inhibitive strains of different species of bacteria of the genus Rhizobium, said strains being unaffected by each other in respect to their ability to fix nitrogen in the leguminous plant for which they are specific." 2 The patent also contains process claims. |