153 Opinion of the Court. The Fidelity Union Trust Co. case did not, however, lay down any general rule as to the respect to be accorded state trial court decisions. This Court took pains to point out that the status of the New Jersey Court of Chancery was not that of the usual nisi prius court. It had state-wide jurisdiction. Its standing on the equity side was comparable to that of New Jersey's intermediate appellate courts on the law side. A uniform ruling by the Court of Chancery over a course of years was seldom set aside by the state's highest court. And chancery decrees were ordinarily treated as binding in later cases in chancery. The present case involves no attack on the policy of the Rules of Decision Act, the principle of the Erie R. Co. case, or the soundness of the other cases referred to above. It involves the practical administration of the Act; and the question it raises is whether, in the long run, it would promote uniformity in the application of South Carolina law if federal courts confronted with questions under that law were obliged to follow the ruling of a Court of Common Pleas. The Courts of Common Pleas make up South Carolina's basic system of trial courts for civil actions." There are fourteen judges for these courts, one for each of the judicial circuits into which the state's forty-six counties are 14 S. C. Const., Art. 5, § 15. These courts also have limited appellate jurisdiction, varying somewhat from county to county. The Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County handles appeals from the county's probate court, 1 S. C. Code Ann. § 228, its court of domestic relations, 1 id. §§ 256–24 and 256–44, and its magistrates courts. The latter have civil jurisdiction concurrent with the courts of Common Pleas only in suits involving less than $100, 1 id. § 257. The county court for Spartanburg County has concurrent jurisdiction in civil suits involving less than $3,000, but appeal from its decisions is directly to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, 1 id. §§ 184 and 190. Opinion of the Court. 333 U.S. grouped.15 A circuit judge hears civil cases at specified times in each county comprising the circuit to which he is then assigned, and at such times his court is called the Court of Common Pleas for that particular county.16 In addition, he presides over a parallel set of criminal courts, the Courts of General Sessions. South Carolina has no tier of intermediate appellate courts, and appeal from Common Pleas decisions is directly, and as a matter of right, to the State Supreme Court." While the Courts of Common Pleas are denominated courts of record, their decisions are not published or digested in any form whatsoever. They are filed only in the counties in which the cases are tried, and even there the sole index is by the parties' names.18 Perhaps because these facts preclude ready availability to bench and bar, the Common Pleas decisions seem to be accorded little weight as precedents in South Carolina's own courts. In this connection, respondent has submitted a certificate from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of South Carolina to the effect that "under the practice in this State an unappealed decision of the Court of Common Pleas is binding only upon the parties who are before the Court in that particular case and would not constitute a precedent in any other case in that Court or in any other court in the State of South Carolina." Consideration of these facts leads us to the conclusion that the Circuit Court of Appeals did not commit error. While that court properly attributed some weight to the 15 S. C. Const., Art. 5, § 13; 1 S. C. Code Ann. § 50. There is provision for periodic interchange of judges among the circuits. 1 S. C. Code Ann. § 22. 16 S. C. Const., Art. 5, § 16; 1 S. C. Code Ann. §§ 51-64. 17 See note 7 supra. 18 S. C. Circuit Court Rule 39. There is a Clerk of the Court of Common Pleas for each county. S. C. Const., Art. 5, § 27. 153 Opinion of the Court. Spartanburg Common Pleas decision, we believe that it was justified in holding the decision not controlling and in proceeding to make its own determination of what the Supreme Court of South Carolina would probably rule in a similar case. In the first place, a Court of Common Pleas does not appear to have such importance and competence within South Carolina's own judicial system that its decisions should be taken as authoritative expositions of that State's "law." In future cases between different parties, as indicated above, a Common Pleas decision does not exact conformity from either the same court or lesser courts 19 within its territorial jurisdiction; and it may apparently be ignored by other Courts of Common Pleas without the compunctions which courts often experience in reaching results divergent from those reached by another court of coordinate jurisdiction. Thus a Common Pleas decision does not, so far as we have been informed, of itself evidence one of the "rules of decision commonly accepted and acted upon by the bar and inferior courts." Furthermore, as we have but recently had occasion to remark, a federal court adjudicating a matter of state law in a diversity suit is, "in effect, only another court of the State"; 21 it would be incongruous indeed to hold the federal court bound by a decision which would not be binding on any state court. " 20 Secondly, the difficulty of locating Common Pleas decisions is a matter of great practical significance. Litigants could find all the decisions on any given subject only by laboriously searching the judgment rolls in all of South Carolina's forty-six counties. To hold that federal 19 I. e., county courts, magistrates courts, probate courts, and courts of domestic relations. See note 14 supra. 20 West v. American T. & T. Co., 311 U. S. 223, 236 (1940). 21 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, 108 (1945). Opinion of the Court. 333 U.S. courts must abide by Common Pleas decisions might well put a premium on the financial ability required for exhaustive screening of the judgment rolls or for the maintenance of private records. In cases where the parties could not afford such practices, the result would often be to make their rights dependent on chance; for every decision cited by counsel there might be a dozen adverse decisions outstanding but undiscovered.22 In affirming the decision below, we are deciding only that the Circuit Court of Appeals did not have to follow the decision of the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County. We do not purport to determine the correctness of its ruling on the merits. Nor is our decision. to be taken as promulgating a general rule that federal courts need never abide by determinations of state law by state trial courts. As indicated by the Fidelity Union Trust Co. case, other situations in other states may well call for a different result. It may also be well to add that, even if the Circuit Court of Appeals had been in error at the time of its decision, reversal of its judgment would not necessarily be appropriate in view of the second Common Pleas decision.23 But we prefer to regard that second decision as an illustration of the perils of interpreting a Common Pleas decision as a definitive expression of "South Carolina law," not as a controlling factor in our decision. Affirmed. 22 In the present case, the Spartanburg decision came to light because petitioner had been a party to it, the Greenville decision because respondent's counsel had been a party to it. 23 See Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Co., 311 U. S. 538 (1941). Syllabus. SUTTLE, ADMINISTRATRIX, v. REICH BROS. CONSTRUCTION CO. ET AL. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. No. 214. Argued December 18, 1947.-Decided March 8, 1948. A resident and citizen of Mississippi brought an action based on diversity of citizenship in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against a partnership and its individual members who were residents of the Western District of Louisiana and a Texas corporation which had qualified to do business in Louisiana and made itself amenable to suit in the federal courts for either the Eastern or Western District of that State. Held: The venue was improper as to the partnership and its individual members and the suit was properly dismissed as to them, since none of the parties was a resident of the Eastern District of Louisiana within the meaning of §§ 51 and 52 of the Judicial Code. Pp. 164-169. (a) The "residence" of a corporation, within the meaning of the venue statutes, is only in the state and district in which it was incorporated. Pp. 166-168. (b) While, concededly, the Texas corporation had made itself amenable to suit in the federal courts of either district in Louisiana by qualifying to do business in that State, such action on the part of the corporation did not constitute a waiver by the partnership and its individual members of the privileges conferred upon them by the venue statutes. P. 168. 161 F.2d 289, affirmed. The District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed as to respondents (residents of the Western District), on the ground of improper venue, a suit brought against them and a foreign corporation by a resident of Mississippi. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 161 F.2d 289. This Court granted certiorari. 332 U. S. 755. Affirmed, p. 169. Charles F. Engle and John D. Miller argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. |