333 U.S. Opinion of the Court. MOGALL v. UNITED STATES. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. No. 48. Argued October 16, 1947.-Decided March 8, 1948. The Selective Service Regulations imposed no legal obligation upon an employer of a registrant under the Selective Training and Service Act to report to the local draft board facts which might have resulted in the registrant being placed in a different draft classification; and an employer's failure to make such reports was not a violation of § 11 of the Act. P. 425. 158 F.2d 792, reversed. Petitioner was convicted of a violation of § 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 158 F. 2d 792. This Court granted certiorari. 331 U. S. 797. Reversed, p. 425. Rudolph F. Becker, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Charles W. Kehl. W. Marvin Smith argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Quinn, Robert S. Erdahl and Irving S. Shapiro. PER CURIAM. Petitioner and his employee, one Perniciaro, were jointly indicted and tried on the charges contained in an eight-count indictment. The defendants were acquitted under Counts 1 to 7, the first of which charged petitioner and Perniciaro with conspiring for the purpose of enabling Perniciaro to evade military service by failing to make known to the draft board facts which might have resulted in Perniciaro being placed in a different draft classifica 424 Opinion of the Court. tion. The defendants were convicted under Count 8, however, which charged petitioner and Perniciaro with failing to report facts in writing to the local draft board which might have resulted in Perniciaro being placed in a different draft classification, contrary to § 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 894, 50 U. S. C. § 311 and § 626.1 (b) of the Selective Service Regulations. The Government now concedes that the Selective Service Regulations imposed no legal obligation upon petitioner, as an employer of a registrant under the Selective Training and Service Act, to make such reports to the local board. It is also conceded that petitioner was tried and convicted upon the assumption that he was under such a legal obligation. We agree that the plain language of the Regulation and the record of this case support these conclusions. The Government urges that although the judgment of conviction against petitioner should be reversed, the indictment should not be dismissed since the prosecution may wish to try petitioner a second time on the charges contained in Count 8, as an aider and abettor. There is no showing of facts sufficient for us to pass judgment on the question. Accordingly, we intimate no opinion on the propriety of this procedure or the issues which it might present. See Sealfon v. United States, 332 U. S. 575 (1948). Those questions will be open in the District Court on our remand of the cause. Reversed. ECCLES ET AL. v. PEOPLES BANK OF LAKEWOOD VILLAGE, CALIFORNIA. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. No. 101. Argued December 9, 1947.-Decided March 15, 1948. In admitting a state bank to membership in the Federal Reserve System, the Board of Governors prescribed a condition that, if a particular bank holding company acquired stock in the bank, the bank would withdraw from membership within 60 days after written notice from the Board. The holding company acquired less than 11% of the bank's stock. The bank sued for a declaratory judgment that the condition was invalid and for an injunction against its enforcement. Its claims of threatened injury were supported entirely by affidavits. The Board disavowed any present intention of enforcing the condition, on the ground that it had satisfied itself that the bank's independence had not been affected and that the public interest required no action. Held: The bank's need for equitable relief is too remote and speculative to justify a declaratory judgment-especially against an agency of the Government and on the basis of affidavits. Pp. 426–435. 82 U. S. App. D. C. 126, 161 F. 2d 636, reversed. The District Court denied a declaratory judgment that a condition prescribed by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in admitting a state bank to membership in the Federal Reserve System was invalid and denied an injunction against its enforcement. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed. 82 U. S. App. D. C. 126, 161 F. 2d 636. This Court granted certiorari. 332 U. S. 755. Reversed, p. 435. J. Leonard Townsend argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Robert L. Stern and George B. Vest. Samuel B. Stewart, Jr. argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Luther E. Birdzell. 426 Opinion of the Court. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a proceeding under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 48 Stat. 955, 28 U. S. C. § 400. Its aim is to have declared invalid a condition under which the respondent became a member of the Federal Reserve System. The California State Banking Commission authorized the establishment of the respondent provided it obtained federal deposit insurance. This requirement could be met either by direct application to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or through membership in the Federal Reserve System. § 12 B (e) and (f) of the Federal Reserve Act, 48 Stat. 162, 170, 49 Stat. 684, 687, 12 U. S. C. § 264 (e) and (f). Respondent sought such membership but its application was rejected. The promoters of the Bank, having requested the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to reconsider the application for membership, were advised that favorable action depended on a showing that the Transamerica Corporation, a powerful bank holding company, did not have, nor was intended to have, any interest in this Bank. Having been satisfied on this point, the Board of Governors granted membership to respondent subject to conditions of which the fourth is the bone of contention in this litigation. This condition reads as follows: "4. If, without prior written approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Transamerica Corporation or any unit of the Transamerica group, including Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association, or any holding company affiliate or any subsidiary thereof, acquires, directly or indirectly, through the mechanism of extension of loans for the purpose of acquiring bank stock, or in any other manner, any interest in such bank, other than such as may arise out of usual correspondent bank relationships, such bank, within 60 days after Opinion of the Court. 333 U.S. written notice from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, shall withdraw from membership in the Federal Reserve System." The Board of Governors gave the respondent this explanation for the condition: "The application for membership has been approved upon representations that the bank is a bona fide local independent institution and that no holding company group has any interest in the bank at the time of its admission to membership, and that the directors and stockholders of the bank have no plans, commitments or understandings looking toward a change in the status of the bank as a local independent institution. Condition of membership numbered 4 is designed to maintain that status." Some time later, in 1944, Transamerica, without prior knowledge of the respondent, acquired 540 of the 5,000 shares of its outstanding stock. The Bank duly advised the Board of Governors of this fact, but requested that it be relieved of Condition No. 4. This, the Board of Governors declined to do. Then followed this action, in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, against the Board of Governors for a declaration that Condition No. 4 was invalid and for an injunction against its enforcement. A motion by the defendants to dismiss the complaint, in that it failed to set forth a justiciable controversy, was denied. 64 F. Supp. 811. The defendants answered, claiming that the Bank's acceptance of membership barred it from questioning the validity of Condition No. 4, and that in any case the condition was valid, and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The Bank, having filed a number of affidavits, moved for summary judgment. The District Court, in an unreported opinion, held that the Bank was bound by the condition on which it had accepted mem |