sisted, like that of a tailor, simply in taking the measure of legislative enactment to constitutional provision and determining whether the size of the one was too large to fit the other. On the contrary, the law had a direct relationship to changing economic and social needs. It was not a rigid bar or strait-jacket to bind the limbs of man in his development; its function was to assist and not to hinder man's progress.

He did not feel that it was the function of a Judge or of the Court, as he put it, "to sit as a superlegislature, or as triers of the facts on which a legislature is to say what shall or shall not" be done. In dealing, for example, with the complicated question of what instrumentalities of state or federal government might be taxed by the other, he insisted that "the limitation upon the taxing power of each, so far as it affects the other, must receive a practical construction which permits both to function with the minimum of interference each with the other."

His own approach to the judicial function in construing the validity of legislation was stated simply: "Some presumption should be indulged that the [state] legislature had an adequate knowledge of . . . local conditions. . . On this deserved respect for the judgment of the local lawmaker depends, of course, the presumption in favor of constitutionality, for the validity of a regulation turns "upon the existence of conditions, peculiar to the business under consideration." . . . Moreover, we should not, when the matter is not clear, oppose our notion of the seriousness of the problem or the necessity of the legislation to that of local tribunals. .. But even if the presumption is not to be indulged, and the burden no longer to be cast on him who attacks the constitutionality of a law, we need not close our eyes to available data throwing light on the problem with which the legislature had to deal."

Often, indeed, during his incumbency on this Bench, it must have given him satisfaction to see that the passing years had proved his point, that many of his dissenting

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opinions had come to express the law in the eyes of the majority of the Court. But his feeling was not merely pride because views which he had stated contrary to the majority had finally been proclaimed to be right; it was rather a sense of gratification that the Court had functioned in accordance with what he considered to be a judiciousness necessary and appropriate to it.

His last words from this Bench were, as we all know, fully characteristic of his judicial philosophy. Fifteen years earlier, the Court had decided that admission to citizenship had to be denied an alien who because of religious scruples was unwilling to bear arms in this country's defense. He had dissented from this view, for he felt that the alien's willingness to take the oath of allegiance and to serve the Nation as a noncombatant was sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements for naturalization. The cases were much discussed, and legislation effecting Stone's views of the matter was several times proposed in the Congress, but was never enacted. Finally, in 1940 and 1942, new statutes on naturalization were passed, but they retained unchanged the language which had been earlier construed by the Court. Stone felt that this amounted to an acceptance by Congress of the Court's previous interpretation, and for him in this field that determination was conclusive. When, in 1946, the question was once more presented to the Supreme Court, although the views of the majority had come to accord with those which Stone had held in his earlier dissent, he felt his former position no longer tenable. In his dissent he said:

"With three other Justices of the Court I dissented in the Macintosh and Bland cases, for reasons which the Court now adopts as ground for overruling them. Since the Court in three considered earlier opinions has rejected the construction of the statute for which the dissenting Justices contended, the question, which for me is decisive of the present case, is whether Congress has like

wise rejected that construction by its subsequent legislative action, and has adopted and confirmed the Court's earlier construction of the statutes in question. A study of Congressional action taken with respect to proposals for amendment of the naturalization laws since the decision in the Schwimmer case, leads me to conclude that Congress has adopted and confirmed this Court's earlier construction of the naturalization laws. For that reason alone I think that the judgment should be affirmed."

This was his last pronouncement as Chief Justice of the United States. It was dramatically characteristic that this last act was consistent with all the others of his life, that he died as he had lived-courageously and honestly, with the dignity and humility of a man who is at peace with himself and whose philosophy embraces all men in the scheme of government and of life.

Words are inadequate in my effort to express the high esteem and affection in which the late Chief Justice was held as a man, and the very real respect with which his accomplishments as a Judge and his contribution to justice and law must be regarded. The courts, he felt, "are concerned only with the power to enact statutes, and not with their wisdom" and, "while unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative branches of the Government is subject to judicial restraint, we should remember that the only check upon our exercise of power is our own sense of self-restraint." His abiding faith in the people was expressed in his statement that "For the removal of unwise laws from the statute books appeal lies not to the courts but to the ballot and to the processes of democratic government."

Mr. Chief Justice of the United States and Associate Justices of this Court: In the name of the lawyers of this Nation, and particularly of the Bar of this Court, I respectfully request that the resolution presented to you this morning memorializing the life of the late Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone be accepted by you, and that it,

together with the chronicle of these proceedings, be ordered to be kept for all time to come in the records of this Court.

THE CHIEF JUSTICE said:

Mr. Attorney General: The Court receives with deep gratification the Resolutions expressing tribute to the memory and service of the late Chief Justice. He was taken from us in the active performance of duty. No tribute would have been more highly prized by him than this tribute from the Bar of this Court, which he loved and served so well.

The task of accurately epitomizing, in a few short paragraphs, the life and character of any man is always a difficult one. Human personality is a too richly varied and subtle thing to be captured within the confines of a formula. But in dealing with the career of Harlan Fiske Stone, the magnitude of the task is immeasurably enhanced. For few men have possessed the versatility of the late Chief Justice. Not only did he become one of the great figures in the history of this Court, but his distinguished career included service as a practicing attorney, educator, scholar, and statesman. Nor were his energies and talents confined to his professional activities. His intellectual interests were many and varied; and he was well versed in the arts of friendship.

Harlan Fiske Stone was born at Chesterfield, New Hampshire, in the year 1872. Shortly after his birth, his parents moved to northern Massachusetts; and there he grew to maturity. The childhood of Harlan Fiske Stone was that of a typical New England farm boy. It was at times a rigorous and demanding life, but it was also a life full of satisfactions and one well-calculated to develop independence and self-sufficiency.

After a period of attendance at the Massachusetts Agricultural College, he entered Amherst College in the class of 1894. The wide breadth of his interests and talents

was apparent even at this early period. While at Amherst, he made an enviable academic record and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. But he was also a campus leader, being three times elected president of his class, and, during his junior and senior years, was a star member of the varsity football team.

In 1895, Harlan Stone entered the Columbia Law School, an institution to which he was to dedicate much of his interests and talents in years to come. He graduated with high honors in 1898, despite the fact that during the period he was required to support himself by such outside activities as teaching and tutoring.

From the time he received his law degree until he entered the service of the Government, some twenty-six years later, Harlan Stone engaged in the active private practice of the law either on a part-time or on a full-time basis. For the six years following his graduation he supplemented his activities as a private practitioner by serving as an instructor at the Columbia Law School. In 1910 he returned to the Law School as Dean, a position which he retained until 1923. The thirteen years in which he served as Dean were years of great constructive development for the Law School. It was also during this period that he established his reputation as an outstanding legal scholar. His work in the law of equity and related subjects remains, even with the passage of the years, the definitive scholarship in those fields.

Following the termination of his academic duties, Harlan Stone engaged in the full-time practice of law in New York City. In April, 1924, he was appointed Attorney General in the cabinet of his former classmate, President Calvin Coolidge. On January 5, 1925, he was nominated Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.

The appointment of Harlan Stone to the Court was viewed with misgivings in some quarters. Because of the nature of his law practice, he was suspected by some of