sufficiently appeared that the binding was not a parish binding.

Under a ground of appeal, stating that notice of chargeability accompanied by a copy of the order and examinations, had not been sent to the appellant parish, in conformity with the statute, an objection that the notice of chargeability sent was accompanied by an imperfect copy of the order cannot be raised. Where a case is granted by the Sessions the party taking it must rely on the objections there stated, or may abandon the case and rely on such other objections as may be raised on a certiorari, but he cannot do both.

On an appeal to the Middlesex Quarter Sessions, against an order, under the hand and seal of B. Combe, Esq., one of the Magistrates of the police courts of the metropolis, sitting at, &c., for the removal of Maria, the wife of James William Jones, and her two children, from the parish of St. Pancras to the parish of St. Anne, Westminster, the Sessions confirmed the order, subject to the opinion of this Court on a CASE, which set out the examination of Edward Jones, the uncle of the pauper's husband, who stated, "the said J.W. Jones is now about the age of twenty-eight years; that in or about the month of May 1831, he was, by and with his own consent, (his parents being dead,) bound by indenture of apprenticeship, bearing date in or about the month of May 1831, which was duly stamped and executed, to serve R. M. Scott, of Dean Street, Soho Square, in the parish of St. Anne, in the liberty of Westminster, in the county of Middlesex, cabinet-maker, as an apprentice, for the term of six years from thence next following. I attended, on behalf of my said nephew, when he was so bound. I saw the said indenture executed by the parties thereto, who did severally sign, seal, and deliver the same in my presence, to which I did then set and subscribe my name as subscribing witness, attesting the execution thereof." The examinations shewed that the indenture was lost, and that search had been made for it. The following grounds of appeal were relied on by the appellants: first, that the said order is bad and defective, on the face thereof: secondly, that the examinations on which the said order was made, are wholly insuffi

cient to support the same, and fail to disclose any such facts as shew either the said Maria Jones, or her supposed husband, to have a settlement in our said parish of St. Anne, Westminster; that the said examinations are wholly bad and insufficient, inasmuch as they neither shew who were the parties to the supposed indenture of apprenticeship therein named, nor do they shew whether the said indenture of apprenticeship (if a parish apprenticeship) was signed and sealed by the parish officers, and allowed by Justices of the Peace as by law required thirdly, that notice in writing of the said paupers being chargeable to or relieved in your said parish of St. Pancras, accompanied by a copy or counterpart of the said order, or by a copy of the examinations on which the said order was made, has not been sent by post or otherwise to us, the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the said parish of St. Anne, Westminster, or any of us, in conformity with the provisions of the statute in that behalf. The appellants, on the hearing, insisted that the examinations were bad, for the reasons specified in the third (1) ground of appeal; the Court overruled this objection, and held the examinations good, subject to the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench. It appeared to the Sessions that the only notice in writing of the said paupers being chargeable to or relievable in the parish of St. Pancras, which had been sent by post or otherwise to the parish officers of St. Anne, Westminster, had been accompanied by what purported to be a copy of the order, but that such document, instead of containing a true transcript of the words of the said order, wholly omitted the name of one of the children in the adjudication. The appellants, on these facts, objected that the respondents had not complied with the provisions of the statute, and that the order ought to be quashed. The Sessions overruled this objection, subject to the opinion of the Court of Queen's Bench. If the Court of Queen's Bench should be of opinion that the said examinations were insufficient, for the reasons stated in the third (1) ground of appeal, or that the defect in the copy of the order of removal accompanying the notice of chargeability, was a

(1) Sic.

good objection, and was sufficiently pointed out in the fifth (1) ground of appeal, then the said order of Sessions and the said order of removal were to be quashed, otherwise the same to stand confirmed (2).

As

Prendergast, in support of the order of Sessions. The objection as to the defect in the copy is not pointed out by the ground of appeal, which only raises the question whether the notice of chargeability and copy of the order were in fact sent, not whether the copy was or was not correct. to the other objection (3), prima facie an apprenticeship is presumed not to be a parish apprenticeship; but, if not so, there is enough stated here to shew that the binding was between the parties. It is stated to be by his own consent. (He was then stopped.)

Pashley, contrà.-As to the apprenticeship, it is at least left in doubt whether this was a parish binding or not. The parties are not stated; and saying that the apprentice was bound raises an ambiguity.

[COLERIDGE, J.-Why are we to assume that it was a parish apprenticeship? It is not even stated that the child was a pauper.]

Facts ought to be stated, not merely inferences drawn by the witness. An examination is insufficient which only states facts consistent with the non-fulfilment of the settlement-The Queen v. St. Sepulchre, Northampton (4). The statement in The Queen v. Cumberworth Half (5), that the binding was by indenture of covenant, goes further than the present case- -The Queen v. Lydeard St. Lawrence (6), The

(1) Sic.

(2) The rule for quashing the order of Sessions was moved by Pashley, in the Bail Court, upon a ground independent of those reserved by the case, viz., that the order of removal was insufficient on the face thereof, inasmuch as it did not shew that the Magistrate who made the order had jurisdiction, and notice of this objection was served on the respondents, together with the rule for quashing the order.

(3) It was objected that the numbers affixed to the grounds of appeal in the case, did not correspond with the reference made to them at the conclusion of the case, and the Court decided upon hearing the argument under protest.

(4) 6 Q.B. Rep. 580; s. c. 14 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 8.

(5) 5 Ibid. 484; s. c. 13 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 49.

(6) 11 Ad. & El. 616; s. c. 10 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 147.

Queen v. High Bickington (7). Then, as to the copy, the ground of appeal is sufficient; it follows the very words of the statute. The respondents alone are cognizant of what the defect is; and the only mode which is open to the appellants of taking the objection, is, by requiring the respondents to shew that everything has been sent which is necessary. Then as to the objection on the face of the order. It was mentioned when the rule for quashing the order was moved for in open court, and notice was given to the respondents at the same time with the rule to quash the order.

[LORD DENMAN, C.J.-It does not, therefore, follow that you can take the objection now.]

He referred to The Queen v. Heyop (8), as shewing that the objection might be raised in this manner.

LORD DENMAN, C.J.-This appears to be an entire innovation. The only points argued in cases set down in the Crown paper are those sent up to us by the Sessions. If we are to permit this, I do not see why we should not do so in every other case. What was said before, that, without notice the Court could not hear the objection, does not imply that they will hear it if notice is given. When the Sessions reserve points for us, we must give them credit for having a good order before them. If, however, upon consideration, we should think Mr. Pashley can take this point, we will hear him on Wednesday. It appears to me there is no ground for questioning what has been done by the Sessions, on any of the objections raised by the case. The statement as to the apprenticeship is sufficient. It is necessary that words should be used in the examinations sufficient to shew a settlement; and there is quite enough in this language to do so. There is no decision rendering it necessary to negative an assumption such as is here put forward. Then, as to the copy of the order which accompanied the notice of chargeability, the Court may see that there are some words left out; but, whether that be so or not, the objection is not well taken. When you say we have no copy, you quite put the other side off from

(7) 3 Q.B. Rep. 790, n.; s.c. 13 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) M.C. 74.

(8) 15 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) M.C. 70.

supposing that you intend to rely on such a point as this. I think the Sessions were quite right in everything, except in reserving a case.

PATTESON, J.-I entirely agree. An indenture, said to be executed between the parties, without more, must be taken to be a common indenture; but this is stated to have been stamped, and parish indentures are not stamped. I think, therefore, that it sufficiently appears not to be a parish binding. As to the other point, it is impossible to say that the objection was pointed out by the ground of appeal, which is, that nothing of the kind, whether correct or not, has been sent. It is manifestly an afterthought that the copy was defective.

COLERIDGE, J.-I am entirely of the same opinion. I do not go into presumptions one way or the other; but as I see it stated that the party has bound himself by indenture, I take it to mean an ordinary binding by indenture, and it is specifically enough described. As to the other point, it was a miserable trick, which I wonder the Sessions gave in to. There is nothing to shew that this point was intended to be relied on by the appellants.

WIGHTMAN, J. concurred.

Order of Sessions confirmed.

On a subsequent day (Jan. 20),—

LORD DENMAN, C. J. stated, that the Court had come to the conclusion that they could not hear an argument upon any points not reserved in the case stated by the Sessions. The result of the practice, as laid down in The King v. Guildford (9) is, that a party must either adhere to the case and the points raised there, or else he must abandon it altogether, and rely only upon the points which are raised on the motion for a certiorari. But, to prevent mistakes, the Court would probably make a rule on the subject.

of a county, and the practice of the Sessions is to try all matters arising in each division at the sessions held for that division, the notice and statement of grounds of appeal, under the 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76. s. 81, must be given at least fourteen days before the first day of holding the sessions at the first place, and will not be in time if given only fourteen days before the adjourned sessions at which the appeal is to be tried.

It appeared, from the affidavits in the case, that an order, under the hands and seals of Sir H. C. Blake, Bart. and Robert Bevan, Esq., two of Her Majesty's Justices of the Peace for the county of Suffolk, dated the 11th of February 1846, was obtained by the churchwardens and overseers of the parish of Woolpit, in the said county, for the removal of Henry Alexander, his wife and children, from the parish of Woolpit to the parish of Badwell Ash, in the same county; and that the order of removal, with the examination of the pauper and a notice of chargeability, was duly sent by the churchwardens and overseers of Woolpit to the churchwardens and overseers of Badwell Ash. The affidavits proceeded to state, that for the purpose of holding the General Quarter Sessions of the Peace, the county of Suffolk is divided into four divisions, and that the General Quarter Sessions for each of such divisions have been immemorially held on a certain day, and at a certain place in each division, that is to say, on the Monday of the week in which the General Quarter Sessions are by law directed to be held, at Beccles, in the said county, for one of such divisions; on the Wednesday of the said week, by adjournment, at Woodbridge, for another of such divisions; on the Friday of the said week, by adjournment, at Ipswich, for another of such divisions; and on the Tuesday of the following week, by adjournment, at Bury St. Edmunds, for the last of such divisions. That the said several Courts of Quarter Sessions for each of the said divisions are presided over by different chairmen, and different grand and petty juries are summoned and sworn for each of the said courts from the division in which the court is held. That by the practice of the Sessions all appeals against orders of removal or others, are required to be tried at the sessions held for the division in which the

respondent parish is situate, or in which the order or matter appealed against was made or arose, and are required, by the rules thereof, to be entered with the clerk of the peace before 10 o'clock on the first day of the sessions for the respective divisions, and not of the sessions held at Beccles; and all indictments are, by the practice of the Sessions, prepared and tried at the sessions held for the division in which the offence is committed, and not at the sessions held for any of the other divisions; and that, generally, all the business of the General Quarter Sessions for the county is transacted at the sessions held for the division in which the matter arises.

The next sessions for the division in which the parish of Woolpit is situated, after the date of the order of removal in question, and the receipt of it by the churchwardens and overseers of Badwell Ash, were held at Bury St. Edmunds, on the 16th of March, and on that occasion an appeal against the order of removal was entered and respited. On the 20th of June the appellants caused the respondents to be served with a copy of the order of entry and respite, and a statement of the grounds of appeal, with a notice of their intention to try the appeal at the next sessions to be holden at Bury St. Edmunds. The sessions were held at Bury on the 7th of July; and on the appeal being called on for hearing, the counsel for the respondents contended, that the notice of the grounds of appeal had been served too late, and that it ought to have been served fourteen days at least before the 29th of June, which was the day on which the General Quarter Sessions of the Peace for the county were holden at Beccles, and not fourteen days before the day appointed for holding the sessions at Bury. The Court of Quarter Sessions held the objection good, and refused to hear the appeal.

Power (Nov. 3, 1846) obtained a rule nisi for a mandamus, commanding the Justices to enter continuances, and to hear and determine the merits of the appeal.

Prendergast and Gurdon shewed cause (Jan. 22, 1847), and cited The King v. the Justices of Sussex (1), The Queen v.

(1) 7 Term Rep. 107.

the Inhabitants of Hindercleave (2), and The King v. Polstead (3), to shew that the time must be calculated in reference to the original sessions.

Power, in support of the rule.-The practice is, that if the respondent parish is within a particular division, the appeal is to be tried there; and the question in the case is, whether, under the 4 & 5 Will. 4. c. 76. s. 81, which enacts, that a statement of the grounds of appeal must be sent or delivered to the overseers of the removing parish fourteen days at least before "the first day of the sessions," a notice and statement of grounds of appeal sent fourteen days before the first day on which the sessions are held, at the place where the appeal is to be tried, is sufficient or not. The appeal could not, by the practice, have been tried at Beccles.

[ERLE, J.-There would be no doubt if the notice was to be given fourteen days before the trial of the appeal.]

The object of the legislature is to give the parties time to examine into the particulars of the case, and prepare for trial, or abandon the order. If the original sessions only were to be considered, the respondents would have only fourteen days if the appeal was to be tried at Beccles, and twenty-two days if it was to be tried at Bury. According to the practice, the appeal could not come on till fourteen days after the notice. The statute does not say "general," or quarter," or "original" sessions, although in other provisions it uses those terms. By the interpretation clause of the act, the words, "General Quarter Sessions" are to be construed as including adjourned sessions. Either the word "sessions" must be taken in the restricted sense, and then the notice is in time; or the word in that clause of the act must be taken to include adjourned sessions.

[ERLE, J.-The adjournment from day to day is as much an adjournment as from place to place. I think the first day must be taken to be the commencement of the sessions.]

Cur. adv. vult.

(2) 19 Vin. 356.

(3) 2 Str. 1263.

ERLE, J.—I think the rule ought to be discharged. The notice and statement of grounds of appeal were given on the 20th of June. The sessions began on the 29th of June at Beccles, and were held by adjournment, at Bury, on the 7th of July; and the appeal in question was to be heard at Bury. The statute requires that the statement of the grounds of appeal should be sent or delivered fourteen days at least before the first day of the sessions at which the appeal is to be tried. The question is, whether the notice in this case, which is in time for the adjourned, but too late for the original, sessions is valid. I am of opinion that it is not. I think when the commencement of the sessions generally is to be ascertained, the original, and not any adjourned sessions, must be taken to be intended. The cases of The King v. Coystan (4), The King v. Polstead, and The King v. the Justices of Sussex, are authorities for this construction.

An order of settlement and maintenance, under 9 Geo. 4. c. 40, on parish A. of a lunatic pauper, confined in an asylum in parish D, was made in April 1841, and quashed by consent, on appeal.

In September 1841 another order of two Justices was made between the same parishes adjudging the pauper's settlement to be in parish A, and directing the overseers of that parish to repay to the overseers of parish D. the sum of 141. 2s., for the removal, maintenance, care, fc. of the pauper. This order was appealed against, and confirmed at the Sessions, but the order of Sessions was, on a case reserved, quashed by the Court of Queen's Bench, on the ground that the statute did not empower the Justices to order the reimbursement to be made to the overseers. In January 1845 another order of two Justices was made, adjudging the pauper's settlement to be in parish A, and directing

(4) 19 Vin. 356.

the overseers of that parish to pay to the keepers of the asylum a weekly sum, for the maintenance, &c. of the pauper. This order having been quashed on appeal by the Sessions, on the ground that the previous order was conclusive between the parishes as to the settlement of the pauper : -Held, that the Sessions were wrong in so deciding, as the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench, the reasons of which must be taken to be adopted by the Sessions, did not turn on the question of settlement.

On appeal against the after-mentioned order, dated the 23rd of January 1845, by Thomas Grove Smith, John Tulley, and James Pumfrey, three Justices of the Borough of Droitwich, Worcestershire, in the matter of John Hughes, a lunatic pauper, the Sessions, on the 7th of April 1845, quashed the said order, subject to the opinion of her Majesty's Court of Queen's Bench, upon the following

CASE.

The pauper, John Hughes, having become chargeable to the parish of St. Peter, Droitwich, and it having been legally proved to the satisfaction of two Justices for the borough, that the said John Hughes was insane, he was by their order, bearing date the 13th day of April 1841, removed to the house of Messrs. Martin Ricketts and John Burdett Steward, at and in the borough of Droitwich, in the county of Worcester, duly licensed for the reception of insane persons; there being no county asylum or public hospital for the reception of insane persons in the county of Worcester. At that time the place of the last legal settlement of the pauper could not be ascertained; but the said two Justices, on the 29th of April 1841, made another order, by which (after reciting the order of the 13th of April 1841, and that the settlement of the pauper could not, at the date of that order, be ascertained, and that they had proceeded to inquire into the place of his settlement, and had heard evidence therein,) they adjudged the lawful settlement of the pauper to be in the parish of St. Andrew, in the city of Worcester, and ordered the overseers of the said parish of St. Andrew to pay a certain sum for the expenses of the removal of the pauper to