Wabash, etc. R. Co., 111 Ill. 351; Michigan Southern etc. R. Co. v. Heaton, 37 Ind. 448; Blossom v. Dodd, 43 N. Y. 264; Madan v. Sherard, 73 N. Y. 329; Newberger v. Howard's Express, 6 Phila. 174.

19. All limitations of liability must be just and reasonable.— In Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. p. 380, it is said that “contracts of common carriers, like those of persons occupying a fiduciary character, giving them a position in which they can take undue advantage of the persons with whom they contract, must rest upon their fairness and reasonableness." It is also stated as one of the conclusions in that case, "that a common carrier cannot lawfully stipulate for exemption from responsibility when such exemption is not just and reasonable in the eye of the law," p. 384. It is further held in the same case that the English Railway and Canal Traffic Act of 1854, declaring void all notices and conditions made by those classes of common carriers, except such as should be held by the court or judge before whom the case should be tried to be just and reasonable, was substantially a return to the rule of the common law, p. 381. These views are sustained by numerous authorities among which we cite the following: Southern Express Co. v. Crooke, 44 Ala. 468; South & North Ala. R. Co. v. Henlein, 52 Ala. 606; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Oden, 80 Ala. 38; Adams Express Co. v. Reajan, 29 Ind. 21; McFadden v. Missouri Pacific R. Co. 92 Mo. 343; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Gilbert, (Tenn.) 1 Am. R. R. & Corp. Rep. 468; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Harris, 67 Tex. 166; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Cornwall, 70 Tex. 611; Gulf, etc. R. Co. v. Gatewood, 79 Tex. 89; 14 S. W. Rep. 913; Maslin v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 14 W. Va. 180; Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264; Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co., 93 U. S. 174; Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 112 U. S. 331; Liverpool, etc. Steam Nav. Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co. 129 U. S. 397.

It follows that the validity of any particular limitation is a question of law for the court, to be determined according to its views of what is just and reasonable in the eye of the law. In Texas & P. R. Co. v. Adams, 78 Tex. 372; 14 S. W. Rep. 666, the question was as to the reasonableness of a stipulation requiring claims for loss or damages to be presented to the delivering line within thirty-six hours after the arrival of the freight. The plaintiff received the goods, a trunk and box, on Saturday afternoon, and did not open them until the following Monday morning. In the meantime she had been sick. The reasonableness of the stipulation was held to be a question of fact for the jury under instructions from the court.

20. All limitations of liability are strictly construed.—It is a general rule that all conditions and provisions intended to restrict the common law liability of carriers, are construed most strongly against the carrier. Montgomery, etc., R. Co. v. Edwards, 41 Ala. 667; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Meyer, 78 Ala. 597; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Tourat (Ala.), 11 So. Rep. 756; Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Talbot, 39 Ark. 523; Hooper v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 27 Cal. 11; Overland Mail & Express Co. v. Carroll, 7 Col. 43; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Smuck, 49 Ind. 302; Rosenfield v. Peoria, etc., R. Co., 103 Ind. 121; Southern Express Co. v. Moon, 39 Miss. 822; Baker v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 34 Mo. App. 98; Barton v. Wheeler, 49 N. H. 9, 30, 31; Wescott v. Fargo, 63 Barb. 353; 6 Lans. 319; Blair v. Erie R. Co., 66 N. Y. 313; Beck

man v. Shouse, 5 Rawle, 179; Cream City R. Co. v. Chicago, etc. R. Co., 63 Wis. 93; Mensell v. Railroad Co., 1 Dill. 531. All cases of doubt and ambiguity are, therefore, to be resolved against the carrier. General language in connection with particular words or exemptions, is to be construed as re. ferring to like causes or perils only. Hawkins v. Great Western R. Co., 17 Mich. 57; S. C. 18 Mich. 427; Mensell v. Railroad Co., 1 Dill. 531.

21. Those courts which permit exemptions from negligence, hold that such exemptions must expressly refer to negligence in order to be effectual.-This is in accordance with the general rule that all exemptions are to be strictly construed against the carrier. Accordingly when the special contract contains exceptions either general or specific, without referring to loss or damage by negligence in express terms, the carrier will be liable, if his negligence contributed to the injury, even though the loss was within the excepted causes. New Orleans Mutual Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, etc., R. Co., 20 La. Ann. 302; Simon v. Steamship Fung Shuey, 21 La. Ann. 363; Alexander v. Green, 7 Hill, 544; Wells v. Steam Nav. Co., 8 N. Y. 375; French v Buffalo, etc., R. Co., 4 Keyes, 108; Steinway v. Erie R. Co., 43 N. Y. 123; Lamb v. Camden & Amboy R. Co., 46 N. Y. 271; Maginn v. Dinsmore, 56 N. Y. 168; Maginn v. Dinsmore, 62 N. Y. 35; Maginn v. Dinsmore, 70 N. Y. 410; Blair v. Erie R. Co., 66 N. Y. 313; Maynard v. Syracuse, etc. R. Co., 71 N. Y. 180; Holsapple v. Rome, etc., R. Co., 86 N. Y. 275; Nicholas v. New York Cent., etc., R. Co., 89 N. Y. 370; Stedman v. Western Trans. Co., 48 Barb. 97; Wescott v. Fargo, 63 Barb. 353; 6 Lans. 319; Stoddard v. Long Island R. Co., 5 Sandf. 180; Jennings v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 52 Hun, 227; Weinborg v. National Steamship Co., 57 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 580; Jennings v. Grand Trunk R. Co. (N. Y.) 5 Am. R. R. & Corp. Rep. 548; Black v. Goodrich Trans. Co., 55 Wis. 319.

It matters not how compreheusive the language used may be. If it is possible to add a proviso to the stipulation that it shall not cover loss by negligence, without its being repugnant to the stipulation itself, then such a proviso will be implied. In a shipment of live stock the shipper agreed as follows: "We do hereby agree to, and do hereby release and discharge the said Co. from all claims, demands and liabilities of every kind and character whatsoever, for or on account of or connected with any damage or injury to or the loss of said stock or any portion thereof from whatsoever cause arising." It was held that this language did not embrace a loss occurring through the negligence of the company or its servants. Maynard v. Syracuse, etc., R. Co., 71 N. Y. 180.

22. Particular limitations construed.-A stipulation read as follows: "I hereby release said company from any and all damage that may occur to said goods arising from leakage or decay, chafing or breakage, or from any other cause not the result of collision of trains or of cars being thrown from the track while in transit." It was held that the word damage did not embrace a total loss, and that the stipulation did not apply where the property was wholly consumed by fire. Menzel v. Railroad Company, 1 Dill. 531. The converse of this was held in Hiel v. St. Louis etc., R. Co., 16 Mo. App. 363. There a stipulation that in case of loss, the cost of the property at the place of shipment should control in estimating damages, was held not to apply in a case where the property was damaged merely. A bill of lading for live stock

provided that the owner took all risk of loss, injury, etc., in loading and unloading, conveyance and otherwise, whether arising from negligence or other wise on the part of the company. It also provided that in consideration of a free pass the owner released the company from all loss or injury to the animals on account of negligence and fault of every description. The stock was injured by reason of a defective car. It was held that this was a cause not within the exceptions, that the general words used in connection with the pass, were to be construed with reference to the particular words contained in the previous stipulation. Hawkins v. Great Western R. Co., 17 Mich. 57; S. C., 18 Mich. 427. An exception of "loss or damage on the lakes or rivers," refers to a loss or damage while navigating the same. St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Smuck, 49 Ind. 302. In this case the property, consisting of grain, was put into a wharf boat to await a packet for transportation, which boat sunk before the grain was transferred. The words "carriages and sleighs" in an exception was held not to cover street railroad cars. Cream City R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 63 Wis. 93.

A stipulation in the usual form limiting liability to $50 in case of each package, was held not to apply to bales of cotton, because the same were not packages within the meaning of the provision. Southern Express Co. v. Crook, 44 Ala. 468.

A stipulation was as follows: 'It is further understood and agreed between the parties hereto that the railroad above mentioned, or any connecting railroad company, shall not be liable for any damages by fire or collision on the rivers and sea, or for loss or damage by storm or accident on water, as the Richmond and Danville and connecting railroads assume no marine risks whatever." Held not to cover loss by fire except on water. Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Talbot, 39 Ark. 523. To same effect, Barter v. Wheeler, 49 N. H. 9, 30, 31 For further illustrations relating more particularly to water transportation, see Spinetti v Steamship Co., 80 N. Y. 71; De Rothschild v. Steam Packet Co., 7 Exch. 734; Taylor v. Steam Company, L. R. 9 Q. B. 546.

23. A contract for limited liability does not make the carrier a private carrier as to that transaction.-In some of the earlier cases it was held that by a special contract limiting liability, the common carrier became, as to that transaction, a mere private carrier for hire. See York Company v. Illinois Central R. Co. 3 Wall. 107; New Jersey Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344; Kimball v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 26 Vt. 247. This view is now universally repudiated. Kirby v. Adams Express Co., 2 Mo. App. 369; Graham v. Davis, 4 Ohio St. 362; Swindler v. Hilliard, 2 Rich. 286; Dillard v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 2 Lea. 288; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Harris, 67 Tex. 166; Maslin v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 14 W. Va., 180; Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co., 93 U. S. 174; Liverpool, etc., Steam Navigation Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397. Upon this point the court in Swindler v. Hilliard, 2 Rich. 286, says: "The carrier's liability is diminished to the extent of the exception, but his character is not changed. He is still a common carrier, so long as any of the incidents and liabilities of that employment remain. He is a public carrier for hire, and the exception in the bill of lading does nothing more than excuse him when the loss has happened by fire without fault or negligence on his part."

The position is most effectively disposed of by the opinion of Bradley, J., in Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 376, who says: "It is argued that a common carrier, by entering into a special contract with a party for carrying his goods or person on modified terms, drops his character and becomes an ordinary bailee for hire, and, therefore, may make any contract he pleases. That is, he may make any contract whatever, because he is an ordinary bailee; and he is an ordinary bailee because he has made the contract. We are unable tɔ see the soundness of this reasoning. It seems to us more accurate to say that common carriers, are such by virtue of their occupation, not by virtue of the responsibilities under which they rest. These responsibilities may vary in different countries, and at different times, without changing the character of the employment. The common law subjects the common carrier to insurance of the goods carried, except as against the act of God or public enemies. The civil law excepts, also, losses by any superior force or any inevitable accident. Yet the employment is the same in both cases. And if by special agreement the carrier is exempted from still other responsibilities, it does not follow that his employment is changed, but only that his responsibilities are changed. The theory occasionally announced, that a special contract as to the terms and responsibilities of carriage changes the nature of the employment is calculated to mislead. The responsibilities of a common carrier may be reduced to those of an ordinary bailee for hire, whilst the nature of his business renders him a common carrier still. Is there any good sense in holding that a railroad company, whose only business is to carry passengers and goods, and which was created and established for that purpose alone, is changed to a private carrier for hire by a mere contract with a customer, whereby the latter assumes the risks of inevitable accidents in the carriage of the goods. Suppose the contract relates to a single crate of glass or crockery, whilst at the same time the carrier receives from the same person twenty other parcels, respecting which no such contract exists; is the company a public carrier as to the twenty parcels and a private carrier as to the one?"

24. Contract exemptions from liability do not excuse the carrier from the exercise of reasonable care.-Notwithstanding a contract limiting the liability of the carrier, he is bound to exercise reasonable care to avoid loss or damage by the excepted causes, and his failure to do so will render him liable for the consequences. In other words, the carrier remains liable for loss or damage arising from the negligence of himself or his servants, or to which such negligence contributed, notwithstanding any exceptions in the contract. Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Jarboe, 41 Ala. 644; Montgomery, etc., R. Co. v. Edmonds, 41 Ala. 667; Ala. Great Southern R. Co. v. Little, 71 Ala. 611; Georgia Pac. R. Co. v. Hughart, 90 Ala. 36; 8 So. Rep. 62; Little Rock, etc., R. Co. v. Talbot, 47 Ark. 97; Merchants' Dispatch & Trans. Co. v. Cornforth, 3 Col. 280; Western & Atl. R. Co. v. Exposition Cotton Mills, 81 Ga. 522; Nicoll v. East Tenn., etc., R. Co. (Ga.), 15 S. E. Rep., 309; Erie R. Co. v. Wilcox, 84 Ill. 239; Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Simpson, 30 Kan. 645; Kiff v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 32 Kan. 263; Orndorf v. Adams Express Co., 3 Bush. 194; Adams Express Co. v. Hoeing, 88 Ky. 373; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Owens (Ky.), 19 S. W. Rep. 590; Simon v. Steamship Fung Shuey, 21 La. Ann. 363; School District v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 102 Mass. 552; Jacobus

v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 20 Minn. 125; Boehl v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 44 Minn. 191; 46 N. W. Rep. 333; Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Weiner, 49 Miss. 725; New Orleans, etc., R. Co. v. Faler, 58 Miss. 911; Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Holland (Miss.), 8 So. Rep. 516; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Abels, 60 Miss. 1017; Southern Express Co. v. Seide, 67 Miss. 609; 7 So. Rep. 547; Nickey v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 35 Mo. App. 79; Doan v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 38 Mo. App. 408; Sturgeon v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 65 Mo. 569; Dawson v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 76 Mo. 514; Ball v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 83 Mo. 574; Smith v. North Carolina R. Co., 64 N. C. 235; Camden & A. R. Co. v. Baldanf, 16 Penn. St. 67; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Weiller, 134 Penn. St. 310; 19 Atl. Rep. 702; Singleton v. Hilliard, 1 Strob. S. C. 203; Railway Co. v. Wynn, 88 Tenn. 320; 3 Am. R. R. & Corp. Rep. 13; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. China Mfg. Co., 79 Tex. 26; 14 S. W. Rep. 785; Galveston, etc., R. Co. v. Ball, 80 Tex. 602; 16 S. W. Rep, 441; Express Co. v. Kountze, 8 Wall. 342; Railroad Co. v. Pratt, 22 Wall. 123; Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co., 93 U. S. 174; Muser v. Holland, 17 Blatch. 412; The Saratoga, 20 Fed. Rep. 869; Hannewell v. Taber, 2 Sprague 1.

This rule prevails in those jurisdictions which permit the carrier to stipulate against liability for negligence, unless negligence is expressly specified in the exception. Westcott v. Fargo, 61 N. Y., 542; Canfield v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 93 N. Y., 533; Jennings v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 5 Am. R. R. & Corp. Rep., 548; Stoddard v. Long Island R. Co., 5 Sandf. 180. And see cases cited in § 21 of this note.

25. Connecting carriers-initial carrier may limit liability to its own line. Where property is received for transportation over two or more connecting lines, the initial carrier may limit its liability to its own line. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Meyer, 78 Ala. 597; Jones v. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co., 89 Ala. 376; Taylor v. Little Rock, etc., R. Co., 32 Ark. 393; Illinois Central, etc., R. Co. v. Frankenberg, 54 Ill. 88; U. S. Express Co. v. Harris, 67 Ill. 137; Wabash, etc., R. Co. v. Jaggerman, 115 Ill. 407; Mulligan v. Illinois Central R. Co., 36 Iowa, 181; Perteson v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 80 Iowa, 92; 45 N. W. Rep. 573; Berg v. Railroad Co., 30 Kan. 561; Detroit, etc., R. Co. v. McKenzie, 43 Mich. 609; Nims v. St. Louis, etc., R. Co., 107 Mo. 475; 18 S. W. Rep. 26. Dimmitt v. Railroad Co., 103 Mo. 433; 15 S. W. Rep. 761; Irwin v. New York Central R. Co., 59 N. Y. 653; American Express Co. v. Second National Bank, 69 Penn. St. 394; Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. Columbia, etc., R. Co., 19 S. C. 353; Railway Co. v. Adams, 78 Tex. 372; McCann v. International, etc., R. Co. (Tex.), 19 S. W. Rep. 547; McConnell v. Railroad Co., 86 Va. 248; Hudd v. U. S. & Canada Express Co., 52 Vt. 335; Tolman v. Abbott, 78 Wis. 192; Myrick v. Railroad Co., 107 U. S. 102. See, also, authorities cited in the quotations from McCann v. International R. Co., below. The facts and reasoning of the court in this case are thus given in the opinion: "This action was brought by appellant to recover damages for injury alleged to have been caused to sixty head of cattle while in transit from San Antonio, Tex., to Chicago, in the state of Illinois. The cause was tried without a jury, and the court found that the contract for shipment was a through contract from San Antonio, Texas, to Chicago, Illinois,' but that the contract, among others, contained the following stipulation: Twelfth. And it is further stipu