to be inserted, when known. The spirit of this requirement is, to give to the owner additional means in the examination of the tax list, to ascertain whether his land has been assessed; the law presuming that every sane person will remember his name, if he is unable to distinguish his land by the description contained in the list. In Louisiana, where the statute required the name of the owner to be inserted, and the list stated that he was "unknown," it was held defective and void.1 (a) Under a similar statute in New York, it was held, that where the land was described in the list as belonging to "the widow and heirs of A. B., deceased," this was a sufficient compliance. So the use of the firm name, where the land was owned by partners. But in the same case the court said, that where the land belonged to a single individual, it was proper and necessary that the name of that individual should be inserted in the list.2 (b) [In Noble v. Indianapolis, an assessment "to the heirs of N." was held good, although they had made partition of the estate, and some had been sold to third parties, but the deeds had not been recorded. So an assessment "to the estate 1 Carmichael v. Aiken, 13 La. 205. See Yeuda v. Wheeler, 9 Texas, 408. (a) Formerly owned by B. insufficient. Kelsey v. Abbott, 13 Cal. 609. In Missouri, notwithstanding the prohibitions of the act touching tax deeds (Adj. Sess. Acts, 1863-4, p. 89, §§ 21, 22; Gen. Stats. 1865, p. 127, §§ 111, 112), evidence is admissible for the purpose of showing that the land had not been assessed in the name of the real owner, or of any former owner, or of any tenant or occupant of the land, and the defect is a vital one. Abbott v. Lindenbower, 42 Mis. 162. In Pennsylvania, a sale of unseated lands for taxes will pass the title, though assessed in a wrong name or by a wrong number, if otherwise designated so as to be capable of identification, and so as not to positively mislead the owner. See Miller v. Hale, 26 Penn. St. 432; Russel v. Werntz, 24 Penn. 337; Philadelphia v. Miller, 49 Penn. St. 440; so in Maryland, O'Neal v. Virginia, &c. Co., 18 Md. 1; in California, O'Grady v. Barnhisel, 23 Cal. 287; Brunn v. Murphy, 29 Cal. 326. See Bidleman v. Brooks, 28 Cal. 72. 2 Wheeler v. Anthony, 10 Wend. 346; Whitney v. Thomas, 23 N. Y. 281. (b) But where tax was assessed to Henry D. V. while the real name was William H. V., it being proved that the person intended was known as Henry in the town, the assessment was held valid. Van Voorhis v. Budd, 39 Barb. N. Y. 479. 3 16 Ind. 56. And see 4 Pet. 349. of J. B. Coles."1 In Coombs v. Warren,2 which was a writ of entry, the demandant claimed under a mortgage, and the tenant under a tax title. The statute required the land to be listed in the name of the "owner or possessor." The land in question was listed in the name of the demandant, a mortgagee of the premises, who never was in possession. The court held, that the mortgagor was the owner, and that as the property was not listed in his name the proceedings were void. The Virginia statute required the commissioners of taxes to "take an account, in writing, of the quantity of land belonging to all persons within their counties, and also the name of the *proprietor or proprietors thereof, and *145 ascertain the value of the same." In a case where the land was listed in the name of the widow of an intestate, instead of the heir, the list was held void.3 So, where the statute of Massachusetts directed an assessment in the name of the "occupant or tenant," and it was listed in the name of the landlord, the list was held void. It was also held by the Court of Appeals in Kentucky, in construing the act of Congress levying a direct tax, that an assessment in the name of a person in possession under a parol contract, instead of the rightful proprietor, was void. In Alvord v. Collin, under the peculiar phraseology of the statute, it was held, that a listing of unimproved lands, belonging to a non-resident proprietor, in which he was wrongly designated, was valid, whereas, in the listing of improved lands belonging to residents, the defect would have been fatal. The decision was placed upon the ground that, in the former instance, the tax was a charge upon the land itself, while in the latter, it was simply a charge upon the person and goods of the delinquent. In those cases where the statute requires the assessor to list the lands in the names of the owners respectively, if known, the principle to be deduced from the authorities is, that it is the 1 State v. Jersey City, 4 Zabr. 108. 2 34 Me. 89. 4 Martin v. Mansfield, 3 Mass. 419. 6 20 Pick. 418. duty of the assessors to ascertain the true name,1 that if they omit the name in the list, or state that the owner is unknown, the presumption is that the officer did his duty, and that the owner was in point of fact unknown, (a) but where it is shown that the name of the original owner was known to the officer, the list will be held invalid, because the statutes expressly declare that the name of the owner shall be inserted when it can be done.2 *146 *Where an entire tract of land is assessed to one who owns only a portion of it, the listing is illegal. Thus in Barker v. Blake, it appeared that one Treat, in the year 1831, was the owner of lot 10, Sumner street, Bangor; that in April, 1832, he conveyed four feet of the south side of the lot to one Baldwin, and a division fence was thereupon erected between them, and this fence was kept up afterwards; that in September, 1832, Treat conveyed the residue of the land to one Taylor; that in 1836 the title of Taylor, by mesne conveyance, became vested in Barker; the whole lot was assessed to Barker, and the assessment was held void. By the court: "It is quite clear that the assessors had no right to assess to him his neighbor's land, jointly with that which he owned in severalty, and such assessment, and the collector's sale and deed in pursuance of them, were utterly void." (b) Where one owns several tracts or parcels of land, they must be listed and valued separately, else the proceedings will be void. Thus in Shimmin v. Inman,5 the statute required the assessors to set forth in their lists "the number of acres of [ But calling his name Packard, instead of Packer, has been held not material. Pierce v. Richardson, 37 N. H. 307.] (a) Smith v. Messer, 17 N. H. 420. 2 The Proprietors of Cardigan v. Page, 6 N. H. 182; Nelson v. Pierce, 6 N. H. 194; Ainsworth v. Dean, 1 Foster, 400; Brown v. Veazie, 25 Me. 359; Merritt v. Thompson, 13 Ill. 716; Shimmin v. Inman, 26 Me. 228. 3 36 Me. 433. (b) So an assessment of part of a single lot to the owner, and part to unknown owners, is illegal. Biddleman v. Brooks, 28 Cal. 72. [4 In Russell v. Werntz, 12 Har. (Penn.) 337, it was held, that the assessment of two contiguous tracts, owned by the same person as one tract, would not avoid the sale.] 5 26 Me. 228. unimproved land which they may have taxed on each nonresident proprietor of lands, and the value at which they have estimated the same." The lots in controversy were thus listed: The court held the list illegal, saying, "A fair construction of the statute requires, that each lot should *147 be valued and assessed separately. The lots may be owned by different persons; and if a joint valuation and assessment were allowed, one owner could not ascertain the amount of tax on his own land, or pay it, or redeem the land when sold, without paying the tax on all the other lands assessed with it. Although, in this case, the several lots appear to have been owned by one person, that fact cannot dispense with the law, or excuse a deviation from it." And in Willey v. Scoville's Lessee,1 the land was thus listed, taxed, advertised, and sold: Grimke, J.: "The proceedings in this case show a defect which is very common in tax sales. Lot 32 (the one in controversy) was listed and advertised for sale, with eight others of the same ten-acre lots, by the following description; the first and second columns contain the range and township, the third enumerates the nine lots by their number, and the fifth contains an apportionment in gross of the tax for which they were delinquent. The law requires that the auditor should so list and advertise the land, as to furnish the owner with a 19 Ohio, 43. description of the land subject to taxation, and that the sale shall be advertised and conducted in conformity with that rule. In this instance there was an assessment in gross of the whole amount of the tax chargeable upon the nine lots, and yet each lot was put up and sold to pay the tax on it separately. The land is not treated as an entire tract in the list, advertisement, or sale, but is so treated in the apportionment of the *148 tax. Now it is evident, that the course pursued should be consistent with itself. If the lots might be treated as separate and distinct parcels of land, then the tax charged upon them should have corresponded with the fact in the description; or, if they should be treated as one entire tract, then, although the assessment of the tax in the advertisement as one aggregate sum would have been correct, the description of the land would itself be erroneous, and so also would the sale under it. In either case the title is defective, and the court were right in ruling out the evidence." The statute of Illinois provides, that each tract of land shall be listed, valued, and assessed separately. (a) This does not mean that an entire tract must be subdivided into the smallest legal subdivisions of which it is susceptible, but simply that two or more tracts disconnected from each other, so as not to be embraced within the same general description, shall not be assessed together. Thus "the S. 1-2 Sec. 5, T. 3 N., R. 4 W.," and "S. W. and S. E. Sec. 9, T. 8 N., R. 8 E.,' 992 were held tively to be a compliance with the statute. 1 respec Lastly, to make a complete and perfect list, the land must be valued in the manner and upon the principles prescribed by law. It has already been shown, that where the law required the lister to join with him two householders in making the valuation, which he neglected to do, the proceeding was held void. All fixed and permanent improvements upon the land, (a) Under the California statute of 1857, city lots must be assessed separately; and if assessed in gross and sold for the aggregate tax, the sale is void. Terrill v. Groves, 18 Cal. 149. But the lands of tenants in common may be jointly assessed under act of 1860. People v. McEwen, 23 Cal. 54. 1 Atkins v. Hinman, 2 Gilm. 443. 3 Kinney v. Doe, 8 Blackf. 350. 2 Spellman v. Curtenius, 12 Ill. 410. |