the seas, leaving us commercially stranded. When, therefore, our Government undertook to formulate the instructions of our delegates to the first Hague Conference in 1899 it felt the time ripe for urging the American Doctrine upon the world once more. At this Conference, at the succeeding conference of 1907 and again at the London Naval Conference some months later, the American delegates urged that private property on the high seas, unless contraband of war or intended for a blockaded port, should be exempt from belligerent capture. Nor did the American delegates stand alone in this matter. Opposed by the representatives of the Entente and of Japan, they found their stand supported by the delegates of the Triple Alliance.

It must be pointed out, however, that even at this moment Germany's attitude and interest, while coinciding to the extent just indicated with our own, were at base opposed thereto. Our attitude was still, as just stated, that of a nation planning neutrality; that of Germany was the attitude of a nation plotting war against superior naval power. The further propositions of Germany on these various occasions make this quite clear. Thus she insisted upon the right to lay mines in the open sea, though under restrictions meant to curtail as much as practicable their possibilities for mischief to neutrals. Again she insisted upon the right to convert peaceable merchantmen at sea into war vessels,-a new species of privateering. Lastly, she demanded the right, which she was later to exercise in the case of the Frye, to destroy neutral vessels carrying contraband without having to bring them into port for purposes of adjudication. In short, Germany's effort throughout was directed not toward making neutral commerce more secure, but toward cutting down the advantage which Great Britain derived under the existing rules of law from her superior fleet and her numerous coaling stations scattered over the globe. And obviously Germany's conduct of naval operation in the present war has simply proceeded along the line of this endeavor, though as it chanced, she found in the submarine a weapon singularly adapted to her purpose. So Freedom of the Seas became at her handling anarchy of the seas, its motto "spurlos versenkt."

And what meantime has been the history of England's attitude toward the problem of Freedom of the Seas? Till the outbreak of the present war it has been for a century past a history of steady, and for the most part uncoerced,

concession. In the course of this period England has abandoned non-belligerent visit and search; she has sacrificed the old doctrine of indelible allegiance-" Once an Englishman, always an Englishman "-which had supported her earlier policy of impressment; she has accepted the principle of "Free ships, free goods." Also, speaking broadly, the British Fleet has been during this time one of the great forces making for liberalism, as the liberation of Greece and of Italy and the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine eloquently testify. Finally it was England who in 1908 issued the invitations for the London Naval Conference, the work of which, the Declaration of London, recorded still further notable concessions on the part of sea power.

But this time the policy of concession over-reached itself; the House of Lords refused to assent to the legislation necessary to put the Declaration of London into operation. When, moreover, at the outbreak of the European War President Wilson proposed to the belligerent parties that, notwithstanding that the Declaration had not yet been generally ratified, they should treat it as a part of the law of nations, while Germany assented outright, Great Britain accompanied her assent with material conditions, and the proposal fell through. A few months later the British Government proclaimed its embargo upon all trade with Germany, a proceeding which made a scrap of paper" of the Declaration of Paris and overrode even more ancient restrictions upon naval warfare. The central feature of the British" blockade," so-called, was its stoppage of all goods, innocent and contraband alike, passing to or from Germany through neutral ports. The extraordinary character of the measure was somewhat concealed by the fact that comparatively few neutral ports were affected by it, but had the war been confined to Great Britain and Germany and had the former then sought to stop all goods destined to Germany through neutral ports, the remarkable character of the attempt would have been evident at once.

Why, then, it will be asked, did we finally enter the war on England's side? In the first place, we had a decided preference for England's type of law breaking, which though it touched our pockets, did not wring our hearts as did Germany's. But more than that, as Germany's designs became plainer, we discovered that for the time being at any rate the question of Freedom of the Seas had become subordinate to

the question of the freedom of the earth, and not being amphibians we naturally felt more concerned on the latter score. Nor had we meantime necessarily any thought of abandoning permanently our views of a free sea, as President Wilson's Fourteen Points of January 8 indicated. Accordingly, now that the battle for free institutions has been won-so far as it can be won on the battle field,-now that military power has been broken and the prospect for a general disarmament on land is good, our Government again presses for the limitation of naval power.

In this connection let us consider some aspects of the Fourteen Points. Nine of these deal more or less specifically with certain details of the immediate peace settlement, and may be dismissed without further mention. The five of broader import read as follows:

I. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at; after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. . .

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed, under specific covenants, for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.

So far as this language bears upon the problem of the Freedom of the Seas, its meaning seems fairly clear. There is to be a League of Nations vested with a certain control over the highways of commerce, which it may exert in support of international covenants. But notwithstanding the League of Nations, there will remain the peril of war, and when war comes freedom of navigation on the high seas is to be absolute except so far as it is restricted by action of the League. Individual belligerents, therefore, will have no right to assail their enemy's commerce in any way. So far as they are concerned the right of blockade will be abolished, the carriage of contraband will go unmolested, private prop

In

erty on the high seas will be exempt from capture. short, the American doctrine of Freedom of the Seas will be realized and surpassed. Moreover, individual naval forces will be "reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." Of course the crucial question is, Will Great Britain subscribe to such a programme?

We have already had something of an index to the British point of view regarding this question in the caveat of the allied Governments which was quoted earlier in this article. It is also an ominous fact that since that caveat was filed, while numerous British statesmen have been crying up the League of Nations idea, not one has uttered a word favorable to Freedom of the Seas, and few have said anything about it. This silence, however, has not been maintained by British pamphleteers, with the result that we need remain in no ignorance regarding the British position. In a word, it is that sea power is the backbone of the British Empire and essential to its defense; and it is asked with some asperity whether England should be expected to surrender her historic protection in reliance upon a plan of world organization which has not yet been even launched? The query is further pointed by reference to the great part which the British Fleet has played in the defeat of Germany.

Any fair man must feel considerable sympathy with this position. At the same time, it must be remembered that the most frequently offered apology for British so-called "navalism" throughout the past four years has been that it was necessary as a defense against German militarism, an apology which at the moment has lost much of its cogency. Some measure of concession from her triumphant sea power is bound therefore to be demanded of England by the rest of the world, if only in proof of her sincerity respecting the project of world organization. Also, there are at least two more material considerations counseling such concession even from the point of view of England's own security.

The first of these may be stated in words borrowed from an English statesman, the late Lord Courtney of Penwith:

An open-eyed recognition of the relative development of ourselves and the United States . . . should at once set aside the dream, if it were ever entertained, of a naval predominance on our part to endure from generation to generation . . . . Having regard to population, accumulated resources and physical power, the notion of challenging the United States to a running competition in ships of war is seen to be idle.

One hundred and forty years ago the Count De Vergennes, Louis XVI's foreign minister and the author of the FrenchAmerican Alliance in the War of Independence, predicted that the time would come when America would be an overmatch for the whole naval power of Europe." It is perhaps the purpose of Secretary Daniels' recently announced programme of construction to convey a hint that the hour foreseen by the French secretary is at hand.

The second consideration is, however, at the moment perhaps even more persuasive. It is epitomized in the word "submarine." There was a moment in the present war when the submarine stirred some very unpleasant feelings in the hearts of British officials; there was never a moment from the autumn of 1916 to within a few weeks of the end of the war when it ceased to be formidable. Of all the great Powers Great Britain is by far the weakest in the matter of provision, the most dependent upon the uninterrupted flow of supplies from the outside world. As Mr. Balfour expressed it, in opposing certain of the features of the Declaration of London: "Starvation not invasion is the danger of this country," and the suggestion has certainly not lost point since then. Nor is this to imply that the submarine will ever again be used with the outrageous disregard of humane considerations with which Germany used it. But it is a comparatively new weapon, and its possibilities for legitimate warfare may yet undergo great development.

Prophecy is proverbially a hazardous business. Nevertheless, in light of the facts just mentioned and of the further fact that for some years Great Britain has been endeavoring to ease the burden imposed by competition in naval armaments, it ought not be surprising if her delegates at the Peace Conference should be willing to accept a compromise arrangement which would represent on the whole a very considerable concession to the principle of Freedom of the Seas; for instance, a compromise along the following lines: First, a great limitation of building programmes. Secondly, a general curtailment of existing armaments on a scale sufficient to leave the British Empire secure, a matter of which Great Britain herself would have to be the judge. Thirdly, a radical remodelling of the rules of practice with reference to contraband, involving the outright abolition of the right of destruction and the substitution (worked out by Great Britain in the present war) of preëmption for confiscation.