The causes of the higher wages on our ships are somewhat complex. In so far as the officers and seamen are Americans, the wages are influenced by the economic and social forces that account for the high standard of living, and the corresponding high wages that prevail in the United States. A large part of the engine crews, and of other ship hands, particularly on the Pacific, are foreigners shipped in foreign ports, and it is probable that the masters of American vessels are not obliged to pay such foreigners higher wages than are paid by masters of other vessels; although it is probable that when aliens are employed a second time-i. e., are hired in an American port-the wages demanded by them may be influenced by the wages current in the United States.

The higher wages and better conditions of life on American vessels are by no means to be deplored; they ought, whatever the needs of the American merchant marine may be, to be carefully maintained. Indeed, it seems necessary that we should make seafaring a more attractive calling, if we are to build up our merchant fleet, and train the men required to man our growing navy. Since 1860, our marine engaged in foreign commerce has been declining; at the same time our industries on the land have been making rapid progress. American men and boys have more and more turned away from our declining over-sea marine, and have chosen callings at home, where greater prospects were offered. In adopting measures for building up our merchant marine, we shall unquestionably find great difficulty in solving this question of securing a personnel of Americans for our vessels.

The foregoing outline of the policy which the United States has pursued toward the shipbuilding industry, the ownership and operation of vessels, and toward the men aboard the ships under our flag, is sufficient to demon

strate the fact that our country has dealt liberally with our maritime interests. Nevertheless, the results of our policy, as far as our shipbuilding industry and our marine engaged in foreign trade are concerned, have been a failure. Our foreign competitors have taken away from us not only the share we formerly had of the general oceancarrying trade of the world, but have also secured nine tenths of the business of carrying our own foreign commerce. The causes that account for our decline in the ocean-carrying trade, and the measures that have been proposed to aid in building up our shipbuilding and shipping interests, will be considered in the following chap

ters.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER READING

CHAMBERLAIN, E. T. "Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Navigation." Department of Commerce and Labor, Washington.

"Report of the Merchant Marine Commission, 1905." (This commission consisted of five senators and five members of the House of Representatives. The secretary of the commission was Mr. Winthrop L. Marvin. The report and testimony were printed in three volumes by the United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.)

SOLEY, J. R. "The Maritime Industries of the United States." This essay by Mr. Soley is a part of Volume I of "The United States of America," by N. S. Shaler, 1894.

CHAPTER XIX

CONDITION OF THE AMERICAN SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY. CONSIDERATION OF CAUSES AND REMEDIES

THE shipbuilding industry in the United States has developed in accordance with the progress of our mercantile and naval marines. Until the Civil War our merchant marine was large, and increased year by year, and the American shipbuilders carried on an expanding business. They not only supplied the shipping purchased by Americans, but also sold a large tonnage to foreign buyers; because our shipwrights could build wooden vessels cheaper and better than their competitors could. The American packets and clipper ships enjoyed an enviable reputation for seaworthiness and speed. The decline in the demand for American-built ships among home and foreign buyers fell off with the gradual substitution of iron for wood in vessel construction after 1850, and with the decrease, which began in 1861, in the tonnage of American vessels engaged in the international carrying trade.

Shipbuilding activity in the United States reached its maximum during the decade ending with 1861. During those ten years there were 3,600,748 tons of shipping constructed in American yards. The output was greatest in 1854 and 1855, when 1,119,496 tons-about 560,000 tons annually-were launched. Those are the only years in our history when the annual tonnage of shipping constructed has exceeded 500,000. During this decade pre

ceding the Civil War the total tonnage of the American merchant marine rose from 3,500,000 tons to 5,500,000, and during those years there were 350,000 tons of shipping sold to foreign buyers.

The Civil War required the construction of a great many war vessels, and it would not have seriously crippled our shipbuilding industry had the war been followed by a demand for American-built ships. The demand did not follow the war, because foreign buyers desired to purchase iron ships, which our yards could not supply, and because ships operated under the American flag were not able to compete successfully with foreign vessels in the international carrying trade. Moreover, for twenty years following the Civil War the United States Government neglected its navy and placed no orders for war vessels among our shipbuilders.

The effect of these causes upon the decline of our shipbuilding activity for over thirty years after the Civil War is revealed in the statistics of tonnage annually constructed. At the end of the war our shipyards were turning out annually between 300,000 and 400,000 tons of ships of all classes; but with the exception of two periods of temporary revival-one in 1873 and 1874, and the other in 1891-the annual output did not reach 300,000 tons until 1899. Moreover, these figures do not indicate the real decline in our shipbuilding industry, be'cause they include the tonnage constructed for our increasing coastwise trade, and for our Great Lakes and other inland waterways where only American-built ships may be employed. The merchant tonnage annually built on our seaboard amounted to about 300,000 tons at the close of the Civil War, after which it declined to about 100,000 by 1880. A short revival came in the early eighties, and another in the early nineties; but with those exceptions the coastwise shipyards made no headway after

1880 until the prosperous period beginning with 1899 was reached, then six years followed during which there was an average output of 250,000 tons. The vessels constructed by our seaboard yards are partly for the foreign trade, but more largely for our expanding coasting trade.. Our yards are not turning out ships for sale to foreigners, and not many ships to be bought by Americans for registry under our flag.

Why is it that the shipyards on the New England seaboard and along the Delaware and Chesapeake cannot construct ships in competition with the builders on the Clyde, Tyne, and Severn? Why is it that the only buyers of American-built vessels are those who purchase ships to be operated under our flag, and are compelled by our navigation laws to secure their vessels from American yards? "What is a steamship, but a locomotive and a steel bridge wrought together?" We export locomotives to many countries, and build bridges in various remote parts of the world, but we cannot compete with the foreign builders in the construction of steel vessels. We can do as good work as any builders can, but the foreign shipyards can do the work for less cost.

That ships can be built more cheaply under present conditions in British and German yards than in American yards is a well-established fact. The Merchant Marine Commission stated, in its report made in January, 1905, that "recent actual bids of American, British, and German yards for typical North Atlantic steamships, which have been communicated to the commission, show an American excess of cost of about forty-seven and thirtyseven per cent." Mr. P. A. S. Franklin, vice president of the International Mercantile Marine Company-a company owning ships under several flags-testified before this commission that "an American-built steamship, suitable for the North Atlantic trade, would cost about