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CHAPTER XX

CAUSES OF THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN MARINE IN THE FOREIGN TRADE

THE decline in the tonnage of shipping engaged under the American flag in the foreign trade of the United States and other countries is so well known that it will be necessary, in this connection, to present only a brief review of the facts and figures regarding the past and present status of our deep-sea merchant marine. The tonnage of American vessels engaged in the foreign trade -our registered tonnage as contrasted with the "enrolled" shipping engaged in the domestic trade-reached its maximum in 1861, when the total of 2,496,894 tons net register was reached. At the close of the Civil War the total was nearly 1,000,000 tons less than at the opening of that great struggle. Until 1880 the figures averaged about 1,500,000 tons; but in 1880 a decline began that continued with but occasional interruption until 1898, when the minimum of only 726,213 tons was reached. The Spanish-American War of that year, and the demands of our increased commerce, brought the figures above 800,000 the next year, and the subsequent increase raised the total of 1905 to 954,513.

While our registered tonnage has been falling off, our enrolled shipping has been increasing. During the past twenty-five years the domestic fleet has risen nearly 3,000,000 tons-the increase during the last five years having been especially rapid. In 1899 the total of enrolled

tonnage was somewhat under 4,000,000 tons, and in 1905 the figures were 5,502,030. The total tonnage of the United States merchant marine in 1905—that engaged in the foreign and coastwise trades and in the fisherieswas 6,456,543. This is the highest point the tonnage of our shipping has ever reached, and the gain during the past twenty-five years has been 58.7 per cent, but the increase has all been in our coastwise and lake fleets. In that part of our commerce that is open to ships under foreign flags, American vessels have not been able to hold their own in competition with their foreign rivals; what progress our shipping has made has been in the carrying trade of which it has had an exclusive monopoly.

The decline in the tonnage of the American marine engaged in international trade is easily explained, and is fully accounted for by the following seven causes:

(1) The gradual but steady substitution of steamers for sailing vessels, and of iron for wooden hulls after 1850, transferred to the United Kingdom the superiority of advantage which the United States had possessed up to that time in the construction and operation of ships. The iron industries of Great Britain in 1850 were twenty five or thirty years in advance of those in the United States, and American manufacturers were unable to compete with the British either in the production of iron for hulls or of machinery for motive power. Moreover, until about 1890, steaming coal was far cheaper in Great Britain than in this country. The construction of iron ships in the United States did not begin much before 1870, and then in but a small way.1 Vessel owners op

1 "The early statistics of iron shipbuilding in the United States have never been fully compiled. The tables of the Bureau of Navigation in the Treasury Department begin in 1869, with an iron tonnage built of 4,584 tons out of a total tonnage built of 275,230 tons, or 1.6 per cent. We know that iron vessels were built before this date in this country

erating ships under the American flag did not desire to purchase iron steamers; at least, their demand was not sufficient to cause American shipyards to be reconstructed and organized for building iron vessels. Great Britain was prepared to change from wood to iron, and from sail to steam, and the United States was not; the result was that Great Britain secured a long lead over us in building and operating ships.

(2) While this revolution was taking place in the business of shipbuilding and navigation, two unfortunate causes tended to weaken the power of our maritime interests to compete with those in Great Britain. One cause was the withdrawal in 1858 of the support which the Federal Government had given our shipping under the laws of 1845 and subsequent years. A subsidy law was passed in 1845 providing for ocean mail contracts, and this law was supplemented by another act passed two years later.

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According to Dr. Meeker,1 the amounts paid in mail subventions from 1847 to 1858 were as follows: Bremen Line (1847-57), $2,000,000; Havre Line (1852-57), $750,000; Collins Line (1850-58), $4,500,000; New York to Aspinwall (1848-58), $2,900,000; Astoria and San Francisco to Panama (1848-58), $3,750,000; Charleston to Havana (1848-58), $500,000. Total, about $14,500,000."

From 1858 until the close of the Civil War the companies carrying the foreign mails of the United States received the ocean postage only. With the restoration of

several in fact, before the war-but they were isolated cases, and probably in no previous year was the proportion as great as at the time when the records begin. In 1870 this proportion was three per cent, as against eighty-two per cent, in England." (J. R. Soley, p. 603 of "The United States," edited by N. S. Shaler.)

1 "History of Shipping Subsidies."

peace, however, the advocates of a larger merchant marine secured the passage of laws providing for three mail contracts: one for a service from New York to Rio Janeiro, another from San Francisco to China and Japan, and a third from San Francisco to Hawaii.

The contract for the mail service between New York and Brazil expired in 1876; the Hawaiian service ended in 1873; and the contract for the Oriental service terminated in 1877. At that time the opposition to subsidies was so strong that no legislation providing for special mail contracts was enacted by Congress until 1891, when the law now in force was enacted. The provisions of that law have already been summarized. The report of the Postmaster-General, issued in December, 1905, states that there was expended during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1905, $1,431,621, to maintain the seven contract services now being performed under the law of 1891.

The action of Congress in 1858, repealing the mail subsidies granted to the transatlantic lines under the Act of 1845, was in part due to the bitter conflict between the North and South. Although the laws of 1845 and 1847 had been passed by a Democratic Congress, the Southern members of Congress, aided by some representatives from the agricultural States of the West, voted to repeal those laws. The Congressmen from the South felt that the mail subsidies were for the benefit of Northern shipowners rather than for the good of the country as a whole.

Whether the maintenance of a liberal mail subsidy policy would have kept our flag on the North Atlantic steam service, is uncertain; but it was at least unfortunate that we abandoned the Government support of our steam marine at a time when it so greatly needed aid in competing with foreign lines.

(3) The effect of the Civil War upon our merchant

marine was disastrous, because the shock of the war came at a critical epoch in the evolution of our shipping interests; at a time when our shipbuilders and shipowners needed support and assistance in tiding over the period of transition from sail to steam and wood to iron. Instead of receiving aid to enable it to meet foreign competition, our shipping was for four years heavily taxed, and was either idle for want of traffic to carry, or, subject to capture by Confederate cruisers, the most destructive of which were fitted out in the shipyards of Great Britain, our most serious maritime rival. The registered tonnage under the American flag in 1861 was 2,642,628; five years later it was only 1,492,926. About 800,000 tons of American vessels were sold to our foreign rivals or transferred to a foreign flag during the war; Confederate cruisers captured about 100,000 tons; over 150,000 tons were lost at sea; nearly 100,000 tons were bought by the United States and converted into war vessels; and the average number of vessels was annually abandoned and taken from the register because worn out.

(4) It would seem that our Government would have been quick to give assistance to our merchant marine at the close of the war. No industry had suffered more during that conflict; none had greater need for, nor a greater claim upon, Government support. Congress supported our manufactures by maintaining a high protective tariff, but failed to take effective measures to build up our merchant marine. The only assistance given to our shipping by the United States Government was the legislation providing for the mail services between New York and Brazil, and between California and Hawaii, Japan, and China. These subsidies covered only a few routes, and those of minor commercial importance. Moreover, the assistance was withdrawn at the end of ten years.

Indeed, Congress burdened American shipping in four

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