regulations as the Secretary of the Navy may prescribe. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized and directed, upon proper audit, to pay, out of the money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to each officer or seaman thus enrolled and employed in the foreign trade or deep-sea fisheries, as hereinafter provided, an annual retainer as follows: For each master or chief engineer of a vessel of the United States of five thousand gross tons or over, one hundred dollars; for each master or chief engineer of a vessel of the United States of one thousand gross tons or over, but of less than five thousand gross tons, eighty-five dollars; for each master or chief engineer of a vessel of the United States under one thousand gross tons, seventy dollars; for each mate or assistant engineer of a vessel of the United States of five thousand gross tons or over, seventy dollars; for each mate or assistant engineer of a vessel of the United States of one thousand gross tons or over, but less than five thousand gross tons, fifty-five dollars; for each mate or assistant engineer of a vessel of the United States under one thousand gross tons, forty dollars; for each seaman, twentyfive dollars; for each boy, fifteen dollars. Such retainer shall be paid at the end of each year of service on certificate by an officer, to be designated by the Secretary of the Navy, that the naval volunteer has satisfactorily complied with the regulations, and on certificate by the Commissioner of Navigation that such volunteer has served satisfactorily for at least six months of the preceding twelve months on vessels of the United States in the foreign trade or in the deep-sea fisheries.

The retainers that would have been authorized by this bill-ranging from $15 a year for a boy, and $25 a year for a sailor or fireman, to $100 a year for the master or chief engineer of a large steamship-would have given a strong inducement to the owners of our merchant marine and fishing vessels to aid the navy by creating a force of naval reserves. The existence of a naval reserve of 20,000 men among the officers and crews of our fishing fleet and merchant vessels would add greatly to the naval strength of the United States. A million dollars a year would cover the expense of paying retainers to a naval

reserve of 20,000 men; and the money thus spent would be of much assistance to our merchant and fishing marines. The United Kingdom appropriates $2,000,000 annually for the maintenance of a naval reserve.

(3) The annual expenditure for the Government subvention of our merchant shipping in the manner suggested, and for the creation and continuance of a force of naval reserves, might warrantably reach a maximum of $10,000,000 a year. The expenditure by the United States Government during the next twenty years of its gross receipts from foreign postage, or a slightly larger amount, to build up the service of ocean transportation in American vessels, and thereby to enlarge our shipbuilding industry, would be a wise policy. The steady and sure development of the foreign trade and the naval strength of the United States is of such prime importance to our country that our merchant marine and our shipbuilding industry may well be given the moderate Government support that is here recommended.

REFERENCES FOR FURTHER READING

"Development of the American Merchant Marine and American Commerce." Report of the Merchant Marine Commission, January 4, 1905. Senate Report No. 2755, 58th Congress, 3d Session.

See also references to the writings of Soley, Crowell, and Marvin, at the end of Chapter XX.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE FUTURE OUTLOOK FOR AMERICAN SHIPBUILDING

AND MARITIME INTERESTS

WHAT is the outlook for the maritime industries of the people of the United States? Have we the ability to construct ships for the international trade, and shall we be disposed to devote our capital and our energies to ocean navigation; or are our maritime efforts to continue to be, as they now are, confined mainly to our coastwise and near-by foreign trade?

Up to the middle of the last century we were eminently successful upon the sea; whereas during the past fifty years our retrogression has been as marked as was our former progress. We have lost most of our international carrying trade, for reasons that have been explained. The purpose of this closing chapter is to inquire whether the basis as well as the superstructure of our maritime transportation business has been destroyed; whether present and prospective conditions indicate the growth or decay of our merchant marine and our shipyards.

Success in building and operating ocean ships depends upon four conditions: geographic, economic, political, and psychological. In forming an estimate as to the prospects of our maritime interests it is necessary to measure carefully the strength and limitations of each of the four bases. upon which we must build for the future.

The geographic basis for the building of ships in the United States and for the development of our merchant

marine is broad and strong, and in this regard the United States compares favorably with any of its rivals. Our water frontage along the Northern Lakes, the Atlantic, the Gulf, and the Pacific, has the great length of 7,300 miles. Although a vast continental country, we have water frontage on all sides-north and south, east and west—and have ready communication by water with Canada, Europe, countries adjacent to the South Atlantic, and with countries about the North and South Pacific. The serious limitation now imposed by the American isthmus upon water commerce between the North Atlantic and the North Pacific is to be removed by the Panama Canal, now being constructed. When the isthmian waterway is opened each seaboard of the United States will enjoy economical ocean connection with both North Atlantic and Pacific countries. Our continental domain will have exceptional facilities for ocean commerce.

Our seaboards and our Great Lake frontage are well supplied with harbors. The best natural harbors are situated where the economic development of the country has been largest, and where the need of good harbors is greatest-along the Atlantic coast, from the mouth of the James River northward; along the Gulf coast, and on the Pacific coast at the Golden Gate; in the lower valley of the Columbia River, and about the shores of Puget Sound. Good harbors also exist at Charleston and Savannah, and, where necessary-as in lower California and about the Great Lakes-artificial harbors have been or are being constructed without difficulty.

A geographic fact of much importance to our shipbuilding industry is that the spacious Chesapeake and Delaware bays, the numerous other smaller bays and inlets of our North Atlantic seaboard, and the entire frontage of our Northern Lakes, are comparatively close to the iron and coal resources of the United States. The prox

imity of coal and iron at Glasgow and Newcastle, in Great Britain, has greatly aided those cities in securing their prominence as shipbuilding centers. The shipyards along the Delaware and Chesapeake are not so close as Glasgow and Newcastle are to coal and iron, but the costs of rail transportation in the United States have been so reduced. as in great part to overcome this slight handicap of the Chesapeake and Delaware shipyards. The American yards, however, have the advantage of abundance of natural deep-water frontage, whereas deep water in the Tyne, and especially in the Clyde, has been secured by extensive and costly dredging.

The acquisition of Porto Rico, the Philippines, and Hawaii, has changed the international position of the United States, and added another geographic factor favorable to the development of a larger American merchant marine. While our political and industrial interests were concerned solely with the progress of the United States on the continent of North America, where the different parts of our national domain, though of vast proportions, were everywhere contiguous, the reasons for building up an efficient merchant marine were less potent than they have become since the United States undertook the administration and development of over-sea colonies.

The increasing and unavoidable responsibilities of the United States as the leading nation upon the American continents are extending the range over which our political and economic influence must be exerted. This fact, quite as much as the possession of noncontiguous colonies, increases the value of having a domestic marine large enough to afford ready communication between the United States and the various American countries. The widening sphere of our international influence strengthens the geographic basis of our merchant marine quite as much as it necessitates the maintenance of a larger navy.