tion the validity of the order of the court substituting him as plaintiff herein.

2. The fact that the grantor was solvent when the conveyance was made was an important item of evidence on the question whether the deed was fraudulent; but it was by no means conclusive.

3. The findings of the trial court are sustained by the evidence.

Action in the district court for Meeker county to determine adverse claims to real estate. The case was tried before Powers, J., who made findings of fact and as conclusion of law found that defendant was the owner of the land subject to plaintiff's right of redemption. From the judgment entered in pursuance of the findings, plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.

M. C. Brady, H. S. McMonagle, and John J. McHale, for appellant. W. A. McDowell and Lewis E. Jones, for respondent.

START, C. J.

This action was commenced in the district court of the county of Meeker by Charlotte A. Quinn, as plaintiff, against the Minneapolis Threshing Machine Company, to determine adverse claims to real estate. After issue was joined, and before the trial of the action, the plaintiff died intestate, and the administrator of her estate, Owen Quinn, the present plaintiff, by order of the court made upon his motion, the defendant opposing, was substituted as plaintiff in this action in place of the original plaintiff and authorized to prosecute the action as such administrator. In his supplemental complaint the administrator alleged that he was in the exclusive possession of the land.

The cause was tried by the court without a jury, the plaintiff appearing and taking part therein, and thereupon the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect following: The original plaintiff, Charlotte A. Quinn, and John Quinn, were husband and wife, and on November 29, 1902, he owned the land in question, and they conveyed it by quitclaim deed to his sister, Rosa A. Johnson, who at the same time and as a part of the same transaction conveyed the land to Mrs. Quinn. Each of the conveyances were made without consideration and with the intent of all the parties thereto to hinder and defraud the defendant, who was then a creditor of John Quinn

102 M.-17

to the amount of $1,005 for a threshing rig purchased by him of it in August, 1902. The defendant recovered, in the district court of Meeker county, judgment against John Quinn, which was duly docketed in the proper county on October 14, 1903, for a part of such indebtedness. Execution was duly issued thereon, and the land by virtue thereof was duly sold to the defendant for the sum of $143.45 on January 25, 1904. On October 28, 1903, John Quinn filed his petition in bankruptcy in the proper court, was adjudged a bankrupt, and thereafter, and on December 26, 1903, he was discharged by order of the court from all of his provable debts and claims which existed at the date of filing his petition. He was not insolvent until October 28, 1903. The court found as conclusions of law that the discharge in bankruptcy of John Quinn did not discharge the lien of the defendant's judgment, that the defendant is the owner of the land subject to the plaintiff's right of redemption from the execution sale, and that judgment be entered accordingly. It was so entered, and the plaintiff appealed from the judgment.

The plaintiff here urges two general propositions: (a) That the trial court had no jurisdiction to substitute the appellant as plaintiff in place of his intestate, or to make findings of fact or order for judgment or grant the defendant affirmative relief. (b) The findings of fact are not sustained by the evidence.

1. There is no merit in the appellant's first claim. The appellant, as administrator, was in possession of the land and on his own motion, but against the objection of the defendant, he was substituted as plaintiff in the action, and prosecuted it to judgment, and thereby compelled the defendant to engage in expensive litigation with him. Now, because the result was unfavorable to him, he faces about and claims that the whole litigation was a moot case. This he cannot do, if the court had, or under any state of facts might have had, jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action and of the parties; for a party cannot be heard to allege, on appeal, error in the decision or ruling of the trial court which he invited or procured to be made. 2 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 519; 2 Cyc. 650. The court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action and of the parties. The plaintiff, as administrator,

was substituted as plaintiff in place of the deceased plaintiff, and he was not only a proper, but a necessary, party, for he was in the exclusive possession of the land. Paine v. First Div. St. P. & Pac. R. Co., 14 Minn. 49 (65) ; G. S. 1894, § 4497; R. L. 1905, § 3705. Whether it was necessary, in order to bind the heirs at law by the judgment, to make them also parties to the action, is a question not involved in this appeal, and we do not consider it.

2. The assignments of error relating to the findings of fact made by the trial court are to the effect that the findings therein referred to are not supported by the evidence. If the finding that the conveyance of the land to Charlotte A. Quinn by her husband, John Quinn, through the instrumentality of Rosa A. Johnson, was made with the intent to defraud his creditors, of whom the defendant then was one, is sustained by the evidence, it follows that the other findings complained of are also sustained by the evidence. The pivotal question, then, is whether the finding as to the fraudulent character of the conveyance is sustained by the evidence.

Counsel for appellant, in discussing this question, attaches controling importance to the fact that the grantor, John Quinn, was solvent at the time the land was transferred to his wife. Whether he was then solvent or insolvent was an important item of evidence, for a solvent debtor is less likely to make a fraudulent disposition of his property than an insolvent one. Such evidence, however, is by no means conclusive. Walkow v. Kingsley, 45 Minn. 283, 47 N. W. 807.

The evidence fully sustains the conclusion that the deed of the land from John Quinn and wife to his sister and the deed from her to Mrs. Quinn were one transaction, the purpose of which was to transfer the title of the land from the husband to his wife. The plaintiff, as the representative of the wife, made no attempt at any time on the trial to show the bona fides of the transaction, but rested his case solely upon the deeds in question. The statute charged Mrs. Quinn with notice. of her husband's debts. G. S. 1894, § 5534; R. L. 1905, § 3609. The defendant introduced evidence tending to show that the deeds were without consideration and fraudulent. The plaintiff called John Quinn, the grantor, in rebuttal, and examined him with reference to his bank

ruptcy; but he was not examined as to the transaction here in question, and he gave no testimony whatever touching the matter. Upon the whole record we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the finding of the trial court, to the effect that the conveyance from Quinn to his wife was made to defraud creditors, is amply sustained by the evidence. See Minneapolis Stockyards & Packing Co. v. Halonen, 56 Minn. 469, 57 N. W. 1135, and Shea v. Hynes, 89 Minn. 423, 95 N. W. 214. Judgment affirmed.

JOHN A. TODD v. WILLIAM J. BETTINGEN.1

Amendments to Pleadings.

November 15, 1907.

Nos. 15,273-(94).2

Liberality in allowing amendments to pleadings is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, decreases as it progresses, and changes to a strictness ordinarily amounting to a prohibition after the matters litigated have received the normally final sanction of an adjudication by the trial court, affirmed on appeal by the court of last resort.

Same-After Affirmance upon Appeal.

When that affirmance is of the trial court's order for judgment, it ordinarily amounts to a direction not to proceed to a determination, as in case of reversal on appeal, but to enter the judgment affirmed. After such affirmance amendments to the pleading which involve a new trial should not be allowed, except possibly in extraordinary cases, and then only when the proposed amendment sets forth, clearly and distinctly, a basis for relief which has not before been presented for judicial determination.

Same.

Plaintiff's original complaint, in an action begun in February, 1903, set forth facts without separate statement of causes of action, and sought different kinds of both equitable and legal relief. Upon demurrer, plaintiff amended. After issues had been joined, the trial court placed the cause on the jury calendar. Plaintiff again amended. Subsequently the

1 Reported in 113 N. W. 906.

2 April, 1907, term.

court, on motion, amended the complaint. On trial, the court directed a verdict for defendant. On appeal from an order denying a new trial, its conclusions were affirmed, viz., that the pleadings and the course of trial determined the action to be one at law to recover damages for the breach of a written contract void under the statute of frauds. The case was remanded. In November, 1906, the trial court allowed amendments which set forth a cause of action in assumpsit or in conversion, and granted a new trial. It is held that the case was not shown to have been within any possible exception to the normal rule prohibiting such an amendment at the time in question.

Appeal.

Pursuant to an order of the trial court allowing an amendment, plaintiff paid defendant $150 when the amended complaint was served. That sum was retained. Plaintiff made no motion on the first day of the term to strike from the calendar, or to affirm, or to dismiss, but, on the contrary, in many ways actively acquiesced in the appeal. It is held that defendant was not prevented from prosecuting his appeal.

Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $4,000 for the breach of a contract. The report on the former appeal will be found in 98 Minn. 170. From an order, F. V. Brown, J., granting plaintiff's motion to amend and supplement his amended complaint and for a new trial upon the framing of such issues as should be made upon such amended complaint, defendant appealed. Reversed. Harris Richardson and Harold C. Kerr, for appellant. Wilson & Mercer, for respondent.

JAGGARD, J.

Plaintiff's original complaint set forth facts without separate statements of causes of action, and sought different kinds of both equitable and legal relief. The trial court, after argument, placed the cause upon the jury calendar. On trial a jury was called. Having heard the testimony, the court disposed of the controversy as a matter of law and directed a verdict for the defendant. It subsequently denied. plaintiff's alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. From that order an appeal was taken to this court, which sustained the view of the trial judge that the pleadings and the course of trial determined the action to have been one at law