EVIDENCE-Continued.

of the brother's children to inherit from the declarant. Wise v. Wynn
(Miss.), 381.

3. Deposition - disqualification of deponent by infamy.] The deposition of
a witness, taken after indictment for forgery but before trial therefor,
he having been subsequently convicted thereof, is incompetent by reason of
the infamy of the deponent. Webster v. Mann (Tex.), 688.

1. Expert-human hair.] An expert witness, who has made a study of hu-
man hair, on being shown hair from the head of the victim of a murder,
and hair found with blood on it on a wheelbarrow belonging to the ac-
cused, may not be permitted to give his opinion, founded only on the or.
dinary appearance of the hair, that the two were from the same head.
Knoll v. State (Wis.), 704.

5. Former testimony of witness become insane.] On a second trial of felony
the testimony given on the former trial by a witness who has since be
come insane may be read in evidence. Marler v. State (Ala.), 95.

6. Of good character, in civil action.] In an action by a mortgagee of per-
sonal property to recover possession thereof, the mortgage being assailed
as fraudulent as against creditors of the mortgagor, evidence of the plaint-
iff's good character and reputation for honesty and fair dealing is inad
missible. Simpson v. Westenberger (Kans.), 195.

7. Market values - newspaper reports.] A witness is incompetent to testify
in North Carolina to market values at Boston, Mass., when his knowledge
is exclusively derived from market reports in a newspaper published in
North Carolina. Fairley v. Smith (N. C.), 522.

8. Parol, of custom, to explain contract.] In an action upon a contract to
pay eight dollars per thousand for brick in the wall," evidence of cus-
tom to ascertain the number by measurement rather than by count, is
inadmissible. Sweeney v. Thomason (Lea), 676.

9. Presumption — of death.] Where an unmarried man has been absent and
not heard from for more than twenty-five years, it may be presumed that
he died within the first seven years of his absence, and without issue.
Shown v. Mc Mackin (Lea), 680.

10. Scientific books.] Reading medical books to the jury is error. People v.
Hall (Mich.), 477.

See CONTRACT, 142; MARRIAGE 263, 605; SURETY, 753.

FIXTURES.

Machinery.] Heavy machines in a factory, steadied by being screwed to
the floor, and connected with the shafting, but removable without injury
to the building, and useful elsewhere, are not fixtures within a mortgage
of the land. Hubbell v. East Cambridge Five Cents Savings Bank (Mass.),
446.

FORMER ADJUDICATION.
See BAR, 271.

FRAUD.

1. Constructive-gift to confidential friend.] An unmarried woman, seventy
years old, feeble and deaf, deeded a considerable part of her property,
twelve days before her death, to a young unmarried man, in whose family
she was living, to whom she was strongly attached, and who had actes
as her agent in a few instances. The deed was drawn by an attorney un-
der her direction, and was executed in the grantee's presence, after she
had read and understood it. She had previously executed a will bestow-
ing the same property on charities. No coercion being shown, held, that
the deed should not be set aside for constructive fraud on account of the
relations of the parties. Pressley v. Kemp (S. C.), 635.

2. Sale

--

intention not to pay.] Where one knowing himself insolvent buys
goods, secretly intending not to pay for them, the vendor, ignorant thereof,
may rescind the sale. Oswego Starch Factory v. Lendrum (Iowa), 53.
In ante-nuptial conveyance.] See MARRIAGE, 39.

See MARRIAGE, 650.

GIFT.

Receipt on account of mortgage debt.] A father, holding a mortgage
against his son, and intending to make him a gift, executed and deliv-
ered to him a receipt for a portion of the debt, providing that the amount
should be indorsed on the mortgage. Held, a valid gift of so much, al-
though the indorsement was never made. Carpenter v. Soule (N. Y.), 248.

GRAND JURY.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 203.

HIGHWAY.

See NEGLIGENCE, 485.

HOMICIDE.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 5.

IMPEACHMENT.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 135.

IMPROVEMENTS.

After ruit. See TRESPASS, 691.

VOL. XLII— 103

INDORSER

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, 409.

INFANCY.

Infant wife's release of dower.] An infant wife is not bound by her re-
lease of dower, although she declared herself of age to the acknowl
edging officer, and may maintain a suit to avoid within a reasonable time
after the death of her husband. Watson v. Billings (Ark.), 1.

See NEGLIGENCE, 418, 508; Parent and Child, 532.

INJUNCTION.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 90; NUISANCE, 182, 534; WATERCOURSE, 112.

INSANITY.

Civil liability of lunatic for condition of realty.] A lunatic is liable in
damages for injury produced by the defective condition of his real estate,
not exclusively occupied and controlled by a tenant.
(Mass.), 423.

See CONTRACT, 142.

INSURANCE.

Morain v. Dealin

1. Father for children -- assignment.] A policy procured by one on his own
life for the benefit of his wife and children is not assignable by him during
the life of any of the beneficiaries. Robinson v. Duvall (Ky.), 208.

2. Goods sold but not delivered — delivery.] The defendant warehousemen
had fire insurance on leaf tobacco by them "owned, or held in trust or
on commission, or sold and not delivered." The plaintiff bought of
them twenty-five particular hogsheads of tobacco, but removed but five,
and the rest were destroyed with the warehouse by fire. The defendants
also lost tobacco of their own exceeding in value the whole insurance.
Held, that the goods had been sold and delivered, and the plaintiff could
not recover any of the insurance. Lockhart v. Cooper (N. C.), 514.
3. Limitation of action - when action barred.] A fire insurance policy lim-
ited the time for suing upon it to a "term of twelve months next after the
1oss or damage shall occur." Held, that this term did not begin to run
until twelve months after the loss became payable by the terms of the
policy. Steen v. Niagara Fire Insurance Company (N. Y.), 297.

waiver - estoppel.] A fire insurance policy provided that no suit
should be maintained on it unless commenced within six months after
loss, and that no waiver of any condition should be effectual unless in
writing and signed by the president and secretary. In a suit commenced
after such limited time, held, that the insurance company was not es-
topped from setting up that defense by the fact that the insured had
been induced to delay suit by the representations of the company's gen-
eral agent that it was unnecessary to sue and that the company would
make assessments and pay without suit. Waynesboro Mutual Fire Insur-
ance Company v. Conover (Penn.), 618.

INSURANCE - Continued.

5. Loss payable to mortgagee — action how brought.] On an insurance
policy issued to A., “loss if any payable to B., mortgagee,” A. may main-
tain an action by the express written consent of B. Coates v. Pennsyl-
vania Fire Insurance Company (Md.), 327.

6. Proximate and remote cause.] By a collision between steamboats a fire
was caused on one of them, and it sank, with insured goods on board, be-
fore the goods were touched by the fire. Held, that if the injury to the
goods could have been prevented but for the fire, an action on the insur-
ance policy was maintainable. New York and Boston Despatch Express
Company v. Traders and Mechanics' Insurance Company (Mass.), 440.

INTEREST.

After maturity.] A sealed note payable twelve months after date," with in
terest at twelve and a half per cent per annum, interest payable annually,"
and described in a contemporaneous mortgage executed to secure it, as a
note, with interest thereon at the rate of twelve and a half per cent per
annum till paid," draws the same rate of interest after maturity as be-
fore. Mobley v. Davega (S. C.), 632.

JUDGE.

Civil liability for act in excess of jurisdiction.] A judge of an inferior
court, having jurisdiction of the subject-matter of an action, but failing
to acquire jurisdiction of the person, by reason of defective service of the
process, is not liable in a civil action of damages, in the absence of proof
of willful or corrupt motives. McCall v. Cohen (S. C.), 641.

JURISDICTION.

See BANKRUPTCY, 45.

JURY.

Not understanding English.] A juror may be excluded on the ground that
he does not adequately understand English, at the discretion of the
trial judge. Sutton v. Fox (Wis.), 744.
Demand of trial by.] See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 438.

LACHES.

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT, 250.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. Damage to one tenant by negligence of another in use of bath-room ac-
cessible to landlord.] A landlord rented a room on the fifth floor of a
building, with a bath-room and water-closet appurtenant thereto, and ap-
purtenant also to another room, which remained in the landlord's control.
Injury occurred to lower tenants by the careless use of the bath-room.
Held, that the landlord was liable therefor, although not personally neg-
ligent. Jones v. Friedenburg (Ga.), 86.

LANDLORD AND TENANT — Continued.

2. Trespass by a stranger -- liability of lessor.] In absence of express

stipulation, the lessor impliedly covenants that the demised premises
shall be open to entry by che lessee, at the time fixed for taking posses-
sion, but the lessor is not liable for a trespass or a withholding of the
premises by a stranger entering afterward. King v. Reynolds (Ala.), 107.

LARCENY.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 338.

LEASE.

See LANDLORD AND TENANT.

LIBEL.

Of attorney-charge of abandoning cause.] It is libellous to publish of an
attorney for a city that he abandoned his client's cause by resigning his
office in the midst of a litigation brought on by his advice, to the detri
ment of his client. Hetherington v. Sterry (Kans.), 169.

By corporation.] See CORPORATION, 379.

LIEN.

See AGISTER, 158.

LIMITATION.

Statute of-part payment.] Where the maker of a note has placed per.
sonal property in the hands of the payee as collateral security, the
payee's application thereof, without notice to the debtor and his assent,
will not constitute a payment warranting the inference of a new promise
Brown v. Latham (N. H.), 568.

Extension of time for criminal prosecution.] See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
554.

Probable cause

-

See INSURANCE, 297, 618.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.

acquittal.] Acquittal of a criminal charge is no evidence of
want of probable cause, in an action for malicious prosecution. Bitting
v. Ten Eyck (Ind.), 505.

See CORPORATION, 413.

MARRIAGE.

1. Ante-nuptial agreement-specific performance.] There was an ante-nuptial
agreement that if the wife would take a farm on which she held a mort-
gage, and the husband would carry it on, she would contribute the products
to the support of herself and the family during marriage. The agreement
was carried out for more than two years, and the husband made valu-
able improvements at his own expense. The wife then conveyed the farm
to a third, who knew of the agreement, in violation of the husband's rights.