A careful comparison of the advantages offered by these two waterways led the commission into a close examination of the rights and privileges owned under franchises by the various canal companies interested in Central America. All such franchises of course stood directly in the way of the government undertaking the construction as a national project. The report concludes as follows:

"1. The estimated cost of building the Nicaragua Canal is about $58,000,000 more than that of completing the Panama Canal, leaving out the cost of acquiring the latter property. This measures the difference in the magnitude of the obstacles to be overcome in the acutal construction of the two canals, and covers all physical considerations, such as the greater or less height of dams, the greater of less depth of cuts, the presence or absence of natural harbors, the presence or absence of a railroad, the exemption from or liability to disease, and the amount of work remaining to be done.

"The New Panama Canal Company has shown no disposition to sell its property to the United States. Should that company be able and willing to sell, there is reason to believe that the price would not be such as would make the total cost to the United States less than that of the Nicaragua Canal.

“2. The Panama Canal, after completion, would be shorter, have fewer locks and less curvature than the Nicaragua Canal. The measure of these advantages is the time required for a vessel to pass through, which is estimated for an average ship at twelve hours for Panama and thirty-three hours for Nicaragua.

"On the other hand, the distance from San Francisco to New York is 377 miles, to New Orleans 579 miles, and to Liverpool 386 miles greater via Panama than via Nicaragua. The time required to pass over these distances being greater than the difference in the time of transit through the canals, the Nicaragua line, after completion, would be somewhat the more advantageous of the two to the United States, notwithstanding the greater cost of maintaining the longer canal.

"3. The Government of Colombia, in which lies the Panama Canal, has granted an exclusive concession, which still has many years to run. It is not free to grant the necessary rights to the United States, except upon condition that an agreement be reached with the New Panama Canal ComThe commission believes that such agreement is pany. impracticable. So far as can be ascertained, the company is not willing to sell its franchise, but it will allow the United States to become the owner of part of its stock. The commission considers such an arrangement inadmissible.

"The Governments of Nicaragua and Costa Rica, on the other hand, are untrammelled by concessions and are free to grant to the United States such privileges as may be mutually agreed upon."

And the report in conclusion says:

"In view of all the facts, and particularly in view of all the difficulties of obtaining the necessary rights, privileges, and franchises on the Panama route, and assuming that Nicaragua and Costa Rica recognize the value of the canal to themselves, and are prepared to grant concessions on terms which are reasonable and acceptable to the United States, the commission is of the opinion that the most practicable and feasible route for' an isthmian canal to be under the control, management, and ownership of the United States' is that known as the Nicaragua route."

The report, being so thoroughly in accord with the established American preference for the Nicaragua route, gave great satisfaction. The character and ability of the commissioners and the thoroughness of their investigations have no doubt settled for all time the choice of routes. The field is clear in Nicaragua, the concessionary companies have been disposed of, and, with abundant means in the Treasury and popular favor to hasten the consummation of the project, there remains but one obstacle to postpone or defeat the undertaking. That obstacle is the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Soon after the convening of Congress in December 1900,

the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was called up for consideration, and for some days the Senate in executive session considered the adoption of the Davis amendment, along with numerous other amendatory clauses offered by various senators. The Davis amendment was agreed to on December 13 (65 to 17), a clause which, as already shown (p. 170), completely transformed the character and purpose of the treaty. On December 20, two additional amendments presented by Senator Foraker were adopted. One of these consisted of the insertion of the words "which convention is hereby superseded," just after the words "Clayton-Bulwer Convention," in the second article of the instrument. The second amendment provided for striking out the entire third article of the convention, which abandoned article had called upon the parties to bring the convention to the notice of the other powers, and to invite them to adhere to it.

The ratification of the treaty so amended by the Senate. took place the same day (December 20, 1900), and the instrument was immediately returned to the President for delivery to Lord Pauncefote.

As the treaty now stands, it is virtually a compromise between absolute neutralization and complete American control. It provides for the construction of the route as a purely American project under the auspices of the government, and gives to the government full management of the waterway, the fixing of tolls, etc. The "neutralization" of the route is then effected, so far as the two powers concerned are able to guarantee its neutralization. It shall be open in time of war as in time of peace to all vessels of all nations, without discrimination, save when there is war against the United States; then the United States may take such measures as it may find necessary to protect itself, even to the closing of the canal against the vessels of the enemy. This reservation of course defeats the absolute neutrality of the route, and the denial of the rights of the other great powers to coöperate in such a guarantee also removes the canal from the class of neutralized waters. Should Great Britain decide to ratify the treaty as already accepted by the Senate, the status of the

Nicaragua Canal would be that of a private waterway, with provisons, however, relating to its control, which give to it the semblance of a neutralized channel.1

VII

The "Canal question" involves three sets of problems, all of which call for definite solution before the actual work of excavation shall begin. These problems relate, first, to the physical features of the undertaking and its cost; second, to its commercial aspects and probable value to the United States; and third, to the political status of the waterway-in other words, shall it be controlled by the United States alone, or shall it be neutralized by common consent of all nations? These three questions are of paramount importance.

1. To the first of these questions (the engineering features and cost), much attention has already been given. It may be assumed that reasonably correct estimates have been made by the United States Government through the exhaustive researches of its recently appointed scientific commissions. The civil engineer and the geologist are enabled to base their calculations upon actual facts; with the utmost precision they have measured the amount of earth to be removed; they have ascertained the hardness of rock to be encountered, and have probed the underlying strata to great depths with a view of obtaining a perfect knowledge of their character. The water-levels of the lakes and rivers have been accurately measured, and the most advantageous sites for dams and locks have been located. The harbors have been sounded, and their approaches most carefully studied. From the engineer's standpoint, then, the problem has already been solved. The conclusions are definite, and the Nicaraguan Canal is beyond all doubt a physical possibility.

In so far as it is possible to compute the cost of so gigantic an enterprise, this has also been calculated. It is true that these estimates vary, yet their differences are not discouragingly great. The most expensive of them all in no way

1 Great Britain declined to accept the treaty as amended.

removes the undertaking from the limits of a financial possibility. The last phase of the problem connected with the physical aspects of canal construction relates to the choice of routes. This has been narrowed down to Panama and Nicaragua. It was the chief object of the last isthmian commission, which has already submitted its preliminary report, to make a final selection. American preference has so long inclined toward the completion of the latter route, that the adoption of the other is extremely unlikely; however, in case of any future change of sentiment to Panama, the physical features of that route have been as thoroughly investigated, and its feasibility equally demonstrated.

2. The second class of considerations involves the commercial aspects of the proposed route, Will it pay? This feature of the canal question has perhaps been too little considered. The people of the United States have been rather inclined to assume that so splendid a triumph of engineering science must surely receive the reward of commercial success; and for proof of this, the satisfactory earnings of the Suez Canal have been offered in evidence. The contemplation of huge enterprises affects the mind somewhat after the manner of wine, and care should be taken lest the splendor of achievement shall dim the judgment. It must be borne in mind that ships follow the shortest and best routes, and that freight seeks the cheapest highways. It should be noted that the Nicaraguan Canal does not furnish the shortest route from New York to the Philippines, nor from the ports of China and the East Indies to London or New York; the fact must also be considered that the Suez route offers greater inducements to steam vessels in the way of coaling stations and shorter laps between ports.

Again, the five competing railroad systems across the continent of North America have so reduced the freight rates in the last fifteen years that assertion has been frequently made, if not thoroughly proved, that any all-water route from the Pacific to the Atlantic coasts cannot compete with the allrail routes. The products of the Pacific slope which would have to be shipped first by rail to the coast and then trans

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