Was the United States

the Monroe Doctrine be examined. threatened from abroad in 1823? If so, do the dangers which threatened the United States in 1823, and called into being the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, threaten the country now? Would a new colony of European origin in South America be a menace to the best interests of the United States to-day? If a doctrine that found its origin in a genuine call for self-preservation is no longer upheld and sustained by that necessity, is its continuance as a national policy longer justified?

The widest divergence of opinion is to be found in the United States upon this subject, no two writers to-day agreeing precisely upon the propriety, the wisdom, or the value of the Monroe Doctrine as a defensive measure. Indeed, all phases of the doctrine, from its alleged origin in the political conditions of our earlier national existence, its authorship, its applications, in fact, its very meaning, have furnished ground for endless discussion. Suffice it to say, the principles involved grew out of certain conditions of our national growth, and the doctrine was then invoked as a defensive measure to meet what seemed to be a menace to our institutions. That which sprang out of an emergency has become a vital principle in the foreign policy of the United States; indeed, it seems to have become a sort of fetish for national worship, the ignis fatuus of American politics. Created as it was to meet the exigencies of the time, it has been expanded into a national determination that the new world. must be kept sacred from all European colonization or use. In the course of changing administrations, and with the consequent changes of opinion at the White House and the Capitol, the doctrine has too often been distorted from its original meaning, and sometimes used to serve the ends of party warfare. It has been quoted as authority for constituting the United States Government the guardian and protector of all the nations of the American continents. By some it is limited to defensive measures; by others its interpretation. would justify all sorts of forcible aggression. From a mere right to protect ourselves, the Monroe Doctrine has been

converted into a right to annex Cuba and any other of the West India Islands. In it is found the right to construct the Nicaragua Canal on foreign soil, and subject its shores to American jurisdiction; for, by seizing and controlling these outposts, and, in fact, all other contiguous or adjacent lands, it is urged that the United States would be following a consistent policy of self-defence. There is a danger that the more powerful and formidable the United States becomes, and the more grasping and insatiate its policy of expansion, the more unrestrained will become the Monroe Doctrine. It may, in time, be too frequently construed to justify acts which never entered the conceptions of its author.

I

A clearer understanding of the principles embodied in the Monroe Doctrine may be obtained by glancing at a few incidents in the history of our foreign relations from the ending of the Revolutionary War (1783), to the close of President Monroe's administration (1824).

Although the Monroe Doctrine itself, as announced in 1823, was ostensibly a defensive measure against the threatened aggressions of a powerful European alliance, there can be no doubt that it was also the announcement of a general policy that had been gradually forming in the American mind for a number of years. This sentiment was the natural outgrowth of the antagonism between the principles of democratic government, as adopted in the United States, and the opposing doctrines of monarchical government, which obtained upon the continent of Europe.

When the Revolutionary struggle was over, and England had acknowledged the independence of the United States (treaty November 30, 1783), the newly created nation was exhausted and disorganized; its resources were small, and the country was great only in its future possibilities. The territory it occupied was a mere strip along the eastern coast of the vast and little-known American continent. On its entire northern frontier lay English colonies that

were more than passively unfriendly; British fortifications and hostile Indians along the lakes and upper Ohio River impeded expansion to the west. On the south and the southwest, France and Spain overshadowed the pioneer republic in extensive domain.

Under these conditions, the earlier American statesmen were tempted to profit by the rivalries of European nations, and thus obtain by foreign alliances, the strength necessary to carry the republic through the critical period of infancy. A single venture in this direction (the treaty with France, of 1778) taught the fathers a useful lesson. It was but a few years later that France, finding herself involved in war with Great Britain, promptly called upon the United States to fulfil her treaty obligations. This the United States was unable to do. To invite another war with England would have been suicidal; to remain neutral was to offend France. In either case, the legitimate result of meddling in the affairs of Europe seemed to be war; and although actual war was in this instance avoided, a bitter party-spirit, aroused by French sympathizers, produced dissensions threatening the peace of the nation. From the first, however, the wiser statesmen of the period realized not merely the advisability, but the necessity, of holding aloof from all foreign entanglements. This sound principle found its best expression in Washington's farewell address, and long continued to be the watchword of succeeding administrations, and the cornerstone of the nation's foreign policy. Each President in turn guarded this vital principle of non-intervention, and the young nation greatly prospered in its career, paying no tribute to the demands of needless war. Underlying the reasons usually given for maintaining an isolated political position in the world, namely, the weakness of the country, and its physical inability to cope with the older European nations, a subtle motive is easily traced. It was felt that the system of popular government inaugurated by the United States would be watched with some apprehension by the crowned heads of Europe. If the experiment in constitutional government should prove successful, its effect on

European forms of government was obvious. Indeed, in some of the European nations a decided hostility had already been manifested against tyrannical institutions. The belief that absolutism was divinely ordained, or that it represented the best form of government, was being rudely shaken throughout Europe. Royalty was naturally suspicious of all movements toward popular institutions, and the fear that monarchical Europe would regard somewhat sullenly the success of democracy in America, was not unreasonable. Here, then, was a source of danger to be guarded against; the liberty so dearly bought was truly worth the price of eternal vigilance.

A double peril was therefore presented to the struggling young nation at the very beginning: First, the danger of being tempted into unfortunate alliances with stronger powers; and secondly, that of unprovoked attack by the forces of monarchical government from purely political motives. In those days royalty commanded stronger armies and navies than the United States could possibly support. The ideas of popular sovereignty and the divine right of kings were essentially antagonistic; and the notion that the crowned heads of the old world might seek to strangle the infant giant of the new, was not altogether unreasonable.

Mr. Jefferson expressed this apprehension as early as 1785, when he wrote to Monroe from Paris, urging him to add his "testimony to that of every thinking American, in order to satisfy our countrymen how much it is in their interest to preserve uninfected by contagion those peculiarities in their government and manners to which they are indebted for those blessings." In his second annual address of December, 1798, John Adams said:

To the usual subjects of gratitude I cannot omit to add one of the first importance to our well being and safety; I mean that spirit which has arisen in our country against the menaces and aggression of a foreign nation. A manly sense of national honor, dignity, and independence has appeared which, if encouraged and invigorated by every branch of the government, will enable us to view undismayed the enterprises of any foreign power and become the sure foundation of national prosperity and glory.

But it was Jefferson who grasped the idea of foreign antipathy more definitely, perhaps, than had any of his contemporaries. Although a strict constructionist, he violated his convictions of constitutional interpretation and purchased the Louisiana territory to keep it out of the hands of France or England, either of which he regarded as a dangerous neighbor. "Previous, however, to this period," he urged upon a hesitating Congress "we had not been unaware of the danger to which our peace would be perpetually exposed whilst so important a key to the commerce of the Western country remained under foreign power." This sudden, acquisition of a large contiguous territory, bringing into the nation an empire to be settled and prepared for statehood, strengthened the bonds of the federation, and gave fresh vigor to the Republic. It also furnished additional reason for the strict observance of the principles of non-interference, and for redoubled watchfulness against all manner of foreign aggression. With new cares and responsibilities, these principles developed still more rapidly, and found final expression in President Monroe's famous message twenty years later.

The purchase of Louisiana gave to the United States a color of title to the Spanish province of West Florida, and existing conditions at home and in Spain made it likely that the United States could acquire this valuable strip of coast land. The title in question was perhaps less complete than the determination to secure it; for after a proclamation to the effect that the United States would hold the territory pending future settlement, President Madison addressed the Senate, January 3, 1811, as follows:

Taking into view the tenor of these several communications, the posture of things with which they are connected, the intimate relation of the country adjoining the United States eastward of the river Perdido to their security and tranquillity, and the peculiar interest they otherwise have in its destiny, I recommend to the consideration of Congress the seasonableness of a declaration that the United States could not see without serious inquietude any part of a neighboring territory in which they have in differ