by their anti-liberal doctrines, declared they would never recognize the seceded colonies until Spain herself had done so.

English sentiment had not yielded to the principles of the allies. The notions of divine right were distasteful to a people who had prospered for centuries under constitutional government, and the principle of forcible intervention adopted by the allies seemed to the English ministry to be wholly improper. In the course adopted by the allies toward the revolutionary movements in Italy, England had no interests directly affected, but she had nevertheless protested against the unwarrantable interference of the powers in the affairs of Naples. But in the proposed movement against liberalism in Spain, to be discussed by the allied agents of the powers at Verona, England had a more direct and more substantial interest.

In earlier days, Spain's economic policy with her transatlantic colonies had been a rigidly exclusive one, but during their revolt, many of the tightly drawn commercial lines had been cut, and old barriers of trade broken down. English merchants had greatly profited thereby, and within a few years they had built up a large and growing trade in South America and the West Indies. In a continuance of these favorable conditions lay the motive of England's action. At the time of the meeting of the allies at Verona, the statesmen of England had about decided to send commercial agents, if not consular representatives, to the larger cities of South America - a course of action which ill accorded with the policy of the allies toward South America. England was not prepared, on the other hand, to go to the extremity of recognizing the independence of the new states at once, as the United States had done the previous year; yet to prevent a revival of commercial exclusion in the Spanish colonies, England was willing to take decided action. England believed that if Spain could subdue her rebellious colonies, she would be compelled at last to grant them commercial freedom; yet influenced by representations and petitions of her own commercial classes, England was perfectly willing to

see the colonists secure their independence, in the belief that political relations could be equally well established with them.

"Again the English had," wrote M. Beaumarchais, author of "La Doctrine de Monroe" (p. 6), "the rare good fortune of finding their own particular interests conform to the noble cause of liberty, and they furthered well their real purposes by posing before Europe, either hesitating or hostile, as disinterested champions of Justice and Right.”

Lord Castlereagh, the Prime Minister, was chosen to represent England at the Congress of Verona, and the ambassador drew his own instructions, which were to oppose strenuously any proposed intervention in Spanish affairs. He further instructed himself to make known the intention of his country to follow her own commercial interests by sending diplomatic agents to South America.

The death of Castlereagh, before the meeting of the allies, brought Mr. Canning forward as Prime Minister, and he appointed the Duke of Wellington in Castlereagh's place to represent England at the Congress. At Verona the allies signed a secret treaty (November 22, 1822) to which only the names of Metternich, Chateaubriand, Bernstet (Prussia) and Nesselrode appear. The first two articles of this instrument are of especial interest.

The undersigned, specially authorized to make some additions. to the treaty of the Holy Alliance, after having exchanged their respective credentials, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I. The high contracting powers, being convinced that the system of representative government is equally as incompatible with the monarchical principles as the maxim of the sovereignty of the people with the divine right, engage mutually, in the most solemn manner, to use all their efforts to put an end to the system of representative governments, in whatever country it may exist in Europe, and to prevent its being introduced in those countries where it is not yet known.

ARTICLE II. As it cannot be doubted that the liberty of the press is the most powerful means used by the pretended supporters of the rights of nations, to the detriment of those Princes, the high contracting parties promise reciprocally to adopt all proper measures to suppress it, not only in their own states, but also in the rest of Europe.

It will be noted that in this treaty of November 22, 1822, in which England took no part, the allies, “make some additions to the Treaty of the Holy Alliance." Thus it appears how these four powers (the original Quadruple Alliance), by assuming to amend a treaty not originally of their own making, had appropriated to themselves the title and doctrines of the former Holy Alliance. One important step was taken at Verona. The Congress adjourned with the understanding that France, in the name of the Holy allies, should send an army into Spain, "to put an end to the system of representative government" which was struggling for existence beyond the Pyrenees. A French army, under the Duc d'Angoulême, crossed the frontier, and after a feeble resistance from the revolutionists, restored Ferdinand to a despotic throne (April, 1822). The next step of the allies seemed to be reasonably certain, - a movement against South American revolutionists. Their efforts against liberalism in Europe had been eminently successful, as demonstrated in Naples, in Sicily, in Piedmont, and lastly in Spain. Ferdinand, having been reinstated upon his throne, beggedlustily for help to subjugate his colonies, both in the interest of Spain and in the cause of absolutism. The advisability of taking such a step had already been broached at Vienna, and freely discussed at Verona. Reports of these contemplated movements in the Americas had reached Washington, and had impressed the administration with a deep feeling of concern. It was feared that France might demand Cuba as a price for restoring Ferdinand, and it was quite certain, that if the allies did interfere in America, the newly created republics would inevitably fall into the hands of the more powerful European nations. In order to determine upon a course of action relative to Spain's seceding colonies, the allies agreed to meet again in the autumn of 1823. In the meantime, however, the activity of Canning had marshalled the forces that opposed the ideas and projects of the Holy Alliance, and suddenly and unexpectedly to the allies, there came from Washington a warning to stop. As they developed in strength and resources, the people of the United

States had for many years been preparing a mine to be sprung when the proper time came. It was Canning who signalled the danger from abroad; it was Adams who placed the charge in position and adjusted the fuse, and it was Monroe who applied the match. The statement that the United States would resist the advance of the allies into the new world, as hinted in President Monroe's Message of 1823, together with the knowledge that England's sympathy was pledged to the United States, was quite sufficient to check any designs which the Alliance may have devised to stifle the cause of liberalism and constitutional government in the Western Hemisphere.

IV

When Canning became Minister of Foreign Affairs he was perplexed in regard to the proper attitude he should take toward the struggling Spanish-American colonies. England's commercial classes inclined toward the independence of these newly created republics; but true to her conservative notions, as well as to treaty pledges to Spain, England was unprepared, even in her own interest, to welcome immediately the seceded Spanish colonies into the brotherhood of sovereign states. An unwillingness to leap as far as her strength will permit is a characteristic of British foreign relations, yet in this particular instance, a leap too far might have proved a leap into the dark, as the strength of all combined Europe seemed to favor the reduction of Spanish-America in the cause of absolutism; such a political error might have isolated Great Britain. Canning was willing to go much further in this direction than had been his more temporizing predecessor, Lord Castlereagh. He protested vigorously against the proposed interference of Europe in America. He was willing that the new states should remain Spanish or be free, indeed it is said that he almost preferred them to return under a modified Spanish rule; but in order to satisfy the requirements of English commercial interests, they must, under no circumstances, pass

under other European sovereignty. "Neither justice, nor humanity, nor the interests of Europe or of America," he said to Polignac, "allow that the struggle. . . should be taken up afresh by other hands." Again, England was far in advance of continental Europe in the development of constitutional government; having progressed in her ideas favorable to popular suffrage, she too, it may reasonably be inferred, viewed with some disfavor the resubjugation of a people who had practically acquired their emancipation from the tyranny of absolute monarchy. Mr. Canning was, in no sense of the word, an enthusiastic admirer of the people of the United States. From his own writings, expressions are not wanting indicating an actual aversion for the keen, aggressive people across the Atlantic, but in the impending danger that threatened both, the one commercially, the other politically, he turned to the United States. He well knew that the people of the United States sympathized with the Spanish colonies in their struggles for freedom; indeed, they had already recognized several of them as sovereign states. He knew, also, that Americans regarded the advance of despotism and the action of the allies with no little suspicion and disfavor. Why not, therefore, utilize this sentiment to his own advantage? He began his reconnoitering tactics at once by seeking Mr. Rush, the American Minister, in London. On August 16, 1823, while discussing with Mr. Rush matters connected with the northwest boundary of the United States, the conversation drifted into Spanish affairs. Mr. Rush spoke of a recent statement made by Mr. Canning, to the effect that England disclaimed all intention of seizing any Spanish colony, and hoped France entertained no such purpose. Mr. Canning seized the occasion to sound the American Minister as to what he believed the Government of the United States would say to a project of going hand in hand with England in order to prevent France, or the other powers of the alliance, from interfering in Spanish America. Mr. Rush wrote:

He did not think that concert of action would become necessary, fully believing that the simple fact of our two countries