by us. The sentiments and the policy announced by the declaration, thus understood, were, therefore, in strict conformity to our duties and our interest.

In this same debate, James K. Polk, member from Tennessee, declared:

When the message of the late President of the United States was communicated to Congress in 1823, it was viewed, as it should have been, as the mere expression of opinion of the Executive, submitted to the consideration and deliberation of Congress, and designed probably to produce an effect upon the councils of the Holy Alliance, in relation to their supposed intention to interfere in the war between Spain and her former colonies. That effect it probably had an agency in producing; and if so, it has performed its office. The President had no power to bind the nation by such a pledge.

With the close of the year 1826, the Monroe Doctrine is found to be limited by the following qualifications:

1. No future colonization on the Western Hemisphere by the European powers can be permitted to take place. The United States will ask the new Spanish-American republics to adopt this rule so far as their own territory is concerned.

2. The United States shall remain free to adopt any course its honor and policy may dictate touching alliances with foreign nations and touching the practical operation of the Monroe Doctrine.

3. The republics of the New World have a set of primary interests of their own, but the United States will not join with any of them in a declaration against interference from abroad.

In short, therefore, the statesmen of the day believed the primary object of the Monroe Doctrine had been accomplished -the Holy Alliance was dead, and Russia had abandoned her West coast colonization schemes. The measure being protective only, its principles might revive as occasion called them into life; but it was distinctly to be understood that, beyond a point of self-defence, the United States had no

intention of assuming a rôle of guardianship over the Western Hemisphere, nor of constituting herself the protector of South America.

VII. SPANISH AMERICA AND CUBA

From the close of the administration of John Quincy Adams, in 1829, to the beginning of Polk's administration, in 1845, there occurred a series of events connected with Spanish-American interests which apparently called for action on the part of the United States Government involv-, ing the principles of the Monroe Doctrine, but which were, nevertheless, permitted to pass unnoticed. It has been said that during that period the doctrine was dormant. All attempts to secure legislative action upon the subject failed in Congress, and the Monroe Doctrine was remembered only as the policy of a past administration. It was, however, universally endorsed as a good policy to revive, should occasion demand it. In those days the words of President Monroe did not apparently receive the broad interpretation that has been given to them in more recent years. The attitude of the country toward Europe, during this period, was one that would likely have been assumed, even had no Holy Alliance ever threatened to meddle in American affairs, and had no defiant message been sent back across the sea. The position assumed by all those who controlled the foreign policy of the United States was simply one of self-defence, and in the absence of definite threats from abroad, the doctrine was not invoked.

The feelings of cordial sympathy in the United States toward South Americans, which had been so freely extended when those people were struggling for their liberty, sensibly 4 cooled when Spanish America finally succeeded in severing its political relations with Spain. In a very short time the South American states gave evidence of a woful lack of political stability. Any sort of permanent confederation among the various states was soon shown to be impossible. A regular succession of revolutions distressed the land, and

the insatiate cupidity and reckless extravagance of their political leaders augured ill for the perpetuation of republican government in South America.

Although the Monroe Doctrine had been intended by its authors only as a defensive measure for the United States, South Americans clamored for its application whenever they encountered difficulties with Europe. Believing, as they did, that the doctrine was promulgated as much for their benefit as for the North Americans, they loudly denounced the United States as a monster of bad faith, when the latter refused to become a party to their quarrels or declined to give them material aid, or even the full quota of sympathy which they felt to be their due.

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In 1829, the Malavinas Islands (Falklands), which belonged to England, were seized upon by the Buenos Ayrean authorities, who, as successors of Spain, claimed a right to the group. The following year, the attention of the United States was drawn to the fact by the arrest of some North American seal hunters on the Falkland shore. The arrest seemed to be unjustified by the circumstances, the fishermen having merely followed a customary privilege granted by England, and the American sloop of war, the Lexington, not only liberated the prisoners, but in retaliation deported the Buenos Ayrean governor (1831). The English thereupon resumed control, and complaint of the Argentine Republic, that this act involved a gross violation of the Monroe Doctrine never ceased to be pressed in Washington. The United States never admitted a claim for indemnity, and has always maintained that it was no party to the controversy between Buenos Ayres and Great Britain, the rights of the latter having long antedated those of the former in the Falklands. Had the same construction been placed upon the words of President Monroe that has frequently been applied since, President Jackson might well have regarded this incident as one demanding the interference of the United States, at least to the extent of investigating the disputed claims of Great Britain to the Falkland Islands. The executive, however, appears to have

entertained no fears of European colonization in the Western Hemisphere, when located at so distant a point from the United States as the Falkland Islands.

In 1835, Brazil and Buenos Ayres recognized the independence of Uruguay by a treaty made through the mediation of England. Some years later, Buenos Ayres threatened to attack the newly created nation it had so recently recognized, and Brazil called upon Great Britain and France for aid in maintaining the integrity of Uruguay. In answer to this call those two powers established a naval blockade along the coast of Buenos Ayres. The United States having no live interest in the dispute, and feeling itself in no way threatened by such an act of European intervention, refused to interpose. Again the United States was roundly denounced in South America for the abandonment of her principles.

Through her foothold in Central America along the Mosquito coast and in Honduras, England had, for many years, been gradually encroaching upon Nicaragua. Great Britain's claims to territory in Central America dated from the seventeenth century, although some of these claims were judged, in the United States, to be of doubtful origin. Up to 1835, extensions of her Belize boundary lines had been made gradually and noiselessly; but in that year the English made so decided a territorial advance into Honduras and Nicaragua, that the Central American authorities appealed to the United States. President Jackson was reminded that "it had always been the policy of the United States to prevent and resist European settlements in America." General Jackson thought it inexpedient to interfere. From a more modern point of view, he would seem not to have been imbued with the spirit of Monroe's message, for a similar move on the part of Great Britain in Venezuela, in 1896, caused great excitement in the United States, notwithstanding the fact that Venezuela is considerably further removed from the United States than is Nicaragua. Subsequently, however, British territorial advances into Central America have been opposed by the United States, upon the sole ground of

violation of the Monroe Doctrine, but not seriously until the subject of an interoceanic canal had come forward more prominently.

In 1842, and again two years later, England found it necessary to besiege San Juan, for the sake of impressing upon the natives a respect for the validity of her territorial claims. These decidedly aggressive acts were passed unnoticed in Washington.

Other instances might be cited which prove to a certain extent that for a number of years after the famous message had been issued, it was not viewed by contemporary statesmen in the same light in which it is generally regarded to-day. The particular danger against which Mr. Monroe had directed his protest had ceased to exist. Its principles were only to be revived in case such acts of aggression or armed interference in America seemed actually to threaten the safety of the United States. The idea that the United States should offer its military forces to South or Central America, at its bidding, was never entertained. It was never denied that European nations had the right belonging to any sovereign power to use force in South or Central America, if necessary, in the collection of debt, or to obtain redress for grievances. However, while the United States for a considerable period took little cognizance of European intervention in South and Central America, President Monroe's declaration was by no means forgotten; this is particularly evidenced in relation to Cuban affairs.

The proximity of Cuba to the American shores has always made it the subject of jealous watchfulness by the United States, and during each administration from that of President Monroe, a share of attention has been directed to it.

As early as 1809, Jefferson looked longingly toward Cuba, although he feared the dangers of a general expansion policy. He wrote to President Madison: "I would immediately erect a column on the southernmost limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it a ne plus ultra as to us in that direction. . . . Cuba can be defended by us without a navy, and this develops the principle which ought to limit our views."