title, privilege, or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute, or commission.1

But to authorize the removal, it must appear from the record, either expressly or by clear and necessary intendment, that some one of the enumerated questions did arise in the State court, and was there passed upon. It is not sufficient that it might have arisen or been applicable.2 And if the decision of the State court is in favor of the right, title, privilege, or exemption so claimed, the Judiciary Act does not authorize such removal.3 Neither does it where the validity of a State law is drawn in question, as opposed to the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, and the decision of the State court is against its validity.1

But the same reasons which require that the final decision upon all questions of national jurisdiction should be left to the national courts, will also hold the national courts bound to respect the decisions of the State courts, upon all questions arising under the State constitutions and laws, where no question of national authority is involved, and to accept those decisions as correct, and to follow them whenever the same questions arise in the national courts. With the power to revise the decisions of the State

Owings v. Norwood's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 344; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304; Inglee v. Coolidge, 2 Wheat. 363; Miller v. Nicholls, 4 Wheat. 311; Williams v. Norris, 12 Wheat. 117; Hickie v. Starke, 1 Pet. 98; Harris v. Dennie, 3 Pet. 292; Fisher's Lessee v. Cockerell, 5 Pet. 256; New Orleans v. De Armas, 9 Pet. 223, 234; Keene v. Clark, 10 Pet. 291; Crowell v. Randell, 10 Pet. 368; McKinney v. Carroll, 12 Pet. 66; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540; Scott v. Jones, 5 How. 343; Smith v. Hunter, 7 How. 738; Williams v. Oliver, 12 How. 111; Calcote v. Stanton, 18 How. 243; Maxwell v. Newbold, 18 How. 511; Hoyt v. Shelden, 1 Black, 518; Farney v. Towle, 1 Black, 350; Day v. Gallup, 2 Wal. 97. It is not sufficient that the presiding judge of the State court certifies that a right claimed under the national authority was brought into question. Railroad Co. v. Rock, 4 Wal. 177.

3

* Gordon v. Caldcleugh, 3 Cranch, 268; McDonogh v. Millaudon, 3 How. 693; Fulton v. McAffee, 16 Pet. 149; Linton v. Stanton, 12 How. 423; Burke v. Gaines, 19 How. 388; Reddall v. Bryan, 24 How. 420; Ryan v. Thomas, 4 Wal.

603.

⚫ Commonwealth Bank v. Griffith, 14 Pet. 56; Walker v. Taylor, 5 How. 64. McKeen v. De Lancy's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 22; Polk's Lessee v. Wendal, 9 Cranch, 87; Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153, 167; Henderson v. Griffin, 5 Pet. 151; Green v. Neal's Lessee, 6 Pet. 291; Massingill v. Downs, 7 How. 767;

courts, in the cases already pointed out, the due observance of this rule will prevent those collisions of judicial authority which would otherwise be inevitable, and which, besides being unseemly,

Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How. 812; Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297; Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. 503; Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599; Greene v. James, 2 Curt. 189; Dubois v. McLean, 4 McLean, 488; Woolsey v. Dodge, 6 McLean, 150; Thompson v. Phillips, Baldw. 246; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436; Sumner v. Hicks, 2 Black, 532. The Judiciary Act of 1789 recognizes this principle in providing that "the laws of the several States, except where the Constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States, where they apply." Sec. 34. In Suydam v. Williamson, 24 How. 427, the Supreme Court of the United States overruled several of its former decisions, in order to make its rulings conform to a more recent decision in the State of New York, the question involved being as to the law of that State. And in Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, the court reiterate the doctrine of former cases, that if the highest tribunal of a State adopt new views on a matter of State law, reversing its former decisions, the Supreme Court of the United States will follow the latest settled adjudications. In the Sixth American Edition of Smith's Leading Cases, vol. i. p. 747, is a note bearing upon this point. Speaking of the case of Diamond v. Lawrence County, 37 Penn. St. 358, where certain county bonds were held not to be negotiable, it is said: "It may be added that, since the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, as reported in 1 Wallace, 83, 206, and 384, the decision in Diamond v. Lawrence County, or any decision like it in any State court, may be regarded as unimportant. A Pennsylvanian, indeed, suing a Pennsylvania city or county, and who must accordingly sue in a State court, could not recover more than the amount which the county actually received; but a citizen of any other State, or any foreigner, to both of whom the courts of the United States are open, would recover the whole amount. Of course, as the bonds are payable to bearer, no Pennsylvanian, if he can help it, will sue on them. By selling them -if sold in good faith—to a citizen of New York or New Jersey, or any other State than his own, since the bonds are declared to have all the qualities of commercial paper,' suit could be brought by the new purchaser in the Federal courts, and the whole amount be recovered." This note does not appear to us to be warranted by the Federal decisions. Before the national courts can disregard the rulings of the State courts on questions respecting the validity and operation of contracts deriving their vitality and force from State statutes, and made and payable within the State, and where the State decisions are not at variance, they must disregard many of their own well-considered opinions, besides establishing for themselves a correctional power in regard to the decisions of the State courts, neither given by the Constitution nor consistent with the general division of powers in the American system. However desirable it may be that the rules in the various States should be uniform, especially on questions of commercial law, it is certain that no power is conferred on the Supreme Court of the United States to make them so, where no question of national authority is involved.

would be dangerous to the peace, harmony, and stability of the Union under our peculiar system.

Besides conferring specified powers upon the national government, the Constitution contains also certain prohibitions upon the action of the States, a portion of them designed to prevent encroachments upon the national authority, and another portion to protect individual rights against possible abuse of State power. Of the first class are the following: No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque or reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit;1 or make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties upon imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of Congress. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay. Of the second class are the following: No State shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.2

8

Other provisions have for their object to prevent discrimination by the several States against the citizens and public proceedings of other States. Of this class are the provisions that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; that fugitives from justice shall 1 To constitute a bill of credit within the meaning of the Constitution, it must be issued by a State, involve the faith of the State, and be designed to circulate as money on the credit of the State in the ordinary uses of business. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 205. And see Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410; Darrington v. State Bank of Alabama, 13 How. 12; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 317.

2 Const. of U. S. art. 1, § 10.

Const. of U. S. art. 4. "What are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are in their nature fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What

be delivered up; and that full faith and credit shall be given in those fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one State to pass through or to reside in any other State, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of every kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the State, may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each State, in every other State, was manifestly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provision in the old Articles of Confederation) the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States of the Union."" Washington, J. in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 380. The Supreme Court will not describe and define these privileges and immunities in a general classification, preferring to decide each case as it may come up. Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591. For discussions upon this subject, see Murray v. McCarty, 2 Munf. 393; Lemmon v. People, 26 Barb. 270, and 20 N. Y. 562; Campbell v. Morris, 3 Har. & McH. 554; Amy v. Smith, 1 Lit. 326; Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 340; Butler v. Farnsworth, 4 Wash. C. C. 101; Commonwealth v. Towles, 5 Leigh, 743; Haney v. Marshall, 9 Md. 194; Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 13 Grat. 767; State v. Medbury, 3 R. I. 138; People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46: Fire Department v. Noble, 3 E. D. Smith, 441; Same v. Wright, Ibid. 453.

1 For decisions under this clause, see Ex parte Joseph Smith, 3 McLean, 133; Dow's Case, 18 Penn. St. 39; Matter of Clark, 9 Wend. 221; Johnson v. Riley, 13 Geo. 97; Matter of Fetter, 3 Zab. 311. The alleged offence need not be an offence at the common law; it is sufficient that it be a crime against the State from which the accused has fled. Johnson v. Riley; Matter of Clark and Matter of Fetter, supra. But the crime must have been actually committed within the State reclaiming the alleged offender, and he must have been an actual fugitive therefrom. Ex parte Smith, supra. The whole subject was considered in Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66. One Lago was indicted in Kentucky for enticing and assisting a slave to escape from his master, and a requisition was made upon the Governor of Ohio for his surrender to the Kentucky authorities as a fugitive from justice. The Governor of Ohio refused to surrender him, on the ground that the act with which he was charged was an offence not known to the laws of Ohio, and not affecting the public safety, nor regarded as malum in se by the general judgment and conscience of civilized na

each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State.1

The last provisions which we shall here notice are, that the United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government,2 and that no State shall grant any title of nobility. The purpose of these is to protect a Union founded on republican principles, and composed entirely of retions. Application was then made to the Supreme Court of the United States for a mandamus to compel the Governor of Ohio to perform this duty. The application was denied on the ground that, although the governor erred in this refusal, no power was delegated to the general government, either through the judicial department or any other department, to use any coercive means to compel him.

1 Const. of U. S. art. 4. This clause of the Constitution has been the subject of a good deal of discussion in the courts. It is well settled that if the record of a judgment shows that it was rendered without service of process or appearance of the defendant, or if that fact can be shown without contradicting the recitals of the record, it will be treated as void in any other State, notwithstanding this constitutional provision. Benton v. Bergot, 10 S. & R. 242; Thurber v. Blackbourne, 1 N. H. 242; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407; Robinson v. Ward's Ex'rs, 8 Johns. 86; Fenton v. Garlick, Ibid. 194; Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37; Pawling v. Bird's Ex'rs, 13 Johns. 192; Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. 161; Woodworth v. Tremere, 6 Pick. 354; Lincoln v. Tower, 2 McLean, 473; Westervelt v. Lewis, Ibid. 511; Bimelar v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 536; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333; Noyes v. Butler, 6 Barb. 613; Warren v. McCarthy, 25 Ill. 95; Rape v. Heaton, 9 Wis. 328; Wood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500; Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Texas, 551; McLawrine v. Monroe, 30 Mo. 462. But whether it would be competent to show, in opposition to the recitals in the record, that a judgment of another State was rendered without jurisdiction having been obtained of the person of the defendant, is not clear on the authorities. Many cases hold not. Field v. Gibbs, 1 Pet. C. C. 156; Green v. Sarmiento, Ibid. 76; Lincoln v. Tower, 2 McLean, 473; Westervelt v. Lewis, Ibid. 511; Pearce v. Olney, 20 Conn. 544; Hoxie v. Wright, 2 Vt. 263; Newcomb v. Peck, 17 Vt. 302; Wilcox v. Kassick, 2 Mich. 165; Bimelar v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 536; Welch v. Sykes, 3 Gil. 197; Roberts v. Caldwell, 5 Dana, 512. Other cases admit such evidence. Starbuck v. Murray, 5 Wend. 148; Holbrook v. Murray, Ibid. 161; Shumway v. Stillman, 6 Wend. 447; Borden v. Fitch, 15 Johns. 121; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232; Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380; Bradshaw v. Heath, 13 Wend. 407; Gleason v. Dodd, 4 Met. 333; Noyes v. Butler, 6 Barb. 613; Norwood v. Cobb, 24 Texas, 551. The same defences may be made to a judgment, when sued in another State, which could have been made to it in the State where rendered. Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234; Mills v. Duryea, 7 Cranch, 484; Steel v. Smith, 7 W. & S. 447; Bank of the State v. Dalton, 9 How. 528.

2 Const. of U. S. art. 4, § 4.

Const. of U. S. art. 1, § 10.