THE PHILIPPINES AND OUR MILITARY POWER.

IT is related that, after the signing of the treaty which ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States, Señor Sagasta, the Spanish Prime Minister, said: "Now is Spain avenged." How true has this prediction proved! The Philippine Islands have already cost our Government more than $300,000,000, and many of the best of the youth of our land. Their acquisition may transform us from a peaceful into a warlike nation. Victor Cousin was not without reason when he said: "Tell me the geography of a country, and I will tell you its future."

Continuous territory is the least vulnerable form of possessions. It is a rule of warfare, as unerring as the instinct of self-interest, that the enemy should always be attacked at its weakest point. We followed that rule in the late war with Spain. We did not engage her upon her home territory because we knew it would require ten times the men and ships to enforce submission. We made our assaults upon her most vulnerable possessions, namely, Cuba and the Philippines, 3,000 and 13,000 miles, respectively, from her base of operations. We attacked her in the two colonies where the people were in open revolt against Spanish tyranny and oppression, and where we knew we should receive cooperation and assistance.

Foreign powers have hitherto hesitated to make war upon us, because of the knowledge that, even if successful, they could not permanently hold any of our territory. The rulers of foreign nations knew with certainty that even if they could accomplish the difficult feat of occupying and annexing a portion of our continuous country, the succeeding years would undoubtedly be spent by our nation, as well as by the inhabitants of the annexed territory, in preparing to overthrow the rule of the foreign power. The fear of such a result and the knowledge of the enormous advantage possessed by those who fight in defence of home and country have prevented even the dream of a war of conquest against us. The continuity

of our territory not only prevents attack, but also enables us to determine at our will when we shall go to war. If we are not ready when the cause arises we can wait in our impregnable country until we are prepared, as

we did just before the late Spanish War. It also gives us the choice of the place of battle. As Mr. Gladstone once said: "The distinction between a continuous empire and one severed and dispersed over the seas is vital."

With the acquisition of islands 7,000 miles from our shores, how changed becomes the situation! In our first conflict with a European nation, the scene of action will be shifted to the Philippines. Our foe will see the importance of attacking our weakest point, and will take advantage of the fact that the people of those islands have recently been in arms against us; knowing full well that where death in such a conflict has embittered so many families, the spirit of insurrection will continue for at least a generation. On account of these disadvantages, some difficulties with foreign powers are likely to develop into wars, which would probably never have occurred had not the vulnerability of these far-away islands been an allurement to the aggressive spirit of warlike nations.

If we are to retain the Philippines, what must be done to overcome the disadvantage of their situation? We want no such surprises as Spain received from us. It becomes necessary to fortify the seaboard cities and towns, and to retain in the islands a force sufficient not only to prevent insurrection, but to repel foreign attack. It will be further necessary nearly to double the proper strength of our navy, so that in case of war we may be able to retain on our own coast the ships necessary for our defence and also to have in the Archipelago fleets sufficiently large to meet the enemy and to engage him with success. Although the total area of the Philippines is about the same as that of New Mexico, it is divided into so many islands that the seacoast to be defended must nearly equal that of all the States bordering upon the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

But what will be the cost of all this? The numerous seaboard cities cannot be fortified for less than tens of millions of dollars. The army of occupation scattered among these many islands to prevent foreign aggression and domestic insurrection cannot be safely reduced below 30,000 men. The cost of such an army, based upon former appropriations of Congress, cannot be less than $45,000,000 per annum. The army already there is costing more than $65,000,000 a year. General Wesley Merritt, in a recent interview, said: "Doubtless the American people will be sorry to be assured that a permanent army of 40,000 soldiers will be required to hold the Philippines; but conservative officers on the spot are convinced that this view of the situation is correct."

The Government expends about $3,000,000 for the building of each battleship, and a large amount each year to repair it, although after fifteen or twenty years it will become antiquated and useless.

Whence are we to obtain all the money which it is so necessary to expend in order to keep a firm grasp upon these distant possessions? It cannot be collected from the Philippine people; for, although they have been paying most of the exorbitant taxes imposed by Spain, the revenue is not more than sufficient to meet the expenditures of their civil government. It is quite likely that the revenues will be insufficient for that purpose when the school system is in full operation, and the numerous necessary improvements, such as roads, bridges, public buildings, and harbors, are made. These military and naval expenses can come only from our national Treasury, and apparently the outlay will be perpetual.

The great wealth and development of our country have arisen from the fact that we have had peace, and that we have not been compelled to impose a constant tax on our industries and people to maintain large armies and navies. With our sovereignty removed from the Philippines, and with our sources of income practically unlimited, we should still be able to pursue our policy of peace and good will without fear of foreign aggression.

In view of the situation in China, the Philippine Islands are supposed by some to be of great strategic value. It is very improbable that we shall ever have any difficulty with the Chinese, because our interest is identical with theirs, namely, the preservation of the integrity of the Chinese Empire. But even if it were otherwise, why keep soldiers 600 to 1,500 miles from the possible scene of action, with a very limited transport service and it is suggested, by the way, that this should be sold when we could place them on our own concession at Shanghai, as the French, Germans, and English have done?

The decision as to whether we are to hold the Philippine Islands involves, therefore, the question, whether we are willing to relinquish concentration for diffusion; to exchange land power, our natural strength, as to which we have enormous advantages, for sea power, as to which we have no peculiar advantage; and to give to the enemy in each conflict the choice of weapons, as well as of time and place of battle. With our military power upon land, we need neither a large army nor a large navy, and require only a light taxation upon the industries and people of the nation, which means prosperity. Exchanging this for sea power, we shall need a navy equal or superior to that of any warlike nation, and

also a large army to sustain the results of our naval engagements; involving taxation which will so cripple many of our industries that they will be unable to compete for trade in the markets of the world, which means adversity.

Why pursue a course which will weaken the military strength of our nation, which will make a greater drain upon the Treasury than will be counterbalanced by the profits it will give to commerce, and which will compel us to abandon the policy under which we have grown so great? Why give up the advantages of a peaceful people for the disadvantages of a warlike people? "They that take the sword shall perish with the sword." That judgment threatens not man alone, but also every nation that indulges the dream of universal empire. Why not avoid the stupendous blunder of the acquisition of these islands, by helping their people to establish a government of their own, based upon Republican principles, and thereby continue to be the beacon-light of liberty and civilization to all the world?

JOHN F. SHAFROTH.

THE CHINESE IN AMERICA.

THE Chinaman in America, as a social entity, is almost entirely unknown. He is an alien, whether Christian or "heathen." He is shy and self-contained, and a mystery to the great majority of Americans, who have little sympathy with him. He does not assimilate readily with other people. While there is often much in common between men of white, black, and red skins, the yellow man is rarely a party to their affairs. Among the reasons for this are the great disparity in their habits and customs; and the facts that their languages have nothing in common at the base, and that their physical characteristics are utterly at variance. Further, the Chinaman is barred by the law from citizenship, and, therefore, is practically without the pale of communal interests.

The Chinaman has a certain power commercially, but none whatever politically. Only those who have become interested in the Chinese through acquaintance with them in the Christian missions here or abroad, or through business relations, know anything of their habits, their methods of living, their industries, their excellences, or their vices. For their own protection they have been compelled to live entirely by themselves. There are no more clannish people on earth than the Chinese in America. Other immigrants in this country are slowly, but surely, assimilated until all become Americans; but the Chinaman remains a Chinaman, for the number of Chinese-Americans is ridiculously small.

The greatest barrier to the complete Americanization of the Chinese is the fact that they cannot become citizens; next is the air of mystery that has been thrown about them. The Chinese have been pictured as a peculiar, unknown, and dangerous element, given to strange and abhorrent vices, and as a people earning much and spending little, that they might drain this country of its wealth for the benefit of China. It has been said that they are utterly without sympathy for this country, the country of their permanent or temporary abode. The fact is that the Chinese are as little understood by the Americans as are the Americans by the Chinese. The result is an unfortunate suspicion on both sides.