was not further pursued. 1 Moore, Extra- | *FLORIDA CENTRAL & PENINSULAR[471] The earliest treaty between the United States and Great Britain on the subject is that of June 3, 1892, which applies only to merchant seamen, being limited to "seamen who may desert from any ship belonging to a citizen or subject of their respective countries." 27 Stat. at L. 961. v. WILLIAM H. REYNOLDS, as Comptroller of the State of Florida, and John A. Pierce, as Sheriff of Leon County. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 471-483.) Equal protection of the laws-assessment of railroad property for omitted taxes. Railroad companies are not denied the equal protection of the laws by Fla. Laws 1885, chap. 2558, requiring the comptroller to as sess the taxes for 1879, 1880, and 1881 upon such railroad property as had escaped taxation for such years, without providing for the assessment of taxes for those years on other property not previously assessed therefor, general legislation having provided that railroad property should be assessed by the comptroller and real estate by the county treasurer. The first treaty with Denmark on the subjest is that of July 11, 1881, concerning "deserters from the ships of war and merchant [470] vessels of their country." 13 Stat. at L. 606. In 1853, in the administration of President Pierce, on a question of the arrest of a deserter from a Danish ship and his discharge by the authorities in New York (the treaties between the United States and Denmark not then containing any stipulation for the restoration of deserting seamen), Mr. Cushing, as Attorney General, gave an opinion to Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, that without such a treaty the executive or judicial authorities of the United States had no power to arrest, detain, and Argued November 5, 6, 1901. Decided Jandeliver up a Danish mariner on the demand of the consul or other agents of Denmark, [No. 183.] uary 6, 1902. which effected the dismissal of a bill to restrain the collection of taxes. Affirmed. See same case below, 28 So. 861. State of Florida to review a decision ery up of deserters from the service of other and said: "The summary arrest and deliv-IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the nations, like the surrender of fugitives from their criminal justice, when found in the territory of a country into which they have escaped or fled, is not a duty absolutely enjoined by the law of nations, but a subject of special convention. So, also, are the authority and jurisdiction of consuls and commercial agents in regard to demanding and superintending the arrest, detention, and surrender. either of deserters from service or fugitives from justice." 6 Ops. of Atty. Gen. 148, 154. This uninterrupted course of action of the Executive Department, beginning almost a century ago, must be considered as conclusively establishing that, independently of a treaty, no international obligation exists to surrender foreign seamen who have deserted in this country. It is hardly necessary to add that the sug gestion of the district attorney can have no effect, other than to call the attention of the court to the facts of the record. The question whether those facts justified the commitment of the prisoner by the United States commissioner is a question to be decided, not by the Executive Department or by any of its officers, but by the courts of justice. According to our view of the facts, and for the reasons and upon the authorities above stated, we are of opinion that the commissioner had no authority to commit the prisoner, that his imprisonment was unlawful, and that he is entitled to be dis charged. 183 U. S. Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer: The Constitution of Florida of 1868, art. 16, § 24, as amended by art. 11 of the amendments of 1875, is as follows: "The property of all corporations, whether heretofore or hereafter incorporated, shall be subject to taxation, unless such property be held and used exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes." Sec. 26, chap. 3413, of the Laws of Florida, 1883, reads: "If any assessor, when making his assessments, shall discover that any land in his county was omitted in the assessment roll of either or all of the three previous years, and was then liable to taxation, he shall, in addition to the assessment of such land for that year, assess the same separately for such year or years that may have been so omitted, at the just value thereof in such year, noting distinctly the year when such omission occurred; and such assessment shall have the same force and effect as it would have had if made in the year the same was omitted, and taxes shall be levied and collected thereon in like manner and together with the taxes of the year in which the NOTE. As to constitutional equality of priv ilegcs, immunities, and protection-see Louisville Safety Vault & T. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. (Ky.) 14 L. R. A. 579, and note. As to the validity of class legislation-see note, and State v. Loomis (Mo.) 21 L. R. A. State v. Goodwill (W. Va.) 6 L. R. A. 621, and 789, and note. 283 taxes paid under protest. After three appeals to the supreme court of the state (35 Fla. 625, 17 So. 902, 39 Fla. 243, 22 So. 697, 28 So. 861), the final outcome of the litigation was a decree dismissing the plaintiff's bill in toto. Messrs. Frederic D. McKenney and Wayne MacVeagh argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Thomas L. Clarke and John A. | Henderson, filed a brief for plaintiff in er ror: assessment is made; but no lands shall be | lection of certain taxes, and to recover other assessed for more than three years' arrears of taxes, and all lands shall be subject to such taxes omitted to be assessed, into whosesoever hands they may come." In 1885 this statute was passed: [472] *"Sec. 1. That in all cases in which any railroad or the properties thereto belonging or appertaining in this state, in the tax years commencing March 1, 1879, 1880, and 1881, or any of such years, were not assessed for taxes for such years, it shall be the duty of the comptroller to cause the same, or so much thereof, as were not assessed, to be assessed for state and county taxes, and 20 per centum of the taxes so assessed for said years and now unpaid shall be collected at the same time the taxes for the year 1885 shall be assessed and collected, and each year thereafter an additional 20 per centum of said taxes shall be collected at the same time and in the same manner as the taxes for such year are collected, until the whole amount of said unpaid taxes for the years 1879, 1880, and 1881 are paid. "The taxes to be assessed under this act shall be the same in amount as they would have been had they been assessed in such years or any of them as to which there was a failure to assess." Laws of Florida 1885, chap. 3558. This statute was followed in 1891 by one in these words: Corporations are "persons" within the meaning of the constitutional provisions forbidding the deprivation of property without due process of law, as well as a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Santa Clara County v. Southern P. R. Co. 118 U. S. 394, 30 L. ed. 118, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1132; Covington & L. Turnp. Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 560, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 198; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 154, 41 L. ed. 667, 17 Sup. Ct Rep. 255; Guthrie, 14th Amend. U. S. p. 120; San Bernardino County v. Southern P. R. Co. 118 U. S. 417, 30 L. ed. 125, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1144. The attempt of the legislature of Florida by the act of 1885 (chap. 3558) to levy taxes for prior years upon railroad property, to the exclusion of other real properties owned by individuals, which had also "Sec. 1. That the state and county taxes escaped taxation for such years, was an unassessed by the comptroller of the state of lawful discrimination, grossly unjust and Florida, upon any railroads and the prop-oppressive. erties thereof in said state, for the years Railroad Tax Case, 8 Sawy. 238, 13 Fed. 1879, 1880, and 1881, under and in pursu- 722. ance of An Act to Provide for the Assessment and Collection of Taxes on Railroads and the Properties Thereof for the Years 1879, 1880, and 1881, as to Which There Was no Assessment,' but which have not been collected, shall be collected, and the payment thereof enforced at the same times and in the same manner as is now or may hereafter be provided by law for the collection and the enforcement of the payment of taxes assessed upon the railroads and the properties thereof in the state of Florida." Laws of Florida, 1891, chap. 4073. The assessment of railroad property in Florida was not made by the county assessors, but by the comptroller of the state. Acts State of Florida, 1879, chap. 3099, §§ 45. 46. The plaintiff is a corporation organized under the laws of Florida on November 17, 1888. and was the owner of several lines of railway which, on May 1, 1889, it acquired from the Florida Railway & Navigation Company, under foreclosure proceedings. [473] The Florida Railway & Navigation Company was organized on February 29, 1884, by the consolidation of several companies, and on July 1 of that year it placed upon its properties a trust deed to secure the payment of $10,000.000 bonds. Property of the same kind and in the same condition cannot be divided into different classes for purposes of taxation and taxed by a different rule because it belongs to different owners, whether natural persons or corporations. Northern P. R. Co. v. Walker, 47 Fed. 681. Mr. William B. Lamar argued the cause, and, with Mr. George H. Lamar, filed a brief for defendant in error: It is within the power of the Florida legislature, in the exercise of the taxing power of the state, to pass the statute of 1885. assessing lines of railroad companies for years past in which they were liable for taxation, but as to which they had escaped assessment and taxation. Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 17 How. 456. 15 L. ed. 127; Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88, 8 L. ed. 876; Albee v. May, 2 Paine, 74, Fed. Cas. No. 134; State, Bonney, Prosecutor, v. Reed, 31 N. J. L. 133; Stockdale v. Atlantic Ins. Co. 20 Wall. 323, 22 L. ed. 348; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L. ed. 648; Re Short, 16 Pa. 63; Black, Constitutional Prohibition, §§ 170, 172; Bay v. Gage, 36 Barb. 447; Perry County v. Selma. M. & M. R. Co. 65 Ala. 391, 58 Ala. 516: Tallman v. Janesville, 17 Wis. 71; North Carolina R. Co. v. Alamance, 82 N. C. 259: Burroughs, Taxn. 483. This bill was filed November 2, 1892, in the circuit court of the second judicial cir- The decision of a state court upon a matcuit of Florida, in and for the county of ter of general law within the state cannot Leon. Its purpose was to restrain the col-be set aside or reversed by this court. New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisi- | of the state-failed to do so, and the effort ana Sugar Ref. Co. 125 U. S. 18, 31 L. ed. is to compel that property to discharge its 608, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 741; Knox v. Exchange obligation. The objection is not that the Bank, 12 Wall. 379, 20 L. ed. 414; Delmas property ought not during those years to v. Merchants' Mut. Ins. Co. 14 Wall. 661, have paid its proportion of the taxes, but 20 L. ed. 757; De Saussure v. Gaillard, 127 that it ought not now to be compelled to pay U. S. 216, 32 L. ed. 125, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. such proportion, because certain other prop1053; McKenna v. Simpson, 129 U. S. 506, erty was similarly situated, and no effort is 32 L. ed. 771, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365; Bacon made to compel payment from it. v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207, 41 L. ed. 132, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1023. The fault, if fault there be, is one of omission rather than commission. The act of the legislature is not a mandate to a single [473] *Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opin-officer, charged with the duty of assessing ion of the court: No question is presented concerning the claim for the taxes paid under protest, counsel for plaintiff stating in their brief that "the sole relief sought in this court is to obtain a reversal of the decree of the state supreme court, in so far as it reversed the decree of the circuit court enjoining the sale of complainant's lines of railroad for the taxes assessed for the years 1879, 1880, and 1881, such taxes amounting to $96,181.69;" and in respect to this matter they sum up all property, to assess certain property, and to omit to assess the rest; but the general legislation having provided that railroad property should he assessed by the comptroller and real estate by county assessors, the act simply directed the comptroller to discharge the duties of assessment as to the [475] property committed to his care, and omitted any direction to the county assessors. This omission, it is contended, makes the act unconstitutional. In other words, the legislature may not pass an act directing one officer to discharge his duty unless it "By the law of 1885 the state attempted couples therewith a direction to other offito authorize the assessment of taxes for cers charged with kindred duty to perform 1879-1881, but only upon property belong- theirs. It would seem to follow that if the ing to railroad companies, though it ap-legislature had on the same day passed anpears from the record that other properties of like class, i. e., real estate belonging to individuals and owners, not railroad companies, had not been assessed for taxes for such years. their contention in these words: other act with like command to the county assessors, the two acts together would be constitutional, though each standing alone would not be; and as the time of its passage is not generally of the essence of a stat[474] *"It surely cannot be 'due process of law' ute, it would also seem to follow that if for the state of Florida in 1885 to arbitrari- the legislature should to-day pass an act dily impose a burden theretofore unheard of recting the county assessors to assess delinupon security holders who in 1884 had in-quent real estate for those years, this late vested their money upon the faith of a title then clear of such burden. "It surely cannot be less than a denial of the equal protection of the laws for the state of Florida in 1885 to impose burdens theretofore unheard of upon the property of railroad companies which under the laws of Florida is real estate, while permitting other real estate, otherwise owned, to escape such burdens." enactment would give constitutional vitality to that passed years ago. How far can this theory of constitutionality be sustained? It must be remembered that "taxes are not debts in the ordinary sense of that term;" that they are "the enforced proportional contribution of persons and property, levied by the authority of the state for the support of the government and for all public needs." Cooley, Taxn. 1st ed. pp. 13 and 1. The decision of the supreme court of the They are obligations of the highest charstate establishes that these proceedings are acter, for only as they are discharged is the not in conliict with the Constitution of Flor- continued existence of government possible. ida. The single question, therefore, to con- They are not canceled and discharged by sider, is whether there is anything in the the failure of duty on the part of any triFederal Constitution which forbids a state bunal or officer, legislative or administrative. to reach backward and collect taxes from Payment alone discharges the obligation. certain kinds of property which were not at and until payment the state may proceed the time collected through lack of statutory by all proper means to compel the performprovisions therefor, or in consequence of a ance of the obligation. No statutes of limimisunderstanding as to the law, or from neg-tation run against the state, and it is a matlect of administrative officials, without also making provision for collecting the taxes for the same years on other property. It will be perceived that there was no new levy of taxes. No act of the legislature was passed imposing an additional burden upon the property of the state in general, or upon any particular property, but the case is one in which, general levies having been made for the years named, certain property which ought to have paid taxes under them-and thus contributed its share of the expenses ter of discretion with it to determine how far into the past it will reach to compel performance of this obligation. No question of bona fide purchase arises, for it was held by the supreme court that. inasmuch as no assessment of this railroad property had been made during the years named, and no lien thereon for taxes established, a bona fide purchaser would have taken it frce from any liability for such taxes; but it was also held that the present owner was not a bona fide purchaser, and this be ing a local matter the decision is conclusive | this court affirm the same propositions. In upon this court. [476] *The question how far the provisions of the 14th Amendment interfere with a state's system of taxation has been more than once before this court. It was very carefully considered in Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533, and the general rule thus stated by Mr. Justice Bradley on page 237, L. ed. p. 895, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 535: as Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206, sub nom. Minot v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 21 L. ed. 888, a special act of the state of Delaware imposing a tax of 3 per cent upon the net earnings or income received by railroad and canal companies from all sources was sustained, the court saying (p. 231, L. ed. p. 896): "The state may impose taxes upon the laws, as well as upon the capital stock of corporation as an entity existing under its the corporation or its separate corporate property. And the manner in which its value shall be assessed and the rate of taxation, however arbitrary or capricious, are is not for us to suggest in any case that a mere matters of legislative discretion. It more equitable mode of assessment or rate of taxation might be adopted than the one prescribed by the legislature of the state; our only concern is with the validity of the tax; all else lies beyond the domain of our jurisdiction." "The provision in the 14th Amendment, that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, was not intended to prevent a state from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property from any taxation at all, such churches, libraries, and the property of charitable institutions. It may impose different specific taxes upon different trades and professions, and may vary the rates of excise upon various products. It may tax real estate and personal property in a dif- In Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U. S. ferent manner. It may tax visible proper- 594, 33 L. ed. 1025, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 593, ty only, and not tax securities for payment a tax upon the corporate franchise or busiof money. It may allow deductions for in-ness of corporations, graded according to the debtedness, or not allow them. We dividends declared by the corporation, was think that we are safe in saying that the sustained, the court, on p. 606, L. ed. p. 14th Amendment was not intended to com- 1031, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 597, referring in these pel the state to adopt an iron rule of equal words to the objection that the tax was in taxation." conflict with the 14th Amendment. It is well known that the states vary "But the amendment does not prevent the materially in their systems of taxation. classification of property for taxation-subEach determines for itself what in its judg- jecting one kind of property to one rate of ment is best for the interests of its people. taxation and another kind of property to a In some there are general exemptions of different rate-distinguishing between franparticular classes of property, such as prop-chises, licenses, and privileges, and visible erty used for religious, educational, and benevolent purposes. Some, in order to encourage certain industries, such as manufacturing, make either general or special exemptions. Some think it for their best in terest to derive their revenues from personal property, corporations, and licenses, and exempt real estate. In some contracts for exemption are authorized by the state Constitution; in others they are forbidden. Now, considering the great diversity in these systems, it would obviously have worked a marked revolution if the 1st section of the 14th Amendment had been construed as compelling a cast-iron rule of equal taxation. It was not intended, as held in the case quoted from, and also in Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357, to restrain the legislature from any proper and legitimate classification, both as respects property for taxation [477] and the methods of assessment and taxation. Doubtless it would prohibit a state from selecting some obnoxious person, and casting upon his property the sole burden of taxation, or a burden differing from that cast upon others whose property was similarly situated; but it does not prevent a state from exercising its judgment as to the property to be taxed and the modes of taxation, providing all property similarly situated is treated in the same way. Besides those just cited, other cases in 286 and tangible property, and between real and personal property. Nor does the amendment prohibit special legislation. Indeed the greater part of all legislation is special either in the extent to which it operates or the objects sought to be obtained by it. And[478] when such legislation applies to artificial bodies, it is not open to objection if all such bodies are treated alike under similar circumstances and conditions, in respect to the privileges conferred upon them and the liabilities to which they are subjected. Under the statute of New York all corporations, joint stock companies, and associations of the same kind are subjected to the same tax. There is the same rule applicable to all under the same conditions in determining the rate of taxation. There is no discrimination in favor of one against another of the same class. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 29, 32, 28 L. ed. 924, 925, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 709, 28 L. ed. 1145, 1147, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730; Missouri P. R Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 523, 29 L. ed. 463, 466, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110: Missouri P. R. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U. S. 205, 209, 32 L. ed. 107, 109, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1161; Minneapolis St. L. R. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26, 32, 32 L. ed. 585, 537, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207." In Giozza v. Tiernans, 148 U. S. 657, 37 L. ed. 599, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 721, a difference in the amount of license required from parties as pugnant to the clause of the 14th Amendment forbidding a denial of the equal protection of the laws." carrying on different kinds of business was Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510, 17 L. 518, L. ed. p. 309) that it considered itself "bound in cases like this to follow the settled adjudications of the highest state court giving constructions to the Constitution and laws of the state." In the light of these decisions, if the state of Florida had deemed it for the best interests of its people to encourage the building of railroads by exempting their property from taxation, such exemption could not have been adjudged in conflict with the 14th Amendment, even though thereby the burden of taxation upon other property in the state was largely increased. Indeed that was the policy of the state prior to the Constitution of 1868. And, conversely, if the state had subjected railroads to taxation, while exempting some other class of property, it would be difficult to find anything in the 14th Amendment to overthrow its action. The mere fact that such legislation may operate with harshness is not of itself sufficient to justify the court in declaring it unconstitutional. These matters of classification are of state policy, to be determined by the state; and the Federal government is not charged with the duty of super "Another point made by the plaintiff in [479]error is that the provision of the Constitution of Virginia exempting tracts of less than 1,000 acres from forfeiture is a discrimination against the owners of tracts containing 1,000 acres or more, which amounts to a denial to citizens or landowners of the latter class of the equal protection of the laws. We do not concur in this view. The evil intended to be remedied by the Constitution and laws of West Virginia was the persistent failure of those who owned or claimed to own large tracts of lands patented in the last century or early in the present century to put them on the land books, so that the extent and boundaries of such tracts could be easily ascertained by the officers charged with the duty of assessing and collecting taxes. Where the tract was a small one, the probability was that it was actually occupied by some one, and its extent or boundary could be readily ascertained for purposes of assessment andvising its action. taxation. We can well understand why one policy could be properly adopted as to large tracts which the necessities of the public revenue did not require to be prescribed as to small tracts. The judiciary should be very reluctant to interfere with the taxing systems of a state, and should never do so unless that which the state attempts to do is in palpable violation of the constitutional rights of the owners of property. Under this view of our duty, we are unwilling to hold that the provision referred to is re If the state, as has been seen, has the power, in the first instance, to classify property for taxation, it has the same right of classification as to property which in past years has escaped taxation. We must assume that the legislature acts according to its judgment for the best interests of the state. A wrong intent cannot be imputed to it. It may have found that the railroad delinquent tax was large, and the delinquent tax on other property was small, and not worth the trouble of special provision there |