pons, Scrip, Punchouts, Store Orders or Other Evidences of Indebtedness to Pay Laborers and Employees for Labor, or Otherwise to Redeem the Same in Good and Lawful Money of the United States in the Hands of Their Employees, Laborers, or a Bona Fide Holder, and to Provide a Legal Remedy for Collection of Same in Favor of Said Laborers, Employees, and Such Bona Fide Holder. [18] *"Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the general assembly of the state of Tennessee, That all persons, firms, corporations, and companies using coupons, scrip, punchouts, store orders, or other evidences of indebtedness to pay their or its laborers and employees, for labor or otherwise, shall, if demanded, redeem the same in the hands of such laborer, employee, or bona fide holder, in lawful money of the United States: Provided, The same is presented and redemption demanded of such person, firm, company, or corporation using same as aforesaid, at a regular pay day of such person, firm, company, or corporation to laborers or employees, or if presented and redemption demanded 89 aforesaid by such laborers, employees, or bona fide holders at any time not less than thirty days from the issuance or delivery of such coupon, scrip, punchout, store order, or other evidence of indebtedness to such employees, laborers, or bona fide holder. Such redemption to be at the face value of said scrip, punchout, coupon, store order, or other evidence of indebtedness: Provided, further, Said face value shall be in cash the same as its purchasing power in goods, wares, and merchandise at the commissary, company store, or other repository of such company, firm, person, or corporation aforesaid. "Sec. 2. Be it further enacted, That any employee, laborer, or bona fide holder referred to in § 1 of this act, upon presentation and demand for redemption of such scrip, coupon, punchout, store order, or other evidence of indebtedness aforesaid, and upon refusal of such person, firm, corporation, or company to redeem the same in good and lawful money of the United States, may maintain in his, her, or their own name an action before any court of competent jurisdiction against such person, firm, corporation, or company, using same as aforesaid, for the recovery of the value of such cou pon, scrip, punchout, store order, or other evidence of indebtedness, as defined in § 1 of this act." qualify the right of contract, in that it re- "There is no prohibition against the issuance of any of the obligations referred to, nor against payment in merchandise or otherwise according to their terms, but only a provision that they shall be paid in money at the election and upon a prescribed demand of the owner. In other words, the effect of the act is to convert into cash obligations such unpaid merchandise orders, etc., as may be presented for money payment on a regular pay day or as much as thirty days after issuance. "Under the act the present defendant may issue weekly orders for coal, as formerly, and may pay them in that commodity when desired by the holder, but instead of being able, as formerly, to compel the holder to accept payment of such orders in coal, the holder may, under the act, compel defendant to pay them in money. In this way and to this extent the defendant's right of contract is affected. "Under the act, as formerly, every employee of the defendant *may receive the [20] whole or a part of his wages in coal orders, and may collect the orders in coal, or transfer them to someone else for other merchandise or for money. His condition is bettered by the act, in that it naturally enables him to get a better price for his coal orders than formerly, and thereby gives him more for his labor; and yet, although the defendant may not in that transaction realize the exThe views of the supreme court of Tennes-pected profit on the amount of coal called see, sustaining the validity of the enactment in question, sufficiently appear in the following extracts from its opinion, a copy of which is found in the record: "Confessedly, the enactment now called in [19]question is in all respects a valid statute and free from objection as such, except that it is challenged as an arbitrary interference with the right of contract, on account of which it is said that it is unconstitutional, and not the law of the land' or 'due process of law.' "The act does, undoubtedly, abridge or for in the orders, it in no event pays more in dollars and cents for the labor than the contract price. "The scope and purpose of the act are thus indicated. The legislature evidently deemed the laborer at some disadvantage under existing laws and customs, and by this act undertook to ameliorate his condition in some measure by enabling him or his bona fide transferee, at his election and at a proper time, to demand and receive his unpaid wages in money rather than in something less valuable. Its tendency. though slight it may be, is to place the employer | of law. But it was held, after full review and employee upon equal ground in the mat- of the previous cases, that the act in quester of wages, and, so far as calculated to tion was a valid exercise of the police power accomplish that end, it deserves commenda- of the state, and the judgment of the sution. Being general in its operation and en- preme court of Utah, sustaining the legis forceable by ordinary suit, and being unim-lation, was affirmed. peached and unimpeachable upon other con- Where a contract of insurance provided stitutional grounds, the act is entitled to that the insurance company should not be full recognition as the 'law of the land' and liable beyond the actual cash value of the 'due process of law' as to the matters em- property at the time of its loss, and where braced, without reference to the state's po- a statute of the state of Missouri provided lice power, as was held of an act imposing that, in all suits brought upon policies of far greater restrictions upon the right of insurance against loss or damage by fire, the contract, in the case of Dugger v. Mechan-insurance company should not be permitted ics' & T. Ins. Co. 95 Tenn. 245, 28 L. R. A. to deny that the property insured was worth 796, 32 S. W. 5, and as had been previously at the time of issuing the policy the full decided in respect of other limiting statutes *amount of the insurance, this court held [22] therein mentioned. 95 Tenn. 253, 254, 28 that it was competent for the legislature of L. R. A. 799, 32 S. W. 6, 7. Missouri to pass such a law, even though it places a limitation upon the right of contract. Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281. In St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404, 43 L. ed. 746, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419, a judgment of the supreme court of Arkansas sustaining the validity of an act of the legislature of that state, which provided that whenever any corporation or person engaged in operating a railroad should discharge, with or without cause, any employee or servant, the unpaid wages of any such servant then earned should become due "Furthermore, the passage of this act was a legitimate exercise of police power, and upon that ground also the legislation is well sustained. The first right of a state, as of a man, is self-protection, and with the state that right involves the universally acknowledged power and duty to enact and enforce all such laws not in plain conflict with some provision of the state or Federal Constitution as may rightly be deemed necessary or expedient for the safety, health, morals, comfort, and welfare of its people. [21] "The act before us is, perhaps, less strin- and payable on the date of such discharge gent than any one considered in any of the without abatement or deduction, was afcases mentioned. It is neither prohibitory firmed. It is true that stress was laid in nor penal; not special, but general; tend-the opinion in that case on the fact that, ing towards equality between employer and in the Constitution of the state, the power employee in the matter of wages; intended to amend corporation charters was reserved and well calculated to promote peace and to the state, and it is asserted that no such good order, and to prevent strife, violence. power exists in the present case. and bloodshed. Such being the character, also true that, inasmuch as the right to purpose, and tendency of the act, we have no contract is not absolute in respect to every hesitation in holding that it is valid, both matter, but may be subjected to the reas general legislation, without reference to straints demanded by the safety and welfare the state's reserved police power, and also of the state and its inhabitants, the police as a wholesome regulation adopted in the power of the state may, within defined limiproper exercise of that power." tations, extend over corporations outside of and regardless of the power to amend charters. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 43 L. ed. 909, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609. The supreme court of Tennessee justified its conclusions by so full and satisfactory a reference to the decisions of this court as to render it unnecessary for us to travel over the same ground. It will be sufficient to briefly notice two or three of the latest cases. In Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383, the validity of an act of the state of Utah, regulating the employment of workingmen in underground mines, and fixing the period of employment at eight hours per day, was in question. There, as here, it was contended that the legislation deprived the employers and employees of the right to make contracts in a lawful way and for lawful pur poses; that it was class legislation, and not equal or uniform in its provisions; that it deprived the parties of the equal protection of the laws, abridged the privileges and immunities of the defendant as a citizen of the United States, and deprived him of his property and liberty without due process But it is The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is affirmed. Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice Peckham dissent. *DAYTON COAL & IRON COMPANY (Lim [23] ited), Plff. in Err., v. T. A. BARTON. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 23-25.) Foreign corporations—subject to state laws -store orders redeemable in money. The fact that a corporation is foreign, and not requiring wages to be part in lawful moneysee Avent-Beattyville Coal Co. v. Com. (Ky.) 28 L. R. A. 273, and note. NOTE. On the validity and effect of statutes domestic, does not help it in contesting the constitutionality of the Tennessee act of March 17, 1899, requiring the redemption in money of store orders and scrip issued to employees in payment of wages, which act is held valid as to domestic corporations. [No. 26.] tracting, there is no condition existing upon which the legislature can interfere for the purpose of prohibiting the contract or controlling the terms thereof. State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 21 L. R. A. 789, 22 S. W. 350; San Antonio & A. P. R. Co. v. Wilson (Tex. App.) 19 S. W. 910; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 22 L. R. A. 340, 35 N. E. 62; Frorer v. People Argued March 7, 1901. Decided October 21, use of School Fund, 141 Ill. 171, 16 L. R. A. 1901. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the affirming a judgment against a corporation in a suit to recover money on store orders issued to employees for labor. Affirmed. See same case below, 103 Tenn. 604, 53 S. W. 970. Statement by Mr. Justice Shiras: [23] *This was an action tried in the circuit court of Rhea county, Tennessee, wherein T. A. Barton, a citizen of Tennessee, sought to recover from the Dayton Coal & Iron Company (Limited), a corporation organized under the laws of Great Britain, and doing business as a manufacturer of pig iron and coke in said county. The company owns a store, where it sells goods to its employees and other persons. The company also has a monthly pay day, and settles in cash with its employees on said pay day. In the meantime, and to such of its employees as see fit to request the same, it issues orders on its storekeeper for goods. On March 17, 1899, the legislature of Tennessee passed an act requiring "all persons, firms, corporations, and companies using coupons, scrip, punchouts, store orders, or other evidences of indebtedness to pay laborers and employees for labor or otherwise, to redeem the same in good and lawful money of the United States in the hands of their employees, laborers, or a bona fide holder, and to provide a legal remedy for collection of same in favor of said laborers, employees, and such bona fide hold ers." This was a suit brought by said Barton to recover as a bona fide holder of certain store orders that had been issued by the defendant company to some of its laborers in payment for labor. The defendant company denied the validity of the legislation, as well under the laws and Constitution of Tennessee as the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The plaintiff recovered a judgment against the company in the circuit court of Rhea county, and this judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of Tennessee, whereupon a writ of error from this court was allowed by the chief justice of the state supreme court. 492. 31 N. E. 395; Leep v. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. 58 Ark. 407, 23 L. R. A. 264, 25 S. W. 75; Wally v. Kennedy, 2 Yerg. 554, 24 v. Pa. 431, 6 Atl. 354; Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 14 L. R. A. 325, 28 N. E. 1126; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep. 34, 2 N. E. 29; People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. 343; Millett v. People, 117 Ill. 294, 57 Am. Rep. 869, 7 N. E. 631; Shaver v. Pennsylvania Co. 71 Fed. 931; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621, 10 S. E. 285. Laws depriving particular persons classes of persons of rights enjoyed by the community at large, to be valid, must be based upon some existing distinction or reason not applicable to others not included within their provisions. or Cooley, Const. Lim. 391; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 6 L. R. A. 621, 10 S. E. 285. The vocation of the employer, as well as that of his employee, is his property. Depriving the owner of property, or one of its attributes, is depriving him of his property under the provisions of the Constitution. People ex rel. Manhattan Sav. Inst. v. Otis. 90 N. Y. 48. Such legislation as the legislation in question partakes of the nature of despotism. Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 114, 50 Am. Rep. 636; State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co. 33 W. Va. 188, 6 L. R. A. 359, 10 S. E. 288; Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, 6 Atl. 354; Com. v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 14 L. R. A. 325, 28 N. E. 1126; People v. Gillson, 169 N. Y. 389, 17 N. E. 343; Bauer v. Reynolds, 3 Pa. Dist. R. 502; Showalter v. Ehlan, 5 Pa. Super. Ct. 242. To take from property its chief element of value, and to deny to the citizen the right to use and transmit it in any proper and legiti mate method, are as much depriving him of his property as if the property itself were taken. Third Nat. Bank v. Divine Grocery Co. 97 Tenn. 609, 34 L. R. A. 445, 37 S. W. 390; Stratton Claimants v. Morris Claimants, 89 Tenn. 497, sub nom. Dibrell v. Lanier, 12 L. R. A. 70, 15 S. W. 87; Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652. The fact that appellant is an alien corporation does not alter the case, or make any different rule from what it would be if it were a domestic corporation. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 30 L. ed. 220, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064. Mr. Frederick L. Mansfield argued the cause and filed a brief for plaintiff in error: When the subject of contract is purely and exclusively private, unaffected by any public interest or duty to persons or society or gov- A statute prohibiting the manufacture or ernment, and the parties are capable of con- ' sale, for food, of any substitute for butter or cheese produced from pure, unadulterated cream or milk, is unconstitutional. People v. Marks, 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep. 34, 2 N. E. 29. The right to pursue in a lawful manner a lawful vocation or trade, unmolested by laws in any way restrictive of that right, is a privilege that is protected and secured to the citizen by the Constitution of the United States. Live Stock Dealers' & Butchers' Asso. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 1 Abb. (U. S.) 388, Fed. Cas. No. 8,408; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 430, 20 L. ed. 453; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 97, 21 L. ed. 415; Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. 8. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652; 1 Smith, Wealth of Nations, chap. 10; Ex parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274, 9 L. R. A. 482, 24 Pac. 737; Re Eight Hour Bill, 21 Colo. 29, 39 Pac. 328; Low v. Rees Printing Co. 41 Neb. 127, 24 L. R. A. 702, 59 N. W. 362; Re House Bill, No. 203, 21 Colo. 27, 39 Pac. 431; Frorer v. People use of School Fund, 141 Ill. 171, 16 L. R. A. 492, 31 N. E. 395. The right to labor is, of all others, after the right to live, the fundamental, inalienable right of man, of which he cannot be deprived under the guise of law, or otherwise, except by usurpation or force. Re Tiburcio Parrott, 6 Sawy. 349, 1 Fed. 481. Everyone has the absolute right to the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control or diminution save only by the laws of the land. 1 Bl. Com. 138; Pumpelly v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co. 13 Wall. 166, 20 L. ed. 557; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378. All laws, therefore, which impair or trammel these rights, which limit one in his choice of a trade or profession, or confine him to work or live in a specified locality, or exclude him from his own house, or restrain his otherwise lawful movements, are infringements upon the fundamental rights of liberty, which are under constitutional protection. People ex rel. Manhattan Sav. Inst. v. Otis, 90 N. Y. 48; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636; Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509, 30 Am. Rep. 323; Low v. Rees Printing Co. 41 Neb. 127, 24 L. R. A. 702, 59 N. W. 362; Nichols v. Walter, 37 Minn. 264, 33 N. W. 800; State ex rel. Randolph v. Wood, 49 N. J. L. 88, 7 Atl. 286; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 29 L. R. A. 79, 40 N. E. 454. The manner in which the law in question discriminates against one class of employers and employees and in favor of all others places it in opposition to the guaranties hereinbefore discussed, and renders it inval id. Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 29 L. R. A. 79, 40 N. E. 454; Frorer v. People use of School Fund, 141 Ill. 171, 16 L. R. A. 492, 31 N. E. 395. allowed by the law to enjoy, it is clear that he is deprived of both liberty and property to the extent that he is thus denied the right to contract. Frorer v. People use of School Fund, 141 Ill. 171, 16 L. R. A. 492, 31 N. E. 395; Ramsey v. People, 142 Ill. 380, 17 L. R. A. 853, 32 N. E. 364; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66, 22 L. R. A. 340, 35 N. E. 62; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 21 L. R. A. 789, 22 S. W. 350; Austin v. Murray, 16 Pick. 121. "The law of the land" does not mean the acts of legislatures which deprive the citizen of his rights, privileges, or property, but it means a valid act; and the spirit of the Constitution means that there must be some limitations on the part of the legislature. Magna Charta relieved the British subject from the tyranny of the King, and remitted in to the despotism of Parliament; the Constitution of the United States, under the 14th Amendment, relieves every person of the uncontrolled despotism of the legislature. Wynchamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378. The right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right to protect property are three fundamental rights of all persons in the United States. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 127, 21 L. ed. 425. There are some rights, in every free government, beyond the Constitution of the state. Citizens' Sav. & L. Asso. v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 661, 22 L.. ed. 461. Mr. Benj. Gorden McKenzie argued the cause and filed a brief for defendant in error: "Due process of law" and "the law of the land" mean one and the same thing. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 101, 24 L. ed. 618. Then it necessarily follows, if this act is constitutional, that it is the law of the land, and by it, within proper and reasonable limits, business and property rights can be regulated. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 392, 42 L. ed. 791, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. This court has held that the statute of Utah making eight hours' labor constitute a day's work is a proper exercise of the police power of the state. be Ibid. See also Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53. The act in question is general in its application, and hence no objection can brought on the ground of class legislation, as it applies to every person, natural or artificial. Such laws have been repeatedly upheld as a proper exercise of the police power of the state. In Tennessee an act regulating fire insurance contracts, and making the three-fourths value clause void, was upheld as proper and constitutional. Dugger v. Mechanics' & T. Ins. Co. 95 Tenn. 245, 28 L. R. A. 796, 32 S. W. 5. The privilege of contracting is both a lib- And the same court has held that an ordierty and a property right; and if A is denied nance prohibiting the erection of wooden the right to contract and acquire property in buildings within certain fire limits was not, a manner which he has hitherto enjoyed un-in a constitutional sense, an impairment of a der the law, and which B, C, and D are still contract for erection of the same, although the contract was made before the passage of | islature of the state of Tennessee prescrib- Truss v. State, 13 Lea, 311. orders. In the case of Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison, in error to the supreme court of TenA West Virginia statute similar to the S. 13, ante, 55, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1, we afnessee, decided at the present term, 183 U. statute in question in many particulars was firmed the judgment of that court sustain sustained and upheld by the supreme courting the constitutional validity of the state of that state. State v. Peel Splint Coal Co. 36 W. Va. 802, 17 L. R. A. 385, 15 S. E. 1000. An act of the state of Indiana requiring biweekly payments of wages was upheld as proper by the supreme court of that state. Hancock v. Yaden, 121 Ind. 366, 6 L. R. A. 576, 23 N. E. 253. The supreme courts of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Kentucky, and many other states have sustained similar, and even more drastic, laws for the regulation of business and contracts growing out of same. State ex rel. Curtis v. Brown & S. Mfg. Co. 18 R. I. 16, 17 L. R. A. 856, 25 Atl. 246; Shaffer v. Union Min. Co. 55 Md. 74; Opinion of the Justices, 163 Mass. 589, sub nom. Re House Bill, No. 1230, 28 L. R. A. 344, 40 N. E. 713. Every intendment is in favor of the constitutionality of the act, and the presumption is that the legislature acted properly. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77. All contracts and property rights are subject to the police power of the state. before us is sufficiently disposed of by a the former the plaintiff in error was a do- We do not care, however, to put our pres- Home Dugger v. Mechanics' & T. Ins. Co. 95 Tenn. 245, 28 L. R. A. 796, 32 S. W. 5; Marr v. Bank of West Tennessee, 4 Lea, 585; Knoxville v. Bird, 12 Lea, 121, 47 Am. Rep. 326: New York v. Miln, 11 Pet. 139, 9 L. ed. 662; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 457, 12 L. ed. 775; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 21 L. ed. 394; Butchers' Union S. H. & L. S. L. Co. v. Crescent City L. S. L. & S. H. Co. 111 U. S. 746, 28 L. ed. 585, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652; Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 125 U. S. 465, 31 L. ed. 700, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 823, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 689, 1062; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 136, 38 L. ed. 388, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499: Reelfoot Lake Levee Dist. v. Dawson, 97 Tenn. 172, 34 L. R. A. 725, 36 S. W. 1041; Smith v. State, 100 Tenn. 494, 41 L. R. A. 432, 46 S. W. 566; Austin v. State, 101 Tenn. 567, 50 L. R. A. 478, 48 S. W. 305; Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. 706; Black, Stat. Constr. & Interpretation of FRED. A. McMASTER, Administrator of Laws, § 154. The very language of § 1, 14th Amend. U. S. Const. implies that by "due process of law, or the law of the land," property rights may be regulated, and even taken. Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co. 103 Tenn. 421, 53 S. W. 955. [24] *Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion of the court: The only question presented for our consideration in this record is the validity, un der the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, of the act of the leg The judgment of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is affirmed. Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice Peckham dissent. the Estate of F. E. McMaster, Deceased, Petitioner, (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 25-42.) 1. Evidence of the unauthorized insertion In |